Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

The Pacific War of 1937

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • #16
    Originally posted by Carl Schwamberg View Post

    The Brits also thought to use their large crusier subs as fleet scouts, but were more willing to consider them as independant raiders. Post war analysis suggests the British submarine commanders were far better trained than any others in technical matters and tactics. So maybe they could have had a early impact against Japans military and merchant fleets.
    I believe the RN was also practicing 'Wolfpack' tactics with its boats.

    Comment


    • #17
      The two magazine articalls I've read on the Brit subs refered to superior tactical training in the 1930s, with few details. No mention of wolfpack or group tactics one way or the other. IJN signal analysis seems to have been fairly good in 1942, tho they could not cope with code breaking. Assuming the same skill level in 1937 then a German style control of 'wolfpacks' might not work very well. I dont know how the USN controled its submarine patrols or controled wolfpack groups in 1944-45. On the IJN side ASW was mostly wishfull thinking until late 1943, so perhaps they would not be very capable with that in 1937?

      The British seem to have had reliable submarine torpedos in 1941. I wonder if that was the case in 1937? Ditto for the French.

      If used for merchant raiding and blockade he submarine force might be used nearer Japan. Outside the IJN home fleet operating area I suspect the Brit/French light crusiers would be busy looking for Japanese merchant ships trying for South America ect... Would the IJN expend some of its own cruisiers as a counter measure? Or try some disguised merchant raiders like the Germans did?

      Comment


      • #18
        Carl-
        I don't think anyone really tired to use WolfPack tactics aside from the Germans, and certainly, nobody ever did so on the scale that The U-Boats did.

        It isn't really feasible today, Tom Clancy has even had a word to say about this.
        For our boats in the Pacific, it was like the battle of the Atlantic in reverse, and we won. Our boats were too few in number, too widely dispersed and too powerful in their own right to make Pack tactics worthwhile or even reasonably efficient.

        In the Med, the RN had a great opportunity to use wolfpacks against Italian convoys, but I don't know if they ever made it work.
        "Why is the Rum gone?"

        -Captain Jack

        Comment


        • #19
          One reason I brought it up was USN submarine commanders refering to attacking Japanese convoys in "packs" of three. This was probablly in 1944.

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by Carl Schwamberg View Post
            One reason I brought it up was USN submarine commanders refering to attacking Japanese convoys in "packs" of three. This was probablly in 1944.
            Ah... a pack of three, eh? A hell of a lot better than just one, but I wonder what Doenitz would have thought.

            The IJN did build one escort carrier to battle US Subs, it had a few Auto-gyros, of all things, each made to carry a depth-charge. Seemed like it might have been better than nothing.... but I heard that is was sunk by a US Sub while carrying supplies to some island somewhere, filled with cargo instead of aircraft.

            It just doesn't get more ironic than that.
            "Why is the Rum gone?"

            -Captain Jack

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by Exorcist View Post
              Ah... a pack of three, eh? A hell of a lot better than just one, but I wonder what Doenitz would have thought.
              Its been three decades since I read anything significant about the US sub campaign. I do recall the Japanese convoys were few, small, and weakly escourted. The largest were half the size of a Allied Atlantic convoy, and the average was of less than twenty ships. Perhaps two or three subs were suffcient?

              In recent years I've accquired the impression there are some details about the US submarine effort of 1944-45 that are not widely published. ie: Just what were the communications between the subs and HQ? From books about the British US signal intel effort we learn that virtually every important Japanese naval code was broken by 1944. How exactly did the USN take advantage of that?

              Originally posted by Exorcist View Post
              The IJN did build one escort carrier to battle US Subs, it had a few Auto-gyros, of all things, each made to carry a depth-charge. Seemed like it might have been better than nothing.... but I heard that is was sunk by a US Sub while carrying supplies to some island somewhere, filled with cargo instead of aircraft.

              It just doesn't get more ironic than that.
              Thats what I have from various sources. Costello touches on this in his history of the Pacific war.

              Comment


              • #22
                Okay, a German Wolf-pack was anywhere from half a dozen to three-dozen boats, drawn up in a line across the expected line of advance of the convoys. They were about 20 miles apart, and would radio spotting reports to each other when the convoy came in sight and converge on it, timed for a nighttime attack.

                From what I remember, 2-3 US boats would operete about 50-100 miles apart and share information in a much more informal way.

                Yes, our boats were far more powerful than German ones, with ten tubes and about two dozen torpedoes.

                The MOST important thing you want to know about a convoy is when they sail, so that you can guesstemate where they will be on certain days. I good sailor will be able to tell what course convoys will be taking from which port- there are not all that many shipping lanes in the world.
                The amount of chatter will generaly tell you how many ships are sailing, but what TYPE is the other biggie. Knowing if its a fast or a slow convoy is also important in finding them.
                "Why is the Rum gone?"

                -Captain Jack

                Comment


                • #23
                  Checking my copy of Smith 'The Emperors Codes' the Japanese "Water Tansport Code" was broken and those messages were regularly read from 1943. That was the radio code used by the IJ Army for adminstrating its ships. Items like ship name, cargo, port of origin/destination, departure/arrival date, & any intermediate ports were sent under this code. The IJN used its own codes for messages controling the cargo ships servicing its shipments. Several codes, were used by the IJN for this which made collection and analysis a bit more difficult that with the low grade and over used Army Water Transport Code.

                  Form memory Ed Beach did not refer to attacking any Japanese convoys larger than a dozen ships. In one case a single cargo ship and small destroyer is described.

                  But, we are drifitng off. What tactics and doctrine the British & French would use in 1937 is more to the point.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Originally posted by IDonT4 View Post
                    Taiwan and South China
                    Don't know about the Japanese Army but the navy operated their planes from Taipei and Shanghai. They only had 3 carriers available, Kaga, Ryujo and Hosho, as the Akagi was under going modernization. They also had several seaplane tenders. The Type 96 Nell had a range of 1200 miles. To get closer as the army advanced the navy set up special refueling bases near the front.

                    They also learned a valuable lesson early on when on August 17, 1937 twelve bombers from the Kaga failed to meet the fighter escort and went ahead anyway. Only one damaged plane returned, so at least the navy learned early on the dangers of unescorted bombing raids. information is from the book Zero.

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Originally posted by tcox View Post

                      They also learned a valuable lesson early on when on August 17, 1937 twelve bombers from the Kaga failed to meet the fighter escort and went ahead anyway. Only one damaged plane returned, so at least the navy learned early on the dangers of unescorted bombing raids. information is from the book Zero.
                      Theres a interesting subject for research, or a tactical wargame scenario. What sort of opposition did the Japanese have that day?

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Carl Schwamberg View Post
                        Theres a interesting subject for research, or a tactical wargame scenario. What sort of opposition did the Japanese have that day?
                        Don't know all the book Zero by Okumiya,
                        Horikoshi with Martin Caidin says is the chinese flew Gloster Gladiators , Curtis 75, Russian N-15 and N-16, but doesn't say what the Japanese saw that day, except to say a large group of fighters. All it says is 12 type 89 bombers took off for a mission against Hangchou and one returned to the Kaga. I got the book, Zero by Ballantine, back in the 60s and found it very interesting. About the same time I also read book by Saburo Sakai

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Originally posted by tcox View Post
                          .... I got the book, Zero by Ballantine, back in the 60s and found it very interesting...
                          Doh! I have that one on my shelf. & yes it describes the Japanese 'learning' a few things along the way. The implication is the highly trained and tactically superior air forces of 1941 were not all that in 1937. Good probablly but not grossly superior.

                          From elsewhere I recall the IJN did not operate its carriers in coordinated units or 'divisions' until 1941. The concept was not tried by the IJN until mid or late 1940. Like everyone else they were operating the carriers as single units supporting a group of capitol ships. When two carrier did operate in proximity they were still functioning without a single 'carrier boss', but rather reporting seperately to the respective fleet or group comander.

                          Comment

                          Working...
                          X