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WHAT IF.....The D-Day Invasion (June 6th)

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  • Originally posted by The Purist View Post
    It's quite simple really.

    The 6th, 7th and 10th Pz Divs are already .... With 20+ divisions holding the allies in place in the west, all needing modern equipment that now cannot be used to rebuilt the eastern armies, what do the Germans use to rebuilt the front along the Dnepr?
    That helps some, I'm not cognizant of the details of the eastern front.

    Originally posted by The Purist View Post
    ...I played out the above scenario to the period of the Red Army offensive at Stalingrad and it does not work out for the allies. Its a stalemate with badly depleted British and Canadian armies who suffer the bulk of the casualties. They'll burn out before 1944.

    Now, no game can really resolve this situation that is why I concentrate on what would happen away from France in the last two posts. With no need for large scale reinforcement of Africa the Germans have more troops to fight in France. With no transfer to Russia in the winter of 42/43 of German reserves there can be no German recovery as we knew it.
    I suspect in the real world how fast the Allied armys burn out is dependant on who commands them, and what the airforces actually contribute. Then there is the variable of Hitler. I suspose there is no easy way to compare possible hypothetical Allied Second front casualties vs the historical in the Med from mid 1942 to mid 1944. Ditto for the effects of air power. Then there is the question of what material & men from the US that might be fed into this battle in terms of what was sent to the ETO/Med historically thru mid 1943 & what was actually avaialble & could be sent. It all sounds like a long term research project. In any case this discussion has raised some interesting reamrks about two traditional assumptions. A. The overwhelming superiority of te Luftwaffe in 1942. B. The Wehrmachts ability to prevent a landing and formation of a enclave.

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    • Originally posted by Carl Schwamberg
      In any case this discussion has raised some interesting reamrks about two traditional assumptions. A. The overwhelming superiority of te Luftwaffe in 1942. B. The Wehrmachts ability to prevent a landing and formation of a enclave.
      In case A) I found the Germans could not maintain continual air cover but could harass the allied air forces more so than in 1944 (at the cost of an earlier draw down in the east). Allied production trumps German quality in this case. Whether the Germans could increase production to matter is unlikely considering the bomber offensive is a bout to 'take off'.

      B) not landing in front of a port and sending everything they can lift did make a difference. A frontal assault would probably have been a fiasco.
      The Purist

      Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

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      • Originally posted by The Purist View Post
        In case A) I found the Germans could not maintain continual air cover but could harass the allied air forces more so than in 1944 (at the cost of an earlier draw down in the east) Allied production trumps German quality in this case..
        Sounds like the historical pattern in the Med. The Axis/Germans would make a surge against the Allied offensive & see it ground away. Tunisia, Sicilly, Southern Italy, Lybia too I suspose.

        Originally posted by The Purist View Post
        Whether the Germans could increase production to matter is unlikely considering the bomber offensive is a bout to 'take off'.
        If the Luftwaffe is comitted in a major way to attacking the Second Front theres likely to be a lot less defending the Reich in 1943-44.

        Originally posted by The Purist View Post
        B) .... A frontal assault would probably have been a fiasco.
        Arent they always?
        Last edited by Carl Schwamberg; 01 Nov 07, 20:41.

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        • Took a few minutes to search out and reread some of Jeff Lessers excellent but unpublished analysis of the Axis logistics in Africa. One of his points concerns how close to the tipping point to collapse the truck supply to the Lybian/Egyptian frontier was in 1942. As little as a 10% reduction in trucks could cause a severe fuel and ammunition shortage, to the point where the Axis inital attacks on the 8th Army at Alimein ect... could not occur, and defense would be problematic.

          This suggests that establishing a properly supplied and mobile force for attacking a Allied enclave in France will draw down German combat power in the east or in Africa far beyond calculations for combat units alone. Since I've not plumbed deep into Lessers numbers, or matched them to anything beyond Ellis (Brute Force) I cant say much more than the attritional battle Purist worte of goes far beyond losses in men & tanks on the battlefield.

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          • Originally posted by Duke William View Post
            Was Launched on June 6th, 1942? (The Year That Stalin Wanted It To Be Started).

            What would have happened?
            Insufficient British resources to go around and too few American troops, vehicles, landing craft, bombers and especially combat experience would have to balance against incomplete defenses and fewer Nazi divisions but a stronger Luftwaffe in France.

            I would expect more of a strong raid than an invasion to be the best that was possible in June of 1942.
            "I ask, Sir, what is the militia? It is the whole people. To disarm the people is the best and most effectual way to enslave them."
            George Mason
            Co-author of the Second Amendment
            during Virginia’s Convention to Ratify the Constitution, 1788

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