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Augmented Operation Rheinübung

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  • marktwain
    replied
    Originally posted by Pruitt View Post
    The 18" Coastal Gun had not been fired for years and had no range finder. They literally opened the breech and looked down it! The German ships were all carrying troops and supplies, so I don't see Blucher standing off. They should have landed the troops elsewheres and taken the Fort by land, which they gad to do anyway.

    Pruitt
    good point .the coup de main was an attempt to take the Norwegian royal family , and the country's gold reserves, by surprise ( the Reich being always short of cash.)

    One can accept that the existence of the torpedoes was a surprise, but it's hard to fathom sailing point blank past three eleven inch rifles....

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  • Pruitt
    replied
    The 18" Coastal Gun had not been fired for years and had no range finder. They literally opened the breech and looked down it! The German ships were all carrying troops and supplies, so I don't see Blucher standing off. They should have landed the troops elsewheres and taken the Fort by land, which they gad to do anyway.

    Pruitt

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  • marktwain
    replied
    Originally posted by T. A. Gardner View Post
    It would make little difference. A Guerre de Course of commerce raiding is not a winning naval strategy. It's a spoiler, usually done by the weaker side in a naval war. It is intended to tie up the naval forces of the stronger side in an expensive game of hide and seek while whittling away at their merchant fleet.
    No matter how successful your commerce raiding is, it won't win a naval war.

    The US use of commerce raiding in the Pacific was ultimately successful because it was part of a larger naval strategy. Alone, it too was not going to win the Pacific War.

    As for this:



    Blücher's action was intended as a coup de main. That is, the Germans were trying for a surprise landing of infantry being carried by the cruiser. That the Norwegians were alert and sank the cruiser is simply a failure of a risky plan that was part of a much larger, risky, operation. Had the British and French not been so incompetent, they could have beaten the Germans in Norway and held the country.
    As it was, neither Britain or France was willing to risk anything substantial on the Norwegian campaign and that allowed Germany, who made a serious and concerted effort to take the country, to win. Put another way, the Norwegian campaign wasn't so much won by Germany as it was lost by the British and French.
    I'll certain ly agree on the 'risky' point. I wonder if the Kreigsmarine ever considered having the Blucher and its convoy stand off and cover the landing with gunfire - while sending in a landing on the old pre dreadnought coal fired ships?

    Where's senor Draco when we really need him?
    Last edited by marktwain; 12 Sep 19, 21:33.

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  • T. A. Gardner
    replied
    It would make little difference. A Guerre de Course of commerce raiding is not a winning naval strategy. It's a spoiler, usually done by the weaker side in a naval war. It is intended to tie up the naval forces of the stronger side in an expensive game of hide and seek while whittling away at their merchant fleet.
    No matter how successful your commerce raiding is, it won't win a naval war.

    The US use of commerce raiding in the Pacific was ultimately successful because it was part of a larger naval strategy. Alone, it too was not going to win the Pacific War.

    As for this:

    Yet Langsdorf got into an avoidable battle...
    The heavy cruiser Blucher was sunk by Norwegian fortress guns - trying to bluff her way past, rather than having a landing force take the fortress..
    Blücher's action was intended as a coup de main. That is, the Germans were trying for a surprise landing of infantry being carried by the cruiser. That the Norwegians were alert and sank the cruiser is simply a failure of a risky plan that was part of a much larger, risky, operation. Had the British and French not been so incompetent, they could have beaten the Germans in Norway and held the country.
    As it was, neither Britain or France was willing to risk anything substantial on the Norwegian campaign and that allowed Germany, who made a serious and concerted effort to take the country, to win. Put another way, the Norwegian campaign wasn't so much won by Germany as it was lost by the British and French.

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  • Phaing
    replied
    Originally posted by marktwain View Post

    Great point- and welcome to the forums.
    Thanks!

    Originally posted by marktwain View Post
    Yet Langsdorf got into an avoidable battle...
    The heavy cruiser Blucher was sunk by Norwegian fortress guns -.
    Its almost as if the Germans were being arrogant, or something like that.

    Leave a comment:


  • Pruitt
    replied
    The Kriegsmarine had to keep proving their worth to justify their place in the budget. A lot of high rank Germans wanted to demobilize the surface ships and send the men elsewhere.

    Pruitt

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  • MarkV
    replied
    Originally posted by marktwain View Post

    Great point- and welcome to the forums

    the Kriegsmarine took some rather questionable risks early in the war. Graf Spree's diesels were in need of overhaul, and by the time of the Battle of the Platte she was heading home at a max of 24 knots- and dropping.
    Yet Langsdorf got into an avoidable battle...
    The heavy cruiser Blucher was sunk by Norwegian fortress guns - trying to bluff her way past, rather than having a landing force take the fortress...

    Perhaps having the greatest Admiral the Backwoods of Austria ever spawned looking over his shoulder jinxed Raeder...
    Raeder was naturally reckless one only has to look at some of the Mediterranean strategies he was urging on Hitler

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  • marktwain
    replied
    Originally posted by Phaing View Post
    Wasn't the German Navy playing a Guerrilla War at Sea, more or less?

    I think that putting all your best hitters in the game at once would be the best way to give the Limeys their best shot at getting them all in one shot.
    You can do that when you have ten battleships and they other guys only have two, and you have 15 Heavy Cruisers and the Germans have about three.
    Great point- and welcome to the forums

    the Kriegsmarine took some rather questionable risks early in the war. Graf Spree's diesels were in need of overhaul, and by the time of the Battle of the Platte she was heading home at a max of 24 knots- and dropping.
    Yet Langsdorf got into an avoidable battle...
    The heavy cruiser Blucher was sunk by Norwegian fortress guns - trying to bluff her way past, rather than having a landing force take the fortress...

    Perhaps having the greatest Admiral the Backwoods of Austria ever spawned looking over his shoulder jinxed Raeder...

    Leave a comment:


  • Phaing
    replied
    Wasn't the German Navy playing a Guerrilla War at Sea, more or less?

    I think that putting all your best hitters in the game at once would be the best way to give the Limeys their best shot at getting them all in one shot.
    You can do that when you have ten battleships and they other guys only have two, and you have 15 Heavy Cruisers and the Germans have about three.

    Leave a comment:


  • Doveton Sturdee
    replied
    Originally posted by marktwain View Post

    I'VE ALWAYS found the cruise a rather odd undertaking...'any departure of the German fleet' was bound to get back to the British Navy, given the huge numbers of 'unfriendly eyes' that the \
    German Heavy Queens would have to sail past. since the invasion of Russia was one month away, staging the forces in the North of Norway, with a possible invasion of Spitzbergen, would have prepared for the inevitable convoys- while saving precious fuel....
    I believe that Hitler was confident that the Russian campaign would be over comparatively quickly. Didn't he say something along the lines of “We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.”

    I suppose that Raeder despatched Bismarck & Prinz Eugen because the previous Operation Berlin, carried out by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, had been a success. The same commander, Lutjens, took his ships through the Denmark Strait, whilst Tovey, with a force of three battleships, eight cruisers, and eleven destroyers, expected him to use the Iceland Faroes gap. Presumably, Tovey learned from his previous mistake, whilst Lutjens assumed (hoped?) that he wouldn't?

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  • marktwain
    replied
    Originally posted by Doveton Sturdee View Post

    Taking mid September, 1941, as a possible date, the RN's resources in heavy ships were rather better than they had been in May. Four battleships (KGV, POW, Rodney, & Nelson) were available, and a fifth, Duke of York, was working up. I have not included the Queen Elizabeths, the obsolete 'R's, or the two battlecruisers, here, of course.

    Three fast fleet carriers, Victorious, Ark Royal, & Furious, were operational, whilst a fourth, Indomitable, was working up in the West Indies, and the older, slower (24 knot) Eagle could also have been called upon.

    Historically, other than the KGVs and Victorious, most of these were at Gibraltar or Freetown, but had there been a possibility of a sortie by Bismarck & Tirpitz together, I think it is more than probable that these dispositions would have been rather different.
    I'VE ALWAYS found the cruise a rather odd undertaking...'any departure of the German fleet' was bound to get back to the British Navy, given the huge numbers of 'unfriendly eyes' that the \
    German Heavy Queens would have to sail past. since the invasion of Russia was one month away, staging the forces in the North of Norway, with a possible invasion of Spitzbergen, would have prepared for the inevitable convoys- while saving precious fuel....

    Leave a comment:


  • Andy H
    replied
    Originally posted by Doveton Sturdee View Post

    Taking mid September, 1941, as a possible date, the RN's resources in heavy ships were rather better than they had been in May. Four battleships (KGV, POW, Rodney, & Nelson) were available, and a fifth, Duke of York, was working up. I have not included the Queen Elizabeths, the obsolete 'R's, or the two battlecruisers, here, of course.

    Three fast fleet carriers, Victorious, Ark Royal, & Furious, were operational, whilst a fourth, Indomitable, was working up in the West Indies, and the older, slower (24 knot) Eagle could also have been called upon.

    Historically, other than the KGVs and Victorious, most of these were at Gibraltar or Freetown, but had there been a possibility of a sortie by Bismarck & Tirpitz together, I think it is more than probable that these dispositions would have been rather different.
    Hi DS

    At least we have a possible 'the other side of the hill' POV now, to counter the initial proposal.

    There are obviously to many variables to come to any concrete decision, other than both sides would suffer losses and that one of those sides had a greater margin to absorb losses going forward, than the other.

    Regards

    Andy H

    Leave a comment:


  • Doveton Sturdee
    replied
    Originally posted by Andy H View Post
    Hi

    Well firstly naval warfare isn't a game of Top Trumps.

    Whilst its easy to concentrate on the BB's (guns and armour) I'd imagine that the Royal Navy would resort to sheer numbers to try and defeat the enemy, just as it did in reality with the Bismarck.

    In addition to the BB's & BC's the RN would know doubt deploy whatever AC's were available plus maybe a few Cruiser Sqns (Heavy and Light) Whilst neither of the Cruisers could sink a BB, the could cause havoc on their superstructure, maybe knocking out key gunnery aids etc or sinking the PE.

    Whatever realistic scenario is imagined, it'll be a crap shoot, literally, and whose side lady luck is on.

    Regards

    Andy H
    Taking mid September, 1941, as a possible date, the RN's resources in heavy ships were rather better than they had been in May. Four battleships (KGV, POW, Rodney, & Nelson) were available, and a fifth, Duke of York, was working up. I have not included the Queen Elizabeths, the obsolete 'R's, or the two battlecruisers, here, of course.

    Three fast fleet carriers, Victorious, Ark Royal, & Furious, were operational, whilst a fourth, Indomitable, was working up in the West Indies, and the older, slower (24 knot) Eagle could also have been called upon.

    Historically, other than the KGVs and Victorious, most of these were at Gibraltar or Freetown, but had there been a possibility of a sortie by Bismarck & Tirpitz together, I think it is more than probable that these dispositions would have been rather different.

    Leave a comment:


  • Andy H
    replied
    Hi

    Well firstly naval warfare isn't a game of Top Trumps.

    Whilst its easy to concentrate on the BB's (guns and armour) I'd imagine that the Royal Navy would resort to sheer numbers to try and defeat the enemy, just as it did in reality with the Bismarck.

    In addition to the BB's & BC's the RN would know doubt deploy whatever AC's were available plus maybe a few Cruiser Sqns (Heavy and Light) Whilst neither of the Cruisers could sink a BB, the could cause havoc on their superstructure, maybe knocking out key gunnery aids etc or sinking the PE.

    Whatever realistic scenario is imagined, it'll be a crap shoot, literally, and whose side lady luck is on.

    Regards

    Andy H

    Leave a comment:


  • Marmat
    replied
    There likely would be no Operation Rheinubung in late 1941, i.e. AFTER the launch of Barbarossa. Bismarck and Tirpitz would both be alternatively deployed on the Norwegian coast, to threaten the Arctic Convoys, and in the Baltic, preventing the Soviet Baltic Fleet from either interdicting, or escaping to Sweden. Such is how Hitler's brain works.

    Leave a comment:

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