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  • Full Monty
    replied
    I've been trying to track down some sources that refer to the quality of the troops in the Kwantung Army. However, finding something that doesn't seem 'tainted' is not easy. This was quite interesting though.

    http://www.geocities.jp/yoshio_osaka...ZooAttack.html

    A few days from now—at most, a week—the main force of the Soviet Far East Command would arrive in Hsin-ching. There was no way to stop the advance. Ever since the war began, the crack troops and once abundant equipment of the Kwantung Army had been drained away to support the widening southern front, and now the greater part of both had sunk to the bottom of the sea or was rotting in the depths of the jungle. The tanks were gone. The anti-tank guns were gone. All but a handful of the troop transport trucks had broken down, and there were no spare parts. Large numbers of troops remained, but there were not enough rifles left to arm every man, nor bullets enough to load every rifle. The great Kwantung Army, Bulwark of the North, had been reduced to a paper tiger.

    Leave a comment:


  • Psycho
    replied
    Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
    I do not know Jack Radey. But I have known David for 25 years because he scoured Soviet military literature so thoroughly and, as you note, he just tells it like he finds it. He had no agenda other than demonstrating that the Red Army was not as mindless, human wave mentality in its operations as portrayed in German memoirs and German-based military history.

    And, we thought this was important because the US Army was fashioning doctrine and operational concepts for future wars that considered the Soviet Army as an unthinking foe. And, parenthetically, one found then, as well as now, a high admiration for the German military and a strong belief that their defeat was winter and deep mud going in and Hitler's intervention and no retreat coming back out.

    I guess that in part explains why I feel compelled to respond when Andrey tries to lump Glantz with other western historians on the Red Army.
    According to Andrey Glantz does not have access to all the information available IIRC. One of the criticisms from the Russian side is that he isn't telling everything so we don't get to know the entire truth. I don't understand their argument because how can he know the full truth if they won't let him see all of it. Plus the fact that it may or may not be the truth. I'm sure our histories are not completely the truth in every case but what else do you go by?

    Jack Radey made wargames mainly during the 70s and 80s. He owned the company People's War Games (PWG). Ever hear of the boardgames Korsun Pocket, Black Sea/Black Death, Kharkov 1943, Aachen, Gazala, and Cossacks are Coming? He is a big Soviet supporter if you listen to his seminars. Like I said, nothing wrong with that but you get a one sided version. Of course to Andrey I guess you are just getting the truth instead of lying Western propaganda.

    Sounds just like my Republican friends that tell me FOX news doesn't take sides like the liberal networks but just tells me the truth. My parents are the opposite, big time Democrats. I just laugh at both sides.

    Leave a comment:


  • R.N. Armstrong
    replied
    Originally posted by Psycho1943
    Been said many times but you are wasting your time trying to convince Andrey. I have actually listened to Glantz during some WW2 seminars at Origins. To me he seemed to be just telling it like it was based on his research. I also listened to Jack Radey. He was a great guy to talk to also but he was very pro-Soviet and anti-German. Nothing necessarily wrong with that but it just seemed more like propaganda instead of giving information like Glantz was doing.
    I do not know Jack Radey. But I have known David for 25 years because he scoured Soviet military literature so thoroughly and, as you note, he just tells it like he finds it. He had no agenda other than demonstrating that the Red Army was not as mindless, human wave mentality in its operations as portrayed in German memoirs and German-based military history.

    And, we thought this was important because the US Army was fashioning doctrine and operational concepts for future wars that considered the Soviet Army as an unthinking foe. And, parenthetically, one found then, as well as now, a high admiration for the German military and a strong belief that their defeat was winter and deep mud going in and Hitler's intervention and no retreat coming back out.

    I guess that in part explains why I feel compelled to respond when Andrey tries to lump Glantz with other western historians on the Red Army.

    Leave a comment:


  • Psycho
    replied
    Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
    Glantz is not a God, but for a long time, he was the only western historian to look in depth at Red Army operations and fully appreciate their impact on the west. The fact that he has found some criticisms in some operations and found some cracks in Zhukov's marble statue is the stuff of history.

    What surprises me about your position is not only your complacency with Soviet sources but also your inability to recognize any western works.
    Been said many times but you are wasting your time trying to convince Andrey. I have actually listened to Glantz during some WW2 seminars at Origins. To me he seemed to be just telling it like it was based on his research. I also listened to Jack Radey. He was a great guy to talk to also but he was very pro-Soviet and anti-German. Nothing necessarily wrong with that but it just seemed more like propaganda instead of giving information like Glantz was doing.

    Leave a comment:


  • R.N. Armstrong
    replied
    Originally posted by Andrey
    As I understood he doesn't want hear Russian opinion in the question of Operation "Mars"... The fact that Soviet Supreme Command itself sent info about Operation Mars to the Germans through Soviet Intelligence is described in a lot of modern Russian books and sources but Glantz doesn't believe in it right now...

    To the point, if Glants used Soviet sources about Manchurian Campaign so he WAS NOT ABLE to miss the info about Japanese Biological Warfare in Manchuria. In 1985 when Glantz's work was made practically ANY Soviet book, documentary or movie about Manchurian Campaign commonly had info about ther Japanese readiness to biological war and described Kwantung Army as a very mighty force. But Glantz didn't say a word about Japanese Biological Warfare in his book and described Kwantung Army as a very weak formation. So it is incorrect to speak that Glantz used mainly Soviet sources.

    Of course, Soviet frontline commanders in their memoirs wrote what they saw in a battle and couldn't write about Japanese Biological Warfare which was not used against them.

    I want to say that Glantz is not the historical God. May be, he is the best WESTERN author but he makes mistakes also.
    Andrey,
    Have you read any of Glantz's books besides the August Storm pamphlets? I do not believe your judgments on him are from first-hand knowledge.

    I think Full Monty gave a fine rebuttal on the relevancy of Japanese capability versus use in the Manchurian operations.

    Glantz is not a God, but for a long time, he was the only western historian to look in depth at Red Army operations and fully appreciate their impact on the west. The fact that he has found some criticisms in some operations and found some cracks in Zhukov's marble statue is the stuff of history.

    What surprises me about your position is not only your complacency with Soviet sources but also your inability to recognize any western works.

    Leave a comment:


  • Andrey
    replied
    Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
    David could have possibly used your editing help.
    As I understood he doesn't want hear Russian opinion in the question of Operation "Mars"... The fact that Soviet Supreme Command itself sent info about Operation Mars to the Germans through Soviet Intelligence is described in a lot of modern Russian books and sources but Glantz doesn't believe in it right now...

    To the point, if Glants used Soviet sources about Manchurian Campaign so he WAS NOT ABLE to miss the info about Japanese Biological Warfare in Manchuria. In 1985 when Glantz's work was made practically ANY Soviet book, documentary or movie about Manchurian Campaign commonly had info about ther Japanese readiness to biological war and described Kwantung Army as a very mighty force. But Glantz didn't say a word about Japanese Biological Warfare in his book and described Kwantung Army as a very weak formation. So it is incorrect to speak that Glantz used mainly Soviet sources.

    Of course, Soviet frontline commanders in their memoirs wrote what they saw in a battle and couldn't write about Japanese Biological Warfare which was not used against them.

    I want to say that Glantz is not the historical God. May be, he is the best WESTERN author but he makes mistakes also.

    Leave a comment:


  • R.N. Armstrong
    replied
    Originally posted by Andrey
    I gave a pair of examples that his work is not correct in the description of Kwantung Army.

    What does your phrase "I believe David Glantz's August Storm..." mean?

    How can you believe to Glants's work if he in one page write about 6 Japanese divisions formed before 1945 but in another page the amount of such divisions is 8?

    How can you believe to him if he distorts the meaning of the term and writes "strength" instead of "relative strength to the 12th Infantry Division of 1937"?

    Glantz didn't mention unit 731, unit 100, unit 516 in the OOB of Kwantung Army.

    It is only three examples...
    David could have possibly used your editing help.

    Leave a comment:


  • Andrey
    replied
    "In spite of a directive from the General Chief of Staff dated July 24, 1945 that stopped the "No. Pao" plan for germ warfare, it had no bearing on the coming war between the Soviet Union and Japan, nor was it intended for the Kwantung Army. General Yamada himself elaborated the capacity of his germ units at the Khabarovsk Trial:

    "Our productivity of germs was indeed great; Unit 731 alone, if necessary, could use its own weapons to warrant successfully waging germ warfare.... Because of the Soviet entry into the war and the swift thrust of the Soviet army into the inland of Manchuria, we had lost our chance of using biological weapons against the Soviet Union and other countries. (Guo Cheng-chou and Liao Ying-chang, pp. 487-488.)"

    Originally posted by Full Monty
    Never being one to leave when I say I will I found the following

    http://en1.endiva.net/chineseholocaust_en/

    With all the rest of the information available this confirms what I believed - namely that the Japanese biological weapons were not intended for battlefield use.
    Hmmm... I understood the quoting phrase in completely other way, here is my description how I have understood it:

    "The Japanese General Staff had stopped "No. Pao" plan of germ war with its directive of July, 24th of 1945 (I read neither about that plan nor about that directive). But that directive was not related to the war against USSR and to Kwantung Army. General Yamada himself elaborated the capacity of his germ units at the Khabarovsk Trial of 1949:
    " Our productivity of germs was indeed great, our unit 731 was able to wage successful germ war... Japan lost its possibility to wage biological war against USSR and other countries only in the result of the coming of USSR in the war and in the result of very fast Soviet advance inside on Manchuria."

    English is not my native language and if I am wrong so, please, describe when my description is incorrect.

    So MY understanding of the phrase means that Kwantung Army was ready to wage germ war and it was the fast Soviet advance that didn't let for the Japanese to use germ warfare.

    Also I want to recall a few facts.

    When USSR had joined the war Colonel Isii was not in unit 731. He was in Tynfan. Morimura writes that the Japanese were preparing to the war against USSR. The Japanese waited only one Soviet powerful blow from the region of Vladivostok and the Japanese waited it not earlier than in the second half of the September. So the Japanese began to organize new base of unit 731 in Tynfan that was closer to possible frontline. If to suppose that the war would begion in the end of the September so the Japanese were able to organize the production of germs and the stores of ready to use germ bombs, shells and other warfare in Tynfan.

    The question is: "Why did the Japanese begin to organize the germ base in Tynfan closer to the probable frontline?" I see only one answer – they were preparing to the germ war against USSR!!! At least they were not stopping their preparing to germ war. During the time of the beginning of the actions against USSR the Japanese still were not ready to use their weapon immediately due the mistake in the time of the beginning of the war. They needed at least a few days to place their germ warfare closer to the frontline and to the air bomber units. The Soviets didn't give them those "a few days". The Japanese began to destroy facilities of unit 731 only when it became understandable that Kwantung Army was not able to stop and even to slow down the Soviet advance inside of Manchuria.

    As such they had no direct effect on the Manchurian Campaign from either side. Of course, as Andrey has pointed out, there was a plan in place to use germs (mainly flea infested rats carrying bubonic plague but with some Anthrax munitions available as well) to disrupt Red Army rear areas as well as terrorise enemy populations both in the USSR and elsewhere, possibly even the US (although how practical the last would have been is in doubt).
    Incorrectly, according Morimura's book the main weapon of Japanese germ war were considered germ bombs carrying by bomber-planes.

    You again distort my words. I spoke not once about latge amount of germ bombs and shells.

    Certainly the Soviet invasion of Manchuria prevented the use of these weapons but there's no evidence that the Red Army was aware of any immediate threat from them.
    May be.

    Additionally there is no evidence that the Kwantung Army deployed its conventionally armed forces any differently to the way they would have been had the biological weapons not been in place. Finally there is no evidence that combat was affected by the presence of said biological weapons.

    There are no other evidences also.

    Before the war whe Command of Kwantung Army knew about unit 731 and could place some troops to cover unit 731.

    When the war began the Japanese had an order to keep the secret of unit 731 and to prevent the capturing of any member of unit 731 by the Soviets. So the Japanese Command could operate for the solving of that mission.
    It is difficult to define the exact reason of any action of Japanese Command and of Japanese troops in Manchurian Campaign to say that Japanese conventional armed forces were not affected by the existence of unit 731.

    In conclusion, I want to say that the Japanese biological warfare was so dangerous like Atomic warfare. If anyone wants to sense what it was it is necessary to replace it by some Atomic bombs. Imagine, that the Japanese had a lot of Atomic bombs that were ready to use – it was necessary only to transfer those bombs to bomber-planes.

    Had you imagined? Can anyone say that a full stockpile of ready to use Atomic bombs what an army of 1945 had is not serious theme to mention about it?

    Leave a comment:


  • Andrey
    replied
    Originally posted by Full Monty
    Regarding Japanese naval capabilities and plans, they were pipe dreams as were their 'plans' to attack the American West Coast with biological weapons. Their naval codes had been long cracked and they were virtually out of fuel for both their army, air force and navy. Yes we can speculate on the possible usage of biological weapons by the Japanese in the same way we can speculate on their possible usage by the Germans in late 1944 or 1945. If anything the German threat was greater because they had the V2 rockets to deliver them with.
    The Americans are afraid of a post card with a little Anthrax but you do not want to suppose Japanese bombs with Anthrax, plague and so on as a threat. It is very strange...

    The Japanese in 1945 had enough fuel to send a few submarines with planes to US Western coast or they could use baloons. A submarine is not a battleship.

    The German V-2 couldn't reach US, they could reach only Britain. And I didn't hear that the Germans had biological weapon. The Germans had chemical weapon but the using of a little amount of poison-gas is not too dangerous so to send V-2 with poison-gas was not too dangerous for the Britishes. But only one bomb with biological warfare can be the reason of a huge epidemic and of the death of millions of people.

    Leave a comment:


  • Andrey
    replied
    Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
    I believe David Glantz's August Storm which was the most comprehensive coverage in the west was as fair and accurate as available sources would allow (and his sources were predominately Soviet).
    I gave a pair of examples that his work is not correct in the description of Kwantung Army.

    What does your phrase "I believe David Glantz's August Storm..." mean?

    How can you believe to Glants's work if he in one page write about 6 Japanese divisions formed before 1945 but in another page the amount of such divisions is 8?

    How can you believe to him if he distorts the meaning of the term and writes "strength" instead of "relative strength to the 12th Infantry Division of 1937"?

    Glantz didn't mention unit 731, unit 100, unit 516 in the OOB of Kwantung Army.

    It is only three examples...

    Leave a comment:


  • R.N. Armstrong
    replied
    Originally posted by Andrey
    All what you had said is correct.

    I disagree with the explanation of the Soviet success how it is made in the West. The Western Cold-War time authors distort the real view of the events and show the Japanese forces in Manchuria much weaker than they were in reality. They continue to show them like a huge analogue of German Volksturm and speak about Japanese soldiers armed by bamboo spears but in reality the Soviet troops in Manchuria opposed to regular Japanese Army units mainly.

    The Soviet sucess was so great because the Soviet troops were very strong and not because the Japanese were very weak. Here is the main difference between Russian and Western opinion about the Manchurian Campaign of 1945.

    Also I want to mention the scale of the operations, the common length of the frontline in Manchuria was one and a half times more than the length of the Soviet-German Front from Murmansk to the Black Sea!!!!
    I believe David Glantz's August Storm which was the most comprehensive coverage in the west was as fair and accurate as available sources would allow (and his sources were predominately Soviet).

    Leave a comment:


  • Andrey
    replied
    Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
    At the strategic and operational levels, I do not believe the Japanese Army experienced fighting on the scale of the eastern front in terms of quantity, density and mix of forces. They probably could not envision the type of operations the Red Army conducted outside of the 1st Far Eastern Front sector, and they were probably surprised how quickly the 1st FEF took apart their mini-Maginot line.

    The Red Army not only brought to bear their experience of fighting on the eastern front, but also transferred troops who had fought in terrain similar to the sectors opposite their Fronts.

    In retrospect the Red Army's Manchurian Campaign looks like a cake walk, which belies much of the technical subtleties in their planning.

    On the other hand, it is fair to say, the Kwantung Army was no match in comparison to the Soviet experiences against the German Army.
    All what you had said is correct.

    I disagree with the explanation of the Soviet success how it is made in the West. The Western Cold-War time authors distort the real view of the events and show the Japanese forces in Manchuria much weaker than they were in reality. They continue to show them like a huge analogue of German Volksturm and speak about Japanese soldiers armed by bamboo spears but in reality the Soviet troops in Manchuria opposed to regular Japanese Army units mainly.

    The Soviet sucess was so great because the Soviet troops were very strong and not because the Japanese were very weak. Here is the main difference between Russian and Western opinion about the Manchurian Campaign of 1945.

    Also I want to mention the scale of the operations, the common length of the frontline in Manchuria was one and a half times more than the length of the Soviet-German Front from Murmansk to the Black Sea!!!!

    Leave a comment:


  • R.N. Armstrong
    replied
    At the strategic and operational levels, I do not believe the Japanese Army experienced fighting on the scale of the eastern front in terms of quantity, density and mix of forces. They probably could not envision the type of operations the Red Army conducted outside of the 1st Far Eastern Front sector, and they were probably surprised how quickly the 1st FEF took apart their mini-Maginot line.

    The Red Army not only brought to bear their experience of fighting on the eastern front, but also transferred troops who had fought in terrain similar to the sectors opposite their Fronts.

    In retrospect the Red Army's Manchurian Campaign looks like a cake walk, which belies much of the technical subtleties in their planning.

    On the other hand, it is fair to say, the Kwantung Army was no match in comparison to the Soviet experiences against the German Army.

    Leave a comment:


  • Andrey
    replied
    OK, let's speak about ordinary weapon again.

    Let's look on the disposition of Japanese troops.

    According Western opinion the most part of the divisions of Kwantung Army were organized only in 1945, had lack of training, personnel, weapon and were very weak.

    The Japanese Command waited of the main Soviet blow only from Vladivostok region (the 1st Far-Eastern Front in the August of 1945). The Japanese didn't wait large blows in other directions.

    Any commander tries to concentrate his best troops in the direction of an enemy's main blow excepting the case when he is ready to advance in other direction. The Japanese in 1945 didn't think about advance.

    Also it is possible to concentrate best troops in rears and to send them in combat later. Such method is used when an enemy can advance in a few directions and it is unknown where he would make main blow. In 1945 the Japanese didn't wait any blows excepting the blow from the region of Vladivostok.

    Also the main Japanese fortifications were not far from border, in the region of Mudantsyan. To let the Russians to capture them meant to fight later in the positions that were not so prepared for defense like those Mudantsyan's fortifications. So to place the best units far from Mudantsyan meant to lose Mudantsyan's fortifications.

    From the April of 1945 the Japanese reinforced Kwantung Army and especially its that had to operate in Vladivostok direction.

    Vladivostok direction was covered by the 1st Front (the 3rd and 5th Armies).

    And all the Russian/Soviet sources write about very furious combats in the region of Mudantsyan. Those combats were the most furious in Manchurian campaign.

    Vasilevskii wrote later that the Soviet troops fought against elite Japanese troops in the region of Mudantsyan.

    Let's look what Japanese units operated in the region of Mudantsyan.

    If to look on the map from the Soviet "History of WWII" of 1976 so the Japanese disposition in the region of Mudantsyan was following (from north to south):

    - the 134th Infantry Division (far to the north-west from Mudantsyan)
    - the 135th Infantry Division (to the north-east from Mudantsyan)
    - the 126th Infantry Division (to the east from Mudantsyan)
    - the 124th Infantry Division (to the east from Mudantsyan)
    (the 135th, 126th, and 124th Infantry Divisions were the basis of the 5th Army of the 1st Front)
    - the 132nd Mixed Brigade (far to the south-east from Mudantsyan)
    - the 128th Infantry Division (far to the south-east from Mudantsyan)
    - an infantry regiment of the 139th Infantry Division (far to the south-west from Mudantsyan)

    Those units were sent to defend the most important direction in the region of the main enemy blow.

    Very far to the south the following units were concentrated:
    - the 122nd Infantry Division
    - the 112th Infantry Division
    - the 127th Infantry Division
    - the 79th Infantry Division
    - the remaining units of the 139th Infantry Division

    Very far to the north the 135th Infantry Division and some sub-units of the 134th Infantry Division were concentrated:

    What can we see? Only one unit – the 112th Infantry Divisions – existed before 1945 and that division was not concentrated in Mudantsyan direction but was disposed far to the south. All other units were organized in 1945 and were very weak according Western sources but fought very furiously against the Soviet troops that had the experience of the combats in Europe.

    If to compare it with Glants's data so two more divisions – the 59th and 137th – also operated against the Soviet 1st Far-Eastern Front (the 59th Division existed before 1945). According the Soviet map the 59th and 137th Divisions were concentrated in Central Korea in the region of Hynnam, it was very far to south.

    NO ONE of the Japanese units that defended Mudantsyan in 1945 existed before 1945!!!! According Western sources all they were "very weak in comparison with the 12th Infantry Division of 1937". Answer, how such "weak" units could fight so well against the veteran Soviet units?

    The units that I have mentioned above had to defend the direction of the main Soviet blow.

    Ok, let's think by other way.

    In the August of 1945 Kwantung Army had 8 divisions existed before 1945. If those divisions were the most reliable and the others were weak (if to believe to Western sources) so if I am the Japanese Commander I have to place those divisions in the main blow direction or in the close rears and to cover all the auxiliary directions by weak units.

    But what can we see?
    The 107th and 119th Divisions were in the North Western and Western Manchuria where the Japanese didn't wait Soviet blows.
    The 108th Divisions was far to the South West, practically in the region of Peking.
    The 117th Division was in the Central Manchuria closer to its Western part, the 63rd Division was to the south from the 117th Division.
    The 39th Division was in Central Manchuria.

    If to divide them between the Japanese Fronts and Armies so the picture also is very strange.

    The 1st Front operated in the direction of the main Soviet direction (how the Japanese waited it) contained only one "old" division – the 112th!!!!

    The 34th Army of the 17th Front in Korea contained one "old" division. Korea was a rears but it can be considered a dangerous zone if to speak about the possible sea landings of Soviet Marines in Korean ports.

    The 3rd Front contained three "old" divisions in the 44th Army and one "old" division in the 30th Army. The 3rd Front covered Western and South Western directions (where the Japanese didn't wait any Soviet advance) with the 44th Army (which completely consisted of "old" divisions), and its 30th Army was in Central Manchuria.

    The 4th Separate Army contained one "old" division and covered the northern direction (where the Japanese didn't wait any Soviet advance).

    So it is seen that in the case of Soviet advance from the region of Vladivostok to Mudantsyan the Japanese command had NO ONE "old" division in that direction. The alone "old" division of the Japanese 1st Front (the most powerful Japanese Front according Japanese sources) – the 112th – was to the south from Mudantsyan.

    And the Japanese could transfer there only two other "old" divisions – the 59th from Korea and the 39th from Central Manchuria. Probably, the Japanese also could transfer the 63rd Division but the 63rd was more far to Mudantsyan than the 39th.

    All other "old" Japanese divisions covered the directions where the Japanese didn't wait Soviet advance and from where they were not able to be transferred in the region of Mudantsyan.

    It means that the Japanese didn't see large difference between "old" divisions and the most part newly formed divisions excluding a few really weak newly formed ones. At least the Japanese divisions that were formed in January-March of 1945 (the 12Xth Divisions) were good enough. In other case the Japanese had enough time (4 months after April, 5th when USSR denonsed Neutrality Pact!!!) to concentrate "old" divisions in the region of main Soviet blow (according their opinion) – in Mudantsyan's region.

    And the Japanese newly formed divisions (the divisions that were formed in 1945) fought very well in Mudantsyan.

    The main conclusion: the Japanese divisions were not so weak like Western sources speak and the Japanese most powerful Front contained mainly divisions that were formed in 1945 and the Japanese didn't worry that it contained only such divisions.

    Leave a comment:


  • Full Monty
    replied
    Never being one to leave when I say I will I found the following

    In spite of a directive from the General Chief of Staff dated July 24, 1945 that stopped the "No. Pao" plan for germ warfare, it had no bearing on the coming war between the Soviet Union and Japan, nor was it intended for the Kwantung Army. General Yamada himself elaborated the capacity of his germ units at the Khabarovsk Trial:

    Our productivity of germs was indeed great; Unit 731 alone, if necessary, could use its own weapons to warrant successfully waging germ warfare.... Because of the Soviet entry into the war and the swift thrust of the Soviet army into the inland of Manchuria, we had lost our chance of using biological weapons against the Soviet Union and other countries. (Guo Cheng-chou and Liao Ying-chang, pp. 487-488.)
    http://en1.endiva.net/chineseholocaust_en/

    With all the rest of the information available this confirms what I believed - namely that the Japanese biological weapons were not intended for battlefield use. As such they had no direct effect on the Manchurian Campaign from either side. Of course, as Andrey has pointed out, there was a plan in place to use germs (mainly flea infested rats carrying bubonic plague but with some Anthrax munitions available as well) to disrupt Red Army rear areas as well as terrorise enemy populations both in the USSR and elsewhere, possibly even the US (although how practical the last would have been is in doubt). Certainly the Soviet invasion of Manchuria prevented the use of these weapons but there's no evidence that the Red Army was aware of any immediate threat from them. Additionally there is no evidence that the Kwantung Army deployed its conventionally armed forces any differently to the way they would have been had the biological weapons not been in place. Finally there is no evidence that combat was affected by the presence of said biological weapons.

    So, whilst Andrey is right to say that the Japanese biological weapons were a serious threat to the USSR (and others) that has not been properly recognised outside of East Asia and the former USSR, he is wrong to say

    The Japanese biological weapon is related with Manchurian Campaign!!!! If an enemy had a powerful weapon but hadn't use it it doesn't mean that it is wrong to speak about that weapon.
    because it belongs in a wider context.
    Last edited by Full Monty; 25 Nov 05, 20:15.

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