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  • Originally posted by Psycho1943
    According to Andrey Glantz does not have access to all the information available IIRC. One of the criticisms from the Russian side is that he isn't telling everything so we don't get to know the entire truth.
    It was your message #178. Reread at least my message #174 (4 messages before).

    I said that Glantz didn't say a word about the info that was widely known in USSR in 1985, every Soviet schoolboy knew it in that time.

    What access restriction do you mean? About which my words do you speak? You distort my words.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Psycho1943
      One thought that occured to me when reading one of Andrey's posts. He mentioned the length of the front. Maybe they were calling the army weak because they were thinned out trying to cover the large area? I doubt anything we say can convince him that we are not out to make the Soviets look poorly.
      THEY [the Japanese] didn't call their troops weak before thy were crushed by Red Army. I gave you enough quotes of the most mportant Japanese militaries. THEY supposed that Kwantung Army was strong enough to stop the Soviets.

      Beaten generals have a lot of reasons to explain their defeats.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Andrey

        In the question of Operation "Mars" I disagree with him not because he said it was a failure of Zhukov. I disagree with him because he doesn't want to take into account Sudoplatov's memoirs that are available at least for last 5 years. The Russian version of huge diversionary operation looks like more truthful and explainable.

        Glantz behaves like Sudoplatov's memoirs never existed. If Glantz really wanted to know the truth about Operation "Mars" he had to check the data from Sudoplatov's memoirs. He had at least 5 years for it!!! At least Glantz had to mention about Sudoplatov's data

        Give me good proofs and I'll believe. It is not my blame that your sources don't look as a reliable enough sources.
        On this point, I think the Sudoplatov source has been overplayed because there is little to offer in rebuttal. Secondly, the source is an unsubstantiated memoir account; it needs verification. Which has not come from other sources, even the official objections to Glantz have not produced corroborating sources.
        Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Andrey

          You offer me to believe in Glantz's words like his books are the same like the Bible.
          The advantage that I have is that until 1995, I had read(and possess in my personal library) everything in English and in open Soviet military literature on the Red Army's Manchurian campaign. Glantz's August Storm was the most complete and detailed account. Since 1995, it sounds like Russian publications are catching up, and I am sure there are some insightful contributions to the campaign. However, for the purposes of the discussions on this thread, I do not believe there have been revelations (pardon the biblical pun) that would alter the conclusions offered.

          Parenthetically, the Bible, as history, has more gaps than I would attribute to Glantz.
          Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 05 Dec 05, 08:23.
          Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
            Did you try Alvin Coox's Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939? While the vast tome deals primarily with the Khalkin Gol/Nomonhan fight, primarily from the Japanese side, Coox has a good section subtitled "To the Demise of the Kwantung Army". He chronicles the Kwantung Army early 1942 "loan" of aviation, ground combat and supporting strength it gave to use in the south--which never returned because of unexpected reverses from Coral Sea and Midway to Guadacanal and New Guinea.

            He writes, "By now[spring 1945] the Kwantung Army was bereft of its finest divisions--the divisions of the Kantokean period. The oldest remaining division had been organized in the spring of 1944. Sixth Army headquarters (which had directed the last pahse of the Nomonhan war from Hailar) was transferred to China in January 1945. To maintain the appearance of strong field forces, IGHQ directed the Kwantung Army to increase the number of divisions and independent brigades by mobilizing the last available recruits." Sounds like a recipe for disaster to me, let alone a well-honed fighting force.

            Coox's strength is in his Japanese sources, he had "been studying the Kwantung Army and working with its survivors for so long--almost 35 years--that I feel as if I served in Manchuria and fought at Nomonhon." I believe he knew the army right up to its demise.
            Ok, let's look on Kwantung Army of 1941.

            In my source I have found the info that "Kantokean" plan ("Special maneurs of Kwantung Army" - the plan of attack against USSR) was signed in June of 1941. Soon the amount of Kwantung Army was increased twice up to 700 thousands men. It was not the addition of new regular units, it was the addition of reservists in the original units of Kwantung Army up to the staffs of military time. It means that Kwantung Army of summer-autumn of 1941 consisted of reservists on 50%!!!
            And it was considerd OK. 50% of Kwantung Army of early 1942 were former reservists who joined it 6 months ago.

            So the large amount of reservists in Kwantung Army of 1945 doesn't mean that they were bad soldiers.

            Let's speak about 1941 again. It looks like Japanese had good tanks in that time. Incorrect!!! The Japanese never had good tank. In Khalkhin-Gol in 1939 Soviet BT-s light tanks were much better than all the types of Japanese tanks. The Soviet tankmen who fought in Khalkhin-Gol recalled that they were very amazed by the weakness of Japanese tanks and they were proud that Soviet constructors provided them by good tanks. And, of course, a T-34 of 1941 also was much better than any Japanese tank of 1941. So it is funny to mention Japanese tank forces of 1941 and to speak" "Oh, to 1945 our tanks had became weak". The Japanese tanks were weak always.

            Let's speak again about the relative might of Kwantung Army of 1941 and 1945. The Soviets had crushed the Japanese in 1939 in Khalkhin-Gol. They fought against regular Japanese units of Kwantung Army and won them in land and in sky. Does it mean that the Japanese forces were very weak in 1939? The result was the same like in 1945. The Soviets were better ALWAYS. The Japanese in 1939 also supposed that they were better up to Zhukov's sudden powerful blow that was like a shock to them. Abd Zhukov in 1939 also won due the element of surprise. So the fact that the Soviets advanced so good in 1945 doesn't mean that the Japanese were weak.

            The oldest Japanese divisions of Kwantung Army were organized earlier than the autumn of 1944 (it is very easy to explore - look on Glantz's OOB)

            China was very close to Manchuria so to return back the 6th Army headquarters was not too difficult.

            The menoirs of the Soviet militaries who took part in the Manchurian Campaign of 1945 contain a lot of interesting information.

            Practically everyone writes that it was not "easy walk". Practically everyone writes about extremely furious Japanese resistance. The Japanese fought up to the end soldier. Very many veterans recall that the Japanese preferred to kill themselves but to not surrender. The Japanese fought in the same way like in the memoirs of the Americam vets about the war in the islands of the Pacific. NO ONE Soviet vet in the book that I've read recalls that they saw the Japanese soldiers with bad training, little weapon or that they met with a Japanese unit like German Volkssturm. The memoirs of Soviet soldiers who fought in Germany in 1945 contain info about German volkssturm and it is impossible that the Soviet vets of Manchuria, 1945 made the conspiracy to not speak about Japanese units that were so wak like German Volkssturm. But Western sources shows the image of untrained Japanese soldiers without enough weapon and even with bamboo spears. I didn't read about "bamboo spears" in the memoirs of Soviet vets.

            If to compare the memoirs of Soviet militaries about 1939 and 1945 so the image of the Japanese soldiers was approximately the same. The regular Japanese soldiers of 1939 fought in the same way like the Japanese soldiers of 1945.

            If to speak that Soviet vets exaggerated the opposing Japanese forces to increase the scale of their victory so it is possible to say the same things about US vets of the Pacific.

            So when anyone wants to imagine how the Japanese resistance was he has to imagine approximately the same like it was in the Pacific. And imagine that the amount of the Japanese was 700,000 (if to believe to Glantz) not including pro-Japanese Chinese forces.

            If you want I can try to translat some Soviet memoirs...

            Comment


            • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
              The advantage that I have is that until 1995, I had read(and possess in my personal library) everything in English and in open Soviet military literature on the Red Army's Manchurian campaign. Glantz's August Storm was the most complete and detailed account. Since 1995, it sounds like Russian publications are catching up, and I am sure there are some insightful contributions to the campaign. However, for the purposes of the discussions on this thread, I do not believe there have been revelations (pardon the biblical pun) that would alter the conclusions offered.

              Parenthetically, the Bible, as history, has more gaps than I would attribute to Glantz.
              How is about the mistakes that I've found in Glantz's work for a half of hour looking carefully his data about Japanese forces??? -

              To the point, in 1995 there was also RUSSIAN military literature. It is not the same Soviet military literature. The censorship began to stop from 1987.

              May be, Glantz decribed well the combats and wrote a lot of good facts from some concrete Soviet memoirs but he distorted the image of Japanese Army how it was shown by the Soviets and Russians. The Soviets and the Russians decribes Kwantuing Arny as a might force inside of powerful fortifications.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Andrey
                How is about the mistakes that I've found in Glantz's work for a half of hour looking carefully his data about Japanese forces??? -

                To the point, in 1995 there was also RUSSIAN military literature. It is not the same Soviet military literature. The censorship began to stop from 1987.

                May be, Glantz decribed well the combats and wrote a lot of good facts from some concrete Soviet memoirs but he distorted the image of Japanese Army how it was shown by the Soviets and Russians. The Soviets and the Russians decribes Kwantuing Arny as a might force inside of powerful fortifications.
                You focused on the Unit 731 which has not been a factor in the operational literature. You found some discrepancies in order of battle that seem to be primarily editing errors.

                Which Russian sources are you referring to that were published between 1987 and 1995?

                The judgment on the condition of the Japanese army is based more on Japanese sources, and those are sources outside of memoirs which seem to lack a healthy skepticism in your evaluations.
                Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                Comment


                • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
                  On this point, I think the Sudoplatov source has been overplayed because there is little to offer in rebuttal. Secondly, the source is an unsubstantiated memoir account; it needs verification. Which has not come from other sources, even the official objections to Glantz have not produced corroborating sources.
                  I don't know how it is called in English. In Russian it has an image of a brick wall. Different facts are like bricks in the wall, they support one another and combine a wall. Any of those facts separately can be considered a mistake or a false only but all of them as one wall "makes a picture of events". "To see a picture" means to have a reliable impression about an event when all the data are coordinated with one another and all possible questions and discrepancies are explained. I "see the picture" of a huge diversionary operation "Mars". Sudoplatov's memoir
                  is only one, the most significant, part of that picture that is supported by other data.


                  Memoir sources can have mistakes that are connected with exact date, number, name. But it is impossible to make up a large scale intelligence operation with a lot of details. The leaders of Soviet intelligence of WWII time were serious guys.
                  I don't understand why Sudoplatove had to make it up. I do not believe in the conspiracy of modern Russian rules or intelligence against Glantz.

                  Russian TV showed a documentary film about that operation, those film was made as a part of the series of documentary films about Soviet intelligence, it was made in coordination with modern Russian FSB. So it is incorrect to speak that Sudoplatov's memoir is only a memoir of an old man with a marasmus.

                  I do not want to begin new talking about Operation "Mars", I only explain what I dislike in Glantz's works. Also I suppose that a lot of Russians (from those Russians who know WWII history - ) are dissapointed by Glantz's position in the question of Operation "Mars".

                  It is a very comfortable position - to mention all favorable sources and to not mention all non-favorable sources as non-reliable and to call all criticism as revenge of official rules for the book that contradicts with official Russian opinion.

                  If Glantz wants the Russians to believe him he has to answer on the criticism against him. Now it looks like he avoided from the discussing it as he doesn't know what to answer.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Andrey
                    Memoir sources can have mistakes that are connected with exact date, number, name. But it is impossible to make up a large scale intelligence operation with a lot of details. The leaders of Soviet intelligence of WWII time were serious guys.
                    I don't understand why Sudoplatove had to make it up. I do not believe in the conspiracy of modern Russian rules or intelligence against Glantz.

                    Russian TV showed a documentary film about that operation, those film was made as a part of the series of documentary films about Soviet intelligence, it was made in coordination with modern Russian FSB. So it is incorrect to speak that Sudoplatov's memoir is only a memoir of an old man with a marasmus.

                    I do not want to begin new talking about Operation "Mars", I only explain what I dislike in Glantz's works. Also I suppose that a lot of Russians (from those Russians who know WWII history - ) are dissapointed by Glantz's position in the question of Operation "Mars".
                    The concern for memoirs is not only factual errors, but also personal agendas. "I don't understand why Sudoplatove had to make it up." I do not understand either, if he even did. But when it is unsupported by other sources, then one suspects personal foibles like trying to claim they know something no one else does. It is said to make themselves look important. It is something they heard as a rumor. It may be an erroneous perception, interpretations or understanding of the action. Motivations in memoirs are as varied as personalities.

                    The other point is "I only explain what I dislike in Glantz's works", yet you have never read his works(as noted in your previous message)! That lacks credibility!! So, if you will do that with Glantz sources, I am skeptical how you handle other sources. I like it very much when you can give a specific reference which I can then track down, read, and judge in the context of the greater available literature. Because, at this point, I do not know if you have fully read the works yourself.

                    I do not know if I would use as strong a word as conspiracy against Glantz. However, the closing of archival access and the reinstatement of security classification on historical material "smells" like the old Soviet management of information--not like the heady days of Glasnost (1987-1995). The government 'dost protest too much' about single book by a western historian.
                    Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 05 Dec 05, 09:51.
                    Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
                      You focused on the Unit 731 which has not been a factor in the operational literature.
                      Do you remember about "a half of an hour"? I am not historian and not an expert in Kwantung Army. But I have found a few mistakes for a short time in the book that you consider a Bible of Manchurian Campaign!!!!

                      Unit 731 was Japanese "Manhattan project". It was a strategical weapon. It was not like an ordinary regiment or battalion. And I used it because it was VERY well known in USSR in 1985 and it was impossible to miss the info about it.

                      You found some discrepancies in order of battle that seem to be primarily editing errors.
                      It doesn't look like editing errors only. It looks like Glantz used other sorces without enough checking. One part of his text was simply copied from one source, the other - from another It is only my guess-work. So it was not his mistake but mistakes of previous authors. Also I can make a conclusion that Glantz himself didn't investigate the question of the strength of Kwantung Army of August of 1945.

                      But all the mistakes, found by me, reduce the strength of Kwantung Army. If to correct the mistakes so the might of Kwantung Army increases. Isn't it strange?

                      Which Russian sources are you referring to that were published between 1987 and 1995?
                      I speak about military literature commonly. In that time the opening of "hidden secrets" of Soviet past was very popular.

                      The judgment on the condition of the Japanese army is based more on Japanese sources, and those are sources outside of memoirs which seem to lack a healthy skepticism in your evaluations.
                      Did you hear that the generals who lost their battle try to find reasons of their defeats? If they reduce the might of their troops so they are looked no so badly like it was really. And the question of "relative strength" of troops is very difficult to check. How is it possible to check the info about combat readiness of the unit that was encircled and crushed by enemy?

                      The Soviet sources explained the failures of 1941 by the Germans' huge supremacy in tanks, planes, guns. In many Soviet memoirs (including Zhukov's ones) and movies sky was full of German planes and the land was full of waves of advancing German panzers.

                      But really Red Army had more tanks and planes than the Germans.

                      If to believe to Soviet sources about Red Army of June 1941 so it means to reduce the real amount of Soviet tanks and planes in a few times.

                      If to return again to the concrete data. In Germany in 1945 practically all German generals knew that the war is lost asnd that the German forces were not able to stop the Soviets, Guderian for a few times tried to speak about it with Hitler. In 1945 all the Japanese military leaders (they supposed that they knew the situation in Kwantung Army) believed that Kwantung Army is strong enough and the failure of Kwantung Army was a complete surprise for them. Isn't it strange if to believe that Kwantung Army was so weak?

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong
                        The concern for memoirs is not only factual errors, but also personal agendas. "I don't understand why Sudoplatove had to make it up." I do not understand either, if he even did. But when it is unsupported by other sources, then one suspects personal foibles like trying to claim they know something no one else does. It is said to make themselves look important. It is something they heard as a rumor. It may be an erroneous perception, interpretations or understanding of the action. Motivations in memoirs are as varied as personalities.
                        Does it mean to not believe to ANY memoir? Churchill, Bradley, Frederick Sherman - does it mean that their memoirs can not be considered a source? How do you define to whom to beleve and to whom - to not believe? Why if Sudoplatov is a source with unknown scale of reliability he is not mentioned completely like his memoir is not existed? The non-reliable sources usually are mentioned with remark "this data was not confirned or disproved".

                        Did you understand what I mean "to see the picture"?

                        The other point is "I only explain what I dislike in Glantz's works", yet you have never read his works(as noted in your previous message)! That lacks credibility!! So, if you will do that with Glantz sources, I am skeptical how you handle other sources. I like it very much when you can give a specific reference which I can then track down, read, and judge in the context of the greater available literature. Because, at this point, I do not know if you have fully read the works yourself.
                        Yes, I didn't read Glantz. It is impossible for me. So what? I have common impression about it and if I read a few hundred pages description which division where advanced in the concrete day of Operation "Mars" it can't answer the question of the strategic task of the operation. OK, I didn't read it but others read it!!! If Glantz's book contained the answer on necessary questions so those who read it (including you) had to answer on those questions. I do not understand why no one is able to explain shortly what is the reason to doubt in large scale diversionary operation. Goncharov's article which was sebt you earlier explains enough all strategic doubts. Did you read that article? Do you consider Goncharov's arguments not good?

                        I repeat again that I am not a historian, I only a person who is interesting the history of WWII.

                        And I am not alone Russian who criticize Glantz's work about Operation "Mars". OK, I am low informed person. But do you suppose that Gareev also didn't read Glantz's book? Gareev criticize it, Orlov critisizes it, Goncharov criticizes it. Who from Russians does agree with Glantz? I speak about the question of the strategical task of the Operation and not about the description of concrete tactical level combats. Why do Russians believe to Sudoplatov but Glantz doesn't believe to him? Do you suppose that Russian experts don't know how to differ reliable and non-reliable memoirs?

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Andrey
                          Does it mean to not believe to ANY memoir?



                          I repeat again that I am not a historian, I only a person who is interesting the history of WWII.

                          Do you suppose that Russian experts don't know how to differ reliable and non-reliable memoirs?
                          Memoirs are interesting, insightful and useful within the context of other sources.

                          One does not have to be a historian to qualify the efficacy of what they are reading. If for no other reason than not to waste your time--too many good works (and so little time).

                          I'm sure Russian experts know how to differentiate memoirs--the problem is 75 years of agendas and manipulations. You have previously posted that you did not believe the whole body of Soviet officer memoirs for the truth about the war. I, on the other hand, have used those memoirs with other sources and have found them, at least in part, interesting, insightful, and useful.
                          Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Andrey
                            I wrote that message and them I deleted it as I do not again discuss who is more biased and who is ready to change his opinion.

                            But you were very quickly and answered my message while it existed.

                            The reason of my message is that Psycho1943 again began to speak that it is impossible to convince me and so on...

                            Ok this might take a few posts to cover everything but I will try to keep it short.

                            You still don't grasp my point and I don't think you ever will. I am not trying to convince you that your sources are wrong and Western ones are right. I am saying that you and I don't know the truth about what happened in WW2. We have to read what is written and base things on what they say. I keep saying that I don't know who is more truthfull. I am not the one that keeps saying, "the sources from my side are right and your side is lying propaganda." I am not the one that is saying, "your sources are trying to make my country and our soldiers look bad." Your stance is always that Russian sources are correct and Western sources are lying propaganda. If you don't actually go as far to call it lying propaganda you are still highly suspect of our information.

                            I am trying to tell you to be more open to the possibility that some of your sources could have mistakes or lies or problems and bias in them. I am sure these things exist in Western sources but they are also present in your sources as well.

                            I have never changed my stance on this subject. I am not trying to turn you against Russian sources and completely believe ours. It would be nice if we could just show you parts of different sources and let you make up your mind without knowing which side it comes from.
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                            • Originally posted by Andrey
                              Glantz's books are not translated in Rusian, English-language books are not selled in Russian book shops. So I didn't read any his book.

                              I heard a lot of good words about Glantz and suppose that he is a very good author who makes mistakes sometimes.

                              I AM NOT AGAINST GLANTZ. I never spoke he is a bad author. I am against those from his opinions that are mistaken according my opinion. I described enough WHY I suppose they are mistaken.
                              We don't have access to the Soviet sources either so we are in the same situation as you. Again as I pointed out before, you complain about mistakes in Glantz works and constantly complain about his writings but seem to blindly accept Russian sources over anything from the West. I am sure you guys have great records of what happened but are you saying there are no mistakes in any of your sources?



                              Originally posted by Andrey
                              You offer me to believe in Glantz's words like his books are the same like the Bible.
                              Sorry but I don't recall anybody from the West here saying that Glantz is the last word on what happened in the East Front battles. He is probably the best source from our side but we aren't claiming he has all the answers. We don't know everything and you and Amvas have mentioned the reason for this yourselves. The archives are not completely open to you guys and especially not open to Westerners. How could he have all the answers when he doesn't even have access to all your sources?



                              Originally posted by Andrey
                              In the question of Operation "Mars" I disagree with him not because he said it was a failure of Zhukov. I disagree with him because he doesn't want to take into account Sudoplatov's memoirs that are available at least for last 5 years. The Russian version of huge diversionary operation looks like more truthful and explainable.

                              Glantz behaves like Sudoplatov's memoirs never existed. If Glantz really wanted to know the truth about Operation "Mars" he had to check the data from Sudoplatov's memoirs. He had at least 5 years for it!!! At least Glantz had to mention about Sudoplatov's data.
                              This is your opinion versus his opinion. Your opinion does not necessarily make you right. It is possible that he is right or that you are right. Or maybe you could both be wrong. Maybe Glantz couldn't find any info to back up Sudoplatov, maybe he just doesn't believe him, or maybe he didn't even get to see it. Who knows why? Why don't you get in touch with him and ask him? Unless he says why then we don't know. You make it sound like he just dismisses Russian stuff out of hand on purpose. You aren't there when he does research or writes his books and neither am I.


                              Originally posted by Andrey
                              You are incorrect.

                              Give me good proofs and I'll believe. It is not my blame that your sources don't look as a reliable enough sources.
                              Your give sources and say we should believe them. We give a source and you say that it is wrong. You base this on your source being right and that makes ours wrong. Do you understand this cycle? Our sources are always wrong unless they agree with yours. If there is any difference in sources then you believe yours is correct.
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                              • Originally posted by Andrey
                                Ok, let's look on Kwantung Army of 1941.

                                In my source I have found the info that "Kantokean" plan ("Special maneurs of Kwantung Army" - the plan of attack against USSR) was signed in June of 1941. Soon the amount of Kwantung Army was increased twice up to 700 thousands men. It was not the addition of new regular units, it was the addition of reservists in the original units of Kwantung Army up to the staffs of military time. It means that Kwantung Army of summer-autumn of 1941 consisted of reservists on 50%!!!
                                And it was considerd OK. 50% of Kwantung Army of early 1942 were former reservists who joined it 6 months ago.

                                So the large amount of reservists in Kwantung Army of 1945 doesn't mean that they were bad soldiers.

                                Let's speak about 1941 again. It looks like Japanese had good tanks in that time. Incorrect!!! The Japanese never had good tank. In Khalkhin-Gol in 1939 Soviet BT-s light tanks were much better than all the types of Japanese tanks. The Soviet tankmen who fought in Khalkhin-Gol recalled that they were very amazed by the weakness of Japanese tanks and they were proud that Soviet constructors provided them by good tanks. And, of course, a T-34 of 1941 also was much better than any Japanese tank of 1941. So it is funny to mention Japanese tank forces of 1941 and to speak" "Oh, to 1945 our tanks had became weak". The Japanese tanks were weak always...

                                I didn't quote the entire post because this makes the main point for me.

                                You keep saying we shouldn't call the Kwantung Army weak but you even make the point here about their capabilities. They had poor equipment especially those pathetic tanks facing you. What fighting these guys had been doing was against Chinese forces. Now I wouldn't say the Chinese weren't courageous or anything but they don't compare to the Soviet troops overall. The Soviets were kicking ass by 1945 and had some of the best equipment of the war. Compared to the Soviet troops I would definitely call the Kwantung Army weak. You guys beat the sh!t out of them and you should have. There might have been a few places that were tough to finish off but overall it was pretty easy.
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