Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

What if the IJN win at Midway?

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • #16
    Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
    but ultimately the only real change would have been for the US to have pursued a single strategy against Japan (MacArthur's obviously) rather than the wasteful dual one they did historically.
    I love this argument. The U.S. should have pursed a single thrust strategy instead of a dual one. And of course the one that should have been pursued is always dugout Doug’s.
    The problem with this is that the U.S. had the resources to pursue a dual thrust while Japan didn’t have the resources to defend against it. So instead of being able to put everything into stopping just the one thrust that some people advocate they had to split their already insufficient forces into stopping multiple thrust. Thus weakening the number of ships, men and aircraft that any of them had to face.

    Also nothing stopped the U.S. from shifting forces around to assist one group or the other as needed.
    Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedy. -- Ernest Benn

    Comment


    • #17
      Whether MacArthur's strategy was better or whether the US could run both strategies because of their materiel superiority is neither here nor there. IF Nimitz had lost his political clout after a Midway disaster then MacArthur's strategy would have been the only game in town. For better or for worse.
      Signing out.

      Comment


      • #18
        Thanks kindly for feedback so far.

        I hadn't even thought of the risk of losing Spruance of Fletcher with their ships. Could that be as costly to the US as Yamato to the Japanese?
        I was simply refering to the loss of the Americans most experienced if only experienced carrier pilots, air crews and yes, officers and ship crews too.

        Thanks for the replies so far! so far I'm not quite losing the bet .

        However, he is right, most the replies so far seem totally apathetic to the effect on Australia. 'They' don't seem to exist, nor the chance of their withdrawal from the war let alone its effects even given serious consideration. As his wife said, 'like the arrogant husband still refusing to take his eyes off the TV even while the wife has her bags packed by the door with the taxi outside about to make her final decision based upon his next words.'

        As for FDR's inviolibility. I might disagree. His own Administration were fearful enough of he being impeached or a non-confidence vote called by Congress over Pearl Harbour then the Philippines disaster that they embarked upon deliberate 'scape-goat' campaigns against their own military leaders.
        After Pearl, it wasn't "Roosevelt's War", it was America's war. He, his Administration nor the Democrats were indespensible. In fact it appears the reason the SIS and intel people left him 'out of the loop' was because they didn't trust him. I don't know if this was along political lines though.
        Just because today's America won't replace a war-time administration no matter what the perceived accomplishments or disasters, doesn't mean that back then they wouldn't.
        Churchill was replaced during the war. Australia's own Prime Minister was replaced during the war. Even where it seems someone has the iron-hand like Tojo, when things went bad enough, he was also replaced during wartime.
        Mussolini, Chiang was kidnapped by his own people and the list goes on. American Administrations have died based upon war set-backs.

        As for 'no difference to the Solomons', I completely disagree. Reading Rr Adm Lee's accounts through the USBB Washington's own veterans webpage and witness accounts and Mr Lippman's focused work on the campaign, that had it been a Japanese victory at Midway and thus Japanese rather than American carriers supporting, they clearly state the Solomons and Port Moresby would succumb leaving Australia open to invasion. They account how MacArthur was furious at Nimitz for the contingency that the subsequent defense of Hawaii would result in Lee and Halsey and their fleets being withdrawn from the South Pacific altogether back to Pearl.
        Unconditional surrender was not Churchill's idea. Most of both cabinents and advisors were against it. The recent biography using Churchill's own voice for his memoirs points out to an embarassing briefing with the usually timid King, about this time, over Churchill's handling of the war losing support of even the Dominions. Canadian support(all volunteer) was hurt by Dieppe and Hong Kong while Australia and New Zealand's over Singapore, Tobruk and Greece. "And His Majesty reminded me that my first duty was to the preservation and continuation of the Empire, not 'a new world order'." and went on to be critical of the 'unconditional surrender' demand of Japan in particular where Britain had far more at stake than America. In the end, the King was right(oddly enough, though who advised him it doesn't say).
        Standing firm on the issue of refusing to promise Indian Independence was one thing, the Crown already felt Dominion support slipping away during the Great War and the King was already conscious of the Empire falling away even then.
        Most people don't realize that Churchill was not the leader of Commonwealth, the King was titular head, but each Dominion had their own elected gov'ts, Parliaments and Senates that could even elect to leave the Commonwealth and become republics as we often hear from Australia on the news today(despite the fact that culturally they are far closer to Britain than Canada).
        I guess I'm saddened by the fact that he appears to be right. We really don't see the Australian quotient here at all. It's dangerously presumptious.
        Today Australia sided with Britain in Iraq, while the rest of the Dominions did not. During the Falklands war, Britain went it alone.

        As for those who cite 'The Shattered Sword' as the American-interpreted Gospel of the Japanese in the Pacific War...I have the greatest respect for Jon (Parshal), I even use his interviews, where I can find them, in regards to American history and American edited views on Japanese thinking. But it is just that, more of 'our' edited views on the Japanese rather than their own historians.

        I know from our own work in Japan and Asia, the Senshi Sosho is considered a 'suspect' archive.
        The reason being not only that the vast majority of it is missing(the Japanese having hidden away or destroyed the rest), but because the Americans physically stole it away and refused to return it to them for 14? years. Therefore corruption and manipulation is accused by Asians.

        As one Korean historian put it.
        "Imagine when the British marched into Washington D.C. during the War of 1812, they stole away the official American gov't and war department records. That they refused to return them to the Americans for 14 years. Would the Americans or international community consider them not to have been tampered with? edited, manipulated? in favour of the British?"
        Would I?.

        Like anyone here I think, I didn't start out thinking this way. But the more I've read the actual veteran's accounts who were there at the time, knowing the 'thinking' of the time and my recent enlightenment by Australian friends(one who claims to work as a lawyer for their Foreign Office even), the more I believe they may be right.

        From the Australian point of view, such a Japanese victory at Midway might be enough to accept, separate, if necessary, conditional terms with Japan(and they were reasonable for Australia) and pull out of the war with Japan and maybe war only with Germany like the Soviet Union.(but no guarantees even there given their mood.) Ironically he claims that the Australian translation of the Senshi Sosho actually backs up the Ultra quotes by Macksey and Wilson of Japanese planning that after such a victory all possible effort, including reinforcements from China and the continent, would be thrown into an immediate offensive and invasion of Australia which according to even British books I have like Oxford I quote, would definately lead to Australian neutrality.

        That's the way I'm leaning now. My friends are right, the more I hear total dismissal of the subject or its effects, the more it seems they are right. Interesting.

        I've apologised myself for my own national ignorance and arrogance assuming that Australia felt the same about either war as Canada did.

        Comment


        • #19
          Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
          Whether MacArthur's strategy was better or whether the US could run both strategies because of their materiel superiority is neither here nor there. IF Nimitz had lost his political clout after a Midway disaster then MacArthur's strategy would have been the only game in town. For better or for worse.
          Doubtful, even if Nimitz had taken the bullet for a failed Midway operation, King would still have been the one pushing the navies plan back in D C. Given that the PTO was mostly ocean he could still have gotten his way. Maybe with Halsey in charge.
          Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedy. -- Ernest Benn

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by Dr What View Post
            I hadn't even thought of the risk of losing Spruance of Fletcher with their ships. Could that be as costly to the US as Yamato to the Japanese?
            I was simply refering to the loss of the Americans most experienced if only experienced carrier pilots, air crews and yes, officers and ship crews too.
            Why would they lose the pilots? The Japanese didn't.
            Most people don't realize that Churchill was not the leader of Commonwealth, the King was titular head, but each Dominion had their own elected gov'ts, Parliaments and Senates that could even elect to leave the Commonwealth and become republics as we often hear from Australia on the news today(despite the fact that culturally they are far closer to Britain than Canada).
            Who is this directed at? We're not stupid you know.

            However, he is right, most the replies so far seem totally apathetic to the effect on Australia. 'They' don't seem to exist, nor the chance of their withdrawal from the war let alone its effects even given serious consideration. As his wife said, 'like the arrogant husband still refusing to take his eyes off the TV even while the wife has her bags packed by the door with the taxi outside about to make her final decision based upon his next words.'
            At the moment there has yet to be any demonstration of an effect on Australia. A heavy defeat for the US at Midway has no direct effect, only an indirect one by its influence on Japanese strategy. I would also point out that you've made no mention of New Zealand, does it not count here?
            Signing out.

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by tsar View Post
              Doubtful, even if Nimitz had taken the bullet for a failed Midway operation, King would still have been the one pushing the navies plan back in D C. Given that the PTO was mostly ocean he could still have gotten his way. Maybe with Halsey in charge.
              Maybe, but Doug's political clout was considerable. A navy failure at Midway would seriously dent their credibility no matter how hard King pushed.
              Signing out.

              Comment


              • #22
                Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                Maybe, but Doug's political clout was considerable. A navy failure at Midway would seriously dent their credibility no matter how hard King pushed.
                Yes, but letís not forget that FDR was a navy supporter (formally under secretary of the navy).
                Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedy. -- Ernest Benn

                Comment


                • #23
                  Originally posted by tsar View Post
                  Yes, but letís not forget that FDR was a navy supporter (formally under secretary of the navy).
                  Indeed he was, but his was not the only voice in deciding strategy.
                  Signing out.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                    Indeed he was, but his was not the only voice in deciding strategy.
                    No, but he was the final voice. He was the one that decided on the Philippines over Taiwan. Although I will be the first to admit that the navies plan for Taiwan was just wrong. But Iím also no fan of going back to the Philippines either.
                    Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedy. -- Ernest Benn

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Assuming FDR is looking to be re-elected in 1944 (and his chances are still good following a Midway disaster - a big 'if' I'd concede), would he risk backing the Navy's strategy? If he did, and there was even a hint of failure after adopting such a course, Roosevelt would have been finished politically.
                      Signing out.

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                        Why would they lose the pilots? The Japanese didn't.
                        Of course the Japanese lost air crews. Eventhough they came out on top of the aerial battles big-time, what crews they didn't lose attacking Midway then the Yorktown wouldn't all survive their burning, exploding, sinking base carriers. Where do you get the idea the Japanese didn't lose pilots there?

                        As for American losses if the Battle went on rather than the 'miracle strike'.
                        Read up on the Battle of Midway. Multiply the losses suffered by the Yorktown by 3. You'd have to add even more to that casualty list as most carriers don't go down as slowly and quietly as the Yorktown did, and with the Japanese controlling the seas, what remained of the US surface fleet wouldn't be able to stick around to pick most of the survivors.


                        Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                        Who is this directed at? We're not stupid you know.
                        If you read my entire post you'd see I include myself in this ignorance. So if I were calling you stupid, I am calling me stupid too obviously.
                        It's directed at all those of us out here who dismiss the Australian risk of pulling out of the war based upon Churchill or Roosevelt's own personal determination and confidence. Which wasn't Australia's obviously.

                        Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                        1. At the moment there has yet to be any demonstration of an effect on Australia. 2. A heavy defeat for the US at Midway has no direct effect, only an indirect one by its influence on Japanese strategy. 3. I would also point out that you've made no mention of New Zealand, does it not count here?
                        1.
                        Are you serious?
                        American carrier power in the Pacific was of paramount importance to the Australians.
                        If you read any historical account, the reason Midway was such a great turning point in the war was because it burst the bubble of Allied falling and Japanese rising morale, even actually reversed it.
                        Momentum.
                        Why do you think Australian morale and support for the war before Midway was so low they were pressing Churchill for terms with Japan?
                        Have you read anything on American and Japanese morale tendencies from Pearl to Midway?
                        Do you not appreciate just how important, not only the victory, but the totality of the victory was to not only military but civilian morale in the war against Japan?
                        I think you under-estimate the greatness of what the Americans achieved there, at the very least from Australia's if not all ANZAC's point of view.

                        As for indirect, it's no more indirect than Britain's fears of the Fall of France or Battle of Dunkirk.
                        It's as simple a logical and well documented progression as:
                        The Germans win the Battle of Britain.
                        The Luftwaffe prevents the Royal Navy from preventing invasion across the Channel.
                        The Germans invade England.
                        But British morale, resolve and support for the war is high, they'll probably? fight on without opening peace talks?

                        The IJN win the Battle of Midway.
                        What the Americans did with Carrier supremacy and superior planes, trained crews, experience, morale and confidence against Japanese Pacific territories in 1944/45,
                        instead the Japanese do to take the Solomons and Port Moresby in 1942.
                        The Japanese invade Ausralia.
                        But unlike the British, the Australian morale, resolve and support for the war is the opposite of Britain's.
                        It's no more incredulous than British concerns of invasion after Dunkirk or the Fall of France.


                        2. First of all, the loss of those 3 US Pac carriers at Midway would be far far more than just a 'heavy defeat' to the US and ANZAC in general. You seem to grossly under-value the presence of those aircraft carriers to the Pacific War in 1942.

                        To Nimitz and most of the Admiralty, those 3 carriers were more important than all the American capital ships in the Pacific combined. FDR being familiar with the navy would appreciate that more than some other leaders.

                        History is full of such battles deciding major changes in foreign policy, military and civilian morale.

                        France decided on surrender after a major defeat.
                        Italy wouldn't have declared war on France had the Germans not won the first Battle of the Ardennes through to Dunkirk.
                        America wouldn't have declared open support for Britain had she lost the Battle of Britain.
                        Hitler wouldn't have declared war on the USA if the Japanese had suffered a major defeat at Pearl Harbour.
                        Rumania, Hungary and Finland not only re-opened peace negotiations after Stalingrad but each actually switched sides after heavy Russian victories.
                        The Philippines, despite knowing America couldn't lose, surrendered after a major defeat.
                        Italy not only surrendered but switched sides based upon the battle for Sicily.
                        Chiang Kai Shek often mentioned the Burma Road, Singapore, Rangoon, Imphal, Midway and such battles as major factors in his decision making process however 'indirect'.
                        It goes both ways.

                        3.
                        Actually I have mentioned New Zealand.
                        But like Canada, New Zealand didn't view the war the same as Australia.
                        Therefore it is Australia, far more than New Zealand, that would be affected.
                        Last edited by Dr What; 30 Jun 07, 06:07.

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Originally posted by Dr What View Post
                          .
                          The Philippines, despite knowing America couldn't lose, surrendered after a major defeat.
                          The Philippines, surrendered after being occupied. Not quite the same thing.
                          Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedy. -- Ernest Benn

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            Originally posted by Dr What View Post
                            Of course the Japanese lost air crews. Eventhough they came out on top of the aerial battles big-time, what crews they didn't lose attacking Midway then the Yorktown wouldn't all survive their burning, exploding, sinking base carriers. Where do you get the idea the Japanese didn't lose pilots there?
                            I know they lost pilots, but not the majority of the aircrew (which was what I thought you were implying).
                            As for American losses if the Battle went on rather than the 'miracle strike'.
                            Read up on the Battle of Midway. Multiply the losses suffered by the Yorktown by 3. You'd have to add even more to that casualty list as most carriers don't go down as slowly and quietly as the Yorktown did, and with the Japanese controlling the seas, what remained of the US surface fleet wouldn't be able to stick around to pick most of the survivors.
                            Hmmmmm, Lexington, Yorktown and Wasp all took their time to sink. But I think you're exaggerating a little. The Japanese aircraft would have to return to their carriers to refuel and rearm leaving a sufficient space of time for the smaller vessels to pick up survivors. The Japanese weren't averse to allowing this to happen - the aftermath of the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales shows this quite well. Sinking the Carriers would be regarded as 'job done'.

                            If you read my entire post you'd see I include myself in this ignorance. So if I were calling you stupid, I am calling me stupid too obviously. It's directed at all those of us out here who dismiss the Australian risk of pulling out of the war based upon Churchill or Roosevelt's own personal determination and confidence. Which wasn't Australia's obviously.
                            Apologies, but it wasn't clear to me.


                            1.
                            Are you serious?
                            American carrier power in the Pacific was of paramount importance to the Australians.
                            If you read any historical account, the reason Midway was such a great turning point in the war was because it burst the bubble of Allied falling and Japanese rising morale, even actually reversed it.
                            Momentum.
                            Why do you think Australian morale and support for the war before Midway was so low they were pressing Churchill for terms with Japan?
                            Have you read anything on American and Japanese morale tendencies from Pearl to Midway?
                            Do you not appreciate just how important, not only the victory, but the totality of the victory was to not only military but civilian morale in the war against Japan?
                            I think you under-estimate the greatness of what the Americans achieved there, at the very least from Australia's if not all ANZAC's point of view.
                            I am serious, and I've read several accounts of the campaigns in the Far East.

                            As for indirect, it's no more indirect than Britain's fears of the Fall of France or Battle of Dunkirk.
                            It's as simple a logical and well documented progression as:
                            The Germans win the Battle of Britain.
                            The Luftwaffe prevents the Royal Navy from preventing invasion across the Channel.
                            The Germans invade England.
                            But British morale, resolve and support for the war is high, they'll probably? fight on without opening peace talks?
                            But that's not a good analogy since removing Britain from the war by whatever means necessary was a stated aim of the Germans. Especially as Britain was the last enemy the Germans faced in Europe. The situation is not the same in the Far East.
                            The IJN win the Battle of Midway.
                            What the Americans did with Carrier supremacy and superior planes, trained crews, experience, morale and confidence against Japanese Pacific territories in 1944/45,
                            instead the Japanese do to take the Solomons and Port Moresby in 1942.
                            The Japanese invade Ausralia.
                            But unlike the British, the Australian morale, resolve and support for the war is the opposite of Britain's.
                            You have yet to demonstrate that the Japanese had the desire or capability to invade Australia.


                            It's no more incredulous than British concerns of invasion after Dunkirk or the Fall of France.
                            I'm a bit incredulous but there you go.


                            2. First of all, the loss of those 3 US Pac carriers at Midway would be far far more than just a 'heavy defeat' to the US and ANZAC in general. You seem to grossly under-value the presence of those aircraft carriers to the Pacific War in 1942.
                            I don't think I do.

                            To Nimitz and most of the Admiralty, those 3 carriers were more important than all the American capital ships in the Pacific combined. FDR being familiar with the navy would appreciate that more than some other leaders.

                            History is full of such battles deciding major changes in foreign policy, military and civilian morale.
                            Indeed it is, but as far as I'm concerned Midway's significance only becomes clear in hindsight. To many ordinary individuals it was the battleship that was the most significant vessel in naval warfare even as late as 1942. The 'Day of Infamy', the loss of PoW and Repulse had a far greater impact on morale than the loss of aircraft carriers.
                            Signing out.

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              Originally posted by tsar View Post
                              The Philippines, surrendered after being occupied. Not quite the same thing.
                              Agree and disagree,

                              while the Philippines did not surrender because of one naval defeat
                              neither did they surrender only after completely occupied
                              invaded yes,

                              but as Keegan point out, 'it was the Battle of Bataan that was the crux for the general surrender throughout the Philippines which was considered inconceivable till then' as well.
                              At that point the Americans still controlled the Visayans, most of Mindanao and the 4 fortified islands around Manilla.

                              "The result was the only surrender in history to a foreign enemy by an American army in the field."

                              "the surrender of 7 May brought organised resistance in the Philippines to an end, and ensured the largely unopposed occupation by the Japanese of various islands thus far beyond their reach."

                              Therefor my point remains that, however inconceivable it seemed, a major battlefield/sea battle defeat does 'result in major changes in policy at the highest levels.'

                              Comment


                              • #30
                                Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                                I know they lost pilots, but not the majority of the aircrew (which was what I thought you were implying).

                                Hmmmmm, Lexington, Yorktown and Wasp all took their time to sink. But I think you're exaggerating a little. The Japanese aircraft would have to return to their carriers to refuel and rearm leaving a sufficient space of time for the smaller vessels to pick up survivors. The Japanese weren't averse to allowing this to happen - the aftermath of the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales shows this quite well. Sinking the Carriers would be regarded as 'job done'.
                                .
                                Very true, with some excellent damage control and luck, Lexington lost fewer men than expected.
                                Wasp rescued 90% I think?
                                But while Lexington was hit in a distant battle where the far smaller-than-Midway Japanese fleet withdrew, and Wasp was sunk by a lone submarine (if i recall correctly?),
                                neither casualty rates reflect the circumstances that would be faced had they been sunk in such a total Japanese victory at Midway as being considered here.

                                The Yorktown is the only one that even comes close to reflecting the circumstances, having actually been there and sunk by Japanese planes, but in a victorious cause.
                                Even in victory the Yorktown suffered horrendously just in the aerial engagements, not including on-board casualties.

                                "Out of 128 pilots and crew who were in the torpedo planes that day, 29 survived, 99 died. And not one torpedo exploded against the hull of a Japanese ship." The Unknown Story of Midway, Kernan(who used the Shattered Sword as one of sources btw)

                                Now if that is in victory, you have to expect even higher in defeat.Every single engagement between Japanese and American planes that day resulted in such lop-sided events with the Wildcats either refusing to engage the Zeros or disengaging after losing 1 of their number even during cover for attack runs.

                                I don't mean to make all Japanese out to be monsters, but first, in the Repulse and PoW, those were sunk by land-based torpedo planes, not a Japanese fleet who'd claim control of the sea area if not to chase down survivors, but secure the seas against further threats to the invasion forces.

                                Upon destruction of the carriers, I do not believe the Japanese would 'call it a day'. I am pretty sure, like we did, they would continue to advance on and through(as we all do when we play naval sims ourselves) and keep attacking cruisers and destroyers even submarines even on rescue missions. Yes, I definately do believe that. They would want to destroy every American cruiser and destroyer even submarine that popped up once the carriers were downed. We did no less when we sunk their carriers.

                                Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                                Apologies, but it wasn't clear to me.
                                .
                                No problem. As I say, I'm playing devil's advocate here. I didn't even used to consider this before at all, let alone see the likelihood. Me too buddy.

                                Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                                I am serious, and I've read several accounts of the campaigns in the Far East.
                                .
                                My apologies if I came across a little condescending. You are obviously well-read and interested in the topic. Just disagree even where not mis-understandings.

                                I think our major misunderstanding so far is trying to equate what a drawn out battle would do compared to the unbelievably lucky stroke we had.

                                Maybe something like wrongly suggesting typical Bismark casualties based upon the Hood engagement alone.


                                Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                                But that's not a good analogy since removing Britain from the war by whatever means necessary was a stated aim of the Germans. Especially as Britain was the last enemy the Germans faced in Europe. The situation is not the same in the Far East..
                                I believe it is because the Japanese never included Australia in their Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere dream. They never wanted an 'anglo' country, only East Asian. And Australia was not 'East Asia'. Their only goal as far as Australia was concerned, was to get it out of the war. If that required invasion, so be it.

                                Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                                You have yet to demonstrate that the Japanese had the desire or capability to invade Australia.

                                I'm a bit incredulous but there you go.
                                .
                                Ah hah! lol
                                I think I might!.

                                I was going to try to dig out my Macksey and Hughes-Wilson books that use quotes from Ultra and post-war Japanese Intelligence files, but how about this instead?

                                This webpage links you to Australian historians actual assessments here.

                                http://www.users.bigpond.com/battlef...ustinvade.html


                                Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                                Indeed it is, but as far as I'm concerned Midway's significance only becomes clear in hindsight. To many ordinary individuals it was the battleship that was the most significant vessel in naval warfare even as late as 1942. The 'Day of Infamy', the loss of PoW and Repulse had a far greater impact on morale than the loss of aircraft carriers.
                                As far as Australian invasion in hindsight, I disagree. I'm sure you can find numerous other authors besides Macksey and Hughes-Wilson who indicate that even before Midway, 'Victory Fever' had even some moderate Japanese seriously considering it. Again, the webpage above citing the Australian intelligence view.

                                As for the battleship vs carrier, you are again perfectly correct, spot on.
                                The 'black shoes' (air power) were still considered second fiddle to the 'brown shoes' (big gun). Yet as far as the Pacific was concerned, Pearl and Midway were what was needed for leaders like Spruance and Fletcher to take centre stage in influence. (I think you'll agree?).

                                Regardless of who wiped out whose carrier force at Midway, the resulting perception of surface power now at the mercy of air power would only be a greater, not lesser, revelation and addition to immediate post-Midway panic.
                                Japan tried to hide her disaster, America simply wouldn't be able to hide that kind of disaster.

                                But I agree with you completely about, to that point, majority opinion was that the battleship was still most important.
                                Yet at that point, despite the raising of most of the sunken old bbs at Pearl, Japan also had the advantage in more modern surface capital ships at the time too.

                                But such a major defeat discussed here, couldn't help but make the Allied perception of the value of aircraft carriers over battleships even more urgent than had we won.

                                Originally posted by Full Monty View Post

                                .. The 'Day of Infamy', the loss of PoW and Repulse had a far greater impact on morale than the loss of aircraft carriers.
                                Well that's only because we won at Midway, not lost.
                                Of course we'd consider the loss of battleships till that time more important than carriers, WE hadn't lost that many carriers yet.
                                It's only after you suffer the same injury that you fully appreciate it's importance.

                                The Quarter-back lying winded on his back with a 240lb line-backer stomping off with arms raised is at least as cognicent of the value of the blitz than the blitzer is.
                                Believe me. I've been on both sides of that ball lol.

                                Believe me guys, I was in the same mind-frame as you about this till recently.
                                If I came across condescending, I didn't mean to sorry, since having to work and live overseas so much, I've been embarassed to find out how egotistical and arrogant my own view of history has been and I thought I was well read.

                                So please include me in any insults I seem to imply.

                                Comment

                                Latest Topics

                                Collapse

                                Working...
                                X