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Occupation of Kauai, Maui, Lahaina Roads & Palawan on 7 Dec, 1941 (8 Dec in Palawan

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  • Michelle,
    Your ability to mix information is amusing.
    The Germans did not lose 4 U-boats per warship, actually, they lost extremely few U-boats sinking the warships (including carriers and BBs).
    We are talking about late 1941 and the 1st trimester of 1942 in this thread. By late April 1942 the allies had lost incredible shipping t and most of the warships sunk by extremely few U-boats in WW II and the U-boats had suffered ridiculously few losses.

    Perhaps the greatest tribute to allied incompetence is the 2nd happy time in which a number of subs comparable to the number of IJN subs I am deploying in the E Pacific sank hundreds of ships along the US coast. These subs were smaller than IJN subs and were deployed all the way from France past strong RN defenses. The allies experienced these enormous losses in urgently needed materiel, men and ships mostly because they wasted huge forces in silly raids such as the Marshalls, Wake, Marcus and Doolittle. In this scenario the axis are operating from much closer bases in Hawaii and E. Island, so that each sub can perform more missions and spend more time attacking, instead of shuttleing to and from base to the front. These subs also have longer range and much better torpedoes than those used by Germany in the first years of the war.

    The U-boat losses which amaze You took place mostly after this period, when production was much higher, but allied ASW improved considerably and only because the allies controlled both sides of the small Atlantic. In this scenario, they control only one side of the huge Pacific.

    When one compares the number and size of IJN subs, the quality of IJN torpedoes and USN ability in ASW in Dic, 1941, to the number and size of U-boats and the quality of the torpedoes available and RN ASW abilities in 1939 (when important RN warships sank in 2 months), one can but wonder at the wasted potential.
    Last edited by Draco; 01 Jul 15, 10:19.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Draco View Post
      Michelle,
      Your ability to mix information is amusing.
      The Germans did not lose 4 U-boats per warship, actually, they lost extremely few U-boats sinking the warships (including carriers and BBs).
      We are talking about late 1941 and the 1st trimester of 1942 in this thread. By late April 1942 the allies had lost incredible shipping t and most of the warships sunk by extremely few U-boats in WW II and the U-boats had suffered ridiculously few losses.
      She's mathematically accurate. Her figures are: The Germans lost 1158 U-boats. They sank 187 war ships. 1158 / 187 = 4.41 U-boats per warship.


      Perhaps the greatest tribute to allied incompetence is the 2nd happy time in which a number of subs comparable to the number of IJN subs I am deploying in the E Pacific sank hundreds of ships along the US coast. These subs were smaller than IJN subs and were deployed all the way from France past strong RN defenses. The allies experienced these enormous losses in urgently needed materiel, men and ships mostly because they wasted huge forces in silly raids such as the Marshalls, Wake, Marcus and Doolittle. In this scenario the axis are operating from much closer bases in Hawaii and E. Island, so that each sub can perform more missions and spend more time attacking, instead of shuttleing to and from base to the front. These subs also have longer range and much better torpedoes than those used by Germany in the first years of the war.
      From December 1941 to August 1942 off the US East Coast the US lost 249 merchant ships and this "warship" (YP-389)



      The Germans used 60 U-boats (want their numbers?). That comes out to an average of 4 merchant sinkings per submarine engaged.

      They lost 9 boats in return.
      It wasn't the quality of US ASW that hurt them, but rather the quantity.
      There simply weren't enough ships and aircraft to cover thousands of miles of coastline.

      Shipping on the West Coast is lighter than the East Coast. The US Pacific Fleet stopped all independent sailing on the West Coast a few days after Pearl Harbor and didn't resume merchant sailings for about 5 weeks at which point convoys were instituted.
      This was easier to do on the West Coast as there are only a few large ports to deal with.
      So, unlike the Germans the Japanese would soon run dry of targets. They wouldn't sink any warships most likely either.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by T. A. Gardner View Post
        She's mathematically accurate. Her figures are: The Germans lost 1158 U-boats. They sank 187 war ships. 1158 / 187 = 4.41 U-boats per warship.
        Huh, thanks. But
        1) I'm a he (Michele is a boy's name over here) and
        2) I'm mathematically accurate but the Germans had 1158 subs - and lost 785. 785/187 still works out to around 4 (4.19).

        Naturally, I'm not saying that the Germans lost 785 subs while hunting those 187 warships. They lost them while doing the right thing to do with subs, i.e. chiefly hunting vulnerable cargo shipping. Nor did I claim that the German subs lost were killed by those 187 warships - this is from all causes, including mines and aircraft.

        What I said, and still maintain, is that even while the Germans were doing the right thing with their subs (and making the Allies pay for their LOCs across the oceans), they still lost many more subs than warships they sank. This, all over the war, which does away with the statistical improbabilities of the attack on Scapa Flow and similar one-off stunts.

        If we assume that the Germans did the wrong thing and attacked the enemy warships as a preferential target, they would have surely sunk a bit more warships. This would have come at the following prices:

        1) they would not have sunk as many Allied merchant ships - a disaster for Germany, but irrelevant for the issue at hand, and

        2) the German subs would have been wiped out of the seas by 1943 at the latest. Hitler would have forbidden further production of the wretched useless tins for 1943 and later.

        Because if the kill ratio is 4:1 while you are chiefly skulking away from warships, the ships that will normally win any battle against you either by chasing you to the bottom or sinking you, and focusing on the easy targets... what will be the kill ratio if you ignore the easy targets and try to attack your killers? 10:1?
        Michele

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Michele View Post
          Huh, thanks. But
          1) I'm a he (Michele is a boy's name over here) and
          2) I'm mathematically accurate but the Germans had 1158 subs - and lost 785. 785/187 still works out to around 4 (4.19).

          Naturally, I'm not saying that the Germans lost 785 subs while hunting those 187 warships. They lost them while doing the right thing to do with subs, i.e. chiefly hunting vulnerable cargo shipping. Nor did I claim that the German subs lost were killed by those 187 warships - this is from all causes, including mines and aircraft.

          What I said, and still maintain, is that even while the Germans were doing the right thing with their subs (and making the Allies pay for their LOCs across the oceans), they still lost many more subs than warships they sank. This, all over the war, which does away with the statistical improbabilities of the attack on Scapa Flow and similar one-off stunts.

          If we assume that the Germans did the wrong thing and attacked the enemy warships as a preferential target, they would have surely sunk a bit more warships. This would have come at the following prices:

          1) they would not have sunk as many Allied merchant ships - a disaster for Germany, but irrelevant for the issue at hand, and

          2) the German subs would have been wiped out of the seas by 1943 at the latest. Hitler would have forbidden further production of the wretched useless tins for 1943 and later.

          Because if the kill ratio is 4:1 while you are chiefly skulking away from warships, the ships that will normally win any battle against you either by chasing you to the bottom or sinking you, and focusing on the easy targets... what will be the kill ratio if you ignore the easy targets and try to attack your killers? 10:1?
          Sorry about the name thing. Didn't know that. It's a girl's name in the US...

          I would add that the Japanese subs weren't as good as German ones, and their crews less competent in many cases. I did post a US report on Japanese submarine performance that included information from interviewed crews post war on that.

          The worst submarine service of any is easily the Russians. They lost more subs than they sank ships. Their performance was abysmal.

          The next two up are Japan and Italy, being about equal. France is about the same. The British are next and better than those three measurably, then comes the US in a close second to Germany.

          Japan is not suddenly going to jump up in quality of crews or boats.

          Comment


          • The US army improved considerably when a fake Prussian officer trained them in Valley forge and wrote the manual. A German commander would probably be more successful with the fanatical Japanese than with starved, half frozen and mostly exconvicts and exslaves in Valley forge.

            Again, You are imixing in results posts june 1942 with those in the initial stages of the war.

            Ypou know that Germany used a lot fewer U-boats along the US coast and wreaked havoc, despite that being the priority theater.

            It's useless to argue that the Japanese wasted their huge sub and carrier resources because of poor startegy and tactics and could have done much better, because your narrow mind simply retorts that they coulod not have done better since the US are invincible ‹bermenschen and there is no way the stupid IJN could have done better.

            In my opinion the US was extremely lucky that Japan did not press its advantage at the crucial time and that it had years to produce absurdly huge amounts of materiel and servicemen to cover for its incompetence and incredible luck in PH, the Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal, despite doing everything wrong.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Draco View Post
              The US army improved considerably when a fake Prussian officer trained them in Valley forge and wrote the manual. A German commander would probably be more successful with the fanatical Japanese than with starved, half frozen and mostly exconvicts and exslaves in Valley forge.


              THAT has to be the all-time biggest red herring argument I've ever seen!



              Again, You are imixing in results posts june 1942 with those in the initial stages of the war.

              Ypou know that Germany used a lot fewer U-boats along the US coast and wreaked havoc, despite that being the priority theater.
              I gave exact figures for what is generally considered the "Second Happy Time" by historians. Fewer? Germany used 60 boats off the US coast, the same number you want Japan to deploy all over the Western Pacific.

              I still want to know where you came up with the 327 merchant ships sunk figure or how you arrived at that insane conclusion....


              It's useless to argue that the Japanese wasted their huge sub and carrier resources because of poor startegy and tactics and could have done much better, because your narrow mind simply retorts that they coulod not have done better since the US are invincible ‹bermenschen and there is no way the stupid IJN could have done better.
              Then you need to stop arguing about this if it's useless to try.


              In my opinion the US was extremely lucky that Japan did not press its advantage at the crucial time and that it had years to produce absurdly huge amounts of materiel and servicemen to cover for its incompetence and incredible luck in PH, the Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal, despite doing everything wrong.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Draco View Post
                Michelle,
                Your ability to mix information is amusing.
                The Germans did not lose 4 U-boats per warship, actually, they lost extremely few U-boats sinking the warships (including carriers and BBs).
                We are talking about late 1941 and the 1st trimester of 1942 in this thread. By late April 1942 the allies had lost incredible shipping t and most of the warships sunk by extremely few U-boats in WW II and the U-boats had suffered ridiculously few losses.

                Perhaps the greatest tribute to allied incompetence is the 2nd happy time in which a number of subs comparable to the number of IJN subs I am deploying in the E Pacific sank hundreds of ships along the US coast. These subs were smaller than IJN subs and were deployed all the way from France past strong RN defenses. The allies experienced these enormous losses in urgently needed materiel, men and ships mostly because they wasted huge forces in silly raids such as the Marshalls, Wake, Marcus and Doolittle. In this scenario the axis are operating from much closer bases in Hawaii and E. Island, so that each sub can perform more missions and spend more time attacking, instead of shuttleing to and from base to the front. These subs also have longer range and much better torpedoes than those used by Germany in the first years of the war.

                The U-boat losses which amaze You took place mostly after this period, when production was much higher, but allied ASW improved considerably and only because the allies controlled both sides of the small Atlantic. In this scenario, they control only one side of the huge Pacific.

                When one compares the number and size of IJN subs, the quality of IJN torpedoes and USN ability in ASW in Dic, 1941, to the number and size of U-boats and the quality of the torpedoes available and RN ASW abilities in 1939 (when important RN warships sank in 2 months), one can but wonder at the wasted potential.
                Just a small point you may wish to consider. The boats which Doenitz sent to the American eastern seaboard (initially Type IXs, but later including some Type VIIs as well) were commanded by highly experienced and generally capable skippers. I do not believe that such terms could be applied to the commanders of the Japanese boats.

                Incidentally, what are these strong RN defences which the German boats avoided. Odd as it may seem, the British tended to concentrate their resources in the Atlantic where they could be most useful, i.e., around convoys.

                Comment


                • Originally posted by T. A. Gardner View Post
                  There is one other little problem... The second one of Draco's surfaced subs opens fire, the coast defenses that are concentrated along that part of Oahu are going to return fire.
                  5.5" shell out by the Japanese... 12 to 16" shell inbound to their sub...

                  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Stevens_(Oregon)

                  It would be one-sided at best. The Japanese would be ineffective while the coast defenses with larger guns than at fort Stevens could easily reply with far greater accuracy.
                  What couldn't be bothered to look up the harbor defenses of Honolulu and Pearl?
                  Diamond Head
                  FORT RUGER
                  Batteries
                  Harlow 8x 12 inch mortars
                  Birkhimer 4x 12 inch mortars
                  Granger Adams 2x 8 inch guns (Barbette)
                  Battery 155 4x 155mm Panama mounts

                  Waikiki Beach (also covering Pearls entrance)
                  FORT DeRUSSY
                  Batteries
                  Randolph 2x 14 inch guns on Disappearing mounts (25k yards)
                  Dudley 2x 6 inch guns on Disappearing mounts

                  Kaakaukukui Reef (entrance to Honolulu harbor)
                  FORT ARMSTRONG
                  Battery Tiernon 2x 3 inch guns, pedestal mount

                  On Sand Island (next to Fort Armstrong)
                  their should be 4x 155mm Guns on Panama mounts

                  Pearl Harbor Defenses
                  FORT WEAVER (Entrance to Pearl)
                  Batteries
                  Winston 2x 16 inch guns, all round firing capable (49k yards)
                  Weaver 4x 155mm Panama Mounts (21k yards)

                  FORT KAMEHAMEHA (Entrance to pearl, adjacent to Hickam)
                  Hasbrouck 8x 12 inch mortars (12k yards)
                  Closson 2x 12 inch Barbette (long range, 30k yards)
                  Selfridge 2x 12 inch disappearing guns (18k yards)
                  Jackson 2x 6 inch disappearing guns (14k yards)
                  Chandler 2x 3 inch guns (11k yards)
                  Hawkins 2x 3 inch guns
                  Kam 4x 155mm Panama mounts

                  FORT BARRETTE Kapolei
                  Hatch 2x 16 inch Barbette

                  Barber's Point
                  4x 155mm Panama mounts
                  Browns Camp
                  4x 8 inch railway guns (24k yards)

                  and many many more guns like 240mm howitzers (~16k yards)

                  Better hope the subs are more than 20,000 yards (~11.4 miles) out side of pearl... other wise their going to get hammered by oh the equivalent of a few battleships and heavy cruisers... Even then you still have 2x 14 inch, 2x 12 inch, 4x 16 inch

                  Interestingly USS Minneapolis (CA-36), along with Hovey and Chandler (both DMS, as ASW screen), where some 20 miles out side of Pearl on the 6th, practically right in the area where the IJN would be forming up to make the ambush...

                  edit:
                  Originally posted by Draco View Post
                  It's useless to argue that the Japanese wasted their huge sub and carrier resources because of poor startegy and tactics and could have done much better, because your narrow mind simply retorts that they coulod not have done better since the US are invincible ‹bermenschen and there is no way the stupid IJN could have done better.

                  In my opinion the US was extremely lucky that Japan did not press its advantage at the crucial time and that it had years to produce absurdly huge amounts of materiel and servicemen to cover for its incompetence and incredible luck in PH, the Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal, despite doing everything wrong.
                  You know if the US where doing every thing wrong at Coral sea, Midway and Guadalcanal and still managed to win, what dose that make the IJN who lost?
                  Last edited by Nebfer; 01 Jul 15, 15:36.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Nebfer View Post
                    What couldn't be bothered to look up the harbor defenses of Honolulu and Pearl?
                    No, I was using Fort Stevens as an example because a Japanese submarine with a 5.5" deck gun tried to shell it. It is the only example of a Japanese warship actually attacking a US coast defense fort.

                    The sub wrecked the backstop on the baseball field...

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by T. A. Gardner View Post

                      The sub wrecked the backstop on the baseball field...
                      WHY GOD WHY!!! OH THE HUMANITY!

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Tyramon View Post
                        WHY GOD WHY!!! OH THE HUMANITY!
                        Isn't it obvious? The Japanese baseball teams couldn't win versus their American opponents so the Japanese destroyed the playing field!

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by T. A. Gardner View Post
                          Isn't it obvious? The Japanese baseball teams couldn't win versus their American opponents so the Japanese destroyed the playing field!
                          Team rivalry is serious business indeed.


                          Lets recap...

                          His 4 wave initial strike is flawed, attacking at dusk was not an option the IJN favored, as it meant returning at night, with a limited number of night qualified aircrews. Furthermore the strike aircraft likely would of had some problems with target acquisition in the looming darkness many planes that would of been knocked out probably would get missed, as such more planes survive the first wave.

                          2nd and 3rd waves are pure night operations and would also where rejected for the same reasons, lack of night qualified crews, furthermore due to the special tactics required by the modified torpedoes, it's likely that night use would be even more difficult, and per written it involves more torpedoes than they actually modified for the task, but about 50%

                          4th wave has nothing really wrong except that it's going to face stiff opposition.

                          Worse is the fact that with out the simultaneous strike on ships that historical did the fleet will sortie when the first wave strikes, and most of the ships will have left the harbor by the time anti ship strike will arrive.

                          To deal with this he has assembled practically every last submarine in the IJN that can be used at pearl, striping them away from their historical patrols, and placing 30 of them a few miles off the Harbor entrance, and use using them as torpedo/gunboats...

                          The Problem with this many 1st off is that when do they surface? If they do it shortly after the strike begins, then Coastal defenses will likely spot them, as it's still a bit light out, and their quite likely in range of a number of coastal battery's, depending on just how far out they are. Problem 2 the most likely assembly area is right in the zone of where a US Cruiser and her ASW escorts are conduction gunnery Drills.

                          This will push them to submerge, or risk detection, though that many subs in fairly close proximity to each other likely compounds the detection risk for submerged units anyway. It also likely pushes the group to other areas to also avoid being noticed.
                          So the likely gunnery component of this element is pointless. And with them submerged results in a vastly reduced detection ability's, particularly at night.

                          As a further element of this blockage is a battle line of IJN warships behind the subs to pick off leakers, the issue with this group is a extreme risk of detection, as it moves out of the marshal islands, and closes with Pearl.

                          As dose the invasion force and it's escorts.

                          Further complications involve the fact that sense this force is easily 3 times the size of the historical raid group, the ability to maintain radio silence is much harder, as is the success of the radio deception plan be harder to do, not to mention the much larger force involved makes their "disappearance", much more alarming than was historical. The US was keeping watch of IJN movements.

                          Another complication is that IJN logistics are very stretched operating out at pearl, the ships will have to return to their main operating bases to rearm, only fools will be rearming in a area that has potential hostiles (all it takes is one sub and one successful torpedo hit, and the IJN will bug out of the area...).

                          Further more the loss of IJN subs in the Malaya area could possibly prevent Force Zs destruction, not to mention the lack of IJN operations in the area, it's also possible the Operation Matador, may not happen due to lack of IJN movement in the area given that their Orders where to invade if the IJN looked about to do so, which they are not (also is the fact that British forces are not quite ready to do so).


                          In short the IJN forces are quite likely detected before the operation goes into effect, and the US forces put on alert. Turning the operation into a disaster for the IJN, though at a cost to the US forces.
                          The Sub force is likely largely swatted aside as their out of position due to US forces in their area of operations, the blocking force, is also doomed as the US forces sorting are much much heavier
                          The alerted US forces likely intercept the 1st wave, giving it a bloody nose, and making it's objectives largely pointless.



                          Edit: so did I miss anything?
                          Last edited by Nebfer; 02 Jul 15, 03:45.

                          Comment


                          • More on the submarines. The historical Japanese plan had submarines stationed in a semi-circle off Pearl Harbor's mouth at a distance of about 8 miles to 20 miles with more ranging out to about 100 miles.

                            Coming in closer than about 6 or 7 miles puts the submarines in the declared "Submarine exclusion area" where the Ward is patrolling, actively looking for submarines.
                            Any serious detection gets the duty DD's (Monaghan and Helm) to respond to assist Ward.

                            Since we know historically the Japanese subs sank or torpedoed exactly ZERO warships that sortied from Pearl Harbor following the attack we can make a reasonable assumption that Draco's plan will have similar results.

                            If, as he wants, they surface to engage the US, they are at a horrible disadvantage in firepower and maneuverability to the Pacific Fleet, coast defense guns, and even aircraft.
                            On aircraft, the USN has a PBY (one of three that survived the attack because it was airborne) in the exclusion area to assist the destroyer. So, the subs are going to get spotted if they surface and spotted almost immediately.
                            As soon as that happens the coast defenses will begin to get manned. The two duty DD will join Ward. The fleet will be alerted and go to GQ setting Zed.
                            It goes down hill from there. Spotting several subs is going to raise things to a general alert. Once the shooting starts (to the detriment of the subs mostly) surprise is gone and the US is going to seriously mess up the Japanese air attacks.

                            If warships are to be in place behind the subs then the Japanese have to close perilously close to Oahu and risk early detection by all sorts of ships, aircraft, etc. Again, an alert US means the likely outcome is not in favor of the Japanese.

                            Off in Asia, the lack of Japanese attacks on Malaysia in the opening days of the war means the Asiatic fleets of the US, DEI, and British unite per their pre-war plan and head to Manila to operate against Japan.

                            When this mass of warships runs into a Japanese invasion fleet off Borneo or Palawan lacking air cover on the Japanese part (no carriers around) the Allied fleet tears the Japanese invasion force a new one.

                            Even with heavy Allied losses, the Japanese losses would be sufficient to cause one or both of these invasions to fail with no immediate prospect of a follow up invasion.

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                            • *Draco reads last two posts*
                              "So you are saying there is a chance!"

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