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  • Originally posted by Full Monty
    "So it is possible to suppose that it would influence on Soviet plans"

    Andrey, don't put the cart before the horse. Everything I've read so far suggests it has no influence and you've found nothing that proves it does. The burden of proof lies with you, not me since all you have to do is find one major article that plainly states that Malinovsky's (or whoever's) plan involved some maneouvre or strike that was designed to neutralise (or similar) the Japanese WMDs.
    It is about Unit 731 again.

    I do not know how you understand a "campaign description". It looks like you suppose that a campaign description begins from the phrase like this: "The 45th Rifle Division began to advance...."

    ANY description of ANY campaign contains the following articles in its beginning:
    - description of the area of the operations;
    - description of the opposing forces including the description of weapon;
    - description of the plans of the opposing sides.

    And ONLY AFTER THIS the description of battle is shown.

    Let's look on Glantz's August Storm. He had made everything according my words above.

    Here his articles
    "Preparations for the Manchurian Strategical Operations" (the description of the concebtration of Soviet forces)
    "Area of operations"
    "The Opposition: Japanese forces and planning"
    ...

    So a Western author who describes Manchurian Campaign MUST to describe the main Japanese forces. Unit 731 was the plant of biological weapon and had a stockpile of ready to use germ bombs and shells. Its significane was tge same like US "Manhattan project". It was not a small group of scientists who made experiments with a few home-made types of new weapon. It was ready to use WMD. So it is impossible to describe the Japanese forces in Manchuria and to not mention unit 731. The significance of unit 731 was much more than even the signigficance of some divisions. So unit 731 can be considered one of the most important Japanese forces in Manchuria. Glantz didn't say ANY word about unit 731. The other Western authors also don't speak about it in the question of the using of biological weapon in the battlefield.

    Also a Western author who describes Manchurian Campaign MUST to describe the Japanese plans of defence. Unit 731 was subordinated to the Commander of Kwantung Army. I gave you enough quotes that prove that the Japanese HAD PLANS to use biological weapon. JAPANESE PLANNED TO USE THEIR BIOLOGICAL WEAPON so any author describing Manchurian Campaign MUST to describe it in his part about Japanese planning. Glantz again didn't say ANY word about the Japanese plans to use the germ warfare of unit 731. The other Western authors also don't speak about those plans.

    And about Soviet planning. If the Japanese had very significant important force like unit 731 and the Soviets knew about it so I do not understand why is it OK to suppose that unit 731 didn't influence on the Soviet plans.

    So even if to not speak about Soviet plans unit 731 MUST be mentioned at least in two part of any good research about Manchurian Campaign - in the descriotion of Japanese forces and in the description of Japanese plans.

    Glantz didn't do it. And all other Western authors don't do it. The Western authors suppose that unit 731 only tortured people for the scientific success of its members but they don't want to understand that its germ bombs and shells were not toys but real strategic scale weapon. But I suppose that if unit 731 was placed in Ivogima, Saipan or Okinawa so they wrote a hundreds book about it where they described how the actions of Allied Command prevebted the Japanese from its using.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Andrey
      It is about Unit 731 again.

      I do not know how you understand a "campaign description". It looks like you suppose that a campaign description begins from the phrase like this: "The 45th Rifle Division began to advance...."

      ANY description of ANY campaign contains the following articles in its beginning:
      - description of the area of the operations;
      - description of the opposing forces including the description of weapon;
      - description of the plans of the opposing sides.

      And ONLY AFTER THIS the description of battle is shown.

      Let's look on Glantz's August Storm. He had made everything according my words above.

      Here his articles
      "Preparations for the Manchurian Strategical Operations" (the description of the concebtration of Soviet forces)
      "Area of operations"
      "The Opposition: Japanese forces and planning"
      ...

      So a Western author who describes Manchurian Campaign MUST to describe the main Japanese forces. Unit 731 was the plant of biological weapon and had a stockpile of ready to use germ bombs and shells. Its significane was tge same like US "Manhattan project". It was not a small group of scientists who made experiments with a few home-made types of new weapon. It was ready to use WMD. So it is impossible to describe the Japanese forces in Manchuria and to not mention unit 731. The significance of unit 731 was much more than even the signigficance of some divisions. So unit 731 can be considered one of the most important Japanese forces in Manchuria. Glantz didn't say ANY word about unit 731. The other Western authors also don't speak about it in the question of the using of biological weapon in the battlefield.

      Also a Western author who describes Manchurian Campaign MUST to describe the Japanese plans of defence. Unit 731 was subordinated to the Commander of Kwantung Army. I gave you enough quotes that prove that the Japanese HAD PLANS to use biological weapon. JAPANESE PLANNED TO USE THEIR BIOLOGICAL WEAPON so any author describing Manchurian Campaign MUST to describe it in his part about Japanese planning. Glantz again didn't say ANY word about the Japanese plans to use the germ warfare of unit 731. The other Western authors also don't speak about those plans.

      And about Soviet planning. If the Japanese had very significant important force like unit 731 and the Soviets knew about it so I do not understand why is it OK to suppose that unit 731 didn't influence on the Soviet plans.

      So even if to not speak about Soviet plans unit 731 MUST be mentioned at least in two part of any good research about Manchurian Campaign - in the descriotion of Japanese forces and in the description of Japanese plans.

      Glantz didn't do it. And all other Western authors don't do it. The Western authors suppose that unit 731 only tortured people for the scientific success of its members but they don't want to understand that its germ bombs and shells were not toys but real strategic scale weapon. But I suppose that if unit 731 was placed in Ivogima, Saipan or Okinawa so they wrote a hundreds book about it where they described how the actions of Allied Command prevebted the Japanese from its using.
      Andrey,

      Did you check the publication date on Glantz's August Storm? It was years before Unit 731 was exposed in Western or Soviet histories.

      History books and authors have a history of their own. You can see why it is so important to know a work's history in order to evaluate whether the author used the known sources, added any new sources for consideration, and/or offers a reevaluation of existing sources.
      Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 07 Dec 05, 06:52.
      Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Andrey
        It is about Unit 731 again.

        I do not know how you understand a "campaign description". It looks like you suppose that a campaign description begins from the phrase like this: "The 45th Rifle Division began to advance...."

        ANY description of ANY campaign contains the following articles in its beginning:
        - description of the area of the operations;
        - description of the opposing forces including the description of weapon;
        - description of the plans of the opposing sides.

        And ONLY AFTER THIS the description of battle is shown.
        This does appear to be rather a rather rigid structure you demand here and is certainly not followed by all military historians. However, if all the accounts of the Manchurian Campaign that you have read follow this structure you should be able to quite easily find the part of the battle plan where Unit 731 was to be attacked and destroyed or at least neutralised. Failing this, perhaps you could find a contingency plan whereby troops that were held in reserve would be used to counter an attack on the advancing Red Army formations by Unit 731 (or troops using their weapons). At the very least you should be able to find a reference to a Japanese plan to counter-attack the invading forces with biological weapons.
        Also a Western author who describes Manchurian Campaign MUST to describe the Japanese plans of defence. Unit 731 was subordinated to the Commander of Kwantung Army. I gave you enough quotes that prove that the Japanese HAD PLANS to use biological weapon.
        Andrey, Andrey, Andrey We have been here before and I'm getting more than a bit tired of repeating myself. What you don't seem to want to acknowledge is that Japanese biological weapons are irrelevant to the Manchurian Campaign. They do not form part of the Japanese defence plan and they had no influence over Red Army planning. At no point during the campaign were they used against Red Army troops. They have no relevance BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT INTENDED FOR USE ON THE BATTLEFIELD! They were a strategic terror weapon intended for use against relatively densely populated civilian targets. In that respect they bear a small similarity to the US atom bombs but even they only get a cursory mention in standard accounts of the Pacific Campaign BECAUSE THEY WERE USED thereby bringing about Japan's surrender!
        Signing out.

        Comment


        • OK I will try one more way to explain the difference. I can't imagine it will mean anything but here goes.

          You provide info from Russian sources to us and speaking for myself (I think it would apply to the others based on their responses) I think "OK now I have more info." If your source says the same thing then I gain nothing. If it has extra things not mentioned at all in our sources then I have gained more knowledge. If it contradicts with our sources then I am not sure which to believe. I have to go by which seems more possible or maybe whichever uses more background and sources when it was put together. That one just depends on personal experience and how the different sources read to me.

          We provide a Western source to you Andrey. If it agrees with your Russian sources there is no problem. If it has extra info then I am really not sure how you might take it. It depends on what the info is. Based on your posts I would guess you believe it if it casts the Russians in a good light but if there is anything bad about the Russians (real or only your belief) then you blow off the source as Western propaganda trying to make you guys look bad. If there is a contradiction between the two sources you will always take the Russian source as truth over the Western. All things equal then that is your choice and I cannot blame you. If the Western source has more to back it up however and you still refuse to accept it then you are just biased versus our sources.
          Check out our webpage for our NFL picks http://members.cox.net/mjohns59/

          Comment


          • Manchurian Operation

            I cznnot believe it took the Russians three months to amass an army large enough to finally breakthrough a Japanese Army that was all but a shell of it's former self.

            After destroying Berlin and the mighty Nazi war-machine, the Russians waited until the time was right to "invade" Manchuria, before the US won the territory as a condition of the surrender that was about to be won, after the two "bombs" were delivered to the Japanese as a show of our strength.
            Kevin Kenneally
            Masters from a school of "hard knocks"
            Member of a Ph.D. Society (Post hole. Digger)

            Comment


            • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
              Andrey,

              Did you check the publication date on Glantz's August Storm? It was years before Unit 731 was exposed in Western or Soviet histories.

              History books and authors have a history of their own. You can see why it is so important to know a work's history in order to evaluate whether the author used the known sources, added any new sources for consideration, and/or offers a reevaluation of existing sources.
              The publication date of Glantz's work is 1983.

              Khabarovsk Trial was in 1949!!! Didn't he hear about it?

              Korolkov's "Kio Ku Mitsu" (about Rikhard Zorge, contains a lot of common info about the situation in Far East including data about unit 731) was written in 1968. It was a book for ordinary public.

              Stalin himself mentions unit 731 in Volume 12 of his "Works". Stalin died in 1953 so he had written it before 1953.

              Isn't it enough?

              Comment


              • OK, read it again.


                "On April, 5th of 1945 USSR denounced Neutrality Pact with Japan.


                In April, 15th Stalin met with General Il’ichev, the Chief of GRU [Military intelligence].

                He asked:
                “We know about 17 Japanese fortified regions. What can you say about them?”

                Il’ichev:
                On the west the Japanese have 4 fortified regions, on the north, along the Amur – 5, on the east – 8. All they were made as a base for aggression but now all they are re-built for a defence only. Each fortificed region contain up to 7 centers of resistance, which had a lot of points. They are placed on prevailing highs and have cross-fire connection with one another. Their flanks usually are rested against impassable terrain – swamps and mountains.

                Stalin:
                “Does it mean that it is impossible to outflank them?”

                Il’ichev:
                “It is impossible to outflank them with significant forces.”

                Stalin:
                “How are they made? Is our artillery able to crush them?”

                Il’ichev:
                “They contain powerful firm fire fortifications which consisted of artillery and machine gun pillboxes, armored hoods, armored observation posts, wooden-ground fortifications, tank ditches, trenches and barbed wire lines. The buildings for personnel, the stores for ammo and food, the stationary electric power stations, the systems of water supply and ventilation are deep under the ground. Improved net of underground communications connects all the bunkers in a united closed complex.

                The situation in the Sakhalin and in the Kurils is the same.”



                In April, 20th the Japanese Supreme Soviet for ruling the war gathered.

                Sudzuki, the Prime Minister, spoke that Japan has to do everything what possible to prevent the war against USSR. He spoke about diplomatic efforts.

                Umedzu, the Chief of General Staff:
                "I have no panic mood. If to speak about military questions we have no to despond and to think that everything is lost. In the north our hopes are related with the firmness of the defence of Kwantung Army.It is impassable due its deep echelonment and the relief in main strategical directions. General Iamada, the commander of Kwantung Army, is sure in the firmness of his troops. For a few months powerful minefields will cover Grand Khingan and the probable crossing points in the Amur and Sungari...

                Now Iamada has 930,000 men. His army has 5,500 guns and mortars, 970 tanks, 1,600 planes. I suppose it is not little."

                Toioda, the Chief of Naval General Staff, added:
                "We have 23 combat ships in border rivers."

                Sudzuki:
                "I suppose that those forces will be increased. Am I right? "

                Umedzu:
                "Yes. But we have no enough weapon for new units so we'll take the weapon from the troops in mother country."

                Anami, the Military Minister, added:
                We have two special units in Manchuria – the Detauchments #100 and the Detauchments #731 of Vakamatsu and Isiia which have biological weapon. Both the units are subordinated to the Kwantung Army. Iamada supposes that even the Detauchments #731 is able to supply his troops by enough amount of biological weapon....

                Sudzuki:
                "Anami, we have to increase our amount of biological weapon. May be, we have to increase the amount of Isiia's unit and we have to do it quickly, for the closest 1.5-2 months..."


                Ionai, the Naval Minister:
                "... In the Kuril Islands and in the Sakhalin we suppose to use the same tactics that we used so successfully against the Americans and the Englishmen..."

                Khara, the chairman of Secret Soviet:
                "... I understand that is a suicide to fight against USSR now. Our efforts have to be directed in the fortifying of our bastions on the north [against USSR] and on active diplomatic efforts in Europe..."




                April, 29th.
                Anami told to Sudzuki about the forming of new divisions in mother country and in Manchuria and Korea.... In the mainland 8 divisions and 7 separate brigades were forming. The were preparing to be an operational reserve of Kwantung Army and had to be in constant increased alertness.



                May, 3rd.
                Allen Dalles got a permission to negotiate with the Japanese.

                In parallel with the contacts with Dalles the Japanese tried to increase their forces.

                Especial attention was drawn to the preparing to a biological war with the hope that the biological weapon would let for Japan to win the combats in the mainland. At May, 5th Isiia ordered to his subordinates: "The war between USSR and Japan is inevitable. We have to increase our production. We have to wait day X of the beginning of the biological war"


                At May, 6th Iamada ordered to his troops:
                "If our troops are forced to retreat in the region of the Grand Khingan in the beginning of the war against USSR so all the rivers, reservoir, and wells in the lost territory have to be infected by a biological weapon, and all the crops and cattle have to be eliminated"



                May, 11th.

                Stalin met with Vasilevskii:
                "...What is your impression about Kwantung Army?"

                Vasilevskii:
                "Kwantung army is the best, most faithful to the Imperor, the most battle-worthy troops. In Japan it is considered a large honor to serve in that Army"

                Stalin:
                "What is about its weapon?"

                Vasilevskii:
                "The Japanese Command has in the mainland two third of their tanks and planes and more than a half of its artillery. The troops mainly dispersed in fortified regions."



                May, 28th

                Harry Hopkins asked Stalin on Moscow about the confirming of Yalta's Soviet engagement to begin the war against Japan. Stalin answered that the Soviet troops would be ready to the August, 8th in accordance to Yalta's agreement.



                In the end of the May the Japanese got new plan of future military actions.

                Iamada's conception was based on the idea that the morale of the Soviet troops will be decreased by difficult conditions of the combats in the most part of Manchuria. He had hopes that the rate of the actions of the Russians would be as slow as the Allied rate in the Pacific and in the South-Eastern Asia. Morally he was ready to use biological weapon.

                The threat from the north forced the Japanese to control the preparing of Kwantung Army to the war against USSR. In the end of the May Anami, the Military Minister, himself arrived in the headquarters of Kwantung Army. He was related to this formation for all his military career. General Iamada got that army, which was in good condition, from General Umedzu 6 years ago.

                Anami prepared to that trip very carefully. He spoke with some generals of his ministry which served in the mainland in that elite formation, also he met with General Umedzu.

                Kwantung Army was placed in Manchuria and was a combination of a few formations. Kwantung Army contained the 1st and 3rd Fronts, the 4th Separate Army, the 2nd Air Army and Sungari River Flotilia.

                The 3rd (Western-Manchurian) Front of General Usiroku had the 30th and 44th Armies and was placed to the west from the line Vanemiao-Chanchun-Mukden. 2 Inf. Divwere placed nearly Mongol border. 6 inf divisions, 3 Inf and 1 tank brigades were in the region of Mukden.
                It was considered a reserve in the case of Soviet advance from the region of Vladivostok.

                The 4th (Northern-Manchurian) Separate Army of General Mikio had 3 inf divisions, 1 inf and 3 mixed brigades was placed on huge territory in the triangle Sakhalian-Hailar-Harbin. The main hopes were on the rivers of Argun and Amur and with the very bad terrain. The headquarters of the army was in Tsitsikar.

                The 1st (Eastern-Manchurian) Front of General Kita was the most powerful and covered Mudantszian and Hunchun directions. It had the 3rd and 5th Armies. The 3rd Army 4 inf divisions, 1 separate mixed brigade and some support units. The 5th Army had 3 inf divisions and some support units. 3 inf divisions were in the reserve of the commander of the Front.

                The 34th Separate Army of General Sanity was in the Northern Korea. It had 2 inf divisions, 1 separate brigade and some support units. The 34th Army was a strategical reserve of the Commander of Kwantung Army. The units of the 34th Army were placed nearly the Korean ports and were ready to be transferred in the mainland.

                The direct reserve of the commander of Kwantung Army was 1 inf division, 1 separate inf and 1 separate tank brigades. Also the troops of Manchou-Go, of pro-Japanese ruler of Innner Mongolia De Van and of the Suiiuan Army Group were subordinated to the commander of the Kwantung Army. Those troops commonly had 8 inf and 7 cav divisions, 14 separate inf and cav brigades.

                Kwantung Army could be reinforced by the reserves from the Northern China where more than 2 Japanese Armies (8 divisions, 115,000 men) were in the region of Pekin.

                Also the troops of the 17th (Korean) Front of General Kodzuki were a possible reserve of Kwantung Army. The 17th Front had 7 inf divisions and 2 separate mixed brigades (97,000 men) organized in the 58th Army with the headquarters in Seoul.

                In the case of military actions the command of Kwantung Army supposed to use the armed detachments, formed from Japanese colonists. Those detachments contained 100,000 men and were dispersed in all the territory of Manchuria.

                During the revision Iamada said with a lot of pride that the command of his one million-men army continued to increase its amount. As the compensation of the technical superiority of Soviet troops the Japanese prepared to use widely special forces - ground "kamikaze"-soldiers whose order was to destroy Soviet commanders and technics.

                The Military Minister was satisfied by Iamada's report about the largest ground forces formation. He was sure that the Soviets would be repulsed in Manchuria and one more long campaign in huge Asian space would begun.




                In May, 28th Japanese Supreme Soviet for ruling the war gathered. Anami reported about his trip in Kwantun Army. His conclusions about the readiness of Kwantung Army were optimistic and were completely approved by the other members of the Supreme Soviet...
                General Umedzu was ordered to apply the experience of Kwantung Army in the using of preparing of ground “kamikaze” units to the 5th Front of General Higuti. The 5th Front contained the 27th Army in Kuril Islands, the 88th Separate Inf Division in the Sakhalin and 2 separate inf divisions in the Hokkaido.

                Also Anami reminded that Kwantung army has 54 tons bacteriums of plague, anthrax, typhus, cholera as strike weapon of a large war. It would show the increasing might of the Japanese Army.

                Sudzuki asked when the Soviets will attack.

                Anami answered that USSR, having only 40 divisions, mainly rifle ones, along the Soviet-Manchurian border, has no supremacy over Kwantung Army. Moreover, the Soviets would have large casualties during attacks against the fortified regions. So the breakthrough of large Soviet forces deep in Manchuria is impossible. The Soviets need more than 3 months to increase twice the forces in Far East. Anami made his conclusion: "The advance of USSR is possible not earlier than the middle of the September, after the end of monsoon rains in Manchuria. The Soviet ground forces can be supported not more than 2,000 planes."

                The other members of the Soviet agreed with Anami. Sidzuki said in the end:
                "We have to hurry to increase the transfer in Manchuria our troops. We have to form the group of troops which is necessary according to our plan of the war against USSR not later than the beginning of the September."



                In May, 30th Imperor's Stavka ordered Iamada to prepare to defence.

                Also it ordered to Okamura, the commander of the Expeditional forces in China, "to transfer immediately 4 divisions and supporting units in Manchuria; to transfer in Central and Northern China and in Manchuria from Hunan, Guansi and Tsiansi some units of the guards of railroads and roads."



                In June, 5th Umedzu met with Iamada, the commander of Kwantun Army, and Okamura, the commander of the Expeditional forces in China, in Dalian where they defined more exactly the actions according the order of May, 30th and defined the actions to prepare the troops to the fights against USSR and USA in China, Manchuria and Korea. Those actions intended the cooperation between Kwantung Army, 17th Front in Korea and the troops in China.

                On the base of the order of Stavka the Japanese troops in China were regrouping. Only covering forces were stayed against the Chinese Gomindan forces and against the territories of the Chinese Communists. The main forces concentrated in main communications with the task to move in coastal regions of Eastern and South-Eastern China and to defend against US landings. The largest groups of troops were organized in Northern China as a possible reinforcement of Kwantung Army and the 17t Front in Korea in the case of the war against USSR.



                In June, 10th Umedzu returned in Tokyo and spoke with Anami. Anami said:
                "The main efforts of my Ministry and of General Staff are concentrated on the mainland, on Kwantung Army. But we also have to remember about the Kuril Islands and about Sakhalin."

                Imperor's Stavka gradually changed its military priorities. China was not too important more as a target for capturing. The Japanese troops were preparing to the fights in the mother country, in the mainland and in the islands.


                From the middle of the May the Japanese air and agents intelligence informed about large Soviet troops transferring in the Far East. As an opposite action in June, 16th the Japanese began to transfer in Manchuria simultaneously 4 inf divisions from the 43rd Army from China.

                In June, 22nd the Japanese Supreme Soviet for ruling the war gathered again.

                Sudzuki opened it. He said that the situation is very difficult.
                Okinava was lost. The war approaches to the mother land. But the situation is most dangerous in the north. If USSR joins the war the situation is unpredictable. Japan is not able to fight on two fronts.

                The Supreme Soviet decided to organize the 30th Army in Manchuria and to form it from Japanese colonists. The 30th Army had to be part of the 3rd Front.



                In the beginning of July Allen Dalles informed the Swedish banker Jakobsen that the separate negotiations would begun as soon as possible because in the case of the joining of USSR to the war all separate negotiations would be stopped. Jakobsen passed the words of Dalles to the Japanese. It was the first info for the Japanese that USSR would join the war soon.



                In July, 7th General Umedzu, the Chief of General Staff, spoke with Togo, Foreign Affairs Minister.

                Umedzu:
                “Togo, what did the Americans say about USSR?”

                Togo:
                “They said that USSR will join the war soon.”

                Umedzu:
                “If to speak about the war against the Soviets so I can calm you. The war will begin after a half of a year or even more.”

                Togo:
                “What is the base of your optimism?”

                Umedzu:
                “Togo, the Soviets have to decide the problem of Kwantung Army. Its million soldiers occupy 17 well-fortified fortified regions. And more. The positions of General Iamada are covered with the 400-km Grand Khingan, the rivers of Argun, Amur and Ussuri and with the Chanbaishan Mountains. In the conditions of good supply by ammo Kwantung Army can rsist Red Army for two years.”

                Togo:
                “But the Russians will transfer there their best troops which crushed Germany.”

                Umedzu:
                “It is not so easy, Togo. The Western Russia is connected with Far East only with alone railroad whose carrying capacity is limited.”

                Togo:
                “I agree, Umedzu. But we have to continue to reinforce the troops of Iamada for the preventing of any surprises.”

                Umedzu:
                “All the efforts of the General Staff are related with those urgent problems, Togo.”


                On July, 18th USSR refused Japanese offer to receive the Japanese delegation which wanted to ask USSR to be a mediator in peace negotiations.

                On the August, 1st Togo and Umedzu met again.

                Togo:
                “Umedzu, you don’t want to agree that the Soviets just about to join the war.”

                Umedzu:
                “Togo, you are a diplomat. I am a military. If to speak about the military questions I disagree with your anxiety. They are still not ready to advance. Their main forces which crushed Viermacht still are in the West. The Russians were not able to get supremacy for last two months. A supremacy is the main factor for the advance.”

                Togo:
                “Umedzu, do you really suppose that USSR is able to concentrate enough troops only to the middle or to the end of the September?”

                Umedzu:
                “Togo, it is important not only to concentrate enough forces but also to use them effectively in the following advance. Where to place the main forces, where to make a main blow? The rate of the following advance will depend from the terrain also. In Manchuria the situation is better for Kwantung Army in all the directions. It is possible to say that the positions of Kwantung Army are secured surely with high mountains, primeval forests, and impassable swamps.”


                In the beginning of the August the most part of the 5th Air Army was transferred in Northern China and Korea and was subordinated to the command of Kwantung Army.


                In August, 8th Japanese ambassador in Moscow got a notification to arrive to Molotov at the evening.

                All the day of August, 8th the leaders of Japan waited the news from Moscow. They had the alone question: “What will be the position of USSR to Japan?”. Nobody believed in the soon beginning of the war.

                In the region of Vladivostok and along the Amur river a typhoon with a cloud-burst had begun at the evening of August, 8th. Wide streams of muddy water gushed out from the hills in valleys, washing out the roads and being the reason of the flood of the rivers. Darkness fell on everything.

                Umedzu had got the weather report from the mainland and called by telephone to Togo:
                “Togo, you have to see how it is difficult to estimate all the factors. There is a typhoon in Manchuria. The roads are washed out with a cloud-burst. It is impossible to speak about any advance of Soviet troops. I foresaw it.”

                Togo:
                “I suppose, Umedzu, you mix your wishes with reality. The Soviets can to break your suggestions and to attack Kwantung Army in bad weather with all their might. I do not bekieve that bad weather will stop them.”

                Umedzu:
                “The weather affects on any type of troops. Planes do not fly in a storm; tanks do not attack in a storm. And you, Togo, are a follower of Potsdam Declaration. You hope on the shameful capitulation of Great Empire.”

                Togo:
                “Umedzu, I am waiting a telegram from Moscow. I have bad presentiments. We can fall in an abyss.”

                In the evening of August, 8th the Japanese ambassador in Moscow Sato was informed by Molotov that USSR declares a war to Japan from August, 9th.

                Togo called by telephone to Sudzuki and offered to gather the Japanese Supreme Soviet for ruling the war as USSR declared the war. The question was to agree with Potsdam Declaration.

                Sudzuki himself called to each member of the Soviet and informed that USSR declared the war.



                The Supreme Soviet for ruling the war gathered in August, 9th a little time after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. But no one spoke about Hiroshima.

                Sudzuki began the first:
                “I have decided that to agree with Potsdam Declaration and the stopping of military actions as soon as possible is alone way out.”

                The militaries were against.

                Umedzu said:
                “…Today the information from Moscow was the most significant. According our calculations USSR has no supremacy over our forces so I suppose that we have to refuse Potsdam Declaration and continue to fight for better conditions of peace. I continue to believe in the firmness of Kwantung Army…”

                Anami, the Military Minister:
                “Japan will not survive without the minerals and industry of Manchuria. Now Manchuria gives us 1,500,000 tons of synthetical fuel, it is a half of our national fuel production. The 8 fuel plants in Girin, Fusun and Sypin have to be covered from air attacks. More than 20 largest Manchurian plants produce air and armor technics, artillery and rifle equipment, explosives and poison-gas. Based on that huge military arsenal, Kwantung Army is able to withstand against any enemy….

                August, 11th.

                The Supreme Soviet for ruling the war gathered.

                The situation was extremely bad, the news from Manchuria were bad.

                Togo, a follower of capitulation, asked Anami, a follower of the fight to the end:
                “Anami, you declare that the Japanese army has real forces for successful long resistance. But answer why do the largest our formation – Kwantung Army – is retreating everywhere from the beginning of the military actions? Earlier we heard not once your categorical declarations that the 17 fortified region along the Manchurian border are an impassable bastion against the Soviets.”

                Anami:
                “Togo, the most significant is not the ratio of troops but the tactics. Who could suppose that the Soviets would begin their advance in the period of monsoon rains, two-three weeks before the time that was estimated by us?”

                Togo:
                “According my data to August, 9th Kwantung Army had more than one million men, 1,200 tanks, about 7,000 guns and mortars, 2,000 planes. It is huge military force from any point of view. Is it possible that USSR had transferred from Europe more troops which are advancing so successfully in Manchuria now?”

                Anami:
                “I am not ready to report right now about the real ratio of the forces in the mainland. Most likely, we made a mistake in the abilities of USSR. They practically had no forces in Mongolia but now whole tank formations are advancing to the Grand Khingan.”

                Togo:
                “If the defense of Iamada stopped the Russians it was easier for us to discuss our diplomatic actions. But Kwantung Army is losing on a battlefield. Our aircraft doesn’t operate. What do you offer to do for the Japanese government?”

                Umedzu:
                “Togo, you speak like you are a neutral spectator. The inability of Kwantung Army to hold their border positions can be fatal to the fate of the Empire”

                Sudzuki:
                “Umedzu, as I remember your inspections on the mainland also calmed the government. What will be with the Empire if the Soviets will crush Iamada’s troops and invade in the mother land?...”

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Psycho1943
                  OK I will try one more way to explain the difference. I can't imagine it will mean anything but here goes.

                  You provide info from Russian sources to us and speaking for myself (I think it would apply to the others based on their responses) I think "OK now I have more info." If your source says the same thing then I gain nothing. If it has extra things not mentioned at all in our sources then I have gained more knowledge. If it contradicts with our sources then I am not sure which to believe. I have to go by which seems more possible or maybe whichever uses more background and sources when it was put together. That one just depends on personal experience and how the different sources read to me.
                  There are proofs also and it is possible to analyze them.

                  We provide a Western source to you Andrey. If it agrees with your Russian sources there is no problem. If it has extra info then I am really not sure how you might take it. It depends on what the info is. Based on your posts I would guess you believe it if it casts the Russians in a good light but if there is anything bad about the Russians (real or only your belief) then you blow off the source as Western propaganda trying to make you guys look bad. If there is a contradiction between the two sources you will always take the Russian source as truth over the Western. All things equal then that is your choice and I cannot blame you. If the Western source has more to back it up however and you still refuse to accept it then you are just biased versus our sources.
                  You are correct, if Western sources have no good proofs I consider them as an anti-Soviet propaganda only. If Russian/Soviet sources have no good proofs you consider them as an Russian/Soviet propaganda only.

                  So it is necessary to show the proofs and to analyze them.

                  You and other Westerners give me what you hade written in Western sources and wait what I should do. I check your info.

                  For example, I am gotten the info that Kwantung Army was weak, its soldiers had a lack of training and of weapon, it had no artillery more that 75mm caliber and so on. I check that info and what I see!!! - the Japanese had a lot of heavy artillery, the Japanese soldiers fought very furiously and were equipped not with bamboo spears (the memoirs of Soviet militaries show it enough), right before the Manchurian Campaign ALL the Japanese Military Leaders including the cOmmand og Lwantung Army estimated combat abilities of Kwantung Army very high. What have I to think about that Western source after this???

                  So I speak what I've found and what are my conclusions. If my conclusions are wrong you are able to say me WHERE I am wrong.

                  But you, instead of thinking about my words and proofs, speak: "You do not want to believe Western sources because they show the Soviets not in good light."

                  I repeat again that I'll not believe in non-proved opinions that contradicts with modern Russian opinion. Try to prove it with good proofs and not only with common words.

                  You are not ready to believe that a lot of info by which you were informed from your childhood is only a propaganda of Cold War....

                  But in any case I rememver what I heard here.
                  Last edited by Andrey; 07 Dec 05, 20:53.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Andrey
                    There are proofs also and it is possible to analyze them.
                    When you say proof I guess you are saying the same thing as source. We give you sources that you say are flawed. Of course that can be true that some of our sources may have mistakes. I asked you before but you did not answer my question. Do any Russian sources have mistakes in them? You say that Western sources are biased. Are you saying that Russian sources never show bias and only tell the truth?



                    Originally posted by Andrey
                    You are correct, if Western sources have no good proofs I consider them as an anti-Soviet propaganda only. If Russian/Soviet sources have no good proofs you consider them as an Russian/Soviet propaganda only.
                    But who are you to say they aren't backed up by good sources? And by the way, I don't check every source to check and see if one source is backed up well enough. I don't have the time or energy to read a dozen books for every book I read. Some books I have read have hundreds of sources listed. How can you ever check every fact and source? I don't consider stuff as propaganda the way you make it sound. For example, I have some magazines put out by a closet Nazi guy. I read them years ago for some historical fact but it was pretty obvious where the propaganda was without checking other sources. I could tell what to dismiss as crap that had no historical value and what I could believe to be actual history.



                    Originally posted by Andrey
                    So I speak what I've found and what are my conclusions. If my conclusions are wrong you are able to say me WHERE I am wrong.
                    Again you don't understand me at all. I don't know that you are wrong. Do you just pass over this every time I type it? I DON'T KNOW the facts of what happened because I did not witness these things first hand. You did not either. You base your opinions on Russian sources only except for where Western sources agree with you completely. That shows that you are completely biased and close minded if you are unable to accept the fact that a Western source that disagrees with your Russian source might possibly be correct.



                    Originally posted by Andrey
                    But you, instead of thinking about my words and proofs, speak: "You do not want to believe Western sources because they show the Soviets not in good light."
                    Has been said over and over. There are Russian sources and Western sources. When they both agree I think we can accept them as correct. When they disagree then who knows what the real truth is? Apparently according to you the Russian source is always correct in these cases. ALWAYS. Never possible that your source could be mistaken or be biased to make your side look more favorable or not at fault or whatever the case may be.



                    Originally posted by Andrey
                    I repeat again that I'll not believe in non-proved opinions that contradicts with modern Russian opinion. Try to prove it with good proofs and not only with common words.
                    And I repeat again. Your side is not necessarily right just because it is your side. You might be right. Unless you were actually there then you do not know the truth. The point is which side you choose to believe instead of being open minded and thinking for yourself. You sound like a Commie or a Nazi or a member of a cult. You believe whatever your side says over the other side instead of being open to the possibility that your side can be wrong on some things. I am not saying you should always believe our sources over yours. How about just one of them? How about one paragraph? Maybe one sentence that disagrees with your sources?


                    Originally posted by Andrey
                    You are not ready to believe that a lot of info by which you were informed from your childhood is only a propaganda of Cold War....
                    Again you seem to know quite a bit about what I have learned while growing up. I was actually never taught anything about the Cold War in any real detail at school. We learned the Allies beat the Axis and we split Germany up and your side was Communist. That's about it. I was never taught details of World War II. I was never told that Commies were bad people. I was always interested in World War II, mainly in the Eastern Front since that was where the ground war was really decided. I did not really know much about the Soviets because we didn't have much information about them. I just played wargames and I had a certain German bias. They seemed to be the preferable side to play in wargames. I didn't read much historical stuff. I usually read mostly the fictional stuff like Sven Hassel and Leo Kessler. I really enjoyed this stuff because they dealt more with the Eastern Front instead of the Western Front stuff which was all I learned about in school (and even then I didn't learn any combat stuff, just the basics like when DDay was and when the war ended, just facts and dates, boring stuff). In the past decade or so I got back into the wargaming stuff and started reading historical stuff and I have actually swung to where I don't mind playing Soviets. It's fun to beat up on the Germans, Rumanians, Hungarians, and Italians especially driving around with T34/85s and big KV tanks they have trouble knocking out.


                    Geez, Andrey. You really type some long ass posts dude. I try to keep them a bit shorter but it's tough when discussing stuff with you.
                    Check out our webpage for our NFL picks http://members.cox.net/mjohns59/

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Andrey
                      The publication date of Glantz's work is 1983.

                      Khabarovsk Trial was in 1949!!! Didn't he hear about it?

                      Korolkov's "Kio Ku Mitsu" (about Rikhard Zorge, contains a lot of common info about the situation in Far East including data about unit 731) was written in 1968. It was a book for ordinary public.

                      Stalin himself mentions unit 731 in Volume 12 of his "Works". Stalin died in 1953 so he had written it before 1953.

                      Isn't it enough?
                      That's right 1983. Glantz work was focused on giving a good, operational overview of the campaign. He would not have found it productive to crawl through the trial transcripts (if they were available) and he would not have spent time pursuing Sorge who is of more interest for his early warning on Barbarossa. This line of reasoning is as Full Monty has explained previously.

                      Volume 12 of the History of the Second World War was not published until 1982--Glantz did not have a copy of it by then. [I know because I was copying and matching (the most useful histories in) his library, so I know he did not have it at the time of writing August Storm, and I did not get my 12 volumes copy until 1989 while in Tel Aviv and found it in a Russian bookstore there.]

                      I don't mean to destroy any of your childhood delusions, but quotes by a Stalin[and other ranking officials] in an official publication [particularly after their death] are probably not their quotes. One must carry a box of salt while reading Soviet official publications.

                      The pattern of your responses indicate that you do not appreciate how inaccessible Soviet military history has been in the west and how it has lacked credibility because of biased, highly politicized, and inaccurate or narrowlly focused writings. No wonder German accounts gained ascendency in the west.
                      Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 08 Dec 05, 08:21.
                      Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
                        That's right 1983. Glantz work was focused on giving a good, operational overview of the campaign. He would not have found it productive to crawl through the trial transcripts (if they were available) and he would not have spent time pursuing Sorge who is of more interest for his early warning on Barbarossa. This line of reasoning is as Full Monty has explained previously.

                        Volume 12 of the History of the Second World War was not published until 1982--Glantz did not have a copy of it by then. [I know because I was copying and matching (the most useful histories in) his library, so I know he did not have it at the time of writing August Storm, and I did not get my 12 volumes copy until 1989 while in Tel Aviv and found it in a Russian bookstore there.]

                        I don't mean to destroy any of your childhood delusions, but quotes by a Stalin[and other ranking officials] in an official publication [particularly after their death] are probably not their quotes. One must carry a box of salt while reading Soviet official publications.

                        The pattern of your responses indicate that you do not appreciate how inaccessible Soviet military history has been in the west and how it has lacked credibility because of biased, highly politicized, and inaccurate or narrowlly focused writings. No wonder German accounts gained ascendency in the west.
                        Do you want to say that he didn't know about unit 731????

                        I repeat that Soviet info about unit 731 was not state secret and was not covered in Soviet archives. It was spoken to a wide public and IT WAS IN ANY SOVIET DOCUMENTARY ABOUT MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN THAT I SAW.

                        I do not believe that Glantz didn't see any Soviet documetary about Manchurian Campaign.

                        If he didn't know about unit 731 so it was very strange - he knew a lot of Soviet sources but didn't know about the sources that was very well known. Glantz coukld speak with ANY Soviet who has some knowledge about Masnchurian Campaign commonly and to know about unit 731.

                        I can't believe that Glantz in 1983 didn't know about unit 731...

                        The sources about unit 731 that I've described are not alone, I described only those ones that I know right now.

                        Also Japanese info about the decisions of its rulers have t contain data about biological weapon (look on my quotes), Glantz had to study then when he described the Japanese plans.

                        And if Glantz missed the info about unit 731 so I don't know what he missed also. It is the same to describe US military plans of 1945 and to not mention about Atomic bombs.

                        To the point, Full Monty's position is that Glantz knew about unit 731 but didn't say about it as "it was not related to the campaign" (and you agreed with Full Monty).

                        So what is your final opinion - he didn't know or he knew but didn't write as it was not related to the campaign?

                        Can you ask Glantz directly what he think about it right now? If he writes August storm now would he mention unit 731 and the Japanese plans of biological war against USSR?
                        Last edited by Andrey; 08 Dec 05, 10:53.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Psycho1943
                          Do any Russian sources have mistakes in them? You say that Western sources are biased.
                          Yes, Soviet sources have a lot of mistakes. Both Soviet and Western sources are biased.

                          Are you saying that Russian sources never show bias and only tell the truth?
                          No.

                          And stop it, if you have to say on the theme of Manchurian Campaign - say it. I do not want to spend my time to prove you that I know about Soviet propaganda. I spoke you on this theme a few times and it looks like I did it in vain - you again and again speak the same things.
                          Last edited by Andrey; 08 Dec 05, 11:02.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Andrey
                            Do you want to say that he didn't know about unit 731????

                            I repeat that Soviet info about unit 731 was not state secret and was not covered in Soviet archives. It was spoken to a wide public and IT WAS IN ANY SOVIET DOCUMENTARY ABOUT MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN THAT I SAW.

                            I do not believe that Glantz didn't see any Soviet documetary about Manchurian Campaign.

                            If he didn't know about unit 731 so it was very strange - he knew a lot of Soviet sources but didn't know about the sources....

                            I can't believe that Glantz in 1983 didn't know about unit 731...

                            The sources about unit 731 that I've described are not alone, I described only those ones that I know right now.

                            To the point, Full Monty's position is that Glantz knew about unit 731 but didn't say about it as "it was not related to the campaign" (and you agreed with Full Monty).
                            Since it usually takes a year to get writings into publication, Andrey tell me any Soviet sources before 1982 that specifically cites Unit 731. Any Soviet book on Manchuria, any magazine/journal on Manchuria. I'm asking for specific citations, not what you think. Of course if you can find more than one that strengthens your case.

                            I agreed with Full Monty on the relevancy of Unit 731 to the operational campaign.

                            I will ask David if he knew about 731, and if so, why he did not put it in August Storm.
                            Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 08 Dec 05, 12:10.
                            Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
                              I agreed with Full Monty on the relevancy of Unit 731 to the operational campaign.
                              Do you suppose that unit 731 has no to be mentioned in the description of Japanese forces and of the Japanese plans?

                              Comment


                              • David Glantz replied, "As far as Unit 731 is concerned, neither Russian nor Japanese sources mention its existence."

                                "In any case, you are correct in concluding that the unit had no effect whatsoever on operations or the campaign."
                                Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                                Comment

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