Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Soviet losses in 1941

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • #16
    I am not really trying to give exact answers, or provide a perfect solution. I am trying to give my opinion and answer your question without writing a book on the subject.

    Actually, the 100,000 troops along the border would be border guards not necessarily the best combat troops.

    The next set of 100,000 troops, (or maybe 200,000, who knows how many would be needed) would be defending key points, bridges, towns, railroad crossings. Places the Germans would need to control in order to advance quickly. These units would be the ones to delay the German attack for the required 24-48 hours.

    As for the length of the front line, I was only thinking about the area facing Germany, the only real threat to the Soviet Union. This would be from the Lwow area in the South to the Batlic Sea in the North, say 800 miles. This also assumes the Soviets would not be defending the bulges in the border area. The 3rd, 10th, and 4th Armies would be pulled back East of Bialystok. In the South, the 6th, 26th, and 12th Armies would be East of the Bug/Dniestr River line.

    Not really. And even then, 2 days wouldn't help much according to Soviet mobilization plan.
    The two days I was talking about was only to bring the existing troops and units, along the main line of resistance, up to combat readiness. Given 24-48 hours to get ready, these units would be able to offer much greater resistance and maybe even delay the German attack for several weeks.

    It is true that Soviet military doctrine at the time advocated counter-attacking any attacker, but that is my point. They were not ready in any way to counter-attack. They were not ready to attack and they were also not deployed properly to defend. That is why the Soviets lost so many men and units in 1941. They were just not ready to meet such a massive offensive.

    With a more realistic defense, the Soviet mobilization plan could have been used to build up the forces needed to go over to the counter-attack. That never happened. Historically, most of the newly raised units were used to plug holes in the front line in a desperate attempt to slow down the German attack.
    Last edited by Dann Falk; 13 Sep 09, 16:39.

    Comment


    • #17
      Dann, you are giving better answers than it seems this guy was ready for. When he starts calling you "Suvarov" for trying to answer why the Soviets were deployed so far forward, that ought to be a hint.

      Something from my POV- whatever doctrine it was that lead to the Soviet tactics in 1941 was obviously wrong. By thinking on their feet and learning as they went, the Red Army was eventually able to come up with a system that worked.

      Peace time tends to generate a bunch of theories about war that have seriious flaws. War-time tends to dash the theories and leave you with what works.

      Comment


      • #18
        Read this book by Rezun., hopefully it will once and for all show what a kind liar he really is.
        http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov6/index.html
        “For there is nothing more serious than a lunatic when he comes to the central point of his lunacy.”

        Max Sterner

        Comment


        • #19
          Originally posted by Dann Falk View Post
          I am not really trying to give exact answers, or provide a perfect solution. I am trying to give my opinion and answer your question without writing a book on the subject.

          Actually, the 100,000 troops along the border would be border guards not necessarily the best combat troops.
          Its not about being best or worst, its about battle readiness, and how their actual unit strength corresponds to their roster strength when hostilities began. Thus you'd probably want your most battle ready units to cover the border, if you really want them to do any fighting.

          Originally posted by Dann Falk View Post
          The next set of 100,000 troops, (or maybe 200,000, who knows how many would be needed) would be defending key points, bridges, towns, railroad crossings. Places the Germans would need to control in order to advance quickly. These units would be the ones to delay the German attack for the required 24-48 hours.

          As for the length of the front line, I was only thinking about the area facing Germany, the only real threat to the Soviet Union.
          Leave the whole Southern front unguarded? Are you serious?

          I still don't see how you win these 48 hours, but let's pretend - you leave Romanian and Hungarian parts of the border completely open and Germans look at the gaping hole in defense in amazement but prefer not to encircle immediately your troops through this hole, but attack where your army is.

          And so they reach the main bulk of your forces, east of Bialystok in 24-48 hours. The problem is, you've won absolutely nothing, and lost 300 000 of your most battle ready units, only to see that Russian mobilization plan works in echelons, first echelon to be fully mobilized within 1-3 days is the echelon, that covers the border, which made up 25-30% of peace-time army.

          You don't really get 3 days, so in reality its 8-10% of the army, the total majority of them you gave to the enemy on a silver plate during the first 48 hours.

          And the second echelon - the remaining troops, is to begin its mobilization from 4th to 7th days after the mobilization begins.

          And the third echelon - repair facilities, spare parts warehouses, 8-15 days.

          And the fourth echelon - supporting units, stationary hospitals, 16-30 days.

          Full mobilization within a month. And by the end of the second day you've already lost all your most battle-ready units, before the mobilization of the main bulk of the army began.

          Don't mean to be harsh, I just don't see how your scenario is making it better for the Soviets to defend themselves.



          Originally posted by Dann Falk View Post
          It is true that Soviet military doctrine at the time advocated counter-attacking any attacker, but that is my point. They were not ready in any way to counter-attack. They were not ready to attack and they were also not deployed properly to defend. That is why the Soviets lost so many men and units in 1941. They were just not ready to meet such a massive offensive.
          Soviets failed to start mobilization in time, while Germany was fully mobilized, and met the enemy with a de facto peace-time army. They were unable to either attack or defend properly, since that wasn't intended to happen at all in theory - Stavka blew it big time. That's what the strategic surprise of German attack was all about.

          All these tales about 'not deployed properly' is just that.
          Last edited by Theocide; 26 Sep 09, 09:52.
          War is the continuation of politics through other means. - von Clausewitz

          Politics is the continuation of war through other means. - Vo Nguyen Giap

          My song called 'My Leben': http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CmjGV7LNWl8

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by Exorcist View Post
            Dann, you are giving better answers than it seems this guy was ready for. When he starts calling you "Suvarov" for trying to answer why the Soviets were deployed so far forward, that ought to be a hint.
            It is a hint, because that's one of Suvorov's line of arguements.

            Originally posted by Exorcist View Post
            Something from my POV- whatever doctrine it was that lead to the Soviet tactics in 1941 was obviously wrong. By thinking on their feet and learning as they went, the Red Army was eventually able to come up with a system that worked.

            Peace time tends to generate a bunch of theories about war that have seriious flaws. War-time tends to dash the theories and leave you with what works.
            The greatest mistake that led to flaw in mobilization, was the idea that the war wouldn't start immediately with an all-out attack, but would go WWI style with 15-25 days of low-scale conflict.
            Last edited by Theocide; 26 Sep 09, 10:25.
            War is the continuation of politics through other means. - von Clausewitz

            Politics is the continuation of war through other means. - Vo Nguyen Giap

            My song called 'My Leben': http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CmjGV7LNWl8

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by Theocide View Post
              mistake that led to flaw in mobilization, was the idea that the war wouldn't start immediately
              but who could have predicted, back then, that Hitler would act in such an adventurous manner...

              Comment


              • #22
                I think we have covered the subject.

                The Soviet Union was not ready for the Nazi attack.

                Comment

                Latest Topics

                Collapse

                Working...
                X