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GKO Directive on 5 Oct 1941

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  • GKO Directive on 5 Oct 1941

    Greetings All,

    I have been looking for a directive issued by the GKO on 5 Oct 1941.

    This directive forms a new “Strategic Echelon” along the Volga River line…containing 9 new reserve armies. Can anyone find and post it…please.

    This info comes from the book Thunder in the East by Evan Mawdsley, page 96.

    Thanks

  • #2
    Originally posted by Dann Falk View Post
    Greetings All,

    I have been looking for a directive issued by the GKO on 5 Oct 1941.

    This directive forms a new “Strategic Echelon” along the Volga River line…containing 9 new reserve armies. Can anyone find and post it…please.

    This info comes from the book Thunder in the East by Evan Mawdsley, page 96.

    Thanks
    There is a NKO directive 0098 dated 6th October 1941. Using a web translator program I got this:
    I order: 108, 486, 537, 440, 138 and 403 Howitzer artillery regiments ARGK heavy-duty regenerated in Artillery regiments ARGK II type by State no. 08/63. Newly formed regiments were assigned numbers 108, 995, 486, 537, 440, 138, 403 and 998. Place the formation in the area of Moscow on the orders of the Commander of the Moscow military district. 8 October for readiness regiments with g. Responsible for the formation of look to the Chief of Artillery of the Moscow military district. Directors of the central offices of NCBS equip Regiment missing property and material part. ZAM. PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR of DEFENCE of USSR General-Colonel of artillery-VORONOV.
    Source: http://www.soldat.ru/doc/nko/1941/0098-1.gif

    Probably best to ask direct, Egorka helped me with directive 325 .
    How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
    Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

    Comment


    • #3
      I quickly browsed through my books with possible placement of NKO orders. But I didn't find this order.
      However a derivative from it might be orders to form several reserve armies

      Look for example here
      http://www.oboznik.ru/?p=10140

      They indeed were expected to be set along the Volga and Sheksna rivers if to follow that orders

      Regards
      Alex
      If you fire a rifle at the past, the future will fire a cannon at you.....

      Comment


      • #4
        Thanks for the info.....but I haven't found the order/directive that I was looking for yet...but I did find a load of good things on the links....Thanks.

        It would appear that maybe most NKO, GKO, Stavka orders are not out yet. That is, they haven't been seen outside a few archives, in Moscow. What we get are the few that are safe, or plain.

        We can only hope for a change in policy.

        Cheers

        Comment


        • #5
          Haven't found the original GKO order, but all of the 'Implementing orders' from the STAVKA to the Military Districts have been published in Zolotarev's "Russkii Arkiv" volume on the STAVKA documents 1941, which is downloadable from http://www.soldat.ru/files/4/6/15/111/. I've summarized the formation orders:


          STAVKA Directive 004038 dated 21 October 1941
          To Commanders of Moscow and Volga MDs
          Formation of 10th Reserve Army with 5 rifle divisions from Moscow MD, 2 rifle divisions from Orel MD, Army HQ to form by 26 October located at Kuznetsk

          STAVKA Directive 004043 dated 22 October 1941
          To Commander, North Caucasus MD
          Formation of 57th Reserve Army with 6 rifle, 1 cavalry divisions in North Caucasus MD
          Army HQ to form by 27 Oct, by 29 Oct located at Stalingrad

          STAVKA Directive 004097 dated 24 October 1941
          To Commanders Volga and Orel MDs
          Formation of 26th Reserve Army with 7 rifle divisions from Volga and Orel MDs
          Army HQ to form by 30 October at Alatyrya

          STAVKA Directive 004275 dated 2 November 1941
          To Commander Siberian MD
          Formation of 58th Reserve Army with 6 rifle, 1 cavalry division in Siberian MD
          Army HQ to form by 8 November, by 1 Nov at Krechetovo

          STAVKA Directive 004276 dated 2 November 1941
          To Commanders, Siberian and Urals MDs
          Formation of 59th Reserve Army with 6 rifle, 2 cavalry divisions from Siberian and Urals MDs
          Army HQ to form by 10 November, at Vologde

          STAVKA Directive 004278 dated 2 November 1941
          To Commanders, Central Asian and Volga MDs
          Formation of 61st Reserve Army with 7 rifle, 2 cavalry divisions from Central Asia and Volga MDs
          Army HQ to form by 10 November at Saratov.

          STAVKA Directive 004279 dated 2 November 1941
          To Commander, Volga MD
          Formation of 60th Reserve Army with 6 rifle, 1 cavalry divisions in Volga MD
          Army HQ to form by 10 November at Gorkii

          STAVKA Directive 004280 dated 2 November 1941
          To Commander Urals MD
          Formation of 39th Reserve Army with 7 rifle, 2 cavalry divisions in Urals MD
          Army HQ to form by 9 November at Gryazovtse

          STAVKA Directive 004281 dated 2 November 1941
          To Commander Urals MD
          Formation of 28th Reserve Army with 7 rifle, 2 cavalry divisions in Urals MD
          Army HQ to form by 9 November at Galiche

          The total is 59 rifle, 11 cavalry divisions. If Golikov (designated commander of 10th Reserve Army) is to be believed, none of these divisions were in great shape, being short training time, experienced officers, equipment, transport (including horses) and weapons of all kinds. All the orders dated 2 November also require 'plans for the defense' of various locations by the army commanders by the end of November, which implies that none of these armies was expected to deploy before the end of November.

          What got me to look these up was that they support Jack Radey's and my thesis that October 1941 was the last truly critical month of the war: there were no reserve armies or major units in position behind the gaping hole that the Vyazma battles tore in the Soviet front until November, and that gave the Germans their last chance to take Moscow - 7 to 20 October, before the fall rains crippled movement. Taking Moscow would not necessarily have won the war for them, but there is no way to see how they could win it without taking Moscow.

          Comment


          • #6
            Like always great info, thanks Sharposhnikov

            I would still like to see the original directive if it can be found…..the date it was issued and the list of units might be telling…I'm trying to pin down the exact directive because there were other armies forming in early 1942. From the book The Secret of Stalingrad by Walter Kerr:

            1st Reserve Army - Activated as 64th Army – Commander Vasili Chuikov – Tula area
            2nd Reserve Army - Activated as 1st Guards Army – Kirill Moskalenko – Vologda area
            3rd Reserve Army – Activated as 60th Army – Maxim Antonyuk – Tambov area
            4th Reserve Army – Activated as 38 Army – Nikandr Chibisov – Kalinin area
            5th Reserve Army – Activated as 63rd Army – Vasili Kuznetov – Middle Don River area
            6th Reserve Army – Activated as 6th Army – Fedor Kharitonvo – Middle Don River area
            7th Reserve Army – Activated as 62nd Army – Valdimir Kolpakchi – Stalingrad area
            8th Reserve Army – Activated as 66th Army – Rodion Malinovsky – Saratov area
            9th Reserve Army – Activated as 24th Army – Dmitri Kozlov – Gorki area
            10th Reserve Army – Activated as 5th Shock Army – Markian Popov – Ivanovo area

            As can be seen, between our two sets of data, waves and groupings of armies appear. So between late 41 and early 42 at least 20 new armies were being put together. These armies would have a huge impact during the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad. I am also trying to see if Stavka used the same locations to assemble, supply and train these units.

            Comment


            • #7
              Little more digging, this time in the Zolotarev edited TERRA volume on Documents from the STAVKA VGK 1942 At: http://www.soldat.ru/files/
              Here are the STAVKA orders for the formation of Reserve Armies in 1942. Notice that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Reserve Armies were initially formed from existing Army HQ that had been moved to the STAVKA reserves early in 1942, towards the end of the Moscow/Winter Counteroffensive.
              After most of the 'second wave' of Reserve Armies were renamed and went to the front, a new 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Reserve Armies were raised towards the end of the year, and these in turn were renamed and went to the front as shown:

              STAVKA Directive 170333 dated 26 April 1942
              To Commander 24th Army
              24th Army renamed as 1st Reserve Army

              STAVKA Directive 170332 dated 26 April 1942
              To Commander 27th Army
              27th Army renamed as 2nd Reserve Army

              STAVKA Directive 170331 dated 26 April 1942
              To Commander 41st Army
              41st Army renamed as 3rd Reserve Army

              STAVKA Directive 994030 dated 28 May 1942
              To Commander 4th Reserve Army
              By 10 Jun 42 form 4th Reserve Army in the area of Kalinin
              With 5 rifle divisions, Army HQ at Kalinin

              STAVKA Directive 994031 dated 28 May 1942
              To Commander 5th Reserve Army
              By 10 Jun 42 form 5th Reserve Army in the area of Stalingrad
              With 6 rifle divisions
              Army HQ by 10 Jun at Stalingrad

              STAVKA Directive 994032 dated 28 May 1942
              To Commander 6th Reserve Army
              By 10 Jun 42 form 6th Reserve Army with HQ at Novokhopersk
              With 6 rifle divisions

              STAVKA Directive 994033 dated 28 May 1942
              To Commander 7th Reserve Army
              By 10 Jun 42 form 7th Reserve Army in the area of Morozovsk
              With 6 rifle divisions, Army HQ at Morozovsk

              STAVKA Directive 994034 dated 28 May 1942
              To Commander 8th Reserve Army
              By 10 Jun 42 form 8th Reserve Army in the area of Saratov
              With 6 rifle divisions, Army HQ at Saratov

              STAVKA Directive NOT FOUND
              9th Reserve Army, formed in June 1942
              (Not in BSSA for 1 June, in STAKA Reserves 1 July with 5 rifle divisions)

              STAVKA Directive 994061 dated 16 June 1942
              To Commander Moscow Military District
              By 1 Jul 42 form 10th Reserve Army
              With 6 rifle divisions, 5 from 9th Reserve Army
              Army HQ at Ivanovo, formed by 1 Jul 42

              Formation of Reserve Armies: 3rd Wave

              STAVKA Directive 994196 dated 31 August 1942
              To form 1st Reserve Army by 15 September 1942
              In area of Morshansk, Bogoyavlensk, Michurinsk
              with 5 rifle divisions, 1 rifle brigade
              Army HQ at Tambov
              23 October 1942 used to form 2nd Guards Army

              STAVKA Directive 994199 dated 31 August 1942
              To form 2nd Reserve Army by 15 September 1942
              In area of Vologda, Cherepovets, Danilov
              with 5 rifle divisions, 1 rifle brigade
              Army HQ at Vologda
              April 1943 used to form 63rd Army (2nd formation)

              STAVKA Directive 994198 dated 31 August 1942
              To form 3rd Reserve Army by 15 September 1942
              In area of Vyshnii Volochek, Torzhok, Kalinin
              with 4 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades
              Army HQ at Kalinin
              January 1943 used to form 2nd Tank Army

              Comment


              • #8
                Once again great info, thanks for your time and effort.

                It looks like I need to check out the http://www.soldat.ru/files/ more fully.

                So:
                1. During the first part of the war, it appears that Stavka was forming groups of at least 10 reserve armies at a time (mostly combined arms infantry armies), in several distinct waves.

                2. Gathering together these newly mobilized troops/units at a few central locations with good rail access and near equipment production/storage areas.

                3. Allowing them to train/drill together for a few months.

                4. Then renumbering the armies for active duty at the front and sending them off to battle… as needed.

                Also, it should be noted that after Stalingrad (winter of 1942), the Soviets stopped loosing entire armies at a time. So, Stavka had no need to form fresh waves of new armies. They could devote their efforts to supplying existing formations with replacements and equipment.

                Comment


                • #9
                  In fact, immediately after Stalingrad there were several measures taken to dramatically improve the capabilities of individual units below Army level:
                  1. All rifle and guards rifle divisions were authorized to replace 1/3 of their rifles with submachineguns.
                  2. All tank and mechanized corps got a 'suite' of supporting units, in addition to the basic motorized rifle and tank brigades: an antitank gun regiment, an antiaircraft regiment, a regiment of 120mm mortars, repair battalions, armored reconnaissance or motorcycle battalions, Guards mortar battalions, combat engineer (sapper) battalions, etc. This made a huge improvement in their firepower and sustainability - just in time for Kursk.
                  3. The brand new artillery divisions were organized with artillery brigade HQ, increasing their span of control so that each division had the equivalent of 12 artillery regiments instead of 7 - 9. In addition, 'Breakthrough' artillery divisions with 50% more firepower were organized, and Guards Mortar Divisions capable of massive concentrations of rocket fire.
                  4. Antitank Artillery Brigades were formed, combining up to 72 antitank guns under one command. The concentration of antitank means on a single axis was massive - and showed up dramatically at Kursk a few months later.
                  5. The 'standard' army organization began to be implemented, with each combined-arms army getting a 120mm mortar regiment, an artillery brigade, an antitank regiment, a engineer-sapper brigade, and an antiaircraft regiment. Even without special augmentation (artillery divisions, tank corps) this made every combined arms army much more capable on defense or offense.

                  The upgrading of individual units continued for the rest of the war, culminating with the December 1944 tables of organization for a Guards Rifle Division with its own artillery brigade and SU-76 battalion, and the 9th Guards Army with its own artillery brigade, heavy SU brigade, antiaircraft division, and artillery and SU regiments in each rifle corps.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Great info

                    Just how many waves of completely new armies were created?

                    I know the Soviets started mobilization just before the start of hostilities.
                    We could call this wave #1 March? – July? 1941.

                    Another was formed and deployed just before the battle for Moscow.
                    Wave #2 Oct-Nov 1941

                    Another after Moscow
                    Wave #3 Dec 41 – June 42.

                    And another wave just before Stalingrad.
                    Wave #4, July – Sept 42.

                    I need to check, but maybe another final wave of new armies (just one or two?) after Stalingrad. That would be Wave #5 Nov 42 – March 43?

                    After this, only filling out and building up units within existing armies, like you said. Also changing the OB of the army and adding new support units.

                    This is just an outline of the wave idea.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Sharposhnikov View Post
                      What got me to look these up was that they support Jack Radey's and my thesis that October 1941 was the last truly critical month of the war: there were no reserve armies or major units in position behind the gaping hole that the Vyazma battles tore in the Soviet front until November, and that gave the Germans their last chance to take Moscow - 7 to 20 October, before the fall rains crippled movement. Taking Moscow would not necessarily have won the war for them, but there is no way to see how they could win it without taking Moscow.
                      I agree. Middle oct is the turning point : germans can't pursuit.
                      End october it's over. Germans should have seen the truth, and then shift into defence, taking the gains and leaving over extended positions. And then THINK.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Additionally, the Germans can't pursue not just because of 'Marshal Mud' - the classic German excuse - but also because of a few other factors:
                        1. The forces surrounded at Vyazma and Bryansk continued to resist and even attack - inflicting over 30,000 casualties on German Army Group Center in the first week of October and thoroughly tying down most of the German infantry and some of the panzer forces so that there were very few units left to pursue - despite an order from von Bock on 7 October for everyone in the German forces to pursue towards Moscow as fast as they could.
                        2. An amazing collection of regular, irregular, an improvised units were thrown up in front of the German advance to slow down and stop them. 32nd, 78th and 316th Rifle Divisions are the best known, but there were also militia and worker's units, training regiments, motorcycle troops, brand new tank brigades - everything but the kitchen sink!
                        3. German logistical planning sucked. That's the short version. As near as we can tell, they planned and stockpiled supplies for only the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclement battles and when those were complete there was, simply, nothing left in the depots to support any further advance. It wasn't a question of not being able to get supplies forward to the troops, THERE WERE NO SUPPLIES TO MOVE!
                        Add to this the fact that the average German infantry division in Army Group Center had already lost 40 - 50% of their infantry BEFORE they started Operation Typhoon, and the entire Moscow Offensive was a badly-conceived, half-mad venture from the start...

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