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1945 Manchuria Operation

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  • Addition:

    In the maps I uploaded all the enemy units including pro-Japanese Chinese forces are shown blue.

    May be, the 1st and the 2nd Inf Divisions are divisions of Manchuoko. But in this case 2 other divisions must be named instead of them.

    Does anyone know did Japan had the 1st and 2nd Inf Divisions and where were they in the August of 1945?

    Comment


    • I have recalld about the link on D. Glantz's work about Manchurian Operation that was given by R.N.Armstrong.

      In that work there is OOB of Kwantung Army.

      I wanted to get own OOB from Soviet sources only.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Andrey
        I have recalld about the link on D. Glantz's work about Manchurian Operation that was given by R.N.Armstrong.

        In that work there is OOB of Kwantung Army.

        I wanted to get own OOB from Soviet sources only.
        Andrey, I have the 12-volume history(bought it in 1981 in a Tel Aviv Russian book shop) and Glantz's work. While I have not made a rigorous comparison, the Soviet history map has some additional brigade level units. I did not check sectors opposite Meretskov's Front.
        Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

        Comment


        • Mr. Armstrong,

          Which 12-volume set are you referring to?

          Regards,

          Konev

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Konev
            Mr. Armstrong,

            Which 12-volume set are you referring to?

            Regards,

            Konev
            It is the official Soviet "History of the Second World War", 1976. It replaced the six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War published under Khrushchev.
            Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Andrey

              May be, the 1st and the 2nd Inf Divisions are divisions of Manchuoko. But in this case 2 other divisions must be named instead of them.

              Does anyone know did Japan had the 1st and 2nd Inf Divisions and where were they in the August of 1945?
              Here is what I have for these two formations (as of 8 Dec, 1941)

              1st Div was in the 4th Army of the Kwantung Army.
              2nd Div was in the 16th Army and posted at Kanazawa, Honshu.

              Still searching for anything beyond the date above
              Scientists have announced they've discovered a cure for apathy. However no one has shown the slightest bit of interest !!

              Comment


              • OK, I have looked more closely to Glantz's work about Manchurian Operation.

                And I have seen a few interesting things right in that moment.

                1. Glantz gives OOB of Kwantung Army. But… his list doesn't contain the very famous in USSR/Russia unit 731 of Colonel Isiia!!!! That unit was subordinated to the commander of Kwantung Army so he MUST be in that list!!!!

                It is VERY strange! Glantz described small size units of a company scale but forgot to mention the unit which produced WMD.

                The unit 731 had produced A LOT OF biological weapon to the August of 1945 (the bacterium were placed in shells and bombs). And the Japanese had the plans how to use it and were ready to use it. For example, US had no enough Atomic bombs in the August of 1945. The Germans in WWII had chemical weapon but were not ready morally to use it.

                The Japanese in the August of 1945 had enough amount of WMD and were ready morally to use it (the even used it earlier against China).

                But Glantz didn't write ANY word about the Japanese biological weapon!!!! It is the same to speak about US in WWII and to not say a word about Atomic bombs.

                2. Danjon said that the Japanese had no artillery more than 75mm caliber.

                OK, I see the following heavy artillery units in Kwantung Army:

                the 3rd Army
                - 2d Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
                - 3d Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
                - Tungning Heavy Artillery Regiment
                - 2d Independent Heavy Artillery Company (A)

                the 5th Army
                - 20th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment (A)
                - 5th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (D)
                - 8th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (D)
                - 1st Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (E)

                the 30th Army
                - 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)
                - 19th Heavy Artillery Regiment (A)

                the 44th Army
                - 17th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment (A)
                - 30th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment (B)

                Does anyone suppose they had no any gun with caliber more than 75 mm?


                3. Here what Glantz writes:
                "Despite its numerical strength, the Kwantung Army lacked quality. The Japanese Imperial High Command had transferred most veteran Japanese divisions from Manchuria before the summer of 1945. Hence, most remaining divisions were newly formed from reservists or from cannibalized smaller units. In fact, only the 119th, 107th, 108th, 117th, 63d, and 39th Infantry Divisions had existed before January 1945.15 Training was limited in all units, and equipment and materiel shortages plagued the Kwantung Army at every level. The Japanese considered none of the Kwantung Army divisions combat ready and some divisions only 15 percent ready.16 "

                Also Glantz gives Appendix 1 with the list of Kwantung Army units where the date of forming is shown.

                OK, let's look that appendix.

                The units been formed before the January of 1945:
                the 119th Division – October 1944
                the 107th Division – May 1944
                the 108th Division – September 1944
                the 117th Division – June 1943
                the 63rd Division – June 1943
                the 39th Division – June 1939
                the 112th Division – July 1944
                the 59th Division – February 1942
                Summary – 8 divisions.

                OK, let's compare both the lists now. We see that Glantz didn't mention the 112th and 59th Divisions in his first list.

                How is it possible? He contradicts to himself!!!!

                OK, let's look his final statement:

                "The Japanese considered none of the Kwantung Army divisions combat ready and some divisions only 15 percent ready.16"

                I look the Note 16 and see " JM 138, p. 161, gives Japanese assessment of division readiness (see app. A)."

                - JM 138 means - U.S. Army Forces Far East, Military History Section, Japanese Monograph no. 138, Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria, January 1943-August 1945 (I don't know what it is )
                - app. A means Appendix 1

                What can we see in Appendix 1?

                We see the "Strength Relative to 12th Infantry Division, 1937".

                So "15 percent ready" means "15 percent ready relative to 12th Infantry Division, 1937".

                I don't know what the 12th Infantry Division was in 1937.

                For example, a Soviet Mach Corpse of 1941 had 1032 tanks and a Soviet Tank Corpse of 1944-45 had 150 tanks and a Soviet Tank Army of 1944-45 had 500-600 tanks usually.

                Does it mean that it is possible to write "a Soviet Tank Corpse of 1944-45 was 15% relative to a Soviet Mach Corpse of 1941"? Anyone who read it will suppose that a Soviet Tank Corpse of 1944-45 was very weak.

                How that comparing was made? Who did make that comparison?

                If to look the Appendix A so it is seen that even Japanese Tank Brigades were compared with the 12th Infantry Division. How was it done? How is it possible to compare a tank unit and an infantry unit????

                Also Brigades were compared with the 12th Division. The digits are low (15-20%). But brigade must be compared with brigade!!! I suppose a full strength brigade is 40% of a full strength division (if to mention supporting divisional units). So if a brigade is 15% of a division it means that the brigade is 15/0.4=37.5% of a full strength brigade.

                Comment


                • The only definite Japanese source for units in the Manchurian/Northern theatre is:

                  TAKI'S HOME PAGE

                  IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY PAGE

                  http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/

                  This gives the following artillery units in the fortress at Koutou.
                  Kotou Fortess
                  Date : Aug., 1945
                  Place : Manchuria
                  Opponent : Soviet Army

                  Artillery Unit/15th Border Guard Unit (Captain Ohki)

                  1st Battery
                  1 Experimental 41cm Howitzer
                  2 Type 7 30cm Long Howitzers
                  2 Type 45 24cm Howitzers

                  2nd Battery
                  2 Type 96 15cm Cannons
                  4 Type 45 15cm Cannons
                  2 Type 38 75mm Field Guns

                  Kotou Fortress located near Ussuri River in the Soviet-Manchurian border (See map). It was the strongest fortress among eight Japanese fortresses in Manchuria and the 4th Border Guard Unit guarded it. The 4th Border Garrison Unit had following artillery unit. 41cm Howitzer was the largest gun of the IJA and Type 90 24cm Railway Gun was only one railway gun of the IJA.

                  Artillery Unit/4th Border Guard Unit (Feb. 1940)

                  1st Battalion
                  2 Type 7 30cm Long Howitzers, 2 Type 45 24cm Howitzers, 2 Type 96 15cm Cannons, 4 Type 45 15cm Cannons

                  2nd Battalion
                  8 Type 91 10cm Howitzers, 6 Type 90 75mm Field Guns, 2 Type 38 75mm Field Guns

                  3rd Battalion
                  18 Type 88 75mm AA Guns

                  13th Battery
                  Type 90 24cm Railway Gun

                  14th Battery
                  Experimental 41cm Howitzer

                  As the Japanese declined in the Pacific theater, many soldiers and guns were extracted from the Kotou Fortress and sent to the Pacific. In 1945, the 4th Border Guard Unit was disbanded and the 15th Border Guard Unit was formed in July, 1945 as the garrison unit of the Kotou Fortress.

                  When the Soviets invaded Manchuria in Aug., 1945, there were about 1,400 garrisons at the fortress. The 41cm gun fired and destroyed a railway brigde of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Then, it fired with over 100 rounds during about one week until it was overrun by Soviet infantry.

                  Though the Soviets announced the surrender of Japan, Japanese garrisons did not believe it. They continued to fight until they were annihilated. The battle of Kotou Fortress ended on Aug. 26th.
                  The only Japanese Armour actions noted relate to Shimushu, Kuril Islands:
                  Shimushu
                  Date : Aug, 1945
                  Place : Shimushu, Kuril Islands
                  Opponent : Soviet Army/Marine

                  Tank Unit
                  Commander
                  Tanks

                  11th Tank Regiment
                  Colonel Ikeda
                  20 Type 97-Improved Medium Tank
                  19 Type 97 Medium Tank
                  25 Type 95 Light Tanks


                  Shimushu Island is the most north island of the Kuril and the border line of Japan and the Soviet Union was drawn between Shimushu Island and Kamchatska Penninsula. About 8,000 Japanese soldiers and one tank regiment were deployed on Shimushu to defend a Japanese territory against the Soviet.

                  When Japan surrendered on Aug. 15th, Japanese forces were ordered to stop the attack against the Allied. However, the Japanese government still reserved the right of self-protection. On Aug. 18th, the Soviet forces suddently invaded Shimushu Island without notice. The strenghts of the Soviet forces were 8,360 soldiers and the Soviet Navy and Soviet Air Forces supported the attack. This Soviet invasion was caused by the territorial ambitions of Stalin. He desired to occupy the Kuril Islands before the American forces would been stationed there.

                  When the Soviet attacked Shimushu, Japanese forces on the island were prepared for disarmament. They were ambarrassed with the Soviet invasion, but dicided to fight with the Soviet for self-protection. They fought strongly with the Soviet soldiers landed on the beach of Shimushu and did much damage to the Soviet, who had not expected the strong resistance of the Japanese defenders.

                  The 11th Tank Regiment also attacked the Soviet forces. About thirty Japanese tanks run over the Soviet soldiers and rushed into the beach. The Soviet soldiers fired to the tanks with AT guns, which were unloaded on the beach in a hurry. As a fog gathered over the beach, it was difficult for the tanks to find out AT guns. A close combat had been fought for over two hours and both sides suffered a heavy loss. When the combat ended, there were twenty one destroyed tanks and over one hundred dead Soviet soldiers on the beach.

                  On Aug. 20th, Japan and the Soviet concluded a cease-fire agreement. The battle on Shimushu Island was the last battle for Imperial Japanese tanks.
                  http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/history2.htm
                  Andy "Weeble" Weaver

                  Research, Reference and Historical Study

                  Illud Latine dici non potest

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Weeble
                    The only definite Japanese source for units in the Manchurian/Northern theatre is:

                    TAKI'S HOME PAGE

                    IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY PAGE

                    http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/


                    This gives the following artillery units in the fortress at Koutou.

                    Thanks for the info. It shows enough that the Japanese had Heavy Artillery.


                    The only Japanese Armour actions noted relate to Shimushu, Kuril Islands:
                    http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/history2.htm

                    11th Tank Regiment
                    Colonel Ikeda
                    20 Type 97-Improved Medium Tank
                    19 Type 97 Medium Tank
                    25 Type 95 Light Tanks


                    Shimushu Island is the most north island of the Kuril and the border line of Japan and the Soviet Union was drawn between Shimushu Island and Kamchatska Penninsula. About 8,000 Japanese soldiers and one tank regiment were deployed on Shimushu to defend a Japanese territory against the Soviet.

                    When Japan surrendered on Aug. 15th, Japanese forces were ordered to stop the attack against the Allied. However, the Japanese government still reserved the right of self-protection. On Aug. 18th, the Soviet forces suddently invaded Shimushu Island without notice. The strenghts of the Soviet forces were 8,360 soldiers and the Soviet Navy and Soviet Air Forces supported the attack. This Soviet invasion was caused by the territorial ambitions of Stalin. He desired to occupy the Kuril Islands before the American forces would been stationed there.

                    When the Soviet attacked Shimushu, Japanese forces on the island were prepared for disarmament. They were ambarrassed with the Soviet invasion, but dicided to fight with the Soviet for self-protection. They fought strongly with the Soviet soldiers landed on the beach of Shimushu and did much damage to the Soviet, who had not expected the strong resistance of the Japanese defenders.

                    The 11th Tank Regiment also attacked the Soviet forces. About thirty Japanese tanks run over the Soviet soldiers and rushed into the beach. The Soviet soldiers fired to the tanks with AT guns, which were unloaded on the beach in a hurry. As a fog gathered over the beach, it was difficult for the tanks to find out AT guns. A close combat had been fought for over two hours and both sides suffered a heavy loss. When the combat ended, there were twenty one destroyed tanks and over one hundred dead Soviet soldiers on the beach.

                    On Aug. 20th, Japan and the Soviet concluded a cease-fire agreement. The battle on Shimushu Island was the last battle for Imperial Japanese tanks.
                    The description is made in pro-Japanese style.

                    It shows the image of "guileful" Russians who suddenly attacked the "good" Japanese in the Japanese territory who were ready to surrender but had to fight against the invaders.

                    Shimushu Island is an island if the Kuril Islands which were considered not a Japanese territory but old Russian territory that was captured by Japan in 1905.

                    So the Soviets invaded not in Japan but in the Kuril Islands.

                    In Potsdam Conference the Allies confirmed that the Kuril Islands are considered Russian territory so USSR had right to take it back in 1945. The Kuril Islands was the territory occupied by the Japanese like Southern Sakhalin, China, Korea...

                    I do not want to begin new discussion about the Kuril Islands, I give you Russian point of view here as you gave only the Japanese one.

                    The Japanese didn't resist as self-protection mean. They fought as the Japanese Command gave order to them to resist against the Soviets in the spite of the fact the Emperor declared about the surrender. The Japanese resisted the Soviets everywhere where it was possible in the spite of the fact of the surrender of Japan.

                    The Japanese tanks fought not against the whole 8,360 Soviet soldiers (I don't know about the correctness of this number) but against the first wave of Marines that were unloaded in the beaches of Shimushu Island. The Soviet Marines operated in very bad conditions - they fought in clear fields against enemy tanks, they had no trenches or any fortifications. In such conditions to lose 100 men in the combat against 30 enemy tanks and to destroy 21 tanks is a very good result.

                    The fog in the beach... The tanks could crush everything by their tracks, the crews of the Soviet AT-guns also couldn't see well enemy tanks due the fog.
                    Last edited by Andrey; 09 Nov 05, 02:54.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Andrey
                      OK, let's look his final statement:
                      "The Japanese considered none of the Kwantung Army divisions combat ready and some divisions only 15 percent ready.16"

                      I look the Note 16 and see " JM 138, p. 161, gives Japanese assessment of division readiness (see app. A)."

                      - JM 138 means - U.S. Army Forces Far East, Military History Section, Japanese Monograph no. 138, Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria, January 1943-August 1945 (I don't know what it is )
                      - app. A means Appendix 1

                      What can we see in Appendix 1?

                      We see the "Strength Relative to 12th Infantry Division, 1937".

                      So "15 percent ready" means "15 percent ready relative to 12th Infantry Division, 1937".

                      I don't know what the 12th Infantry Division was in 1937.
                      Andrey,

                      I believe Glantz is refering to some units not having established strengths anywhere near their allowed levels when compared to the 1937 pattern of the Japanese infantry divisions TO&E. For the most part, the Japanese army was still using this table of strength for its infantry divisions, so,....if you stand a 1937 division next to some of the 1945 divisions in Manchuria the Manchurian divisions look very weak.



                      Originally posted by Andrey
                      For example, a Soviet Mach Corpse of 1941 had 1032 tanks and a Soviet Tank Corpse of 1944-45 had 150 tanks and a Soviet Tank Army of 1944-45 had 500-600 tanks usually. Does it mean that it is possible to write "a Soviet Tank Corpse of 1944-45 was 15% relative to a Soviet Mach Corpse of 1941"? Anyone who read it will suppose that a Soviet Tank Corpse of 1944-45 was very weak.

                      How that comparing was made? Who did make that comparison?
                      Your comparison is not really accurate. The Red Army TO&E for the Mechanized Corps of 1941 is no longer in use, to compare various tank corps, one must use the 1944 TO&e. On the other hand, the TO&E for the 1937 Japanese infantry division was still the official "measurement" for comparing the readiness of divisions. The 12th infantry division is simply an example of a standard division found in the Japanese army in 1937.


                      Originally posted by Andrey
                      Also Brigades were compared with the 12th Division. The digits are low (15-20%). But brigade must be compared with brigade!!! I suppose a full strength brigade is 40% of a full strength division (if to mention supporting divisional units). So if a brigade is 15% of a division it means that the brigade is 15/0.4=37.5% of a full strength brigade.
                      Again, you must compare the infantry brigade of 1937 against the strength of the infantry brigades of 1945. The Japanese did not really organize an independant infantry brigade any differently than the ones found in the divisions.

                      Finally, I am not aware of the Japanese adopting a late war or reduced establishment division on a wide scale but they may have used some in Manchuria. If anyone has any information on this it would helpful if they posted it here.

                      Cheers.
                      Last edited by The Purist; 10 Nov 05, 13:04.
                      The Purist

                      Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by The Purist
                        Andrey,

                        I believe Glantz is refering to some units not having established strengths anywhere near their allowed levels when compared to the 1937 pattern of the Japanese infantry divisions TO&E. For the most part, the Japanese army was still using this table of strength for its infantry divisions, so,....if you stand a 1937 division next to some of the 1945 divisions in Manchuria the Manchurian divisions look very weak.

                        Your comparison is not really accurate. The Red Army TO&E for the Mechanized Corps of 1941 is no longer in use, to compare various tank corps, one must use the 1944 TO&e. On the other hand, the TO&E for the 1937 Japanese infantry division was still the official "measurement" for comparing the readiness of divisions. The 12th infantry division is simply an example of a standard division found in the Japanese army in 1937.
                        OK, let’s speak about it again. There is the difference between a relative strength and a combat effectiveness.

                        Relative comparison can be done with any unit but according concrete rules. Units can be compared in their manpower, fire power taking into account supply level, equipment quality, training level and so on. They can be compared in concrete conditions – the comparison can be different for defense and for attack, for the actions in mountains, in deserts, in swamps and in plains. The mountain troops are good in mountains but ordinary infantry is better in plains. The tank units better in attack but infantry units are better in defense. They can be compared on the base of their opponent – AT-artillery units are good against tanks but are bad against infantry. It is very difficult task to estimate relative strength of units. A few different specialists can compare the same units and to get different results as they can use different methods of the comparison. And the specialist must be very competent to make correct comparison. The specialists must be unbiased. For example, a beaten general will try to show that the enemy was stronger and his troops were weaker than it was in reality. So the Japanese spoken before Soviet advance of 1945 and the Japanese spoken after it could speak completely different things.

                        In any case it is necessary to describe the rules of the comparison and who made it.

                        Two units can get completely different marks if to use different criteria of the comparison and if different persons will do it.

                        It is why I was so amazed by the fact that the Japanese tank brigades were compared with an infantry division. I don’t know how to compare such units. It is the same to answer: “Who is stronger – an elephant or a whale?” or “Who will win – a lion of a shark?”

                        The combat readiness is the relative strength of a unit compared to its full strength analogue of THAT TIME. It means that a unit of 1945 MUST to be compared with the same full strength unit of 1945.

                        I didn’t hear about the rule acting now that the standard Japanese units are considered the units of 1937 and the standard Soviet tank units were the units of 1944 (to the point, the structure of the Soviet tank units changed for all the time of the war and the same units of 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945 were not the same). If I hear that in North Africa in 1942 a German unit fought against a British unit I have an impression in my head what they HAD TO BE in 1942 and I HAD NO to remember that one country estimated its units strength compared to the units of 1937, and the second one – of 1940.

                        I read that in 1945 the Japanese decreased the amount of the soldiers in their divisions. As I read they turned from 20,000-men divisions to 10,000-men divisions system. So it means that the manpower of the full-strength Japanese divisions of 1945 was only 50% of the full-strength Japanese divisions of 1944. And if to compare Japanese divisions with the units of 1937 using the criteria of manpower so a full-strength division will get only 50% of relative strength and a reader will suppose that the division was very weak but it was wrong. But in any case it is not correct to use only the manpower criteria.

                        So I again draw your attention on what Glantz had done.

                        First of all, he gave the digits of relative strength in comparison with the division of 1937 but called it incorrectly as “combat readiness”. I have explained already that it is not the same.

                        Secondly, he didn’t say who and how made that comparison. It is very important.

                        I gave you enough quotes which show that the Japanese military leaders and the Command of Kwantung Army supposed before the Soviet advance of 1945 that Kwantung Army is strong enough. The digits in Glantz’s work Appendix A give completely opposite view of Kwantung Army.

                        Thirdly, Glantz firstly said that 6 divisions existed before 1945 but in Appendix 1 that amount is 8. It means that Glantz didn’t check the info but only rewrote the info from two different sources that contradict with each other. He could do the same with the relative strength of Japanese units – he could rewrite without checking the info from non-reliable sources.

                        I want to say that Glantz is not God and he can have mistakes.




                        Again, you must compare the infantry brigade of 1937 against the strength of the infantry brigades of 1945. The Japanese did not really organize an independant infantry brigade any differently than the ones found in the divisions.

                        Finally, I am not aware of the Japanese adopting a late war or reduced establishment division on a wide scale but they may have used some in Manchuria. If anyone has any information on this it would helpful if they posted it here.

                        Cheers.
                        Let’s look on Appendix 1 again. There is the clear inscription there - “relative to the strength of the 12th Infantry Division, 1937”. It is not the same “relative to the strength of a corresponding unit of 1937”. It means that the brigades were compared with a division and not with a brigade.

                        Comment


                        • Here is the data from "The History of the World War II", volume 11, Moscow, 1976

                          It is only small part of the info. All the volume 11 describes the actions of USSR and Western Allies against Japan in 1945.

                          "To the beginning of 1945 the amount of Kwantung Army was decreased in the result of the transferring of 11 regular divisions in the Southern Group of Troops, but the existence of numerous garrisons in Manchuoko let to increase its amount quickly..."


                          "...The Japanese considered Manchuria and Korea not like occupied territory but practically like Japanese territory.

                          Japan turned Manchuria and Korea in the military-industrial base and strategical bridgehead for the aggression in the mainland.

                          During the war Manchuria had 55% of common output of Japanese production of synthetic fuel. In the beginning of 1945 8 plants, producing synthetic fuel from coal and shale, worked in Manchuria. For example, 2 plants of common output about 600,000 tons per a year were in Fushun, 2 (240,000 tons) – in Girin, 1 (180,000 tons) – in Sypin.

                          According the plan of Supreme Soviet for Rule the War Indonesia was lost and the output of those plants had to be increased up to 2,000,000 tons per a year.

                          Manchuria was one of the main producers of explosives and poison-gases. In 1945 12 Manchurian plants produced explosives, the largest were in Andun, Anshan, Girin, Kanchentsy (peninsula Guandun).

                          The most part of machine-building plants that were organized right after the occupation of Manchuria were reconstructed and adapted for the producing of military equipment during the war in China and in the Pacific. For example, the city of Shenian had 4 plants producing industrial and electrical equipment, 2 aircraft plants, some plants of artillery and rifle equipment, 1 tank and 1 automobile plants. The city of Dalian had 3 machine-building plants. Such plants were in Harbin, Chanchun, Tsinchzhou, Huaide (Gunchzhulin) and in other cities and towns. The production of tanks, armored cars and other military equipment was organized in steam locomotive plants in Dalian, Shenian, Harbin, Mudantsian. The turning of main industrial enterprises on the producing of military equipment was finished in 1943-44 and to the beginning of 1945 all the territory of Manchuria turned in a large military arsenal.

                          The Japanese took out from Manchuria large amount of iron ore, coal, soya beans, they took out from Korea light metals, tungsten, ferroalloys and rice. Simultaneously the Japanese increased the smelting of metals directly in Manchuria and Korea. For example, the production of steel in bars in Manchuria and Korea was increased in 1944 up to 1.3 million tons (the common smelting in the Empire in 1944 was 5.9 million tons).

                          Korea was becoming more and more important in the military industry of Japan. Due the low price of electrical energy and the rich sources of raw materials the production of aluminum developed very briskly in Korea. In Korea the extraction of tungsten ore had reached a high level (it was equal to 84% of its extracting in Japan), the same was the situation with the extraction of fluor-spar (94% of its production in Japan), copper (40% of its production in Japan), graphite (100% of its production in Japan)..."

                          Comment


                          • An additional question - Why didn't Western authors mention the Japanese biological weapon?

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Andrey
                              An additional question - Why didn't Western authors mention the Japanese biological weapon?
                              Did they use them against either the US forces in the Pacific or the Russian troops in Manchuria? Not that I am aware of. The Nazis, US, UK and USSR also had chemical/biological warfare units but no one seemed ready to sink to that level (thankfully). They existed everywhere but were used nowhere, so they are generally left out of battle descriptions. It is not a conspiracy or an oversight,...just a non sequitor.
                              The Purist

                              Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by The Purist
                                Did they use them against either the US forces in the Pacific or the Russian troops in Manchuria? Not that I am aware of.
                                Incorrect. The Japanese were ready to use it and had real plans of using their biological weapon.

                                And may be it will be new for you but the Japanese REALLY USED their biological weapon against China and USSR.

                                They used it a few times against China, there are a lot of evidences of former members of Japanse "unit 731" about it. They used it in limited amount against USSR with saboteurs who operated in Mongolia and in Soviet territory.

                                The Japanese WERE READY to use it still in August of 1939 during Khalkhin-Gol (Nomongan) events AFTER their offensive. BUT Zhukov suddenly began HIS offensive and crushed Japanese forces so Japan had to make peace agreement and the using of biological weapon was not useful.

                                All the plans of the Japanese offensive against USSR in 1941-43 REALLY CONSIDERED considered large scale using of biological weapon.

                                The Japanese plans of 1945 of the defence against Soviet offensive REALLY CONSIDERED the using of biological weapon.

                                So the Japanese were ready to use biological weapon a few times but they didn't do it because:
                                - in 1939 Zhukov crushed their troops in the border of Mongolia,
                                - in 1941 Soviet soldiers showed unexpected firmness and the Japanese didn't risk to attack USSR (the Japanese were ready to attack USSR in the case of the downfall of Moscow)
                                - in 1942 Soviet soldiers again showed unexpected firmness in Stalingrad and the Japanese again didn't risk to attack USSR (the Japanese were ready to attack USSR in the case of the downfall of Stalingrad)
                                - in 1945 Soviet troops advanced so quickly and so successfully that the Japanese
                                didn't suppose that they have any chance to stop them and had decided that it was time to stop the war.

                                The Nazis, US, UK and USSR also had chemical/biological warfare units but no one seemed ready to sink to that level (thankfully). They existed everywhere but were used nowhere, so they are generally left out of battle descriptions.
                                OK, imagine that "Indianapolic" was sank BEFORE he transported the Atomic bombs to B-29 bombers in the Pacific and there were no Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
                                Or the Japanese suddenly surrendered in August, 1st with the same consequance.

                                Is it a reason to speak that it is wrong to mention about US Atomic bombs???? Very strange.

                                And your "thankfully" is a very strange as US used WMD-Atomic weapon. You deleted it from the list of WMD. I suppose if the Americans throwed of a poison-gas in Hiroshima so you also deleed chemical weapon from your list...

                                It is not a conspiracy or an oversight,...just a non sequitor.
                                For Russians it looks like a real conspiracy.

                                Comment

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