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What if the Allies won the war in 1939?

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  • Carl Schwamberg
    replied
    Consider the effects on military development in general. The R & D programs in place in 1939 would only be modestly affected by the few months of combat experience. Ditto for doctrine. The French would certainly retire Gamelin, he was overdue for that and falling out of favor, but the 'Methodical Battle' doctrines would likely undergo limited change in the next couple years. Fundamental change in French, British, or anyone else's military doctrines would be slow in the next few years.

    An entirely different question concerns the political and economic effects of a German defeat. There is no definition in this thread of exactly the terms or conditions of a Allied victory. Are the nazis simply removed in a German army coup & Hitler shot? Or is the defeat total & Germany occupied by French and Polish armies? Or something in between? Lots of variables there.

    Even under the army coup scenario the economic chaos created by the nazi government would be a long term drag on Germany. The expulsion of educated and sucessfull men & women, Jews, Socialists, or other enemies of the nazis from Germanys schools, government, and business community could not be easily undone in a couple years. Fraudulent finacial practice by the nazis in the government and the banking system would also require years to make right. nder best circumstances Germany will constitute a raw wound in the worlds economic system for another five to ten years, perhaps dragging the global economy back into the pit of of th the earlier depression.

    Conversely some nations will in the longer run benefit greatly from the German refugees who settle into their population.

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  • panther3485
    replied
    Originally posted by ShAA View Post
    1. Soviet Russia had been expecting an all-out Capitalist attack since the very end of the Civil war. It seemed perfectly obvious to the Soviet leaders that the world's Imperialism would quash the only Communist state in the world to prevent its expansion. The intervention of 1918-1919 was used to prop up this idea in the masses' counscuiousness. Since approximately 1921 the propaganda of a worldwide revolution was changed by the idea of the country's defence against the future invasion.

    2. Since early 1930ies the USSR became the most active proponent of a European Collective Security system which was supposed to become a network of mutually binding agreements between Europe's major actors to prevent conflict escalation.

    Here's a wiki entry on it:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_security



    Litvinov's strategy faced ideological and political obstacles. The Soviet Union continued to be perceived by the ruling class in Great Britain as no less a threat than Nazi Germany (some felt that the USSR was the greater threat), not least for its policy of supporting the elected government in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). At the same time, as the Soviet Union was blindly stumbling about in the midst of the Great Purge, it was not perceived to be a valuable ally by the West.[4][42]

    Further complicating matters, the purge of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, forced the Soviet Union to close down quite a number of embassies abroad.[52][53] At the same time, those purges made the signing of an economic deal with Germany less likely by disrupting the already confused Soviet administrative structure necessary for negotiations and giving Hitler the belief that the Soviets' were militarily weak.[54]

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%...urity_failures
    Thanks mate, some good extra info there.

    Leave a comment:


  • Carl Schwamberg
    replied
    Setting aside eastern Europe for a moment...

    Where the war to send in 1939 or 1940, the large scale orders for military equipment to the US will cease. As trade returns to peace time patterns there will be a 'adjustment' in the cash flow and credit allocations in US industry. This will not only come from the cancellation of European orders, but the embryonic US rearmament inititated in 1939 will be quickly reduced. Without the huge influx of cash & credit, and large expansion of industrial plant from military orders the development of the US in the 1940s & 1950s will be different.

    Over the longer run development in the western hemisphere & the US will be affected by the European industrial plant survivng the 1939 war intact. The existing (and older) European industrial infrastructure and skilled labor force will quickly return to peacetime activity. That will be a second major change in US/American industrial development. Both North and South America will have actual industrial competition in the 1940s & early 1950s, unlike OTL from 1945, where the European (and Asian) industrial plant had to be largely rebuilt.

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  • The Purist
    replied
    Considering that the vast majority of them lacked the spare parts to be kept running and the doctrine for their use was in a flux, he could not have done much.

    In the 1950s Stalin could have driven across Europe while the UN was distracted in Korea but he did not.

    Even during the Cold War the Warsaw Pact had and estimated 50-55,000 tanks,... but they were never used. The superioity was pronounced throughout the 50s 60s and 70s. The tanks were never used.

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  • Bartek
    replied
    Originally posted by panther3485 View Post
    IMO, Stalin's strategy was to cultivate friendly relations with the Third Reich, and pacify Hitler, for as long as he needed to buy the required time. This obviously was going to include trade, which was beneficial to both countries. Although supplying Nazi Germany with raw materials, oil and foodstuffs was helping that regime to grow stronger, the Soviets were growing more powerful and better prepared too, and potentially they had the capacity to become exponentially stronger compared to Germany. Stalin's aim was to become so strong and well prepared that he could repel any conceivable attack but of course, as we both know, he needed time. The longer he could delay a conflict, the better his chances of surviving an invasion.

    Hitler was aware that the disparity in strength between the two nations could only grow in favour of the Soviets as time went on. This is why he attacked as soon as he feasibly could, in 1941. Stalin had miscalculated in believing he had more time before the German attack.
    Sure ,but all that reasonable arguments do not denied agressive nature of Soviet's regime .
    If WW2nd would end at November 1939 by the fall of III Reich ,what would Stalin do with his thousands of tanks ?
    Would he sell them to Gilette company ? Rebuild them into farming tractors ?
    Sooner or later bolsheviks' economy would fall down under the weight of RKKA ,just like fell at 1989 ,inspite of robbering of Eastern and Middle European countries .
    Last edited by Bartek; 26 Jan 10, 09:07.

    Leave a comment:


  • panther3485
    replied
    Originally posted by Bartek View Post
    "Sure Chief , but if Stalin would like to stop the WW2nd he had only to stop trade with III Reich .During the WW1st after two years ( from 1914 till 1916) of sea-blockade Central Powers were at very difficult economy conditions , but during WW2nd after two years of sea-blockade ( from 1939 till 1941 ) III Reich was at very good condition because of trade with USSR."
    IMO, Stalin's strategy was to cultivate friendly relations with the Third Reich, and pacify Hitler, for as long as he needed to buy the required time. This obviously was going to include trade, which was beneficial to both countries. Although supplying Nazi Germany with raw materials, oil and foodstuffs was helping that regime to grow stronger, the Soviets were growing more powerful and better prepared too, and potentially they had the capacity to become exponentially stronger compared to Germany. Stalin's aim was to become so strong and well prepared that he could repel any conceivable attack but of course, as we both know, he needed time. The longer he could delay a conflict, the better his chances of surviving an invasion.

    Hitler was aware that the disparity in strength between the two nations could only grow in favour of the Soviets as time went on. This is why he attacked as soon as he feasibly could, in 1941. Stalin had miscalculated in believing he had more time before the German attack.

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  • Bartek
    replied
    Originally posted by panther3485 View Post
    Yes, the conflict between the Western powers was over all too quickly for Stalin's liking. He was hoping for more time. However, despite the rapidity and near completeness of the German victories, Stalin still did not expect Hitler to attack as early as he did. He thought he should be safe for at least another year or two. That is where he was wrong as we know, and the size of his force was of little help, given its poor condition and state of unreadiness. But as events turned out, he was right to fear a major attack from the west, even if his thinking was paranoid to begin with and did not involve any 'great vision'. Building up his industrial capacity as a high priority was the right thing to do, and IMHO contributed in no small way to saving the Soviet Union from destruction in WW2.
    Sure Chief , but if Stalin would like to stop the WW2nd he had only to stop trade with III Reich .During the WW1st after two years ( from 1914 till 1916) of sea-blockade Central Powers were at very difficult economy conditions , but during WW2nd after two years of sea-blockade ( from 1939 till 1941 ) III Reich was at very good condition because of trade with USSR .

    Leave a comment:


  • Bartek
    replied
    Originally posted by ShAA View Post
    1. Soviet Russia had been expecting an all-out Capitalist attack since the very end of the Civil war. It seemed perfectly obvious to the Soviet leaders that the world's Imperialism would quash the only Communist state in the world to prevent its expansion. The intervention of 1918-1919 was used to prop up this idea in the masses' counscuiousness. Since approximately 1921 the propaganda of a worldwide revolution was changed by the idea of the country's defence against the future invasion.
    I agree ,but what Russians expected after such cruel and terrible civil war ? Russian civil war at years 1917-1921 were so cruel and merciless as Nazis new world .
    More , Tuchaczewski and Trocki declared the march behind Wisla river with help for German comrades at 1920 .
    Should Europe wait until CzeKa would come to Paris and London ?

    I don't understand why the holy war against Auschwitz is rightfull ,but war against Gulag is wrong ?

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  • ShAA
    replied
    Originally posted by panther3485 View Post
    Now you're just being funny yourself.

    Obviously, Stalin would not have been able to foresee precisely how events would unfold. However, I believe he did have a general fear, some would say paranoia, about a major attack from the West at some stage in the not too distant future. Building up a large force would be the hedge against such an attack. But to be fully ready would take time. When the Germans attacked in June 1941, he was taken by surprise not because he had failed to foresee the possibility of an attack happening at all, but because he had convinced himself it would not happen at that time.

    Timing is everything.
    1. Soviet Russia had been expecting an all-out Capitalist attack since the very end of the Civil war. It seemed perfectly obvious to the Soviet leaders that the world's Imperialism would quash the only Communist state in the world to prevent its expansion. The intervention of 1918-1919 was used to prop up this idea in the masses' counscuiousness. Since approximately 1921 the propaganda of a worldwide revolution was changed by the idea of the country's defence against the future invasion.

    2. Since early 1930ies the USSR became the most active proponent of a European Collective Security system which was supposed to become a network of mutually binding agreements between Europe's major actors to prevent conflict escalation.

    Here's a wiki entry on it:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_security

    The most active and articulate exponent of collective security during the immediate pre-war years was the Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov, but after the Munich Agreement in September 1938 and Western passivity in the face of German occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 it was shown that the Western Powers were not prepared to engage in collective security against aggression by the Axis Powers together with the Soviet Union, Soviet foreign policy was revised and Litvinov was replaced as foreign minister in early May 1939, in order to facilitate the negotiations that led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Germany, signed by Litvinov's successor, Vyacheslav Molotov, on August 23 of that year. The war in Europe broke out a week later, with the German invasion of Poland on September 1.
    Litvinov's strategy faced ideological and political obstacles. The Soviet Union continued to be perceived by the ruling class in Great Britain as no less a threat than Nazi Germany (some felt that the USSR was the greater threat), not least for its policy of supporting the elected government in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). At the same time, as the Soviet Union was blindly stumbling about in the midst of the Great Purge, it was not perceived to be a valuable ally by the West.[4][42]

    Further complicating matters, the purge of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, forced the Soviet Union to close down quite a number of embassies abroad.[52][53] At the same time, those purges made the signing of an economic deal with Germany less likely by disrupting the already confused Soviet administrative structure necessary for negotiations and giving Hitler the belief that the Soviets' were militarily weak.[54]

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%...urity_failures
    Litvinov's policy of containing Germany via collective security failed utterly with the conclusion of the Munich Agreement on September 29, 1938, when the Britain and France favored self-determination of the Sudetenland Germans over Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity, disregarding the Soviet position.[55] However, it is still disputed whether, even before Munich, the Soviet Union would actually have fulfilled its guarantees to Czechoslovakia, in the case of an actual German invasion resisted by France.[56][57]

    In April, 1938, Litvinov launched the tripartite alliance negotiations with the new British and French ambassadors, (William Seeds, assisted by William Strang, and Paul-Emile Naggiar), in an attempt to contain Germany. However, for one reason or another, they were constantly dragged out and proceeded with major delays.[58]

    The Western powers believed that war could still be avoided and the USSR, much weakened by the purges, could not act as a main military participant. The USSR more or less disagreed with them on both issues, approaching the negotiations with caution because of the traditional hostility of the capitalist powers.[59][60] The Soviet Union also engaged in secret talks with Nazi Germany, while conducting official ones with United Kingdom and France[61]. From the beginning of the negotiations with France and Britain Soviet position demanded occupation of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania [61]. Finland was to be included in Soviet sphere of influence as well[62]. While Britain refused to agree to occupation of the three buffer states by the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany accepted the proposal.[62]

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  • panther3485
    replied
    Originally posted by Bartek View Post
    ... but because Stalin was sure that Hitler was a typical "usefull idiot" ,for that reason he was "feeding " the III Reich from September 1939 , waiting till Adolf would knock down England ,then USSR would claimed itself as liberator of the nations from the nazis' yoke .
    France had fallen too early for Stalin's plans , "Seeloewe" plan was left ,and that's why Stalin appeared suprised at June 22nd .
    Yes, the conflict between the Western powers was over all too quickly for Stalin's liking. He was hoping for more time. However, despite the rapidity and near completeness of the German victories, Stalin still did not expect Hitler to attack as early as he did. He thought he should be safe for at least another year or two. That is where he was wrong as we know, and the size of his force was of little help, given its poor condition and state of unreadiness. But as events turned out, he was right to fear a major attack from the west, even if his thinking was paranoid to begin with and did not involve any 'great vision'. Building up his industrial capacity as a high priority was the right thing to do, and IMHO contributed in no small way to saving the Soviet Union from destruction in WW2.
    Last edited by panther3485; 26 Jan 10, 05:20.

    Leave a comment:


  • Bartek
    replied
    Originally posted by panther3485 View Post
    Now you're just being funny yourself.

    Obviously, Stalin would not have been able to foresee precisely how events would unfold. However, I believe he did have a general fear, some would say paranoia, about a major attack from the West at some stage in the not too distant future. Building up a large force would be the hedge against such an attack. But to be fully ready would take time. When the Germans attacked in June 1941, he was taken by surprise not because he had failed to foresee the possibility of an attack happening at all, but because
    ... but because Stalin was sure that Hitler was a typical "usefull idiot" ,for that reason he was "feeding " the III Reich from September 1939 , waiting till Adolf would knock down England ,then USSR would claimed itself as liberator of the nations from the nazis' yoke .
    France had fallen too early for Stalin's plans , "Seeloewe" plan was left ,and that's why Stalin appeared suprised at June 22nd .

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  • Bartek
    replied
    Originally posted by The Purist View Post
    None whatsoever. There is no way to turn metal into wheat so it made no difference. The industrialisation plans did provide jobs and helped the economy though.




    So you have not read the research. There may not have been famine in Galcia but there was famine in Khazakstan and other small republics in the south. Food distribution was poor, some forecasts were incorrect and crops failed amongst a drought. It all contributed to the famine but the effects of which, as the modern researchers have discovered, were not nearly so dramatic as once thought. One thing the research does call into question was whether the famine was "man made" or was it a confluence of events both natural and man made that led to the tragedy.
    So You think that Russians who were talking lies about the famine at 30's suddenly start to tell the truth ? It could be true ,but if someone was telling lies through more then 70 years won't expect then everyone will immediately believe in his newest version .

    BTW We got a very accurate,modern researches about global warming and pandemy of swine flu lately ,and what had happened ? Of course except some guys who earned a quite good money on global histeria .

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  • The Purist
    replied
    Originally posted by Bartek
    And You don't see anything strange at the fact ,that during such terrible famine the government spent money and sources on building tanks ?
    None whatsoever. There is no way to turn metal into wheat so it made no difference. The industrialisation plans did provide jobs and helped the economy though.


    Originally posted by Bartek
    ...BTW There were no famine on Polish part of Ukraine at that time ,strange why ?
    So you have not read the research. There may not have been famine in Galcia but there was famine in Khazakstan and other small republics in the south. Food distribution was poor, some forecasts were incorrect and crops failed amongst a drought. It all contributed to the famine but the effects of which, as the modern researchers have discovered, were not nearly so dramatic as once thought. One thing the research does call into question was whether the famine was "man made" or was it a confluence of events both natural and man made that led to the tragedy.

    Leave a comment:


  • panther3485
    replied
    Originally posted by Bartek View Post
    Ouuu !
    The Great Teacher and Prophet comrade Stalin anticipated at 1929 that at 1933 Adolf Hitler would won the elections and would start the World War 2nd at 1939 , he also foreseen that at 1939 Poland and Finland would attack USSR , at 1940 the same would do Latwia, Lithuania,Estonia and Romania .But he appeared unable to foresee that at 1941 Hilter would attack USSR .

    Very funny indeed ,but totaly unconvince
    Now you're just being funny yourself.

    Obviously, Stalin would not have been able to foresee precisely how events would unfold. However, I believe he did have a general fear, some would say paranoia, about a major attack from the West at some stage in the not too distant future. Building up a large force would be the hedge against such an attack. But to be fully ready would take time. When the Germans attacked in June 1941, he was taken by surprise not because he had failed to foresee the possibility of an attack happening at all, but because he had convinced himself it would not happen at that time.

    Timing is everything.

    Leave a comment:


  • Bartek
    replied
    Originally posted by panther3485 View Post
    No, I meant they turned out to be a real threat later. Not much later, though. It was almost as if the worst fears had been realized. Too bad for the Soviets that their armed forces, while being unquestionably very large, were in such poor shape. Not least their decrepit tank fleet.
    Ouuu !
    The Great Teacher and Prophet comrade Stalin anticipated at 1929 that at 1933 Adolf Hitler would won the elections and would start the World War 2nd at 1939 , he also foreseen that at 1939 Poland and Finland would attack USSR , at 1940 the same would do Latwia, Lithuania,Estonia and Romania .But he appeared unable to foresee that at 1941 Hilter would attack USSR .

    Very funny indeed ,but totaly unconvince

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