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  • #61
    Originally posted by Purple fang View Post
    Ooh, this quote from Crevald kills your whole assertion that Rommel could not have the fuel or trucks to take Egypt. Game set match.

    When the battle of Alam Halfa started Rommel had over 10,000 tons of fuel available (Creveld - p.198), more than adequate to drive through 8th Army and on to Suez.
    But he didn't take Egypt did he. In any case, you'll find that it wasn't just Egypt but much more. This was the key quote

    'Rommel explained that he would soon conquer Egypt and the Suez Canal, and then he talked about German East Africa. I couldn't restrain a somewhat impolite smile, and asked what he would be needing for the purpose. He thought he would need another two panzer corps. I asked him "Even if we had them, how are you going to supply them and feed them?" To which I received the classic reply, "That's quite immaterial to me. That's your pigeon."


    Double-Fault, you lose.
    Signing out.

    Comment


    • #62
      "Umm, we're not discussing Alamein but Alam Halfa."


      Um, sorry, I didn't specify that when I posted it, dismissed.



      "But he didn't take Egypt did he. In any case, you'll find that it wasn't just Egypt but much more. This was the key quote"


      Yes, but we ARE discussing Egypt here, mainly. not objectives beyond so much. They are side issues, but not the main subject.





      One-third of what? No reference, no link? No evidence otherwise.

      one 3rd of supplies,( obviously!), came from here.


      In Ellis "Brute Force" table 45 [index]Embarkation and disembarkation of supplies [fuel] to North Africa by Axis Merchant shipping June 1940-May 1943. It tracks the figures through out this period.Through July 1941 the amount is at most 1% rising to ~ 9% losses during that period.From July 41-April 1942 the allies do better with 9%-35% losses , while the period from April 1942-Oct 42 the figures are more like 5-15%. With the collapse after El Alamine the losses mount steadly from 15% to 44% [April 1943]. In Nofi "The War Against Hitler"pp 89 he notes "The Regia Marina ran 1210 convoys to Africa between June 1940 and December 1942. These loaded roughly 2,500,000 tons of supplies of which roughly 1,930,000 tons actually arrieved at their destination. " Roughly 14% of the material never arrived. Here are more detailed breakdown Jan-Sep-1940 0% losses [148,817 tons landed] Oct'40-Jan'41 losses 4% [197,792 tons landed] Feb-Jun'41 6.6% losses [447,815 tons landed] Jul-Dec '41 26.8% losses [356,294 tons landed] Jan-Jun '42 6.2% losses [441,878 tons landed] Jul-Dec'42 35.5% losses [337,409 tons landed] Its of interest to note that Africa Korps daily requirement of logistics was 1500 tons at full strength, while the above figures range from 1000 tons a day to 2200 tons a day. By the end of 1942 the force being supplied was double but Ellis points out that the amount of supplies reaching front units was often only 1/4 to 1/3 of what was needed. The fact that the land transport route invovled upto 1000 km of which at most 1/3 was by rail, while upto 1/3 could be moved along using coastal shipping [Coastal steamers/MPF/Sieble Ferries etc]. It looks like maybe 1/2 of the 'landed supplies' were actually reaching forward forces.



      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_Force_(book)

      The book is noted for its extensive use of statistical background information.


      Again where is the Crevald data on these supply methods you consistently say exists, but consistently don't post???? Or is it entirely up to me to post sources/data on this facet of Axis supply? So far that's been the case.
      Last edited by Purple fang; 08 Dec 07, 00:29.

      Comment


      • #63
        Originally posted by Purple fang View Post
        "Umm, we're not discussing Alamein but Alam Halfa."


        Um, sorry, I didn't specify that when I posted it, dismissed.
        But I did. Jankers for you.


        Originally posted by Full Monty
        "But he didn't take Egypt did he. In any case, you'll find that it wasn't just Egypt but much more. This was the key quote"

        Originally posted by Purple Fang
        Yes, but we ARE discussing Egypt here, mainly. not objectives beyond so much. They are side issues, but not the main subject.
        So you admit that I never posted anything like

        your ... assertion that Rommel could not have the fuel or trucks to take Egypt.



        One-third of what? No reference, no link? No evidence otherwise.

        one 3rd of supplies,( obviously!), came from here.


        In Ellis "Brute Force" table 45 [index]Embarkation and disembarkation of supplies [fuel] to North Africa by Axis Merchant shipping June 1940-May 1943. It tracks the figures through out this period.Through July 1941 the amount is at most 1% rising to ~ 9% losses during that period.From July 41-April 1942 the allies do better with 9%-35% losses , while the period from April 1942-Oct 42 the figures are more like 5-15%. With the collapse after El Alamine the losses mount steadly from 15% to 44% [April 1943]. In Nofi "The War Against Hitler"pp 89 he notes "The Regia Marina ran 1210 convoys to Africa between June 1940 and December 1942. These loaded roughly 2,500,000 tons of supplies of which roughly 1,930,000 tons actually arrieved at their destination. " Roughly 14% of the material never arrived. Here are more detailed breakdown Jan-Sep-1940 0% losses [148,817 tons landed] Oct'40-Jan'41 losses 4% [197,792 tons landed] Feb-Jun'41 6.6% losses [447,815 tons landed] Jul-Dec '41 26.8% losses [356,294 tons landed] Jan-Jun '42 6.2% losses [441,878 tons landed] Jul-Dec'42 35.5% losses [337,409 tons landed] Its of interest to note that Africa Korps daily requirement of logistics was 1500 tons at full strength, while the above figures range from 1000 tons a day to 2200 tons a day. By the end of 1942 the force being supplied was double but Ellis points out that the amount of supplies reaching front units was often only 1/4 to 1/3 of what was needed. The fact that the land transport route invovled upto 1000 km of which at most 1/3 was by rail, while upto 1/3 could be moved along using coastal shipping [Coastal steamers/MPF/Sieble Ferries etc]. It looks like maybe 1/2 of the 'landed supplies' were actually reaching forward forces.

        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_Force_(book)

        The book is noted for its extensive use of statistical background information.
        I have that work and have been using it as support. Would you like me to continue to do so? Would you like me to expand upon the above?

        Did you notice that the losses that cover the period up to Alamein are just 15% maximum of the total shipped? Yet we hear that Rommel was nearly out of fuel for that period. How can this be? Could it be that the supplies were getting to the ports but due to the extreme distance involved in its transportation prevented it getting to the front as the Toppe study, the one involving German generals that was written in 1952, the one I linked to but you dismissed, said was the case?
        Last edited by Full Monty; 08 Dec 07, 00:57.
        Signing out.

        Comment


        • #64
          Originally posted by Purple fang View Post


          Again where is the Crevald data on these supply methods you consistently say exists, but consistently don't post???? Or is it entirely up to me to post sources/data on this facet of Axis supply? So far that's been the case.
          I post links that you don't bother taking, why should I spoon feed you any more?

          But I'm feeling generous, this from 'Brute Force' (now you've cited it I feel I can quote directly) pp.259-60.

          The difficulties involved are brought out in another OKH study made in late 1941 which tried to estimate the supply requirements of the DAK alone in a successful drive to Tobruk. Something like 3,500 lorries would be required. The return journey between Tripoli and Tobruk was just over 2,000 miles, to be covered at roughly 150 miles per day. In desert conditions a truck would consume upwards of 75 litres in covering this 150 miles giving

          a monthly requirement for the whole fleet of ..... 5,776 tons. This, mind you, for transport only. This amount would not have allowed one single gun to move an inch; not one tractor would heave a single gun into position; no half-track would have moved any infantry. In the year 1941, the average monthly tonnage of motor fuel arriving for the army in Africa was 4,884 tons
          Signing out.

          Comment


          • #65
            So you admit that I never posted anything like


            Quote:
            your ... assertion that Rommel could not have the fuel or trucks to take Egypt.


            No, the opposite.






            to be covered at roughly 150 miles per day. In desert conditions a truck would consume upwards of 75 litres in covering this 150 miles giving



            Do at least TRY & stick to the subject matter, namely, MFP's, Ferries, a/c etc.




            But I did. Jankers for you.


            But I didn't, Jankers for you.
            Last edited by Purple fang; 08 Dec 07, 00:53.

            Comment


            • #66
              Originally posted by Purple fang View Post
              So you admit that I never posted anything like


              Quote:
              your ... assertion that Rommel could not have the fuel or trucks to take Egypt.


              No, the opposite.
              But I never asserted that.






              to be covered at roughly 150 miles per day. In desert conditions a truck would consume upwards of 75 litres in covering this 150 miles giving



              Do at least TRY & stick to the subject matter, namely, MFP's, Ferries, a/c etc.
              You quoted Ellis, that's what he says. There's no mention of MFPs, Ferries, a/c etc. Indeed he quotes from the German liaison officer with the Italian Navy

              "If insufficient supplies reached the front this was due above all to the deficiencies in the motor transport system of the Afrika Korps .."

              See that's why you shouldn't rely on Wikipedia since the reference it claims to use actually says nothing of the sort.

              Mull over that one whilst I'm sleeping.


              But I did. Jankers for you.


              But I didn't, Jankers for you.
              Again, I was clearly discussing Alam Halfa, you stated that Montgomery was criticised for not counter-attacking because intel showed Rommel only had 50 tanks. This was obviously wrong so claiming you were actually discussing 2nd Alamein is totally specious.
              Last edited by Full Monty; 08 Dec 07, 01:13.
              Signing out.

              Comment


              • #67
                In case anyone doubts that Purple Fang wasn't referring to Alam Halfa here is the relevant post.

                Originally posted by Purple fang View Post

                As for Rommels fuel situation, as usual, you're dead wrong.

                http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Alam_Halfa

                In a message to OKW, Rommel justified his decision to abandon the offensive by the lack of fuel, Allied air superority and the loss of the element of surprise.

                Yes, fantasist. Allied air superiority, fuel issues etc. If you are unable to grasp these basic elements, factually presented, then you live in a non reality sort of fantasy world, no doubt about it.



                "Attempting to portray it as an uneven contest is absurd."

                No tis factual. An inability to understand this & attempt to present it otherwise is the stuff of fantasy.









                He had brains young man. He knew that in previous battles the British armour had impaled itself on German AT screens. He knew that the doctrine his forces worked under was greatly inferior to that the Germans had. Thus he ensured he did not throw away the kind of victory that his predecessors had.

                Crap. His intel found that Rommel was down to 50 tanks & he didn't exploit this weakness. He had the wrong stuff no doubt.
                Note that at the bottom there's no attempt to show that he's referring to a different engagement as he now claims that he was. My 'He had brains young man' comment that the last paragraph respond to comes from

                Originally posted by Purple Fang View Post
                "Your opinion, no facts to support it. At Alam Halfa Rommel met Montgomery on equal terms and lost, that is an undeniable fact. Kindergarten stuff maybe, but it's undeniable."

                This is the view of a fantasist. Not only did Monty have Ultra, ( & Rommel had no equivalent, his Italian intel source was gone), Monty also had much more gas, Rommel ran short because Italians didn't deliver. Monty also has air superiority. Nothing fair or equal about it.










                Ultimately, it was the superior firepower of the Allies and their mastery of the skies that brought them victory.

                There has been criticism of Montgomery's leadership during the battle[15], especially his choice to avoid losses, that prevented the British tank formations from finishing off the Afrika Korps, when it was strung out between the minefields and Alam Halfa. Friedrich von Mellenthin in Panzer Battles painted a dramatic picture of Panzer divisions, paralyzed by lack of fuel, under constant bombardment and awaiting a British onslaught.

                Monty had no guts.
                Clearly referring to the battle of Alam Halfa since at 2nd Alamein the panzers were never near to the location described by Mellenthin.
                Signing out.

                Comment


                • #68
                  As to whether I ever posted a statement to the effect that 'Rommel had neither the fuel nor the trucks to take Egypt' I defy anyone to quote me from this thread. I quoted from Halder regarding Rommel's demands for forces to take Egypt AND East Africa and I also quoted from Creveld where he concludes that the forces required to take the Middle East as against the logistical problems in supplying them were a circle that couldn't be squared.

                  Now, to close this off I stated clearly, using Creveld as a reference, that Rommel had at least 10,000 tons of fuel before Alam Halfa (he used up that amount during the battle) and that this was enough to drive through 8th Army and on to Suez. However, as PF confirmed, this was not enough to fight a battle against a resolute 8th Army whose commander was too smart to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors, something Rommel clearly expected to happen. He basically over-estimated the capabilities of his own forces, under-estimated that of his opponent, and failed to take into account the logistics of the situation if his plan failed. Let me state that categorically - Rommel's plan did not fail for lack of fuel, the lack of fuel was the result of the failure of his plan. His continuing fuel shortages were down to the distance from his primary supply ports as the links I've provided and the quotes I've cited clearly show. That Rommel blamed the Italians, his quartermasters, Kesselring and just about anyone else rather than acknowledging that shows his ignorance of the realities of the war in the Western Desert.

                  Let me draw the links together into one lump just to make it easier.

                  http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resour...oppe/toppe.asp

                  http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb01/MS610.htm

                  http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_vi...ISOBOX=1&REC=6
                  Signing out.

                  Comment


                  • #69
                    But I never asserted that.


                    Yah you did, you've been arguing that all along, then you got slotted with your own source, now you're changing your tune.

                    Adrian as well has been slotted with his own source, here's his quote...

                    Basically the ports in Libya can NOT off load enough supplies to supply an Axis army that can take Egypt





                    & this quote from crevald again shows he does not factor in, or was not aware of the ability of the axis to use ferries & MFP's from Tobruk, up the coastline to the front. More effecient than using trucks no doubt.

                    "there was even 10,000 tons of supplies at Tobruk! However, the Axis did not have the means to move them to the front and even if they had transferred sufficient vehicles to do so they would have consumed most of the fuel and water stocks in the process"

                    Crevald a good author, but not a complete one it would seem. I would much like to discuss this particular facet of Axis supply with him.

                    To finish up, Ultra was Monty's ace, plus superiority in aircraft, & as well the bottleneck meant Rommel could not use his art of maneuver as he had in previous campaigns. He had one shot, & his opponent had too many aces to play. Anyone could've won with the same hand monty had.
                    Last edited by Purple fang; 08 Dec 07, 15:44.

                    Comment


                    • #70
                      Certainly nothing "equal" at this stage of the game.

                      http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.pat...attles1942.htm

                      BATTLE OF GAZALA AND THE CAULDRON (May-June 1942)

                      The British still outnumbered the Germans and Italians 2 to 1 in tanks, as the Axis had seven German and three Italian regiments to the British fourteen armoured regiments. The British had also received some of the new American Grants with thicker armour and a 75mm gun and if fact had 700 tanks in service with another 400 in reserve or in the Nile delta.


                      Nor at this stage..

                      BATTLE OF ALAM HALFA (30th August- 2nd September 1942)

                      The Axis only had 200 front line tanks, to the Allies 800+, but half of the Panzers were now the MK III with the long 50mm gun of the MK IV with the new longer barrelled 75mm gun. To counter this he only had about 24 88mm guns and the 50mm PAK 38, was no longer really effective against the newer British Sherman, Grant and Valentine tanks.


                      & certainly not at this stage..

                      BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN

                      In the five weeks after Alam Halfa the 8th Army trained relentlessly, by day and by night. Its strength rose to 1,350 tanks, with over 1,000 of these being with the forward units. The artillery was also strengthened so that 832 guns were available for the coming battle.
                      Last edited by Purple fang; 08 Dec 07, 16:09.

                      Comment


                      • #71
                        Again, I was clearly discussing Alam Halfa, you stated that Montgomery was criticised for not counter-attacking because intel showed Rommel only had 50 tanks. This was obviously wrong so claiming you were actually discussing 2nd Alamein is totally specious.


                        But I wasn't, & it was I that made the comment, therefore your retort is specious & irrelevant. I mentioned it not in reference to a specific battle, rather it was a comment in general to Monty's inneficiency. It stands on it's own & your unrelated battle mention is still dismissed.

                        Comment


                        • #72
                          You're digging your own grave now. The quotes are there for all to see, all you've got is hot air. Merry Christmas kiddo, I hope Santa brings you some good books to read. If you want some recommendations you can PM me, I'll tell you where to go.
                          Signing out.

                          Comment


                          • #73
                            because you can't, my posts DO speak for themselves. your inference is dismissed for the 30th time. You didn't quote any anyways, I did. Yes, they are there for everyone to see, & none fit your decharacterizations. It's all plain for all to see. I'll pitch em again. see if this time you can possibly fathom the CORRECT meaning.

                            Crevald may or may not be the **** Page 2.

                            One must check the veracity of said authors data before blindly worshipping it. Page 2.


                            You mean the view forwarded by that author, not established fact. Page 1.

                            Crevald a good author, but not a complete one it would seem. page 5.



                            Right, so you are using Bickers as an example to attempt to discredit an author whose work you have not read."


                            Um, NOT. I have made no attempt to discredit Crevald. Learn to read man. I have made no direct comparison of them. Again, if you'd read, I said even credible authors can often be wrong Page 4.




                            Here's what you said...

                            And all the other stuff about him not being in full possession of the facts, or that he was estimating, or that he was biased.

                            Never said he was biased. If you can find that quote, please do post it, til then you innuendo is dismissed. I post quotes, you post hot air.
                            Last edited by Purple fang; 08 Dec 07, 17:47.

                            Comment


                            • #74
                              Regarding your Bickers comment, wrong again as usual.

                              http://www.amheath.com/authors/autho...or.show&id=206


                              Richard Townshend Bickers

                              RLT Bickers has written more books about the RAF and its predecessor, the RFC, than any other author past or present - some under a pseudonym. Being multilingual, he does his own research in foreign archives and by interviews and correspondence. His short stories and newspaper articles were first published and broadcast while he was a serving RAF officer. By the time he left the RAF his first four novels had appeared. His biography of his friend "Ginger" Lacey, the top-scoring pilot in the Battle of Britain, was published to acclaim in 1962.

                              Bickers volunteered for the RAF on the outbreak of war and served, with a Permanent Commission, for eighteen years. In England he operated with Fighter and Coastal Commands; in North Africa and Italy with Desert Air Force and Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force. After the war he did a tour in Hong Kong and Malaya.





                              & this comment, also wrong.

                              Rommel's plan did not fail for lack of fuel, the lack of fuel was the result of the failure of his plan.

                              It was Ultra & British a/c that sighted him early as well British superiority in aircraft, combined with a better thought out defense on the British side that told the tale, not a flawed plan on Rommels part. Nice fantasising, but reality tells a different story than yours. The 40 mile wide bottleneck as well reduced Rommels tank maneuverability. these were the relevant factors, not your personal unsupported view that it was all down to a bad plan by Rommel. Again, your bias rears it's ugly head.

                              Happy Holidays.
                              Last edited by Purple fang; 08 Dec 07, 18:02.

                              Comment

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