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WHAT IF.....The D-Day Invasion (June 6th)

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  • WHAT IF.....The D-Day Invasion (June 6th)

    Was Launched on June 6th, 1942? (The Year That Stalin Wanted It To Be Started).

    What would have happened?
    Last edited by Duke William; 21 Sep 07, 16:27.

  • #2
    Major allied defeat due to the allied inability to capture an intact port or maintain air supremacy over the channel. It would have to be done with mainly US and Canadian troops as the British would still be fully commited in AFrica at this time. With equipment like the Crusader II, Stuart and Lee/Grant tanks versus the Pz III and Pz IV, together with poor allied doctrine, the German would roughly handle the green Yanks and Canadians. With additional troops transferred from Russia the outnumbered allied army in France would be pinned to the coast and then driven into the sea or forced to evacuate by August or September at the latest.

    The pressure taken off the Russians would probaby have meant the cancellation of the German drive into the Caucasus. There probably would have been some sort of offensive in the south, perhaps to clear the eastern Donbas all the way to Vornezh-Viroshilovgrad and Rostov. With major transfers to the west and fewer Red Army losses, the Russian winter offensives might just possibly push the Germans back to the Dnepr.

    Most of the troops transfered west would probably remain well into late late fall before they could be transfered back to the Russian front. The end result would probably be a delayed invasion of Europe, probably through the Mediterranean (no attempt to repeat the disaster in France) and the Red Army occupying all of Germany and perhaps Norway and Denmark. France might be liberated by a last minute landing from the west together with landings from the south.
    The Purist

    Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

    Comment


    • #3
      I would have to agree with the purist 100% on his first paragraph. The first half of his second paragraph. And the first half of the third paragraph.

      Yet, I would tend to think that during 1942 Stalin was still contemplating surrendering to Germany, and a dramatic loss of that magnitude would likely push him to negotiations with Hitler. Because, unless I am mistaken in my calculations, a large scale cross channel excursion into France would mean no American invasion of Afrika, and a serious drawdown of English forces in the Med., thus allowing Rommel to receive increased supplies, and probably resulting in Rommel taking the oil fields of Egypt. A collapse of the British in Egypt would also result in a total loss of all of the Palastinian areas. In 1942 the Red army was still very much afraid of the Wehrmacht, and a German victory of this type would only add to reinforce that belief. Also with no "major" operations in the East, the German Luftwaffe/Wehrmacht would be well poised to interdict and harass the Soviet army to the point that it could not mount major operations nor sustain even smaller attacks. Without a major attack by either side the Germans would have large stockpiles of supplies, equipment, and men available to them to counter any winter 42/43 attacks by the Soviets ie. Kharkov etc.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by deterrumeversor
        ...Yet, I would tend to think that during 1942 Stalin was still contemplating surrendering to Germany, and a dramatic loss of that magnitude would likely push him to negotiations with Hitler.
        Unless Hitler was going to agree to pull back to the pre-invasion borders Stalin was not interested in a peace deal. By the Summer of 1942 the Russian were confident that they would now survive and defeat the Germans. There was no need to even contemplate "surrender".

        Originally posted by deterrumeversor
        ... Because, unless I am mistaken in my calculations, a large scale cross channel excursion into France would mean no American invasion of Afrika, and a serious drawdown of English forces in the Med., thus allowing Rommel to receive increased supplies, and probably resulting in Rommel taking the oil fields of Egypt. A collapse of the British in Egypt would also result in a total loss of all of the Palastinian areas.
        There would be no draw down of forces in the Egypt because the British could not afford to pull troops out of the theatre,...especially with the defeats at Gazala and Tobruk that June. Further, an allied landing in France in June '42 would mean less supplies for Rommel not more. The German high command would now have two main active fronts in Europe and Rommel's side-show would fall further behind in priority. It is most likely that he would be told to stop on the Egyptian border and the additional troops and kit sent to him that summer would have gone to the west along with his fuel and ammunition.

        <<There are no oilfields in Egypt>>

        Originally posted by deterrumeversor
        ... In 1942 the Red army was still very much afraid of the Wehrmacht, and a German victory of this type would only add to reinforce that belief. Also with no "major" operations in the East, the German Luftwaffe/Wehrmacht would be well poised to interdict and harass the Soviet army to the point that it could not mount major operations nor sustain even smaller attacks. Without a major attack by either side the Germans would have large stockpiles of supplies, equipment, and men available to them to counter any winter 42/43 attacks by the Soviets ie. Kharkov etc.
        You under estimate what the LW would be doing,....it would be transferred en masse to the west to reinforce the small fighter wings already there. Along with the airforce the bulk of the best panzer forces would also go and the lion share of the fuel would have to go as well. The reason there is no major German attack in the east is because of limited resources. Yet Hitler would probably insist on some sort of operation, especially after the May '42 disaster Kharkov. This led the Germans to belive that the last reserves of the Red Army were gone and the subsequent ease with which the Germans advanced in June and July '42 only reinforced that view. The reason I limited the advance to Voronezh-Vorishilovgrad-Rostov was because that is about all either AG A or AG B could have managed if its partner AG had been sent west.

        The allies would land and even get inland someways before meeting the local panzer units (among them the SS divisions being coverted) and once the LW and panzers have arrived to challenge the Allied army the fun begins. By July the Germans would be ready to launch their 'back hand blow' in the west and by August-Sept they would probably be brought to a halt in the east as well. Then it is a matter of how quickly they can transfer the heavy units back east. If the allies hold on until late summer the Germans will have to leave significant number behind to watch against a second attempt.

        With equipment losses in the east and west, along with the burning of huge quantities of fuel the Germans simply did not have,....they would face dilemas on all three fronts. Fuel in particular would be a problem if the Germans are fight on three fronts,...the synthetic plants are not up and running at the 1944 level. The economy has not yet been kicked into full wartime production and it is likely that losses at the front in 1942 would grossly outstrip production of all items.

        This is a great scenario for the USSR but not so good for th western allies and a disaster for the Germans.
        Last edited by The Purist; 21 Sep 07, 22:34.
        The Purist

        Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

        Comment


        • #5
          [QUOTE=The Purist;766896]Major allied defeat due to the allied inability to capture an intact port or maintain air supremacy over the channel. It would have to be done with mainly US and Canadian troops as the British would still be fully commited in AFrica at this time.

          [QUOTE]

          Unlikely to even start.

          How many troops did the US have ready for overseas deployment in June 1942?
          How many had they sent across the Atlantic?
          How much amphibious assault landing craft were available?

          Remember it took until November to get forces for Torch available. I am afraid that a landing (as opposed to a raid) in June 1942 was not feasible.

          Comment


          • #6
            Purist... I am not going to get into a pissing match with you...but your condesending tone in this thread (and the other june 6th one) is not warrented nor appreciated.

            Yes, believe it or not Stalin was as late as early 1943 still debating a negotiated settlement with Hitler. Yes I believe he would have given up the Baltic states, and the Ukraine in an effort to buy a peaceful solution....Untill of course he had rebuilt the Soviet army to the point that he could have attacked in 1944 or 1945.
            "In November, 1943, Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt met together in Teheran, Iran, to discuss military strategy and post-war Europe. Ever since the Soviet Union had entered the war, Stalin had been demanding that the Allies open-up a second front in Europe. Churchill and Roosevelt argued that any attempt to land troops in Western Europe would result in heavy casualties. Until the Soviet's victory at Stalingrad in January, 1943, Stalin had feared that without a second front, Germany would defeat them."

            "Stalin, who always favoured in offensive strategy, believed that there were political, as well as military reasons for the Allies' failure to open up a second front in Europe. Stalin was still highly suspicious of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt and was worried about them signing a peace agreement with Adolf Hitler. The foreign policies of the capitalist countries since the October Revolution had convinced Stalin that their main objective was the destruction of the communist system in the Soviet Union. Stalin was fully aware that if Britain and the USA withdrew from the war, the Red Army would have great difficulty in dealing with Germany on its own."
            http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSstalin.htm





            YES THERE ARE OILFIELDS IN EGYPT!!!

            "The first oil field was discovered in Egypt in 1869 and it came into production in 1910. At this time, Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields (a joint venture between BP and Shell) was the major operator in the area and continued exploration and development until it was nationalised in 1964." http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/eg/p0005.htm



            I ask you Purist .....Where do the forces come from for the cross channel attack if not from Afrika? And how many divisions do the Allies have for this incursion? Assuming that there are no forces pulled from Africa...there can be no naval/land/air reinforcement of the 8th Army either.. Ergo, with Rommel being given a short breather, and a chance for the supplies already in theatre to catch up he, not the British break the El Alamein lines by 5 Nov., but more probably within July some time. Also to consider...Is Auchinleck replaced by Montgomery, or is Monty kept to lead the invasion?
            "26 May: Axis assault on the Gazala line begins
            11 June: Axis forces begin advance to Tobruk
            21 June: Tobruk captured by Axis forces
            30 June: Axis reaches El Alamein
            5 November: Axis lines at El Alamein broken"
            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_African_Campaign
            (yes it is wiki...but the dates are what they are, and it is the easiest format to read them in)



            The Germans have significant forces at their disposal already in theatre So the neccesity of transferring large amounts of forces (some yes, but not many) from other (Russian) fronts was not required. And those forces could have been transferred from the recent victory in the Crimean campaign. The Germans were also quite adept at moving units back and forth from east to west and back. In 1942 the Allies had caused no appreciable damage to Germany's rail infrastructure yet. Also the German military was not yet in a serious supply crunch since the allied bombing had yet to damage Germany's oil supply system.
            "Fronts: Ger Rus Fra Nor assorted other fronts
            May 1942 2 170 34 11 7 5 3 0
            Jun 1942 2 180 27 11 7 5 3 0
            Jul 1942 5 179 29 11 7 5 3 0
            Aug 1942 3 176 36 11 7 6 4 0
            Sep 1942 9 178 37 11 7 6 4 0"
            http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7288

            Against 30 or so German divisions even as late as Nov. 1942 the allies could only muster enough naval/land forces for a 65-75,000 man invasion force (the Torch op). Yes some of those divisions of Germany's were in training, however the Germans had this infuriating habit of staffing new/training divisions with a core of battle hardened veteran troops. The Western Allies (esp. the Americans)were going in completely green.
            http://www.historynet.com/wars_confl...2/3026106.html

            As for the Luftwaffe having to be reinforced heavily by Russian front air units... Not really.
            In Operation Jubilee the Raf/USAAF were only able to muster a little over 1,000 air craft for the battle, and they lost over 100 of them. Ther Luftwaffe with 200 fighters, and 100 bombers was in the same position as the Raf during the Battle of Britain.. Close proximity to air bases, long loiter times over the battle zone, and in 1942 the Luftwaffe held technical superiority over the Raf/USAAF with the FW-190. The Luftwaffe lost only 40 aircraft... A 2.5 to 1 loss ratio, almost a mirror image of BoB. So with out too much trouble the the Luftwaffe could have pulled units from Germany and, Norway doubling their forces and maintaining air superiorty over the battle zone indefinetly.
            http://www.rpi.edu/~fiscap/history_files/dieppe.htm



            Now lets look at some of the intangibles, given a major Western Allied defeat such as this....
            Does Bulgaria join in as an active combatant? Does Turkey?
            What do the Vichy French do? (remember they are still at this time PO'd at the British for shelling their fleet and attacking them in Syria/Lebanan) What occurs in the Middle East?
            Can Lend-Lease still be brought in through Iran and Iraq; or is it all forced to go the much more dangerous northern route?
            Does Germany go ahead with Case Blue? Does Stalin sensing a weakened Germany commit his forces earlier, keeping the Germans out of Stalingrad? This would save the Axis the 300,000 troops lost in Stalingrad in January? Without a decisive Allied victory in Afrika the Germans don't lose 250,000 more troops there either. Thats a lot of battle hardened troops for Germany to still have on the battlefield in '43 to deal with any Soviet attacks.

            Quite a lot to think about... A German victory in WWII, not a good thought, but a very real one given the scenario.

            Comment


            • #7
              had the allied attempted a landing in 1942 it would be a bigger dieppe- a bloodbath of many canadians, british and american troops, for the reasons described above - logistics, equipment, troops, training, all were unsufficient.

              they would have to start again in 1943, but with a very different command as lots of heads (perhaps even churchill, as this would not be his first failed attempt at amphibious landing gone bad) would roll.

              but this migth have lots of other implications as with France, for example, would Vichy stand up or down to the weird invasion of it's soil, albeit the one under German occupation (we're assuming a landing happens in north of France and not in the south, right?..)

              it woudl endup a big morale booster for the Axis, perhaps changing the fate of operations in the Mediterranean and even in the East as troops would be abel to go east in the winter of 1942.

              indeed, with Fall Blau delayed or cancelled, the Germans would find themselves in a MUCH better position for when the soviet winter offensive would come. in a better line, with no losses from the Stalingrad campaign, and with stronger mobile reserve, with less depleted divisions (especially in tanks). a failed winter 1942/1943 offensive might really put Stalin to the negotiation table - would Hitler do that too, emboldenend by a successful 1942?
              "Freedom cannot exist without discipline, self-discipline, and rights cannot exist without duties. Those who do not observe their duties do not deserve their rights."--Oriana Fallaci

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by deterrumeversor View Post
                Purist... I am not going to get into a pissing match with you...but your condesending tone in this thread (and the other june 6th one) is not warrented nor appreciated.
                Okay, let me take this on,

                Yes, believe it or not Stalin was as late as early 1943 still debating a negotiated settlement with Hitler. Yes I believe he would have given up the Baltic states, and the Ukraine in an effort to buy a peaceful solution....Untill of course he had rebuilt the Soviet army to the point that he could have attacked in 1944 or 1945.
                There is good evidence that low level diplomatic discussions took place in 1943 but with neither side willing to trust the other and the Germans still feeling they held a winning had they quickly stalled.

                "In November, 1943, Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt met together in Teheran, Iran, to discuss military strategy and post-war Europe. Ever since the Soviet Union had entered the war, Stalin had been demanding that the Allies open-up a second front in Europe. Churchill and Roosevelt argued that any attempt to land troops in Western Europe would result in heavy casualties. Until the Soviet's victory at Stalingrad in January, 1943, Stalin had feared that without a second front, Germany would defeat them."

                "Stalin, who always favoured in offensive strategy, believed that there were political, as well as military reasons for the Allies' failure to open up a second front in Europe. Stalin was still highly suspicious of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt and was worried about them signing a peace agreement with Adolf Hitler. The foreign policies of the capitalist countries since the October Revolution had convinced Stalin that their main objective was the destruction of the communist system in the Soviet Union. Stalin was fully aware that if Britain and the USA withdrew from the war, the Red Army would have great difficulty in dealing with Germany on its own."
                http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSstalin.htm
                Stalin's paranoia and suspiciousness about just about everyone, whether friend or foe, is well documented. Even after the D-Day landings he still had little faith in his allies despite the amount of aid the USSR was receiving. Whatever the Western Allies did would not have been big enough or soon enough for Stalin although the empty promises made by Churchill regarding the opening of a Second Front in '42 and '43 didn't help matters.

                As an aside, Churchill did want to attack in the West as soon as the USSR was invaded in 1941 but was dissuaded by those of a more balanced disposition within the War Cabinet.




                YES THERE ARE OILFIELDS IN EGYPT!!!

                "The first oil field was discovered in Egypt in 1869 and it came into production in 1910. At this time, Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields (a joint venture between BP and Shell) was the major operator in the area and continued exploration and development until it was nationalised in 1964." http://www.mbendi.co.za/indy/oilg/af/eg/p0005.htm
                Reading this it would seem that in the period in question Egyptian oil wasn't of any great strategic importance. Certainly the British didn't seem overly bothered about it. Thanks for bringing it up though.


                I ask you Purist .....Where do the forces come from for the cross channel attack if not from Afrika? And how many divisions do the Allies have for this incursion? Assuming that there are no forces pulled from Africa...there can be no naval/land/air reinforcement of the 8th Army either.. Ergo, with Rommel being given a short breather, and a chance for the supplies already in theatre to catch up he, not the British break the El Alamein lines by 5 Nov., but more probably within July some time. Also to consider...Is Auchinleck replaced by Montgomery, or is Monty kept to lead the invasion?
                "26 May: Axis assault on the Gazala line begins
                11 June: Axis forces begin advance to Tobruk
                21 June: Tobruk captured by Axis forces
                30 June: Axis reaches El Alamein
                5 November: Axis lines at El Alamein broken"
                http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_African_Campaign
                (yes it is wiki...but the dates are what they are, and it is the easiest format to read them in)
                There is a substantial Home Army (including the Canadians who attacked Dieppe in August 1942) available to the CIGS although nothing substantial enough to mount anything more than a big raid. I'll try and firm that up for you. If Rommel could be persuaded to follow orders and stop on the Egyptian border then he might get enough supplies to advance into Egypt at some indeterminate future date although he would still run into the same logistical crisis that he did historically - this is down to geography as much as any Axis failings.


                The Germans have significant forces at their disposal already in theatre So the neccesity of transferring large amounts of forces (some yes, but not many) from other (Russian) fronts was not required. And those forces could have been transferred from the recent victory in the Crimean campaign. The Germans were also quite adept at moving units back and forth from east to west and back. In 1942 the Allies had caused no appreciable damage to Germany's rail infrastructure yet. Also the German military was not yet in a serious supply crunch since the allied bombing had yet to damage Germany's oil supply system.
                "Fronts: Ger Rus Fra Nor assorted other fronts
                May 1942 2 170 34 11 7 5 3 0
                Jun 1942 2 180 27 11 7 5 3 0
                Jul 1942 5 179 29 11 7 5 3 0
                Aug 1942 3 176 36 11 7 6 4 0
                Sep 1942 9 178 37 11 7 6 4 0"
                http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7288
                Quantity is one thing, quality is another. The forces in France were usually understrength (indulging in a little R&R whilst refitting before being returned to the Eastern Front) or were so called 'Fortress Divisions' employed in coastal defence. Any counter-attacking force would require mobile forces to be drawn from the East. The Germans don't have that many panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions in their army, certainly not enough to sustain offensive operations on two fronts (ignoring the African sideshow for now). They do also have to deal with a serious fuel shortage in 1942, hence the strategy of that year in the East. Rushing forces around Europe, even by train, will only exacerbate that.

                Against 30 or so German divisions even as late as Nov. 1942 the allies could only muster enough naval/land forces for a 65-75,000 man invasion force (the Torch op). Yes some of those divisions of Germany's were in training, however the Germans had this infuriating habit of staffing new/training divisions with a core of battle hardened veteran troops. The Western Allies (esp. the Americans)were going in completely green.
                http://www.historynet.com/wars_confl...2/3026106.html
                But 'Torch' was still part of a sideshow. Given that a 1943 invasion of France was still the preferred option, at least from the American perspective, a lot of resources were being held back in the UK for that. As for the Germans, although new divisions were indeed forming, one of the problems of their system is that this cut the strength of the veteran divisions at the front who, instead of receiving replacements, were gradually bled to death.

                As for the Luftwaffe having to be reinforced heavily by Russian front air units... Not really.
                In Operation Jubilee the Raf/USAAF were only able to muster a little over 1,000 air craft for the battle, and they lost over 100 of them. Ther Luftwaffe with 200 fighters, and 100 bombers was in the same position as the Raf during the Battle of Britain.. Close proximity to air bases, long loiter times over the battle zone, and in 1942 the Luftwaffe held technical superiority over the Raf/USAAF with the FW-190. The Luftwaffe lost only 40 aircraft... A 2.5 to 1 loss ratio, almost a mirror image of BoB. So with out too much trouble the the Luftwaffe could have pulled units from Germany and, Norway doubling their forces and maintaining air superiorty over the battle zone indefinetly.
                http://www.rpi.edu/~fiscap/history_files/dieppe.htm
                Jubilee is a bit of an oddity given Allied air tactics that day. I'm not sure that it holds up as evidence for Luftwaffe air superiority in the case if a full scale invasion (big 'if' of course) was launched across the Pas-de-Calais (again as the Americans wanted). The Allies would certainly assemble as much as they could in Southern England to support and, even allowing for the edge that the FW-190 had over the Spifire V in the Summer of '42, this would be too much for the JGs in France to handle. When the Germans counter-attacked they would have to have reinforcements transferred West to support them. Doctrine demanded it as much as anything else.

                Now lets look at some of the intangibles, given a major Western Allied defeat such as this...
                I'll leave the intangibles for now if you don't mind.
                Signing out.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Most kind of you, Kevin,...I would hate to be accused of being *more* "condescending" than I already am.

                  <<Oops, there I go again,....sorrrrryyyy >>>

                  The Purist

                  Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by The Purist View Post
                    Most kind of you, Kevin,...I would hate to be accused of being *more* "condescending" than I already am.

                    <<Oops, there I go again,....sorrrrryyyy >>>

                    Anything for an old friend.
                    Signing out.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Ok Purist....These are all your own quotes, from your own posts


                      "There would be no draw down of forces in the Egypt because the British could not afford to pull troops out of the theatre,...especially with the defeats at Gazala and Tobruk that June."
                      Vs.
                      "But 'Torch' was still part of a sideshow."
                      Vs.
                      "<<There are no oilfields in Egypt>>"
                      Vs.
                      "Reading this it would seem that in the period in question Egyptian oil wasn't of any great strategic importance. Certainly the British didn't seem overly bothered about it. "
                      Vs.
                      "They (the Germans) do also have to deal with a serious fuel shortage in 1942, hence the strategy of that year in the East. Rushing forces around Europe, even by train, will only exacerbate that."

                      So which is it? Is Afrika important or not? Can't tell by your posts.
                      =====================================

                      "What is this fixation on Soviet negotiations? It was not going to happen. Let's move along."
                      Vs.
                      "There is good evidence that low level diplomatic discussions took place in 1943 but with neither side willing to trust the other and the Germans still feeling they held a winning had they quickly stalled."

                      So not going to happen....or were happening? Can't tell by your posts.
                      ==========================

                      "Quantity is one thing, quality is another. The forces in France were usually understrength (indulging in a little R&R whilst refitting before being returned to the Eastern Front) or were so called 'Fortress Divisions' employed in coastal defence."

                      I thought I covered that with this statement.... Yes some of those divisions of Germany's were in training, however the Germans had this infuriating habit of staffing new/training divisions with a core of battle hardened veteran troops.

                      "The Germans don't have that many panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions in their army, certainly not enough to sustain offensive operations on two fronts (ignoring the African sideshow for now). "

                      I don't remember ever stating that they would be commiting to two large scale offensives.... I believe in my first post I said..... Also with no "major" operations in the East, the German Luftwaffe/Wehrmacht would be well poised to interdict and harass the Soviet army to the point that it could not mount major operations nor sustain even smaller attacks. Without a major attack by either side the Germans would have large stockpiles of supplies, equipment, and men available to them to counter any winter 42/43 attacks by the Soviets ie. Kharkov etc. You stated that they would mount Case Blue. I then simply asked in my second post what if they did...then what?

                      "Jubilee is a bit of an oddity given Allied air tactics that day. I'm not sure that it holds up as evidence for Luftwaffe air superiority in the case if a full scale invasion (big 'if' of course) was launched across the Pas-de-Calais (again as the Americans wanted). The Allies would certainly assemble as much as they could in Southern England to support and, even allowing for the edge that the FW-190 had over the Spifire V in the Summer of '42, this would be too much for the JGs in France to handle. When the Germans counter-attacked they would have to have reinforcements transferred West to support them. Doctrine demanded it as much as anything else. "

                      Operation Cerberus..aka..the channel dash...approx. 700 Raf aircraft 470 fighters and 230 bombers clashed with 250 Luftwaffe fighters and 170 bombers.. Net losses 17 fighters 26 bombers for Raf. 17 fighters 0 bombers Luftwaffe. That was in supposedly Raf controlled waters not on Luftwaffe controlled France.... Seems that the Luftwaffe could and did maintain air superiority for most battles in France until about early '44, let alone mid '42. http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OO...I_Cerberus.htm

                      I do remember reading once..although for the life of me I can't remember where; that the Luftwaffe maintained at least a 2 to 1 kill ratio over the Allies in cross channel raids over France up untill the Beginning of 1944. Hence with out a reference I left it by itself.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by deterrumeversor View Post
                        Ok Purist....These are all your own quotes, from your own posts
                        What is this thing with mixing mine and TPs posts up? I understand we often share similar viewpoints but we are quite separate people with an Ocean and at least half a Continent between us.

                        I'll respond to you when you split your post into dealing with my view alone or make appropriate use of the quote function so I can work out exactly what you're addressing.

                        Edit: That reads slightly more brutally than I intended. It's just that there's so much jumbled up in that post that it's hard to separate what's yours, or mine, or The Purist's.
                        Last edited by Full Monty; 22 Sep 07, 19:09.
                        Signing out.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Erm,...you may be confusing FMs and my posts. If I'm not mistaken Kevin is backing me on my "observations".

                          So which is it? Is Afrika important or not? Can't tell by your posts
                          Not to Hitler and German High Command, no,...it is a side show.

                          "What is this fixation on Soviet negotiations? It was not going to happen. Let's move along."
                          Vs.
                          "There is good evidence that low level diplomatic discussions took place in 1943 but with neither side willing to trust the other and the Germans still feeling they held a winning had they quickly stalled."

                          So not going to happen....or were happening? Can't tell by your posts.
                          Well, I did post that unless Hitler was going to agree to pull back to the partition line there would be, could be no peace. However, as even the low level chats went nowhere,...it's moot. There were no real negotiations so no real possibility of the Russians quiting the game. Seems pretty plain to me.

                          I am also of the opinion that Hitler would still have attacked in Russia in 1942. Hitler launched a major offensive on one of the main fronts in every year of the war and it was mainly done for political or economic reasons after 1941.

                          - In 1942, Hitler would not and could not countenance being inactive against the Red Army, his hatred of Communism and the Slavs would have compelled him to make a move to prove that he called the shots and the Germany had the initiative. He would have had to repond to the allied landings in France and make his best moves against the Russians.

                          - 1943 Hitler attacked gain in the east for the sole purpose of convincing the neutrals (especially Turkey) that German held the initiative and still hel the upper hand.

                          - In 1944 Hitler attacked the western allies in a hopeless endeavour to try and split apart the western allies. This is about as political as one can get in the strategic realm.

                          - In 1945 Hitler attacked in Hungary in support of yet another political gambit that from the military point of view was a waste.

                          It has been noted by more than one historian that dictatorships, by their very natures, must be and be seen to be dynamic entities. Populations only support dictators who are winners and seldom tolerate totalitarian regimes that are losers. We need look no further than Mussolini and then Hitler himself in WWII. Once Hitler was seen to be leading the country to ruin first the army turned on him and then the people, powerless to rise anymore simply shrugged off the regime and waited for defeat. Germany *had* to attack in Russia in 1942 or admit they could no longer win, this is something Hitler would never, ever have allowed.

                          If you want a more contempoaray example look at Argentina before and after the Falklands War. With popular support ebbing away the Argentine junta staged the rapid invasion of the Falklands and their popularity shot into orbit. When the war was lost, the humiliated Argentine population turned on the regime and cast them out last last weeks trash.

                          "Sic Semper Tyrannis" - Thus always to tyrants.

                          World War II was never simply a matter of military moves. In fact this war was decided more by political events and manuevres than by any mass movement of armies, navies or air forces. All the shooting, killing and dieing were all rather secondary to the real driving forces behind the conflict and its resolution.

                          I'll leave Kevin to deal with the bits that purtain to his posts.
                          Last edited by The Purist; 22 Sep 07, 23:11.
                          The Purist

                          Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

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                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                            What is this thing with mixing mine and TPs posts up? I understand we often share similar viewpoints but we are quite separate people with an Ocean and at least half a Continent between us.
                            Ack. You beat me to it.

                            Actually, its an ocean and 4/5 of continent when I summer in the west and and ocean and 1/2 a gulf when I sojourn to my winter palace by the sea.
                            The Purist

                            Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

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                            • #15
                              You are right,! Sorry about that .. I was very distracted at that time, and it seems that I miss read/got confused .... Kids running amok Please accept my apologies

                              ...

                              ...

                              You got to admit that was a pretty neat trick though...Splicing the two of you together from an ocean away

                              ...sorry I'll shut up now..

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