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Words of main Russian official military historian about Warsaw Uprising in 1944

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  • Words of main Russian official military historian about Warsaw Uprising in 1944

    Here is article from book about Marshal Zhukov. This book was written by most famous modern Russian official military historian General Makhmud Gareev, concrete article is related to Warsaw Uprising:

    Part 1

    "If to speak about Warsaw Uprising of 1944...

    Even now there are voices which speak about blame of Red Army which supposedly could but didn't came to help for insurgents. It is used as one more reason for accusations against Zhukov and Rokossovskiy. One Polish colleague in military historical conference in Moscow in 1995 directly said: "It was Zhukov who prevented to help insurgents Warsawians".

    But real events of that time, new documents< which became known after war, refute this slander.

    If to speak without any diplomatic tricks so it is possible to see clearly main sources and reasons both defeat of Warsaw Uprising and all tragedy of Polish people during WWII.

    Still in 30th preservation of Polish state was especially significant for preventing of war and aggression of Germany against USSR. May be, USSR could make more efforts for gaining the confidence of Poland for protecting of Poland together with France and Britain. During negotiations with Western countries (in summer of 1939) USSR even didn't try to invite Poland in these negotiations in spite of it was clearly that Poland will refuse this offer. British ambassador in Moscow W.Sids wrote in his report to British Foreign Affairs words of Voroshilov: "For all time of negotiations (British-French-Soviet in summer of 1939) Polish mass media and public leaders declared that they do not want help from Soviets. So we had to conquer Poland for offer our help or to entreat to get our help". Really, it was very difficult to help for Poland in conditions when Poland rulers preferred to let to destroy their state but to not "square" with Soviet Union.

    Already after 1941 when Polish people sensed results of betrayal of their leaders Bur-Komorovskiy in meeting of KRP on October, 14th of 1943 spoke about possibility of Polish Uprising in occupied territory: "We can not let uprising in that time when Germany still defends Eastern Front and protects us from that side. In this case weakening of Germany is not in the interests of us. Moreover, I see threat in the person of Russia... The farther Russian army is the better it is for us. So we can not to begin uprising against Germany when it holds Russian Front and Russians far from us." Leaders of bourgeois Poland were ready to continue hold their people under German occupation any time for preventing of infringement of their narrow class interests

    If Nazism is not Nazism (despite all it comes from West) for some leaders in spite of death of 6 millions of Poles so for whom and how it was possible to help in 1944?

    Firstly, government in London and Bur-Komorovskiy didn'twant neither cooperation, nor help from Red Army. I took part in combats during liberation of Vilnius amounting to 45th Rifle Corps which was under command of our talented Polish nationality commander - S.G. Poplavskiy. We saw his sincere, good intentions and giant efforts with the purpose of making connections and cooperation with Polish underground for liberation of Vilnius and other regions of Lithonia, where many Poles lived. Still during approaching to these regions he sent some groups of officers in German rears for connecting with Lithuanian and Polish patriots. Many ordinary members of underground with pleasure were ready to cooperate. But leaders which were connected to Bur-Komorovskiy and other leaders of AK deceived by different ways and, in essence, didn't want to cooperate. S. Poplavskiy asked them to attack German positions from rear direction when troops of corps will approach to Vilnius but they made attempt to capture Vilnius on July, 7th and their 5,000-men detachment was broken by Germans. In result 45th Corps and other formations of 5th Army liberated Vilnius on July, 13th without support of Polish patriots. I write about it because I saw it, I executed many orders of General Poplavskiy which were related to this questions and know what happened in reality.

    Approximately the same events were in July, 23th in Lvov but in much more scale in Warsaw region.

    On August, 1st Warsaw Uprising began according order from London emigrant government. Neither Stavka of Supreme Command in Moscow, nor Commander of 1st Byelorussian Front Rokosovskiy were informed about it. According order of Rokossovskiy two Soviet officers-paratroopers were sent to Generl Bur-Komarovskiy for connection and coordination of actions. But Bur-Komarovskiy didn't desire to meet with them and fate of these officers is unknown. Before it General Bur-Komorovskiy met with German representatives but in this case he didn't desire to meet with representatives of allied army. Political task of uprising was clear - to capture Warsaw and to declare that Poland has government here. For this task London Polish leaders sent thousands of bad armed Warsawians against German troops in that time when Soviet troops didn't approach to Warsaw yet.

    According Polish newspapers recently one document was found on Polish archives. This document was hidden for tens of years. This document let to understand how uprising was prepared and to make sure that heroic action of Warsawians was doomed to failure.

    This document confirms that in middle of June of 1944 secret meeting between senior officer of German security service Paul Fuhs and Commander of AK Tadeush Bur-Komarovskiy occurred near Yuzefov (suburb of Warsaw). German officer-translator was present at these negotiations, this officer later was won over by Polish security service and gave detailed report about these negotiations.

    There is registration of these negotiations in the 50-year old document.

    "Fuhs: Pan General, we listened hearsays that you want to declare about start of uprising in Warsaw on July, 28th and that you are making active preparations for it. Don't you suppose that such decision will be reason of bloodshed and suffering of civil population?

    Komorovskiy: I am only soldier and have to execute orders of my commanders, like you have to execute orders of your commanders. My personal opinion is not significant, I submit to London government and you know about it.

    Fuhs: Pan General, London is far, they do not take into account situation here, it is question of political squabbles. You know situation here better and can send all information about it in London.

    Komorovskiy: It is question of prestige. Poles want to liberate Warsaw with help of Armiya Krayova and to appoint Polish administration before coming of Soviet troops...
    I know that you know places where I hide, I can be catched in any minute. But it will not change situation. Other ones will make my duties instead of me. If London made decision uprising will undoubtedly begin."

    To be continued...

  • #2
    Part 2

    Cruelty of Polish emigrant leaders is amazing. They sent on certain and senseless death thousands of their citizens in conditions when German Command knew everything beforehand and prepared to suppression of uprising. Also there is other interesting detail - according words of Bur-Komorovskiy German security service knew every minute when he was but didn't catch his. It means that Germans needed his for some reasons. It is not accidental that after suppression of uprising Komorovskiy didn't come to side of Soviet troops (he had such possibility) and continue struggle for liberation of Poland, he preferred to surrender to German security service. So all possible was made to embarrass and even, in some case, to make impossible help from side of Soviet Union.

    Secondly, in spite of animosity and adventurism of Polish London rulers and in the name of respect to Polish people Soviet Command made all possible actions for help to insurgents Warsawians in current conditions. Some historians and journalists speak that troops of 1st Byelorussian Front had to continue offensive, to come towards insurgents and to capture Warsaw. But they do not take into account that troops of Front finished huge Byelorussian Offensive Operation, came with continuous combats 500-600 km and had no enough forces, ammunitions for continuation of offensive.

    In current unfavorable situation in tens days of August troops of 1st Byelorussia Front made series of persevering attempts to fight their way to Warsaw. But left, western bank of Vistula gave large advantages to defenders and embarrassed offensive. Germans made hard counterattacks against captured beachheads in western bank of river. In result Zhukov and Rokossovskiy designed plan of liberation of Warsaw with help of sweep from north and south. 1st Army of Polish Army had to come in city.

    In this time Zhukov was sent in Bulgaria. When he returned he saw heavy wearisome combats on approaches to Warsaw. In that time when thousands of Soviet soldiers and real Polish patriots died in combats Polish leaders in London and West commonly raised a clamour that Red Army doesn't want to help for insurgents. US and British aircraft in a pointed manner dropped cargo in region of Warsaw from high altitudes but only small amount of this cargo falled into insurgent's hands.

    Help of Soviet Command was more effective. From September, 13th to October, 2nd aircraft of 1st Byelorussian Front made 4821 sorties as help to insurgents including 2535 sorties with cargo - ammunition, food, medicaments. At that Soviet night bombers PO-2 dropped cargo from low altitudes and cargo usually landed in place of destination.

    Only on September, 11th troops of 1st Byelorussian Front repelled numerous counterattacks of German troops and could to begin new offensive.

    Rokossovskiy wrote "To the September, 14th our troops routed enemy and captured Praga... It was most favorable time to begin uprising in Polish capital. If to make combined attack of troops from East and insurgents - from Warsaw (with capturing of bridges) so it was possible to believe in possibility to liberate and to hold Warsaw. Troops of Front were unable on more success even in case of mostly favorable situation. Our Armies cleared Praga from enemy and came to eastern bank of Vistula. All bridges which connected suburb to Warsaw were blown-up."

    According words of Rokossovskiy Polish landing groups of 1st Polish Army landed in that places of western bank of Vistula which had to be occupied by insurgents. But suddenly they found that these places are occupied by Germans. It became known soon that to the time of start of landing of soldiers of 1st Polish Army in western bank of Vistula units of AK were transferred from coastal regions deep into city according order of Bur-Komorovskiy and Monter.

    So idea of Bur-Komorovskiy which was spoken still in 1943 that is favorable for him if German troops will hold front against Soviet troops as long time as possible emphatically put into practice. And all fairy-tales that Soviet troops didn't want to help for Warsaw uprising are only clumsy tales for uninformed people.

    I have only hope that Polish people will made correct conclusions from its history and will not suppose that only Bur-Komorovskiys show correctly national interests of Polish people.

    As soldier, who took part in liberation of Poland, I assure of that in spite of many mutual mistakes and injustices Zhukov and Rokosovskiy, Poplavskiy, Berling and Sverchevskiy, those 600,000 Soviet soldiers and many thousands of Poles which died for liberation of Poland, sincerely wanted good for Poland, hoped on mutual understanding between our peoples.

    If to return to activity of Zhukov I want to emphasize that attempts of Soviet troops to attack including with reason to help for Warsaw Uprising continued till start of October of 1944, i.e. till the time when uprising was suppressed (on October, 2nd)

    In the end of September according order of Stavka Zhukov arrived in region of 1st and 2nd Byelorussian Fronts. He visited 47th and 70th Armies which had heavy combats for holding and increasing of beachheads on river Narev. Troops had no success and suffered heavy losses. Only 2nd Tank Army lost 500 tanks and self-propelled guns. Representative of Stavka, Zhukov made conclusion about necessity to stop these futile attacks, to fortify current positions and to prepare to the new offensive operation. Rokossovskiy agreed with this opinion but he had to continue attempts to advance according order of Stavka. During war troops suffered most heavy casualties in such attacks. Stalin disagreed with arguments of Zhukov and called his to Moscow together with Commanders of troops of Front. During meeting in Stavka Stalin and Molotov made huge pressure on two Marshals (Zhukov and Rokossovskiy), they demanded to continue offensive and promised to give more aircraft, artillery, tanks. But Marshals didn't change opinion and continued to dispute their opinion... After long wranglings Stalin agreed with offer of Zhukov to stop attacks and to defend.

    It was impossible to liberate Warsaw, all Poland, other countries from Nazism for long time more if to continue futile attacks by troops which lost advance capabilities. It was necessary to organize new well-prepared advance operation. And this operation began after some time..."

    Comment


    • #3
      would anybody be interested in Berling's post-op report?

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by Oleg Grigoryev
        would anybody be interested in Berling's post-op report?
        If you have it, by all means feel free to post it.
        Scientists have announced they've discovered a cure for apathy. However no one has shown the slightest bit of interest !!

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by Andrey
          ...Cruelty of Polish emigrant leaders is amazing....
          Gotta love Russian propaganda. Always so subtle.
          “To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed…” -1984 about the Big Lie

          Comment


          • #6
            Btw, it is the same 60 years old story: Every anti-German resistance movement which didn't take its orders directly from Moscow was in fact co-operating with Nazis...

            Which reminds me about the fact that when Stalin launched his pogroms (anti-semitism) in 1948, members of former Jewish anti-nazi underground movement were persecuted in Eastern Europe for this very same thing (!).
            “To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed…” -1984 about the Big Lie

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Sheik Yerbouti
              Btw, it is the same 60 years old story: Every anti-German resistance movement which didn't take its orders directly from Moscow was in fact co-operating with Nazis...

              Which reminds me about the fact that when Stalin launched his pogroms (anti-semitism) in 1948, members of former Jewish anti-nazi underground movement were persecuted in Eastern Europe for this very same thing (!).
              Pogroms and anti-Semitism are not the same thing. Pogrom is when enraged mob begins to trash places of living/ businesses that belong to certain ethnic group while killing or maiming the representatives of above mentioned ethnic group in the process. For instance there was at least one Jewish pogrom in Poland after the war that I am aware of. As for history of non-Communist (better still –anti-Communist) resistance it is not exactly spotless. There was at least one occasion on which they proposed a truce to Germans provided that the later would supply them with the equipment and other support in their fight against pro-Communist partisans as well as Lithuanian nationalist partisans. I don’t know if Germans accepted – but still interesting bit of trivia nonetheless.

              Comment


              • #8
                Pre-empting forthcoming source request:

                The activities of the Polish Underground in Byelorussia and Ukraine during the occupation remain the subject of much controversy. In this work it is not possible to deal with the arguments exhaustively. By presenting a few examples, however, it is intended to demonstrate how different groups of Poles reacted to the situations they faced.

                Polish Underground organizations, containing elements from diverse political backgrounds, were established in the eastern provinces during the Soviet occupation and continued to be active under German rule. In many areas their activities remained mainly passive, registering members, passing on information and collecting money and supplies for future use. Indeed many Poles initially accommodated themselves with the German occupation regime, taking consolation in the Soviet defeats. In Byelorussia, Poles competed with Byelorussians for positions within the German administration. In these local power struggles denunciation was employed by both sides to remove potential rivals.

                In the Novaya Mysh rayon the local police was heavily infiltrated by the Polish Underground. Several former policemen claimed after the war that they had been recruited to the Byelorussian Police on instructions from the Polish Underground. They swore secret oaths of loyalty to General Sikorski and took conspiratorial nicknames. Poles were directed to serve in the Schutzmannschaft from 1942 in order to receive military training. The chief of the Novaya Mysh Police, Henryk Zaprucki, was simultaneously a commander in the Polish Underground. Whilst serving with the Germans, Polish policemen attempted to smuggle food, weapons and ammunition to Polish partisan units. During the retreat these Armija Krajowa (AK) men became split up and some were killed in a battle against the Germans near Slonim after deserting.
                Membership of the Polish Underground did not prevent some policemen from participating in German actions against the Jews. The following scene is recalled by a Polish policeman from Novaya Mysh at the end of 1943:
                While we were eating breakfast and drinking vodka the policeman P. came into the house and reported to Zaprucki that the policemen had arrested a Jew and a Jewess. Then Zaprucki said to policeman L., `Go and deal with them.' L. and P. left the house and we stayed as before. After some time, while we were in the house I heard several single shots, but I did not see who was shooting at whom, but later P. told me and the other policemen that he and ...W. had shot the Jews who had been arrested. After the shots L. returned to the house alone and told Zaprucki that the Jews had been dealt with. 136
                Similar anti-Semitism has been recorded among certain Polish partisan groups. The Polish Underground in their reports stressed the indisciplined plundering by so-called 'Jewish-peasant gangs'. At the same time, in areas such as Volhynia, the Poles were more prominent than the Ukrainians in rescue efforts for the Jews.
                Some Polish groups actively resisted the Germans, especially following the arrest and murder of members of the Polish `intelligentsia' in the summer of 1942. However, the Poles also showed great mistrust towards the Soviet partisans, as well as Byelorussian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalist forces. In areas such as the Naliboki forest, the Polish Underground formed their own partisan units and there was sporadic co-operation with Soviet partisan forces. In response to German deportations in June 1943 about 40 Poles left their homes in villages near Derevna to join the detachment known as the `Polish Legion' in the forest. During the course of `Operation Hermann' in the summer of 1943 the Germans reported that a number of Polish partisans were destroyed, captured or driven westwards into a pocket. At this time the Poles began to complain of being betrayed by their Soviet comrades in arms. Equally, Jewish partisans under Soviet leadership reported being attacked by

                members of the `Polish Legion' from September 1943, after the arrival of officers sent by the exile government in London.
                As the return of Soviet power to the former territory of eastern Poland became more likely, friction mounted between the Soviet and Polish partisan groups. By the autumn of 1943 these tensions increasingly broke out into open conflict. The Polish government in exile sought to establish its authority within the eastern territories before the advance of the Red Army; Polish reports complained of `wild looting' by the Soviets against the Polish population, driving them into the towns. One of the local AK commanders, who had also been a commander in the police, forbade all contacts with the Soviet partisans. He told his subordinates that
                `these were enemies who had to be fought. After the retreat of the Germans, we were to continue fighting in the rear of the Red Army.'
                By the end of 1943 the Soviet partisan commanders in turn insisted that the Poles subordinate themselves to the `legal' pro-Soviet government in Moscow under Wanda Wasilewska. In surprise attacks the leaders of the Polish partisan units were arrested by the Soviets; some were taken to Moscow and others were killed. Captured other ranks of the `Polish Legion' were disarmed and conscripted into Soviet units.
                The Germans were aware of these rivalries and attempted to turn them to their advantage. At the end of 1943 Polish partisans in the Vilnius district opened negotiations with the Germans as they came under increasing pressure from Soviet partisans. The Poles offered to clear the area of Soviet units in return for weapons, medicines, freedom of movement and the ability to recruit in the area. They also sought German support in their on-going struggle for power against the Lithuanians in Vilnius., At the same time some Polish units still fought fierce battles with the Germans and especially their Lithuanian police auxiliaries, who committed excesses against the Polish population. 15 1 Following the German retreat there began a new period of war against the [Soviet] invaders by the remnant Polish Underground forces which had escaped `incorporation' into the Red
                Army.
                From the Collaboration in the Holocaust – Crimes of the local police in the Byelorussia and Ukraine 1941-1944. by Martin Dean; pages 142-144.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Oleg Grigoryev
                  Pre-empting forthcoming source request:


                  Similar anti-Semitism has been recorded among certain Polish partisan groups. The Polish Underground in their reports stressed the indisciplined plundering by so-called 'Jewish-peasant gangs'. At the same time, in areas such as Volhynia, the Poles were more prominent than the Ukrainians in rescue efforts for the Jews.
                  Some Polish groups actively resisted the Germans, especially following the arrest and murder of members of the Polish `intelligentsia' in the summer of 1942. However, the Poles also showed great mistrust towards the Soviet partisans, as well as Byelorussian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalist forces. In areas such as the Naliboki forest, the Polish Underground formed their own partisan units and there was sporadic co-operation with Soviet partisan forces. In response to German deportations in June 1943 about 40 Poles left their homes in villages near Derevna to join the detachment known as the `Polish Legion' in the forest. During the course of `Operation Hermann' in the summer of 1943 the Germans reported that a number of Polish partisans were destroyed, captured or driven westwards into a pocket. At this time the Poles began to complain of being betrayed by their Soviet comrades in arms. Equally, Jewish partisans under Soviet leadership reported being attacked by

                  members of the `Polish Legion' from September 1943, after the arrival of officers sent by the exile government in London.
                  As the return of Soviet power to the former territory of eastern Poland became more likely, friction mounted between the Soviet and Polish partisan groups. By the autumn of 1943 these tensions increasingly broke out into open conflict. The Polish government in exile sought to establish its authority within the eastern territories before the advance of the Red Army; Polish reports complained of `wild looting' by the Soviets against the Polish population, driving them into the towns. One of the local AK commanders, who had also been a commander in the police, forbade all contacts with the Soviet partisans. He told his subordinates that
                  By the end of 1943 the Soviet partisan commanders in turn insisted that the Poles subordinate themselves to the `legal' pro-Soviet government in Moscow under Wanda Wasilewska. In surprise attacks the leaders of the Polish partisan units were arrested by the Soviets; some were taken to Moscow and others were killed. Captured other ranks of the `Polish Legion' were disarmed and conscripted into Soviet units.
                  The Germans were aware of these rivalries and attempted to turn them to their advantage. At the end of 1943 Polish partisans in the Vilnius district opened negotiations with the Germans as they came under increasing pressure from Soviet partisans. The Poles offered to clear the area of Soviet units in return for weapons, medicines, freedom of movement and the ability to recruit in the area. They also sought German support in their on-going struggle for power against the Lithuanians in Vilnius., At the same time some Polish units still fought fierce battles with the Germans and especially their Lithuanian police auxiliaries, who committed excesses against the Polish population. 15 1 Following the German retreat there began a new period of war against the [Soviet] invaders by the remnant Polish Underground forces which had escaped `incorporation' into the Red
                  Army.


                  From the Collaboration in the Holocaust – Crimes of the local police in the Byelorussia and Ukraine 1941-1944. by Martin Dean; pages 142-144.
                  [/QUOTE]

                  Is this Berling's post-op report ??
                  Very interesting.

                  As Dan Kurzman relates in his excellent "The Bravest Battle", the AK in general turned it's back on the Polish uprising in 1943, although there were individual examples of support.
                  Scientists have announced they've discovered a cure for apathy. However no one has shown the slightest bit of interest !!

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Tigersqn
                    From the Collaboration in the Holocaust – Crimes of the local police in the Byelorussia and Ukraine 1941-1944. by Martin Dean; pages 142-144.
                    Is this Berling's post-op report ??
                    Very interesting.

                    As Dan Kurzman relates in his excellent "The Bravest Battle", the AK in general turned it's back on the Polish uprising in 1943, although there were individual examples of support. [/B][/QUOTE]

                    Now, now don't get you underwear in a bunch – I am sill translating Berlings’ writings. :nonono:

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      I read John Erickson's Road to Berlin last year and as i recall of his 150 pages he wrote about the warsaw uprising, his conclusions was that the AK had grossly misjudged everyone and everything in attempting to use the Red Army to liberate Poland and Warsaw while being totally hostile to anything USSR. They didn't inform any general or rep on the soviet side and didn't take into account that Operation Bagration was "au bout du rouleau". Soviet forces were fending off hard counter attacks from north of warsaw and some soviet units were being battered by panzers and were in critical conditions. There was still a big concentration of armoured SS troops behind and north of warsaw waiting for an occasion to counterattack, so that even if the soviets had tried to force their way into Warsaw, no one could have predicted if it would have succeeded anyway or if it would just amount to even more soviet grunts dead for nothing. The red army during the last days of the uprising still parachuted ammos and equipment to the rebels, but not enough according to pretty much everything.

                      But he also went to say that soviet reaction was more one of vengeance then one of comprehension of the situation warsaw citizens were facing. And you don't need to know stalin personnally to understand what it could mean sometimes.
                      In the end, he put the blame on pretty much everyone involved in this gigantic blunder..

                      Just a question:
                      Would it have made a difference in the end if the russians had send in more means or even a para division (or two) into warsaw? probably not anyway.
                      “Die in peace my brothers, but die quietly, so that we hear nothing but the faintest echo of your suffering…”

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        All russians had to do was to allow american bombers with supplies to land on their territory.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          I think some of you mix up the Warshaw uprising when the Soviets troops were near and the earlier yewish Ghetto uprising.

                          What is AK?

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Redwolf
                            I think some of you mix up the Warshaw uprising when the Soviets troops were near and the earlier yewish Ghetto uprising.

                            What is AK?
                            Armee Krojowja(sp)= Polish Home Army
                            Scientists have announced they've discovered a cure for apathy. However no one has shown the slightest bit of interest !!

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by menel
                              All russians had to do was to allow american bombers with supplies to land on their territory.
                              And you would do what hold German armor -till the next Soviet offensive will jump off? Please… Short of parachuting Patton with its entire army there was nothing that would save an uprising. It was ill conceived, ill planed, and ordinary polish soldier’s heroics notwithstanding, ill executed. Oh btw the only American drop that was conducted confirmed Soviet fears – most of the supplies fell to Germans.

                              Comment

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