Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Efficiency of Armor Use in the USSR

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Efficiency of Armor Use in the USSR

    In this thread tanks includes vehicles on caterpillars with a fixed cannon or with a turret.

    1) The USSR had over 20,000 tanks and 60,000 cannon when Germany invaded with about 3,400 tanks and 7,400 cannon. Moreover, the USSR manufactured nearly 100,000 of the best tanks in WW II and 500,000 cannon and received about 18,000 tanks from the US and Britain. In contrast Germany produced about 60,000 tanks and some of these were deployed in the west.

    2) While on May 10, 1940 Germany had about 4,800 planes, including dozens of Hs123 dive bombers and hundreds of Stukas, Bf-110s, Ju-88s, By June 22, 1941 Hitler had lost over 5,000 planes and 10,000 aviators in France, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Greece, Africa and the Med and airplane production was dismally low between the fall of France and the end of Barbarossa. So Hitler invaded the huge USSR with a lot fewer Hs 123, Stuka, Bf-110, Ju-88, etc, than he had used in the invasion of tiny France. Accordingly, Guderian received the most concentrated and prolonged air support in history during his sickle cut advance in France, while in the USSR the much weakened Luftwaffe had to cover a huge front exceeding 3,000 km and provided extremely deficient support to Guderian and to all the other commanders, who had to face huge numbers of tanks, cannon, troops and impressive, deep defensive lines with their fast dwindling forces.

    3) Most of the German tanks and weapons that invaded the USSR were much inferior to many of the Soviet counterparts they had to face. For example some of the German tanks were pierced even by the Soviet 13 mm machine gun round, while Soviet tanks were impervious to the most abundant German antitank gun (37 mm) and to the German 20 mm cannon.

    4) Throughout the war the USSR produced close to 37,000 Sturmovik antitank planes (compared with a few thousand Stukas), millions of antitank bombs, antitank mines and heavy rockets and even trained dogs to blow up tanks.

    5) German tanks, trucks, planes, etc, were always short of fuel, while the USSR produced some fuel and received a lot from the US. Moreover, the Soviets received huge numbers of trucks, trains, etc, which greatly helped to supply the tanks, troops, etc, While German factories, refineries, railroad centers, trains, etc, were being bombed persistently.

    6) While Germany and the US had to fight on two distant fronts, Stalin refused adamantly to attack Japan until Germany fell and fought most of the war on his own territory. In 1944 on average Germany lost 1,000 planes per month in the west and 420 in the east.

    Despite these glaring differences, the Germans captured in 6 months what the Soviets took 3 years to recapture. Therefore, one can only conclude that the Soviets used their massive resources extremely inefficiently.

  • #2
    Originally posted by Draco View Post
    In this thread tanks includes vehicles on caterpillars with a fixed cannon or with a turret.

    1) The USSR had over 20,000 tanks and 60,000 cannon when Germany invaded with about 3,400 tanks and 7,400 cannon. Moreover, the USSR manufactured nearly 100,000 of the best tanks in WW II and 500,000 cannon and received about 18,000 tanks from the US and Britain. In contrast Germany produced about 60,000 tanks and some of these were deployed in the west.
    The Tank arsenal of the USSR was by the time pretty much a paper tiger with many non-operational or outdated models.


    3) Most of the German tanks and weapons that invaded the USSR were much inferior to many of the Soviet counterparts they had to face. For example some of the German tanks were pierced even by the Soviet 13 mm machine gun round, while Soviet tanks were impervious to the most abundant German antitank gun (37 mm) and to the German 20 mm cannon.
    That assessment is solely based on the incorrect conclusion that all soviet tanks was of the more advanced models which wasn't the case. Further the full theoretical performance of tanks can only be used if they are properly supplied, organized, maintained, supported and the crews are properly trained. Almost none of these conditions were meet by the time of the invasion.



    4) Throughout the war the USSR produced close to 37,000 Sturmovik antitank planes (compared with a few thousand Stukas), millions of antitank bombs, antitank mines and heavy rockets and even trained dogs to blow up tanks.
    The last which was nothing of a great success.


    5) German tanks, trucks, planes, etc, were always short of fuel, while the USSR produced some fuel and received a lot from the US. Moreover, the Soviets received huge numbers of trucks, trains, etc, which greatly helped to supply the tanks, troops, etc, While German factories, refineries, railroad centers, trains, etc, were being bombed persistently.
    LL aid became significant only after the German coffin was kicked open.

    6) While Germany and the US had to fight on two distant fronts, Stalin refused adamantly to attack Japan until Germany fell and fought most of the war on his own territory. In 1944 on average Germany lost 1,000 planes per month in the west and 420 in the east.
    Apparently you have no understanding of the amount of German troops on Soviet soil. Attacking Japanese forces didn´t make sense at the time as they was practically harmless and the land they occupied had very little strategic value.

    Despite these glaring differences,
    That has been debunked

    the Germans captured in 6 months what the Soviets took 3 years to recapture.
    And then the Germans lost everything...


    Therefore, one can only conclude
    Faulty logic based on faulty perimeters, even if they had been correct other conclusions could have been reached.

    that the Soviets used their massive resources extremely inefficiently.
    Theoretical numbers are one thing. But failing to take into account all theoretical numbers is not a very good foundation to try and make any kind of analysis.
    “For there is nothing more serious than a lunatic when he comes to the central point of his lunacy.”

    Max Sterner

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by Erkki View Post
      The Tank arsenal of the USSR was by the time pretty much a paper tiger with many non-operational or outdated models.
      The same can be said of the VVS.

      That assessment is solely based on the incorrect conclusion that all soviet tanks was of the more advanced models which wasn't the case.
      I forget exactly, but offhand the number of new tanks was less than 20% of the tank park. Of that total, most were plagued with an unreliable drive train that led to many being abandoned without seeing combat.

      Further the full theoretical performance of tanks can only be used if they are properly supplied, organized, maintained, supported and the crews are properly trained. Almost none of these conditions were met by the time of the invasion.
      Actually, NONE of those conditions were met by the time of the invasion. This has been described at length in at least three different, lengthy threads earlier this year.

      LL aid became significant only after the German coffin was kicked open.
      Again, this has been extensively discussed. Lend-Lease, generally meaning aid from the USA, began to arrive in 1943 but did not amount to much until 1944, when it was used to good effect. By then Germany's fate was already sealed. The Wehrmacht stayed on the defensive after Kursk, but to all intents and purposes their goose was cooked at Christmas in 1941.

      Apparently you have no understanding of the amount of German troops on Soviet soil. Attacking Japanese forces didn´t make sense at the time as they was practically harmless and the land they occupied had very little strategic value.
      The Japanese had nothing of interest to the USSR and the Japanese military posed no threat. The Soviet attack on Japan was part of the geopolitical chess game being played by the Big Three, not part of Stalin's own agenda. He said he would attack Japan ninety days after Germany was defeated, and he did.

      The rest of the original post is supposition based on the simplistic German-cum-American view of the Eastern Front. There has been enough good information come from Soviet archives in the last twenty years to debunk all of the conclusions drawn, but history as more than a bit of inertia.

      Regards
      Scott Fraser
      Ignorance is not the lack of knowledge. It is the refusal to learn.

      A contentedly cantankerous old fart

      Comment


      • #4
        Throughout military history, if you simply totaled up the weapons and men on each side and assumed the larger totals would win, you would be wrong about 75% of the time. From Alexander the Great through Frederick the Great, Napoleon, the 1940 campaign in France, the 1941 campaign in the USSR, the 1991 "Desert Storm" campaign in Kuwait/Iraq - the smaller side won, and frequently won overwhelmingly. Simple numerical totals are simply not reliable as an indicator of the relative worth of the forces.
        Specifically, the Campaign of 1941 pitted a German army at the peak of efficiency in terms of experience, doctrine, training, tactical and operational leadership, and tactical organization, against a Soviet Army in the middle of a massive expansion, short on officers, technicians, sergeants, vehicles, and overwhelmingly equipped with obsolete aircraft and tanks. Tactical and operational doctrine was still being worked out, had not been the subject of training yet, and, especially in the armored formations, tactical organizations were brand new, untrained, ill-equipped and with almost completely inexperienced leaders at all levels.
        Revealingly, a new Winter Warfare manual, incorporating the lessons of the Winter War in Finland, had just been completed in May 1941: the first of the 'new' revised tactical manuals. Ever wonder why the Red Army suddenly showed dramatic improvement in the winter of 1941 - 42? It was not simply (as the Germans repeatedly asserted) that the "Russian is ... primitive and at home in the wilderness" - 50% of the Soviet population in 1940 lived in towns and cities, and were no more at home in the 'wilderness' or the woods than the average Berliner: they were effective because they had a sound doctrine, sound equipment, and time to get at least the minimum required training - all factors which did not apply in the conditions of June - August 1941.
        Throughout the war, the German army was very good at the tactical and operational level - although their operational efficiency and mobility declined sharply in the last year of the war - and so they could inflict stinging tactical blows and casualties on all of their opponents. This efficiency at the lower levels, however, was coupled - from 1941 on - with almost incredible obtuseness at the strategic level, and the end result was that at the end of the day on 11 May 1945, for the first time in over 1000 years, there was not a single square meter of land anywhere in the world that was governed by German-speaking people.

        So much for the effectiveness of German arms.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by Scott Fraser View Post

          Actually, NONE of those conditions were met by the time of the invasion. This has been described at length in at least three different, lengthy threads earlier this year.
          In General that is completely true, however I am not certain enough to say that there never was a case when some or all of the conditions were meet on a local, even to no doubt temporary basis.
          “For there is nothing more serious than a lunatic when he comes to the central point of his lunacy.”

          Max Sterner

          Comment


          • #6
            Draco, to reply to your post one need to write a whole article. So I'll be brief enough

            Originally posted by Draco View Post
            In this thread tanks includes vehicles on caterpillars with a fixed cannon or with a turret.

            1) The USSR had over 20,000 tanks and 60,000 cannon when Germany invaded with about 3,400 tanks and 7,400 cannon. Moreover, the USSR manufactured nearly 100,000 of the best tanks in WW II and 500,000 cannon and received about 18,000 tanks from the US and Britain. In contrast Germany produced about 60,000 tanks and some of these were deployed in the west.
            By June 1 RKKA had ~23,106 tanks and tankettes and about 200 tanks were received from industry before June 22.
            Among them 12,782 tanks were in western military districts, or about one half.
            From that 12,782 – 2,157 tanks were new, not used and 8,383 used operable. The others needed some kind of repair. Fraction of operable tanks was about 82.5%.
            But the devil is hiding in details as usual. Many tanks operable on paper in reality had minor defects, which though made them inoperable in current moment of time.
            When we look at figures of the number of tanks left parks on June 22 one can see up to 25% of tank power were left there.

            As for guns of all types, I can see 53,951 guns of field artillery and 9,785 of antiaircraft artillery on June 1’41.

            Also you forgot several thousands of tanks captured by Germans in the cause of campaigns of 1939-41 years in Europe and tanks in German satellites, which also had several hundreds of vehicles.

            2) While on May 10, 1940 Germany had about 4,800 planes, including dozens of Hs123 dive bombers and hundreds of Stukas, Bf-110s, Ju-88s, By June 22, 1941 Hitler had lost over 5,000 planes and 10,000 aviators in France, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Greece, Africa and the Med and airplane production was dismally low between the fall of France and the end of Barbarossa. So Hitler invaded the huge USSR with a lot fewer Hs 123, Stuka, Bf-110, Ju-88, etc, than he had used in the invasion of tiny France. Accordingly, Guderian received the most concentrated and prolonged air support in history during his sickle cut advance in France, while in the USSR the much weakened Luftwaffe had to cover a huge front exceeding 3,000 km and provided extremely deficient support to Guderian and to all the other commanders, who had to face huge numbers of tanks, cannon, troops and impressive, deep defensive lines with their fast dwindling forces.
            And again, devil is hidden in details. I have to say that the airplanes have no power individually. They must be guided. Germans organized very effective guiding structure for Luftwaffe.
            Soviets had much problems with their organization. For example, soviet air divisions were subordinated to surface troops commanders, which had their own problems on the ground and had no experience of operating with aviation. Later in 1942-43 aviation was re-organized into air armies, which increased their opportunities much.
            Again, you forgot signals services. Soviet planes for a long time had great problems with been equipped with radios. Germans had also such thing as ground representative, which were used for coordination between air and surface forces directly on battlefield. Soviets started using similar scheme again only in 1942-43
            Besides all the organization problems the war appeared at the period of reorganization of soviet air units and when they only started receiving new planes of newer generation. Sometimes an air regiment had TWO sets of airplanes, new and old. And new airplanes were left on the ground, because pilots were not trained enough to use them.
            German air forces by that time used their planes for longer period and were much trained including air tactics, where Soviets were also behind them.
            Finally, better supply and service let Germans use their pilots and planes much more intensively than the Soviets.
            As for Guderian he got his support after Germans managed to catch most soviet planes on the ground and thus weakened them much

            3) Most of the German tanks and weapons that invaded the USSR were much inferior to many of the Soviet counterparts they had to face. For example some of the German tanks were pierced even by the Soviet 13 mm machine gun round, while Soviet tanks were impervious to the most abundant German antitank gun (37 mm) and to the German 20 mm cannon.
            It’s only part of the truth. Again, devil hiding in details
            For example German 75mm gun had more powerful armor-piercing round than its 76-mm counterpart. Moreover Soviet had great lack of those. Similar problems had 45mm Soviet gun. Its armor-piercing round was found to be much weaker than expected.
            Just for your reference, Soviet had no 13 mm weapons… Maybe you meant 12.5-mm DShK MGs, or 14.5mm AT rifles. Also, draw attention, that Soviets had noting similar to German automatic 20-mm guns, widely used by Germans as antitank under suitable conditions. 20-mm gun was enough to hit soviet light tanks as well as 37-mm AT guns. They got problems only while meeting with the newer T-34 and KV tanks (sometimes with T-28s)
            Besides guns you forgot that tank had observation facilities and radio. German tanks had advantage in them


            4) Throughout the war the USSR produced close to 37,000 Sturmovik antitank planes (compared with a few thousand Stukas), millions of antitank bombs, antitank mines and heavy rockets and even trained dogs to blow up tanks.
            Believe me, IL-2 made much more problems to Germans than you think. They were not antitank. They were used as ground attack bombers including antitank purposes. Btw they got special antitank bombs only in 1943.
            A good question is using of antitank mines. I can say that in 1941 soviet had great, no – GREAT lack of those. You almost never see any details about usage of Soviet mines in 1941 before the battle of Moscow.
            Also I would say Soviet mines sometimes were not powerful enough to destroy German tanks. They only damaged them and after several hours of repair a tank became operable.
            Heavy rockets were used against tanks only in emergency. It was not a usual case.
            Finishing with this Stikas were not very effective against Soviet tanks (forget about Rudel, who claimed knocking out a whole tank army). Only in the first months of the war when soviet had almost no air protection they could have some success. For example during Soviet counter-blow of the 5th and 7th Mechanised corps in Senno-Lepel direction, or in Lithuania in late June. Mostly Stukas had success attacking tank on march. While IL-2 could got them with much success on battlefield as well.
            Attempt to use 37-mm guns on IL-2 like it was done on Ju-87G failed because showed its low efficiency just against tanks. Only very well trained pilots could hit a tank using this.
            LOL, I wonder how much tanks Rudel counted destroyed which in reality were merely masked by smoke shells. Russian crews were very resourceful and Rudel – very conceited.


            5) German tanks, trucks, planes, etc, were always short of fuel, while the USSR produced some fuel and received a lot from the US. Moreover, the Soviets received huge numbers of trucks, trains, etc, which greatly helped to supply the tanks, troops, etc, While German factories, refineries, railroad centers, trains, etc, were being bombed persistently.
            Have you ever heard about synthetic fuel? Germans had problems mostly with the diesel fuel.
            Much German factories were placed underground and were not much suffering from air attacks.
            Lack of fuel took part mostly in 1945, when Germans lost Hungarian and Romanian oilfields.
            As for the Soviet fuel supply, I will say that about 50% of Soviet operable tanks didn’t even reach battleground due to problems with fuel or sparse supply. The Soviets had great lack of tank-trucks. In many times the ordinary trucks with barrels were used for transporting of petrol.
            Also, do you remember that it were Germans to invent such a comfortable thing as jerrican?
            Maybe it’ll surprise you, but soviets had nothing similar before the war.
            Btw, if you think that soviets factories, oil fields et.al. were not bombed by Germans, you are mistaken. However German air raids were weaker than allied against Germans. But Soviets had no underground plants. And besides all Soviets lost a great number of industry facilities in 1941. Only a giant-scale evacuation helped to restore production facilities by 1942-43 years.
            You must agree, that capturing of industrial facilities is much more destructive thing than bombings in any case.

            6) While Germany and the US had to fight on two distant fronts, Stalin refused adamantly to attack Japan until Germany fell and fought most of the war on his own territory. In 1944 on average Germany lost 1,000 planes per month in the west and 420 in the east.
            The USA felt safely fighting at two fronts because it had no surface fronts on its own territory. American industry had absolutely no problems with enemy air attacks. America unlike the USSA had a very power fleet. You could compare a soviet Navy forces on the Far East with Japanese ones and realize that attacking Japanese with them were similar to kamikazes with that differences that kamikazes had some chances for success. In 1945 the Japanese fleet, which soviets were so afraid was almost ruined that made possible to attack the islands, but nothing more.

            Despite these glaring differences, the Germans captured in 6 months what the Soviets took 3 years to recapture. Therefore, one can only conclude that the Soviets used their massive resources extremely inefficiently.
            Again you make a well-known mistake, comparing weapons with the results achieved by the troops.
            It’s not the same.
            In 1941 the Red Army was a misbalanced army of the piece time. Some units had up to 75% of soldiers recruited in May 1941. The Army expanding in 1939-41 resulted in loosing of balance in different segments. Especially this affected to the tank troops and aviation. Soviet High Command had no clear understanding how to operate with all that mass of tanks and airplanes and how to organize cooperation between different branches. This resulted in making misbalanced units such as a giant mechanized corps.
            They had very weak infantry and artillery supply. Besides all, the artillery had great problems with speedy prime-movers. Ordinary tractors could move guns only with 5-6 km/h. Due to lack of tanks to equip all the designed units most of them were understrengthened and had great lack of everything. Starting from commanders and finishing with supply.
            A separate problem was education of soldiers and officers. Due to natural problems much percent of those had only primary (4 forms!) education. And this can’t be trained.
            One more thing was national problem. Lots of recruits from the mid-Asia and Caucasus didn’t even know the Russian language! And the first thing commanders need to organize was to pass through this problem!
            Germans never had anything like this, btw.
            Some soviet units (the most powerful ones, btw) were used for reorganization into larger ones. As a result from one well-trained division we got 2 weaker ones.
            A separate story was supply. Most Soviet units had great problems with autotransport and prime-movers.
            Counting tanks, airplanes et.al. many authors forget that tank is not a horse, which can eat grass. And any vehicle needs to “eat” not only fuel, but also oil and sparse. Do you know, that the number of sparse parts produced by Soviet industry was negligible!!! It appeared due to the soviet planning economy, when producing of tanks was glorious. for those large numbers plant heads got orders and glory. While producing of some auxiliary vehicles, or sparse parts was not such. As a result even minor breakage led to missing of a vehicle. Soviet field repair workshops (which number was also about 2-3 times less than needed by staff again due to that damn incomplete reorganization) needed to repair one operable tank using details from two, or more others. I wonder how Soviet supply services could operate at all!
            For example, only ONE 8th Mechanized Corps was equipped with: T-34, KV-1, KV-2, T-26, BT-7, T-40, T-37, BT-7 tanks! 8 different types! And every type needed not only its own spares, but also different fuel and other supply.
            Another problem was as I have mentioned lack of prime-movers and other auxiliary vehicles. Been busy with tanks the soviet industry was not able to produce the other needed vehicles. It resulted in lack of powerful prime-movers, armored personnel-carriers, mobile antiaircraft vehicles (almost the only one such was M-4 quadrupled 7.62mm Maxim MG mount on truck. Later appeared 25-mm gun on truck) , field repair workshops, buses, tank-trucks and many others.

            Resuming all what I say. The main problem were not in weaponry, which in many cases was not too dramatically worse than German analogues, but in organization. For this state of arts there were lots of different objective and subjective reasons, which needs much time for discussion.
            Under an extremely difficult conditions of fights. Been caught by sudden German invasion unprepared, disorganized Soviet army made everything it could do under those conditions to defeat the most powerful army of the XX century.

            Regards
            Alex
            If you fire a rifle at the past, the future will fire a cannon at you.....

            Comment


            • #7
              Erkki wrote:
              The Tank arsenal of the USSR was by the time pretty much a paper tiger with many non-operational or outdated models.

              I disagree, Soviet armor included the T-34s that shocked the Germans and the extremely well armored KVs, which could only be penetrated by the 88 mm and that within 800 m.
              In contrast, during Barbarossa German armor was not only extremely scarce (given the massive numbers of enemy armor it encountered and the extent of the front), but included such poorly armed and extremely vulnerable vehicles as the Pz I & II, Polish & Czech tanks, etc, The number of the really useful Pz IV, STUG 3 as well as the 75 mm and 88 mm weapons is laughable. Moreover, the supposedly modern German army entered the USSR mostly on foot and dragging a large number of cannon and tons of supplies, etc, with 625,000 horses at Napoleonic pace. It used a jumble of British, French, American and German trucks for which it had no spares and which were rapidly damaged by the dust of the unpaved roads in the summer and the mud of the rainy season and most imprtantly, army group center could not use the railroads for months, because they had to replace the wide gauge rails. Accordingly in Yelnya Guderian lost over 40,000 men and almost all the tanks and artillery because he ran out of fuel, ammunition, etc, had no air support and Hitler refused permission to withdraw.
              Even the Romanian, Finnish and Hungarian armies, which had almost no tanks and planes and extremely few German tanks and planes supporting them realized impressive advances against massive Soviet forces. Interestingly Romania started Barbarossa with over 8,000 cannon (many of them good Czech cannon), more than the ridiculous German number. (for comparison purposes, the Soviets used over 16,000 cannon in Stalingrad alone and over 41,000 cannon in Berlin alone, besides the huge number of tanks).

              Here are two excerpts from my files:
              Throughout WW II the Soviets received 229,000 tons of aluminum, 2,752 Hurricanes, 1,331 Spitfires, 4,719 Airacobras (with 1.2 million high explosive 37 mm rounds), 2,397 P-40s, 2,400 Kingcobras, 203 P-47s, 5,000 Douglas A-20s, 866 B-25 Mitchells (18,339 planes in total), 2,000 Railroad engines, 3,485 Valentine tanks, 4,100 Sherman tanks (especially made with Diesel engines for the USSR), 832 Matilda tanks, 301 Churchill tanks, 1,200 Lee/Grant tanks, 1,233 Stuart tanks, etc, (over 13,000 tanks in all), 2,336 Bren carriers, 900 M3 halftracks, 3,092 M3A1 Scout cars, 360,000 Studebaker, Ford and Dodge trucks (200,000 of them heavy trucks), 51,000 Willys MB jeeps, 8,070 tractors, 8,000 Ford GPA amphibious vehicles (over 450,000 vehicles in all), 11,000 railroad cars, 62,000 miles of railroad tracks, 5,400 40mm AA guns, 56,445 field telephones, 600,000 km telephone wire, 1,400 radar sets, 317,000 tons of explosive materials and 103,000 tons of toluene the primary ingredient of TNT, 991 million shell cases in various sizes, 5.8 million tons of food (canned pork, powdered eggs, bacon, etc,), 6,200 electric generators, tens of thousands of machine tools, 15 million pairs of boots, millions of tons of high octane aviation fuel, steel, tires, rubber, medical supplies, etc, The Iranian railroad alone transported 5 million metric tons of supplies to the USSR. In total the USSR received 178 million metric tons. In contrast, the Germans had to relocate many Luftwaffe and army units from the USSR to North Africa in the winter of 1942 (during the Battle of Stalingrad), then to Italy and France, keep a huge air defense force over Germany and lost over 25,000 airplanes on the western front and their factories, rail road centers, power plants and cities were consistently bombed, which greatly contributed to the defeat of Germany in the USSR.

              Just during the last quarter of 1942 (during the battle of Stalingrad), Stalin received 350,000 tons of steel, 250.000 tons of aviation fuel, 60,000 trucks, 11,000 jeeps, 2 million boots, 50,000 tons of explosives, 300 Airacobras, etc, At the same time the Allies disembarked in North Africa, forcing Hitler to relocate troops, tanks and planes from the USSR. The reduced strength of the Luftwaffe in Stalingrad allowed the Soviets to gain air superiority over Stalingrad and to move troops from the eastern side of the Volga and finish off the German army, which could not be supplied by air, because of the Soviet air superiority, the bad weather and the lack of Ju-52s (many of which were also sent to Africa and promptly lost there).

              The Germans were far from beaten before operation Torch forced the relocation of planes etc, from Stalingrad, so the idea that L-L and allied help started after the nails were on the coffin is quite absurd. Had not Hitler lost 5,000 planes in France, Holland, Norway, the BoB, Greece, etc, Barbarossa would have been far more successful. Had not Africa tied up over 500 German planes (includng the best aces like Marseille) in Africa most of 41 and 42 Stalingrad would have been a different story.
              Last edited by Draco; 17 Aug 12, 22:36.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Draco View Post
                Erkki wrote:
                The Tank arsenal of the USSR was by the time pretty much a paper tiger with many non-operational or outdated models.

                I disagree, Soviet armor included the T-34s that shocked the Germans and the extremely well armored KVs, which could only be penetrated by the 88 mm and that within 800 m.
                Draco, seems you ignored my post.
                Ok, once more I'll remind you the problem. Not weaponry itself is fighting, but men and units. And German organization that time was much better than the Soviet one, which was caught just while reorganization and rearmament.
                Seems you also ignore another thing. Tanks T-34 and KVs which you are so fond of in 1941 had very low reliability due to numerous breakages. That time they were not like those famous tanks you know from 1942-45 years.
                Also been secret before the war crews had very low experience in their maintenance (silent about spares, which as usual were in very poor state)
                And attacking without infantry support neither T-34 nor KVs could achieve a success operating against German infantry, which used T-mines against them for example even when artillery was not much effective. but artillery (like later the Soviet artillery against German heavy tanks) could damage both KV and T-34s firing by wheels and tracks for example

                In contrast, during Barbarossa German armor was not only extremely scarce (given the massive numbers of enemy armor it encountered and the extent of the front), but included such poorly armed and extremely vulnerable vehicles as the Pz I & II, Polish & Czech tanks, etc, The number of the really useful Pz IV, STUG 3 as well as the 75 mm and 88 mm weapons is laughable. Moreover, the supposedly modern German army entered the USSR mostly on foot and dragging a large number of cannon and tons of supplies, etc, with 625,000 horses at Napoleonic pace.
                "on foot" - bla-bla-bla....
                German army had much trucks, horses and other auxiliary vehicles incompatible with the Soviet army.

                It used a jumble of British, French, American and German trucks for which it had no spares and which were rapidly damaged by the dust of the unpaved roads in the summer and the mud of the rainy season and most imprtantly, army group center could not use the railroads for months, because they had to replace the wide gauge rails. Accordingly in Yelnya Guderian lost over 40,000 men and almost all the tanks and artillery because he ran out of fuel, ammunition, etc, had no air support and Hitler refused permission to withdraw.
                Yes, Germans had problems with supply of different types of their vehicles. but they had quite good working industry in occupied countries. So, most problems were logistic of those spares while in the Soviet case it was also a problem of production.
                Also Germans captured a large number of soviet automobiles and used them since the beginning of the war (as well as captured artillery)

                Even the Romanian, Finnish and Hungarian armies, which had almost no tanks and planes and extremely few German tanks and planes supporting them realized impressive advances against massive Soviet forces.
                I need to remind you that they still had several hundreds of tanks in total.
                Even Slovakians had their own armored brigade.
                Where you noticed massive soviet forces against Hungary or Finns or Romanians???

                Interestingly Romania started Barbarossa with over 8,000 cannon (many of them good Czech cannon), more than the ridiculous German number. (for comparison purposes, the Soviets used over 16,000 cannon in Stalingrad alone and over 41,000 cannon in Berlin alone, besides the huge number of tanks).
                Romania didn't occupy such frontline. counting power count not absolute figures, but relative ones

                Here are two excerpts from my files:
                Throughout WW II the Soviets received 229,000 tons of aluminum, 2,752 Hurricanes, 1,331 Spitfires, 4,719 Airacobras (with 1.2 million high explosive 37 mm rounds), 2,397 P-40s, 2,400 Kingcobras, 203 P-47s, 5,000 Douglas A-20s, 866 B-25 Mitchells (18,339 planes in total), 2,000 Railroad engines, 3,485 Valentine tanks, 4,100 Sherman tanks (especially made with Diesel engines for the USSR), 832 Matilda tanks, 301 Churchill tanks, 1,200 Lee/Grant tanks, 1,233 Stuart tanks, etc, (over 13,000 tanks in all), 2,336 Bren carriers, 900 M3 halftracks, 3,092 M3A1 Scout cars, 360,000 Studebaker, Ford and Dodge trucks (200,000 of them heavy trucks), 51,000 Willys MB jeeps, 8,070 tractors, 8,000 Ford GPA amphibious vehicles (over 450,000 vehicles in all), 11,000 railroad cars, 62,000 miles of railroad tracks, 5,400 40mm AA guns, 56,445 field telephones, 600,000 km telephone wire, 1,400 radar sets, 317,000 tons of explosive materials and 103,000 tons of toluene the primary ingredient of TNT, 991 million shell cases in various sizes, 5.8 million tons of food (canned pork, powdered eggs, bacon, etc,), 6,200 electric generators, tens of thousands of machine tools, 15 million pairs of boots, millions of tons of high octane aviation fuel, steel, tires, rubber, medical supplies, etc, The Iranian railroad alone transported 5 million metric tons of supplies to the USSR. In total the USSR received 178 million metric tons. In contrast, the Germans had to relocate many Luftwaffe and army units from the USSR to North Africa in the winter of 1942 (during the Battle of Stalingrad), then to Italy and France, keep a huge air defense force over Germany and lost over 25,000 airplanes on the western front and their factories, rail road centers, power plants and cities were consistently bombed, which greatly contributed to the defeat of Germany in the USSR.
                And what does this mean?
                It's obvious without your figures that lend-lease was a large support for the Soviet union when it lost a giant facilities of its industry been captured in wester regions.

                As for units in the northern Africa. you can yourself count surface power of Rommel's corps with those forces on the Eastern Front

                Just during the last quarter of 1942 (during the battle of Stalingrad), Stalin received 350,000 tons of steel, 250.000 tons of aviation fuel, 60,000 trucks, 11,000 jeeps, 2 million boots, 50,000 tons of explosives, 300 Airacobras, etc, At the same time the Allies disembarked in North Africa, forcing Hitler to relocate troops, tanks and planes from the USSR. The reduced strength of the Luftwaffe in Stalingrad allowed the Soviets to gain air superiority over Stalingrad and to move troops from the eastern side of the Volga and finish off the German army, which could not be supplied by air, because of the Soviet air superiority, the bad weather and the lack of Ju-52s (many of which were also sent to Africa and promptly lost there).
                Stalingrad became a grave of German transport aviation. And if not the bad weather the Soviet air forces would annihilate them.

                The Germans were far from beaten before operation Torch forced the relocation of planes etc, from Stalingrad, so the idea that L-L and allied help started after the nails were on the coffin is quite absurd. Had not Hitler lost 5,000 planes in France, Holland, Norway, the BoB, Greece, etc, Barbarossa would have been far more successful. Had not Africa tied up over 500 German planes (including the best aces like Marseille) in Africa most of 41 and 42 Stalingrad would have been a different story.
                Allies helped before 1944 only in navy and air raid operations. Sorry, but never consider African battles to affect on the course of surface war too much
                If you fire a rifle at the past, the future will fire a cannon at you.....

                Comment


                • #9
                  Hi Amvas,
                  I did not argue your post because it basically agrees with my posture that Soviet leaders used very poorly the resources they had.

                  The Finns did face massive armor and air attacks even in 1939, which they opposed mostly with pre WW I artillery, civilians, Molotov cocktails, former officers of the Russian army, biplanes and a few lousy Brewster Buffaloes. They used most efficiently their meager artillery, men and planes. In contrast, the extremely incompetent Stalin ordered the invasion in the worst possible weather and put in charge the even more incompetent Voroshilov and Budyony. It was only when the weather improved, even more massive forces were commited and the slightly less incompetent Timoshenko replaced Budyony that the mighty Red Army forced the ridiculously small population of 4 million Finns to yield 13% of their territory.

                  Even in December of 1941 the supposedly brilliant Zhukov with fresh troops (well trained and many of them veterans from the encounters with the Japanese) and nearly 1,000 planes and tanks (many of them T-34s) stopped the exhausted and poorly supplied Germans and recovered only a small territory but could not wipe out the army group center, which was nearly out of tanks, planes and men (the few remaining were exhausted after 6 months of continuous fighting and freezing without winter coats).

                  The Germans were quite impressed with the 1941 T-34s they encountered and pressed the few they could capture in working order into service and got a lot more out of them than the Soviet leaders did.

                  As an example of what brilliant leadershp can do. Tiny Poland was invaded by 3 million Germans (nearly as many as in Barbarossa) and from 3 fronts. The Poles had 20 times fewer and worse tanks and cannon than the Soviets and a few hundred primitive planes. They did not have time to mobilize their 1 million men army as the Germans attacked public transportation, preventing a large number of men from joining their units. Yet the Poles managed to destroy half of the 200,000 German vehcles in their country and caused the German to run out of shells and bombs, so that had not the Soviets invaded with 1,000 tanks and 900,000 men 2 weeks after the Germans did or had the allies invaded Germany, Hitler would have been out of ammunition.

                  Similarly in France, the Germans would never have defeated the allies had they not concentrated huge air resources in support of Guderian and even then lost 2,000 planes to a few and obsolete MS.406, H-75s and Hurricanes with 2 blade propellers. In contrast, in the USSR a much weaker Luftwaffe had to destroy thousands of Soviet planes per week at the same time that it supported 3 huge and widely distant offensives, so that air support concentration was a tiny fraction of that in France, yet nothing could stop German armor during Barbarossa. In other words, given the meager air support during Barbarossa, it cannot even be considered Blitzkrieg.

                  WW II was won by airplanes. Like I said, Rommel maintained for years over 500 German planes with the best aces and great losses that would have been fatal for the USSR. Even the very few 88 mm guns, men, AA guns, tanks, etc, that Rommel used or were sunk in transit to Africa, would have had an impact in the USSR. Had Hitler not wasted 5,000 planes in the west before Barbarossa and several thousand more in the west during Barbarossa and in 1942, Kursk wouldn't even have taken place.
                  Last edited by Draco; 18 Aug 12, 11:41.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Draco View Post

                    I disagree, Soviet armor included the T-34s that shocked the Germans and the extremely well armored KVs, which could only be penetrated by the 88 mm and that within 800 m.
                    Oh yes T-34 existed! But why not go for T-35 or Kw-2 right away? The German army had Tiger II that was a big problem whenever encountered but they was to few, to unreliable and suffered from bad crew training and various other issues and didn´t manage to change the way of the war significantly. Just as the T-34 and Kw-1 that existed in 1941.



                    In contrast, during Barbarossa German armor was not only extremely scarce (given the massive numbers of enemy armor it encountered and the extent of the front),
                    Once again the total number of Soviet tanks are misleading


                    but included such poorly armed and extremely vulnerable vehicles as the Pz I & II, Polish & Czech tanks, etc, The number of the really useful Pz IV, STUG 3 as well as the 75 mm and 88 mm weapons is laughable.
                    And the Soviets didn´t have vulnerable tanks? Are you bloody serious?

                    Moreover, the supposedly modern German army entered the USSR mostly on foot and dragging a large number of cannon and tons of supplies, etc, with 625,000 horses at Napoleonic pace. It used a jumble of British, French, American and German trucks for which it had no spares and which were rapidly damaged by the dust of the unpaved roads in the summer and the mud of the rainy season and most imprtantly, army group center could not use the railroads for months, because they had to replace the wide gauge rails.
                    And the Soviet forces are supposedly immune to bad roads? They used hoover tanks, Aeroplanes and helicopters for resupplying I suppose?

                    Accordingly in Yelnya Guderian lost over 40,000 men and almost all the tanks and artillery because he ran out of fuel, ammunition, etc, had no air support and Hitler refused permission to withdraw.
                    Oh as usually the German generals comes up with excuses! I had no resources! It was Adolf! It was the Winter!


                    Even the Romanian, Finnish and Hungarian armies, which had almost no tanks and planes and extremely few German tanks and planes supporting them realized impressive advances against massive Soviet forces.
                    Once again you refuses to understand the shape those forces was in...

                    Interestingly Romania started Barbarossa with over 8,000 cannon (many of them good Czech cannon), more than the ridiculous German number. (for comparison purposes, the Soviets used over 16,000 cannon in Stalingrad alone and over 41,000 cannon in Berlin alone, besides the huge number of tanks).
                    So we jump from 1941 to 1942 to 1945? Interesting comparisons and all these are Artillery? Or AA or AT?
                    Here are two excerpts from my files:
                    Throughout WW II the Soviets received 229,000 tons of aluminum, 2,752 Hurricanes, 1,331 Spitfires, 4,719 Airacobras (with 1.2 million high explosive 37 mm rounds), 2,397 P-40s, 2,400 Kingcobras, 203 P-47s, 5,000 Douglas A-20s, 866 B-25 Mitchells (18,339 planes in total), 2,000 Railroad engines, 3,485 Valentine tanks, 4,100 Sherman tanks (especially made with Diesel engines for the USSR), 832 Matilda tanks, 301 Churchill tanks, 1,200 Lee/Grant tanks, 1,233 Stuart tanks, etc, (over 13,000 tanks in all), 2,336 Bren carriers, 900 M3 halftracks, 3,092 M3A1 Scout cars, 360,000 Studebaker, Ford and Dodge trucks (200,000 of them heavy trucks), 51,000 Willys MB jeeps, 8,070 tractors, 8,000 Ford GPA amphibious vehicles (over 450,000 vehicles in all), 11,000 railroad cars, 62,000 miles of railroad tracks, 5,400 40mm AA guns, 56,445 field telephones, 600,000 km telephone wire, 1,400 radar sets, 317,000 tons of explosive materials and 103,000 tons of toluene the primary ingredient of TNT, 991 million shell cases in various sizes, 5.8 million tons of food (canned pork, powdered eggs, bacon, etc,), 6,200 electric generators, tens of thousands of machine tools, 15 million pairs of boots, millions of tons of high octane aviation fuel, steel, tires, rubber, medical supplies, etc, The Iranian railroad alone transported 5 million metric tons of supplies to the USSR. In total the USSR received 178 million metric tons. In contrast, the Germans had to relocate many Luftwaffe and army units from the USSR to North Africa in the winter of 1942 (during the Battle of Stalingrad), then to Italy and France, keep a huge air defense force over Germany and lost over 25,000 airplanes on the western front and their factories, rail road centers, power plants and cities were consistently bombed, which greatly contributed to the defeat of Germany in the USSR
                    .

                    And how much German material was lost in the USSR?

                    Just during the last quarter of 1942 (during the battle of Stalingrad), Stalin received 350,000 tons of steel, 250.000 tons of aviation fuel, 60,000 trucks, 11,000 jeeps, 2 million boots, 50,000 tons of explosives, 300 Airacobras, etc,
                    The Germans lost the war outside Moscow in 1941, so it was to late to make that much difference. The LL saved a lot of Soviet lives but the end was already decided.
                    At the same time the Allies disembarked in North Africa, forcing Hitler to relocate troops, tanks and planes from the USSR.
                    How much exactly?

                    The reduced strength of the Luftwaffe in Stalingrad allowed the Soviets to gain air superiority over Stalingrad and to move troops from the eastern side of the Volga and finish off the German army, which could not be supplied by air, because of the Soviet air superiority, the bad weather and the lack of Ju-52s (many of which were also sent to Africa and promptly lost there).
                    Why didn´t the Germans simply relocate air from other parts of the front then?

                    The Germans were far from beaten before operation Torch forced the relocation of planes etc, from Stalingrad, so the idea that L-L and allied help started after the nails were on the coffin is quite absurd.
                    They was, their best troops laid as wolf food throughout the Soviet union...

                    Had not Hitler lost 5,000 planes in France, Holland, Norway, the BoB, Greece, etc, Barbarossa would have been far more successful.
                    Surely but they would have lost either way.

                    Had not Africa tied up over 500 German planes (includng the best aces like Marseille) in Africa most of 41 and 42 Stalingrad would have been a different story.
                    You give the German air force far to much value. I don´t see how more planes, depleting the Supplies faster and thus reducing the effectivness of the German air force even more are going to make up for the poor state of the German military.
                    “For there is nothing more serious than a lunatic when he comes to the central point of his lunacy.”

                    Max Sterner

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Draco View Post
                      Hi Amvas,
                      I did not argue your post because it basically agrees with my posture that Soviet leaders used very poorly the resources they had.

                      The Finns did face massive armor and air attacks even in 1939, which they opposed mostly with pre WW I artillery, civilians, Molotov cocktails, former officers of the Russian army, biplanes and a few lousy Brewster Buffaloes.
                      Why are you ignoring massive prepared defences? As well as Swedish Volunteer forces?


                      As an example of what brilliant leadershp can do.
                      If they were brilliant why did they loose so much ageist those "grossly incompetence Soviet subhuman"?
                      “For there is nothing more serious than a lunatic when he comes to the central point of his lunacy.”

                      Max Sterner

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Hi Erkki, Sorry, I'll only deal with your two last questions.
                        What you call massive defenses in Finland, were nothing compared to the deep Stalin line, which the Germans overcame. The simple fact that you are not surprised by the Red Army stumbling against a nation with 4 million people, with little industry, money and armament tells me that you will defend it regardless of what evidence says.

                        The Soviets waited until the Germans had destroyed or isolated by far most of the Polish army and only then invaded. However, their logistics were so poor that the tanks ran out of fuel, etc, Did you expect the few Poles to fight off 3 million Germans and 900,000 Soviets?

                        My point was that the small and poorly supplied Polish army, with much better leaders destroyed more German vehicles and in proportion more planes, despite the massive concentration of forces they encountered than the much better armed, huge Soviet army did in the same time.

                        I never said the Soviets were subhumans, just that their leaders were extremely incompetent. Had Stalin not murdered the best leaders, which included many of the best in the world (Tukhachevsky, etc,) and allowed his troops to withdraw, extending the German supply lines and his generals to maneuver, instead of ordering disastrous, premature counter offensives, the Germans would not have captured even half the territory, for they had extremely few resources.

                        I place a lot of importance on planes because they were decisive throughout the war. The British won the naval battle in Norway (wiped out the Kriegsmarine), but were kicked out by the LW. Hitler could not invade Britain and lost the war, because he lost the BoB (and a huge part of his planes). The Germans would not have defeated the allies in France without the LW. Holland surrendered prematurely because the LW destroyed Rotterdam. Yugoslavia, Greece would not have fallen so fast without the LW. Crete would have never fallen without the LW and Rommel would not have lasted a week without it. Accordingly, I am convinced that had the Germans had 600 more planes at the outset of Barbarossa, the outcome would have been different in all 3 offensives by changing completely the events in Tikhvin, Yelnya, etc,

                        Planes saved Malta, planes took Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, etc, American planes saved Wake the first time and Japanese planes took it the second time. Planes wiped out the Japanese fleet, etc, Soviet planes saved Kursk (because the Germans were losing thousands of planes to the west). Planes defeated the RN shamefully in the Dodecanese. 12,000 allied planes made possible the invasion of France. Only after the Soviets had air superiority could they advance after Kursk (though much more slowly than the Germans when they had air superiority).

                        Somehow the Soviets did not seem to use most effectively air superiority. Especially against the Finns or in Curland (where the isolated Germans withstood multiple offensives involving formidable tank, artillery and air forces, until the war was over.
                        Last edited by Draco; 19 Aug 12, 11:13.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Draco View Post
                          Hi Erkki, Sorry, I'll only deal with your two last questions.
                          What you call massive defenses in Finland, were nothing compared to the deep Stalin line, which the Germans overcame.
                          The Stalin line was partly disarmed before the war, and besides, the Germans simply outflanked parts of it rendering its defences useless. However, parts of it served their intended purpose well enough: bunkers at Kiev held the Germans until the encirclement strike from the north, parts of the Luga line were made up of Stalin line bunkers, and the Finns didn't even attempt to storm the Karelian Fortified region at all.

                          The simple fact that you are not surprised by the Red Army stumbling against a nation with 4 million people, with little industry, money and armament tells me that you will defend it regardless of what evidence says.
                          Putting aside the gross miscalculations of Soviet leaders which were based on the technical and numerical superiority of the Red Army, one has to take into consideration the following factors:

                          1. The Finns spent 20 years building fortifications and investigating the very complex terrain of this area.

                          2. The Soviet technical advantage was nearly nullified by the rocky, foresty and boggy terrain of this area - a tankman's nightmare to say the least. Proper aerial reconnaissance in forested areas was very difficult as well.

                          The Soviets waited until the Germans had destroyed or isolated by far most of the Polish army and only then invaded. However, their logistics were so poor that the tanks ran out of fuel, etc, Did you expect the few Poles to fight off 3 million Germans and 900,000 Soviets?
                          Erm, why did they have to attack Poland together with the Germans?

                          My point was that the small and poorly supplied Polish army, with much better leaders destroyed more German vehicles and in proportion more planes, despite the massive concentration of forces they encountered than the much better armed, huge Soviet army did in the same time.
                          Maybe it's because they fought on the land they'd been in control for at least 2 decades, close to the main supply centers, while most of the fighting in the first weeks of the war took place on the newly acquired territories.

                          I never said the Soviets were subhumans, just that they leaders were extremely incompetent. Had Stalin not murdered the best leaders, which included many of the best in the world (Tukhachevsky, etc,) and allowed his troops to withdraw, extending the German supply lines and his generals to maneuver, instead of ordering disastrous, premature counter offensives, the Germans would not have captured even half the territory, for they had extremely few resources.
                          It is argued that it were these counteroffensives which ultimately hindered the German advance as the troops lacked both the mobility and the doctrine to deal with strong and fast armoured breakthroughs of the Wehrmacht.

                          Accordingly, I am convinced that had the Germans had 600 more planes at the outset of Barbarossa, the outcome would have been different in all 3 offensives by changing completely the events in Tikhvin, Yelnya, etc,
                          At Tikhvin the planes could do Germans little good - the weather was bad most of the time and in that terrain the Red Army employed the Finnish tactics of mobile ski brigades with much success to harass Geman communications and to advance quickly through thick snow.

                          Somehow the Soviets did not seem to use most effectively air superiority. Especially against the Finns or in Curland (where the isolated Germans withsttod multiple offensives involving formidable tank, artillery and air forces, until the war was over.
                          And this is exactly for the reasons I've mentioned above. As for Kurland, the strength of Soviet attacks has been massively exaggerated by Wehrmacht generals as this was essentially a holding operation since early 1945.
                          www.histours.ru

                          Siege of Leningrad battlefield tour

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by ShAA View Post
                            As for Kurland, the strength of Soviet attacks has been massively exaggerated by Wehrmacht generals as this was essentially a holding operation since early 1945.

                            Between October and February, the Red Army conducted no less than 5 separate offensives into Courland.

                            The first 2 offensives(15-22 oct)(27 oct-25 nov) could be said to have had the goal of capturing Riga and destroying the Courland grouping of German forces respectively.

                            The other 3 offensives up through Feb. were essentially executed to prevent German forces from being transferred out for the defence of the Reich.

                            A 6th offensive in March had the same objective as the last 3.

                            Krivosheev estimates that between Feb and May 1945, the Red Army facing Courland suffered a total of 160,000 casualties.
                            German sources estimate as many as 320,000 Soviet casualties suffered between October '44 and early March '45.
                            Scientists have announced they've discovered a cure for apathy. However no one has shown the slightest bit of interest !!

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by tigersqn View Post
                              Between October and February, the Red Army conducted no less than 5 separate offensives into Courland.

                              The first 2 offensives(15-22 oct)(27 oct-25 nov) could be said to have had the goal of capturing Riga and destroying the Courland grouping of German forces respectively.

                              The other 3 offensives up through Feb. were essentially executed to prevent German forces from being transferred out for the defence of the Reich.
                              A 6th offensive in March had the same objective as the last 3.
                              Offensives as such do not always mean a decisive application of all available forces to achieve a crushing and spectacular defeat of the enemy. Quite often they play an auxiliary role to tie down the units which the enemy might use at the main point of attack where the main force is concentrated.

                              Krivosheev estimates that between Feb and May 1945, the Red Army facing Courland suffered a total of 160,000 casualties.
                              Yes, compared to the main fronts such casualties were not that large, which amount to a holding action against an army group which was not completely encircled and could have been evacuated at any time.

                              German sources estimate as many as 320,000 Soviet casualties suffered between October '44 and early March '45.
                              Not sure why this is relevant here at all, but I see why you brought it up here and where you're coming from
                              www.histours.ru

                              Siege of Leningrad battlefield tour

                              Comment

                              Latest Topics

                              Collapse

                              Working...
                              X