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Review: The Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941

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  • #46
    Originally posted by Kardon View Post
    That's just plain silly. We might as well call the result of World War II a German strategic victory because it set the stage for a miraculous German economic recovery and the collapse of the Soviet Union. That makes about as much sense.
    In a way that is true. Except there was no Third Reich Germany to reap the benefits.

    Comment


    • #47
      Originally posted by Sharposhnikov View Post
      There are two things everybody needs to know to put the "Triangle" battles of late June 1941 in context:
      1. The Red Army attempted to counterattack the Germans EVERYWHERE from the first days of the war. 3rd and 12th Mech Corps tried to counterattack in the Baltic, Boldin's "Cavalry Mechanized Group" of 6th Cav, 4th and 11th Mech Corps tried to cut off 3rd Panzer Group in Byelorussia, and Southwestern Front tried to chop off 1st Panzer Group in the Ukraine with a converging attack by 6 Mechanized Corps of varying strengths. The Soviet Army's doctrinal documents were almost uniformly offensive in nature before the war, and the natural and immediate reaction to a enemy offensive was to mount counterattacks, counterstrokes, or counteroffensives. ALL of these attempts in June and July 1942 failed both tactically and operationally. At most, they delayed the German panzers for a few days, at the cost of the destruction of most of the mechanized forces in the border military districts. Specifically, in the Ukraine the Germans failed to take Kiev in their first rush not because of counterattacking armor, but because 5th Army was on Army Group South's northern flank and 11th Army in the south failed to keep up against South Front, so that the Germans did not dare strike deep until these flanking elements were stabilized. Once 5th Army and South Front retreated, the Germans were at the gates of Kiev within a week and across the Dnepr southeast of Kiev soon after.
      2. Barbarossa did not fail because of any tactical or operational action on the part of the Red Army. It failed because it was based on completely false assumptions by the Germans concerning the Soviet state and armed forces. Barbarossa only contemplated defeating Soviet forces west of the Dnepr River and advancing to Smolensk. After that, it was assumed that the bulk of Soviet forces would have been destroyed and the Soviet state would either sue for peace or collapse! In other words, when the Germans got to Smolensk in July and still had two Soviet Fronts in front of them and another (reasonably) intact Front on their southern flank, Barbarossa was an obsolete failure and the Germans had to come up with a new plan for further operations - hence the delay of Army Group Centre for a month at Smolensk, while Hitler and his generals argued over what to do next.
      When you debate incompetence, spare a thought for a supposedly brilliantly competent German General Staff whose planning for the largest ground campaign in history was a complete cock-up after less than six weeks! Compared to the German strategic and grand strategic failure, the Soviet tactical and operational failures turned out to be insignificant - the Soviet state could lose the Ukraine, Southwestern Front, Western Front (twice), the Baltic States, etc, and still survive and (eventually) win. The Nazi state could not grossly underestimate what was required to bring Babarossa and the War in (their) East to a successful conclusion and ever recover, and they never did.
      An interesting assessment. I'd agree with the majority of what you said but I think the offensives during the first days of Barbarossa need more detail to be put into a better perspective. They weren't successful, especially in hindsight, but I think the attacks had a sobering effect on the German forces they faced. How long that lasted, is another question. I also think that if the chaos of the first days did not exist, in a perfect world perhaps, the Red Army could, and would, have inflicted tremendous losses on the Wehrmacht.
      "This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
      "Man is the only animal that deals in that atrocity of atrocities, War. He is the only one that gathers his brethren about him and goes forth in cold blood and calm pulse to exterminate his kind. He is the only animal that for sordid wages will march out... and help to slaughter strangers of his own species who have done him no harm and with whom he has no quarrel.... And in the intervals between campaigns he washes the blood off his hands and works for "the universal brotherhood of man" - with his mouth". Mark Twain
      "It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets. Voltaire

      Comment


      • #48
        The initial counterstrikes of June 1941 have been almost completely ignored in histories of the war. Mostly, I think this is because in the context of the disasters befalling the Red Army at the frontiers, they appeared insignificant. There are probably also some serious gaps in the archival record in this period. I know that later in July-August there are still whole days when individual Soviet divisions and brigades are not even reporting their position to higher headquarters. Sometimes this is because they are in the process of being wiped out, and sometimes its simply because they have lost too many staff officers and are too busy trying to survive. Whatever the reason, this makes it very hard to reconstruct precisely what was going on.
        When Colonel Glantz started his "Forgotten Battles" series of self-published books, his coverage of the June battles was very sketchy because of the lack of information on them. His first book virtually started with the counterstrikes of July, at Orsha, Smolensk, etc because only the bare outlines of the June battles could be reconstructed. I'll be very interested to see how well the 'Bloody Triangle' manages to reconstruct the details of the Ukraine fighting (my copy is still winding its way through the snailmail to me!). Next step is to do the same with the attempted counterattacks in the Baltic and Byelorussia, but the fighting by the units of Western Front will probably have to be largely reconstructed from German records, because virtually all the Soviet units and HQ involved were destroyed in the Bialystock/Minsk encirclements.

        Comment


        • #49
          Originally posted by Sharposhnikov View Post
          The initial counterstrikes of June 1941 have been almost completely ignored in histories of the war. Mostly, I think this is because in the context of the disasters befalling the Red Army at the frontiers, they appeared insignificant. There are probably also some serious gaps in the archival record in this period. I know that later in July-August there are still whole days when individual Soviet divisions and brigades are not even reporting their position to higher headquarters. Sometimes this is because they are in the process of being wiped out, and sometimes its simply because they have lost too many staff officers and are too busy trying to survive. Whatever the reason, this makes it very hard to reconstruct precisely what was going on.
          When Colonel Glantz started his "Forgotten Battles" series of self-published books, his coverage of the June battles was very sketchy because of the lack of information on them. His first book virtually started with the counterstrikes of July, at Orsha, Smolensk, etc because only the bare outlines of the June battles could be reconstructed. I'll be very interested to see how well the 'Bloody Triangle' manages to reconstruct the details of the Ukraine fighting (my copy is still winding its way through the snailmail to me!). Next step is to do the same with the attempted counterattacks in the Baltic and Byelorussia, but the fighting by the units of Western Front will probably have to be largely reconstructed from German records, because virtually all the Soviet units and HQ involved were destroyed in the Bialystock/Minsk encirclements.
          I think he does a good job considering all the new narratives that have come out from Russian historians/historian wannabes. But the problem is that he does not know how to cite well which will leave you asking a lot of questions as to where the information is coming from. As for 1941 border battles, you're right, much of the information is simply not there. What I most enjoyed about the book is that the Red Army put up resistance at practically every point, nevermind that they were caught by surprise. Divisional commanders knew how to slowly give ground so that they weren't encircled and when two divisions were encircled it was not because their commanders were incompetent, but because due to miscommunication they thought other forces were coming up to close gaps and join them at their front lines.
          For myself, I am mainly interested in the Mechanized Corps and what happened to them throughout the summer months, which is why I found this book very interesting. Lastly, I have developed a growing interest in the 5th Army, I wish someone would do something with its history for the beginning period of the war.
          "This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
          "Man is the only animal that deals in that atrocity of atrocities, War. He is the only one that gathers his brethren about him and goes forth in cold blood and calm pulse to exterminate his kind. He is the only animal that for sordid wages will march out... and help to slaughter strangers of his own species who have done him no harm and with whom he has no quarrel.... And in the intervals between campaigns he washes the blood off his hands and works for "the universal brotherhood of man" - with his mouth". Mark Twain
          "It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets. Voltaire

          Comment


          • #50
            If we can broaden this a bit to Belorussia, the counterattack of the 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps around Senno on 5-9 July was a complete mess. The 7th MC had been in the area for more than a week, but was given at most a day to plan. The 5th MC was committed almost piece-meal as it arrived by train from the south. Both corps were given completely unrealistic objectives which persisted until just before the offensive was canceled on the 9th. They and the 20th Army had only a very general impression of what they were facing: they thought they would hit the 39th Army Corps in the flank and rear as it was attacking across the Western Dvina, but instead the 5th MC ran head-long into 47th Panzer Corps south of Senno, and the 7th Panzer Division (reinforced) was capable of holding off the 7th MC while the 20th Panzer and 20th Infantry (mot.) divisions took Vitebsk from the north. Pre-attack reconnaissance appears to have been very poor, and there was little coordination with the rifle divisions which were in direct contact with the 7th Panzer Division. These mechanized corps were roughly equivalent to Tank Armies, and the difference in planning and combat support is striking. The effect of the offensive was to badly damage both MCs and it had no effect on the German advance to Vitebsk, although it may have delayed the 47th PzC for a day or two.
            "If you have too firm a belief in the glories of soldiering, try a war."

            Comment


            • #51
              Originally posted by Kardon View Post
              If we can broaden this a bit to Belorussia, the counterattack of the 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps around Senno on 5-9 July was a complete mess. The 7th MC had been in the area for more than a week, but was given at most a day to plan. The 5th MC was committed almost piece-meal as it arrived by train from the south. Both corps were given completely unrealistic objectives which persisted until just before the offensive was canceled on the 9th. They and the 20th Army had only a very general impression of what they were facing: they thought they would hit the 39th Army Corps in the flank and rear as it was attacking across the Western Dvina, but instead the 5th MC ran head-long into 47th Panzer Corps south of Senno, and the 7th Panzer Division (reinforced) was capable of holding off the 7th MC while the 20th Panzer and 20th Infantry (mot.) divisions took Vitebsk from the north. Pre-attack reconnaissance appears to have been very poor, and there was little coordination with the rifle divisions which were in direct contact with the 7th Panzer Division. These mechanized corps were roughly equivalent to Tank Armies, and the difference in planning and combat support is striking. The effect of the offensive was to badly damage both MCs and it had no effect on the German advance to Vitebsk, although it may have delayed the 47th PzC for a day or two.
              That, in effect, is very similar to what happened in the South and speaks volumes about the chaos and miscommunication going on during the first days, and even weeks, of the invasion.
              "This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
              "Man is the only animal that deals in that atrocity of atrocities, War. He is the only one that gathers his brethren about him and goes forth in cold blood and calm pulse to exterminate his kind. He is the only animal that for sordid wages will march out... and help to slaughter strangers of his own species who have done him no harm and with whom he has no quarrel.... And in the intervals between campaigns he washes the blood off his hands and works for "the universal brotherhood of man" - with his mouth". Mark Twain
              "It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets. Voltaire

              Comment


              • #52
                Originally posted by Sharposhnikov View Post
                The initial counterstrikes of June 1941 have been almost completely ignored in histories of the war. Mostly, I think this is because in the context of the disasters befalling the Red Army at the frontiers, they appeared insignificant. There are probably also some serious gaps in the archival record in this period. I know that later in July-August there are still whole days when individual Soviet divisions and brigades are not even reporting their position to higher headquarters. Sometimes this is because they are in the process of being wiped out, and sometimes its simply because they have lost too many staff officers and are too busy trying to survive. Whatever the reason, this makes it very hard to reconstruct precisely what was going on.
                When Colonel Glantz started his "Forgotten Battles" series of self-published books, his coverage of the June battles was very sketchy because of the lack of information on them. His first book virtually started with the counterstrikes of July, at Orsha, Smolensk, etc because only the bare outlines of the June battles could be reconstructed. I'll be very interested to see how well the 'Bloody Triangle' manages to reconstruct the details of the Ukraine fighting (my copy is still winding its way through the snailmail to me!). Next step is to do the same with the attempted counterattacks in the Baltic and Byelorussia, but the fighting by the units of Western Front will probably have to be largely reconstructed from German records, because virtually all the Soviet units and HQ involved were destroyed in the Bialystock/Minsk encirclements.
                ??? In what history are they unknown? In the western researches?

                They described well enough in Soviet era historical books. There are a lot of memoirs. They are described in many Soviet/Russian military movies.

                For example, the mini-TV series "Battle for Moscow" describes it.

                Comment


                • #53
                  Originally posted by Andrey View Post
                  ??? In what history are they unknown? In the western researches?

                  They described well enough in Soviet era historical books. There are a lot of memoirs. They are described in many Soviet/Russian military movies.

                  For example, the mini-TV series "Battle for Moscow" describes it.
                  I can't speak for the Soviet era, but recently, within the past 2-3 years, a lot of books and monographs have come out regarding 1941 specifically. Problem is that there are very few Western authors interested in military history these days, less so the Eastern Front of WWII. David Glantz can't do it all himself.
                  "This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
                  "Man is the only animal that deals in that atrocity of atrocities, War. He is the only one that gathers his brethren about him and goes forth in cold blood and calm pulse to exterminate his kind. He is the only animal that for sordid wages will march out... and help to slaughter strangers of his own species who have done him no harm and with whom he has no quarrel.... And in the intervals between campaigns he washes the blood off his hands and works for "the universal brotherhood of man" - with his mouth". Mark Twain
                  "It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets. Voltaire

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    Originally posted by Shamil View Post
                    The nature of the American-Japanese Pacific war significantly differed from the land war in the Eastern front. Besides the US did not have significant military superiority in that region while the superior Red Army forces were concentrated in the Western parts of the USSR at the beginning of the war.

                    ...

                    The highest French military commanders of 1940 are not called great generals while you clearly think of Zhukov as a good commander after his contributing to the defeat of the absolutely superior Red Army forces in Ukraine within a few months.

                    ...

                    The deployment of multi-million Axis land armies to the Soviet border does not let speak about possibilities of "element of surprise" and "a sudden attack"

                    The Red Army of "peaceful time" outnumbered all the fully mobilized armies of Germany and its allies in both manpower and armaments.
                    "Element of surprise" and "sudden attack" DID really existed.

                    The Soviet troops in the military districts along the western border didn't outnumber the German forces involved to Barbarossa. It's lie to speak about the superiority.

                    They had some superiority in number of tanks and planes.

                    The Soviet troops of "peaceful time" were dispersed in huge territory, had lack of personal and especialy of wheel transport means (because it was planned to get the wheel transport from civil structures in the case of a war) and need many time to concentrate. In the same time the German units were concentrated and well prepared.

                    In the pre-war Soviet plans - no, but the first more or less stable defence line was established along the Dnieper as a natural obstacle. I consider Barbarossa plan partially successful as Axis really destroyed most of the Red Army forces located in the West of the USSR withing a few months. However, the plan underestimated the Soviet military build-up and mobilisation potential that allowed to restore the bulk of pre-war Red Amy power within a short period of time.
                    No
                    Last edited by Andrey; 01 Feb 09, 21:15.

                    Comment


                    • #55
                      Originally posted by Kunikov View Post
                      I can't speak for the Soviet era, but recently, within the past 2-3 years, a lot of books and monographs have come out regarding 1941 specifically. Problem is that there are very few Western authors interested in military history these days, less so the Eastern Front of WWII. David Glantz can't do it all himself.
                      The matter is that the subject is well described in Soviet/Russian sources and for wide public also. It's wrong to speak that the subject is unexplored.

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Originally posted by Andrey View Post
                        The matter is that the subject is well described in Soviet/Russian sources and for wide public also. It's wrong to speak that the subject is unexplored.
                        In the west it is very 'unexplored.'
                        "This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
                        "Man is the only animal that deals in that atrocity of atrocities, War. He is the only one that gathers his brethren about him and goes forth in cold blood and calm pulse to exterminate his kind. He is the only animal that for sordid wages will march out... and help to slaughter strangers of his own species who have done him no harm and with whom he has no quarrel.... And in the intervals between campaigns he washes the blood off his hands and works for "the universal brotherhood of man" - with his mouth". Mark Twain
                        "It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets. Voltaire

                        Comment


                        • #57
                          Originally posted by Sharposhnikov View Post
                          There are two things everybody needs to know to put the "Triangle" battles of late June 1941 in context:
                          1. The Red Army attempted to counterattack the Germans EVERYWHERE from the first days of the war. 3rd and 12th Mech Corps tried to counterattack in the Baltic, Boldin's "Cavalry Mechanized Group" of 6th Cav, 4th and 11th Mech Corps tried to cut off 3rd Panzer Group in Byelorussia, and Southwestern Front tried to chop off 1st Panzer Group in the Ukraine with a converging attack by 6 Mechanized Corps of varying strengths. The Soviet Army's doctrinal documents were almost uniformly offensive in nature before the war, and the natural and immediate reaction to a enemy offensive was to mount counterattacks, counterstrokes, or counteroffensives. ALL of these attempts in June and July 1942 failed both tactically and operationally. At most, they delayed the German panzers for a few days, at the cost of the destruction of most of the mechanized forces in the border military districts. Specifically, in the Ukraine the Germans failed to take Kiev in their first rush not because of counterattacking armor, but because 5th Army was on Army Group South's northern flank and 11th Army in the south failed to keep up against South Front, so that the Germans did not dare strike deep until these flanking elements were stabilized. Once 5th Army and South Front retreated, the Germans were at the gates of Kiev within a week and across the Dnepr southeast of Kiev soon after.
                          2. Barbarossa did not fail because of any tactical or operational action on the part of the Red Army. It failed because it was based on completely false assumptions by the Germans concerning the Soviet state and armed forces. Barbarossa only contemplated defeating Soviet forces west of the Dnepr River and advancing to Smolensk. After that, it was assumed that the bulk of Soviet forces would have been destroyed and the Soviet state would either sue for peace or collapse! In other words, when the Germans got to Smolensk in July and still had two Soviet Fronts in front of them and another (reasonably) intact Front on their southern flank, Barbarossa was an obsolete failure and the Germans had to come up with a new plan for further operations - hence the delay of Army Group Centre for a month at Smolensk, while Hitler and his generals argued over what to do next.
                          When you debate incompetence, spare a thought for a supposedly brilliantly competent German General Staff whose planning for the largest ground campaign in history was a complete cock-up after less than six weeks! Compared to the German strategic and grand strategic failure, the Soviet tactical and operational failures turned out to be insignificant - the Soviet state could lose the Ukraine, Southwestern Front, Western Front (twice), the Baltic States, etc, and still survive and (eventually) win. The Nazi state could not grossly underestimate what was required to bring Babarossa and the War in (their) East to a successful conclusion and ever recover, and they never did.
                          That was by far the best comment on this particular action. I have nothing to add, and I damn sure am not going to refer you to any TV shows

                          Comment


                          • #58
                            Originally posted by Sharposhnikov View Post
                            There are two things everybody needs to know to put the "Triangle" battles of late June 1941 in context:
                            1. The Red Army attempted to counterattack the Germans EVERYWHERE from the first days of the war. 3rd and 12th Mech Corps tried to counterattack in the Baltic, Boldin's "Cavalry Mechanized Group" of 6th Cav, 4th and 11th Mech Corps tried to cut off 3rd Panzer Group in Byelorussia, and Southwestern Front tried to chop off 1st Panzer Group in the Ukraine with a converging attack by 6 Mechanized Corps of varying strengths. The Soviet Army's doctrinal documents were almost uniformly offensive in nature before the war, and the natural and immediate reaction to a enemy offensive was to mount counterattacks, counterstrokes, or counteroffensives.
                            Yes, they counterattacked to catch initiative.

                            To the point in the Smolensk battle Zhukov used the same tactics - to counterattack everywhere. His task was to force the Germans to defend and to break their plans of attacks. And it was very successful.

                            There was no other choice.

                            In conditions of summer 1941 Germans could break any static defence everywhere. The length of the frontline and the density of troops didn't let for the Soviets to break powerful defence everywhere. They Germans would found weak points and attack there outflanking strong defence positions and forcing their defenders to reatreat to new un-prepared positions. Only counterstrikes were able to stop the Germans.

                            I read that many German generals were very worried about numerous Soviet counterstrikes there and there, again and again. Those counterstrikes forced them to send some part of their mobile forces against them instead of to use them in attacks.

                            ALL of these attempts in June and July 1942 failed both tactically and operationally.
                            ??? Very brave statement.

                            At most, they delayed the German panzers for a few days, at the cost of the destruction of most of the mechanized forces in the border military districts.
                            Those tanks would be lost in any case. In reality they were lost in a battle. If the Mech Corps would be used in defence their tabks would be lost in retreats - due breakages, airstrikes and lack of fuel. The Germans would attack in places of weak defence outflanking the Mech Corps.

                            Specifically, in the Ukraine the Germans failed to take Kiev in their first rush not because of counterattacking armor, but because 5th Army was on Army Group South's northern flank and 11th Army in the south failed to keep up against South Front, so that the Germans did not dare strike deep until these flanking elements were stabilized. Once 5th Army and South Front retreated, the Germans were at the gates of Kiev within a week and across the Dnepr southeast of Kiev soon after.
                            What is the reason of such statements?

                            In the first days the Panzer units rushed very quickly. Why do you suppose their rush would be slower without the huge engagement against the Mech Corps?

                            The 5th Army and the forces in south could stay where they were but the Kleist tanks could enter Kiev in a few days after the beginning of the war if they would use their blitzkrieg tactics and the Soviets would use the Mech Corp in defence.

                            It is necessary to remember that the battle didn't result to the losses of the Soviet Mech Corps. It also resulted to significant losses in German panzer units of Army Group South and decreased their attacking might.

                            2. Barbarossa did not fail because of any tactical or operational action on the part of the Red Army. It failed because it was based on completely false assumptions by the Germans concerning the Soviet state and armed forces. Barbarossa only contemplated defeating Soviet forces west of the Dnepr River and advancing to Smolensk. After that, it was assumed that the bulk of Soviet forces would have been destroyed and the Soviet state would either sue for peace or collapse!
                            It was the resistance of Soviet troops in the border regions (including the resistance of encircled units) that was reason of fails of all the initial time planning of Barbarossa which let for Soviets to prepare new forces.

                            Neither mobilization nor industrial might could be used in those first weeks of the war.

                            In other words, when the Germans got to Smolensk in July and still had two Soviet Fronts in front of them and another (reasonably) intact Front on their southern flank, Barbarossa was an obsolete failure and the Germans had to come up with a new plan for further operations - hence the delay of Army Group Centre for a month at Smolensk, while Hitler and his generals argued over what to do next.
                            Yes, and the counteroffensive of the Mech Corps was one of reasons for that...

                            About Fronts. The Soviet forces which met the Germans in the region of Smolensk were a few Armies of internal ditsricts and someremains of retreating units. Their forces were very limited and they were able to organize very thin defence line. So Fronts were very different. It is very easy to speak that the Germans fought against a Front in June and againsy another Front in July. It is necessary to recall the amount of forces in those Fronts


                            And the Germans didn't stop in Smolensk area according their will to stop and to think what to do. They WERE STOPPED in ther result of huge battle there. In that battle they were exghausted and need time to recover their forces. That delay was a forced delay in the result of actions of Soviet troops in the Smolensk Battle which also was won due the tactics of small and large counteroffensives and counterattacks in combination with defence.

                            When you debate incompetence, spare a thought for a supposedly brilliantly competent German General Staff whose planning for the largest ground campaign in history was a complete cock-up after less than six weeks! Compared to the German strategic and grand strategic failure, the Soviet tactical and operational failures turned out to be insignificant - the Soviet state could lose the Ukraine, Southwestern Front, Western Front (twice), the Baltic States, etc, and still survive and (eventually) win. The Nazi state could not grossly underestimate what was required to bring Babarossa and the War in (their) East to a successful conclusion and ever recover, and they never did.
                            yes
                            Last edited by Andrey; 01 Feb 09, 22:04.

                            Comment


                            • #59
                              Originally posted by Kunikov View Post
                              In the west it is very 'unexplored.'
                              So what? Every Soviet schoolboy who saw "Battle for Moscow" in the 80th, heard about the battle in the triangle Lutsk-Brody-Rovno. But many Western historians haven't heard about this.

                              Many participants of those actions survived and wrote memoirs which were available in Soviet public libraries. Bagramyan, Rokossovskii, Moskalenko, Popel, Riabyshev...

                              So nobody IGNORED it. At least in the USSR. Westen historians ignored it.

                              There is a Russian saying "Bylo by zhelanie..." ("It it would be a wish ansd will to do...")
                              Last edited by Andrey; 01 Feb 09, 22:08.

                              Comment


                              • #60
                                Originally posted by Andrey View Post
                                So what? Every Soviet schoolboy who saw "Battle for Moscow" in the 80th, heard about the battle in the triangle Lutsk-Brody-Rovno. But many Western historians haven't heard about this.

                                Many participants of those actions survived and wrote memoirs which were available in Soviet public libraries. Bagramyan, Rokossovskii, Moskalenko, Popel, Riabyshev...

                                So nobody IGNORED it. At least in the USSR. Westen historians ignored it.

                                There is a Russian saying "Bylo by zhelanie..." ("It it would be a wish ansd will to do...")
                                Memoirs and historical monographs are two different things. There are only two that address the border battles in some detail, Pleshakov and Glantz. The book this thread was created about was not written by an historian, so I exclude it. So yes, in the west 1941 has been largely ignored. Я имею желание, but it will take some time until I can do anything about it.
                                "This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
                                "Man is the only animal that deals in that atrocity of atrocities, War. He is the only one that gathers his brethren about him and goes forth in cold blood and calm pulse to exterminate his kind. He is the only animal that for sordid wages will march out... and help to slaughter strangers of his own species who have done him no harm and with whom he has no quarrel.... And in the intervals between campaigns he washes the blood off his hands and works for "the universal brotherhood of man" - with his mouth". Mark Twain
                                "It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets. Voltaire

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