Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Market Garden: Alterations

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • #76
    Originally posted by Naffenea View Post
    I'll disagree with you on the use of a parachute brigade for Arnhem. What the troops needed most was transport and artillery, which means glider borne troops.

    Look at it this way, if it wasn't for the 82nd being where they were, a lot less Brits and Poles would have come home. Do you think the 1st AB would have been able to crack the Waal as fast as the 504th?
    Nope, I don't think the 1st A/B could've crossed the Waal.

    I do think that the simple switch of the 504th PIR for that one Brigade would bring along veteran parachute and glider artillery, and a Company of crack parachute engineers. All the need for transport could be reduced by these guys experience in moving on foot.

    Of course as I already said, that means the 505th PIR has to assist the 507th PIR at the river. That's no big change if you trading 3/504 for 2/505, the certain substitute, as they where both hardened, veteran battalions.

    I still say that means more of the British and Poles, as well as Americans, have a chance to cross the river, instead of only getting Col. Dobey (the mad colonel of Arnhem) and his boys across....

    Never work, because of the Airborne politics, though. The British were already in hot water over trying to steal the 509th PIB (saying they'd always been considered "British"), and Ridgway nearly had to go to Italy to get the 504th PIR back once already. It would have to be a complete Division swap, and I don't see the 101st A/B or the Br 1st A/B holding down the middle very well.....
    "This life..., you know, "the life." Youíre not gonna get any medals, kid. This is not a hero business; you donít shoot people from a mile a way. You gotta stand right next to them... blow their heads off."

    BoRG

    Comment


    • #77


      Great Thread!
      Watts Up With That? | The world's most viewed site on global warming and climate change.

      Comment


      • #78
        Alteration...

        Something radical.

        Perhaps the entire plan might have been successful if the airborne landings had been SEQUENTIAL and roughly attuned to the advance of 30 Corps?. By this i mean that the 101st is dropped as planned, but the 82nd are held back until all the 101st and 30 Corps objectives are secured. Once thats done and consolidated then the 82nd do their drop and so on.

        The first benefit of this is it allows the attack plan to be altered if needs be without disrupting the entire operation.

        The second benefit this would present is that all three Airborne Divs could be dropped in one lift, because the transport assets would be consolidated.

        The third benefit is that it gives the airborne assets a more achievable role, without ruffling anyones 'feathers'.

        Final point for now...

        One thing thats often missed in regard to this operation is what the actual use of airborne forces tells the enemy, simply by where and when they are dropped. For example take any competant German Intel officer gazing at his map of Holland at the end of the first days fighting. On it he has a very rough outline of where the 3 Airborne divs have dropped and about the 30 corps attack.

        The PLACING of the 3 Air divisions at once suggests the allied strategy and more importantly, suggests that its the bridges that are the key to the whole operation. Furthermore it shows that Arnhem is the strategic prize and that if 1st Airborne is isolated or the advance of 30 corps slowed, the whole things fails.

        Anyway...

        Looking forward to your comments.

        Gary

        Comment


        • #79
          ASG, iirc I suggested something similar on another of the Market-Garden threads on the grounds that drawing Bittrich's Corps away from Arnhem would slow the German response to the landing there. The primary objection was that the single road makes it absolutely clear where XXX Corps is heading for allowing the Germans to reinforce the garrison and effectively mine the road bridge. I'll see if I can find the thread with that debate in.
          Signing out.

          Comment


          • #80
            Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
            ASG, iirc I suggested something similar on another of the Market-Garden threads on the grounds that drawing Bittrich's Corps away from Arnhem would slow the German response to the landing there. The primary objection was that the single road makes it absolutely clear where XXX Corps is heading for allowing the Germans to reinforce the garrison and effectively mine the road bridge. I'll see if I can find the thread with that debate in.
            http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forum...ad.php?t=34512 Post 20.

            Two years ago almost exactly!
            Signing out.

            Comment


            • #81
              Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
              ASG, iirc I suggested something similar on another of the Market-Garden threads on the grounds that drawing Bittrich's Corps away from Arnhem would slow the German response to the landing there. The primary objection was that the single road makes it absolutely clear where XXX Corps is heading for allowing the Germans to reinforce the garrison and effectively mine the road bridge. I'll see if I can find the thread with that debate in.

              FM e.a., I was just too slow :-), I wanted to post that we have been discussing this possibility here too.
              Last edited by Colonel Sennef; 30 Dec 07, 08:14.
              BoRG

              You may not be interested in War, but War is interested in You - Leon Trotski, June 1919.

              Comment


              • #82
                Originally posted by captainsennef View Post
                FM e.a., I was just too slow :-), I wanted to post that we have been discussing this possibility here too.
                Searching for that proved very enlightening for me because I scanned through several M-G related threads going back to when I first posted at ACG. I realised just how much more I know now compared to then and how that is reflected in my opinions ...... and the number of books consuming my limited shelf-space!
                Signing out.

                Comment


                • #83
                  Originally posted by allsirgarnet View Post
                  Alteration...

                  Perhaps the entire plan might have been successful if the airborne landings had been SEQUENTIAL and roughly attuned to the advance of 30 Corps?. By this i mean that the 101st is dropped as planned, but the 82nd are held back until all the 101st and 30 Corps objectives are secured. Once thats done and consolidated then the 82nd do their drop and so on.
                  Indeed. That would require a set of fluid Airborne plans, of course, and that's hard to do. Gains planned and not made, or lost just prior to drop, would throw big trouble the way of the plans guys too. I figure you could get away with it twice. The third time you'd have to expect German reaction forces to be ready for the trick. It's possible though, in my opinion, to have some success with one drop per day, if everything else goes as planned. It just seems like it would give the Krauts alot of prep time.....
                  Last edited by Paul Mann III; 30 Dec 07, 11:01.
                  "This life..., you know, "the life." Youíre not gonna get any medals, kid. This is not a hero business; you donít shoot people from a mile a way. You gotta stand right next to them... blow their heads off."

                  BoRG

                  Comment


                  • #84
                    Originally posted by allsirgarnet View Post
                    Alteration...

                    Something radical.

                    Perhaps the entire plan might have been successful if the airborne landings had been SEQUENTIAL and roughly attuned to the advance of 30 Corps?. By this i mean that the 101st is dropped as planned, but the 82nd are held back until all the 101st and 30 Corps objectives are secured. Once thats done and consolidated then the 82nd do their drop and so on.

                    Gary

                    Originally posted by allsirgarnet View Post
                    Full Monty
                    ASG, iirc I suggested something similar on another of the Market-Garden threads on the grounds that drawing Bittrich's Corps away from Arnhem would slow the German response to the landing there. The primary objection was that the single road makes it absolutely clear where XXX Corps is heading for allowing the Germans to reinforce the garrison and effectively mine the road bridge. I'll see if I can find the thread with that debate in.
                    I saw something like this in a NATO Ex. back in the 1980s. The air mobile element was to be a series of heliocopter squadrons inserting infantry companys, the ground attack force a brigade rather than corps, and the enemy Warsaw Pact forces, whom it was assumed would be slow to react. The execution repeatedly fell apart mostly due to the complexity of timing the various groups. Despite handicaps the opforce was able to mass resrves in the threatened sector. And, most important destroy the two key bridges. In one case a change in plan for the route and time of a airmobile element resulted in the loss of 20% of the helos to Blue force anti air fires. The KISS principle was clearly illustrated.

                    Comment


                    • #85
                      First off, thanks for the link to the previous thread... i had no idea it had been extensively covered. Reading both it and your responses here has set me thinking again. A few indeas...

                      Grip...

                      One of the things that seemed lacking in the entire operation was what Monty called Grip, by which he meant (generally) a firm guiding hand able to grasp both the situation in any action and be able to affect it with decisive command. I can remember a scene from 'A bridge too far' in which most of the higher commanders south of the Rhine are discussing why the plan failed. Regardless of the accuracy of the scene itself it to me exposes the problem which was who really had COMMAND of the operation? The scene suggests that the operation was run by committee and we all know how dangerous that can be.

                      Given the complexity and possible risk of the entire operation, doesnt it seem strange that no one of higher than corps (equiv) command was guiding the thing. Even more odd is that given Monty's 'fetish' (used admiringly) for proper command during battle and how he emphasised this by his own use of command, the M-G operation seems almost to have run itself. For example, after Alamein Monty's TAC Army HQ was at times the leading HQ of the 8th Army, so that he as commander was on the spot to adjust the operation if needed. From everything ive read on the operation, this style of command simply doesnt come across in MG.

                      Operations...

                      Its strange that the use of Airborne forces emphasises the duality of their role and i think this is key to why MG ultimately failed. In general we might say that in strategic terms the use of airborne forces is offensive by nature, yet their tactical role is in my view best described as defensive. Although after the drop/landing the troops have to capture objectives, their very nature as 'light infantry' requires both surprise and ferocity to achieve their aims. You might say that the general rule of thumb requires their objectives be captured within a day, after which the element of surprise is lost?

                      Now in the three main drops the above general rules apply. The relatively lightly armed para's make the most of both surprise and their own ferocity to capture their objectives on the first day. After that if their role isnt defensive as they are equiped for then obviously they will have to rely on ferocity and training to fight better equipped troops. You might say that to use the airborne OFFENSIVELY after the first days surprise is lost is not their intended role. Monty himself commented on this during his exercises in the UK during 1941-42, where he emphasised the need for the airborne objectives to be achievable. By this he meant they were far enough forward to give a strategic advantage, but still near enough so that conventional forces could relieve them before they were overun.

                      Arnhem...

                      If you look at the general plan for 1st Airborne, doesnt it seem a disaster waiting to happen. You have a partial divisional drop, which is expected to both defend its drop zones and push on to capture its objectives. This seems simple but it has a fatal flat because of the size of the area to be defended. Let me explain.

                      Once down the DZ area represents the area 1st AB has to defend and hold and because its an airborne operation they have to defend front, flanks and rear. Then they push east to gain their objective which is actually Arnhem itself, and not just the 2 bridges and the ferry. AS they push east on the first day, the area they need to defend incrases vastly, yet the force remains the same. This means that their offensive capability on their best day for attack is actually severely weakened.

                      On the second day more of the Division arrives, but by this time the crucial element of surprise is lost. This i think is when the Arnhem battle was itself lost. From this point on the 1st AB should (in airborne tactical terms) have been defending its objectives and waiting to be relieved by 30 Corps. Instead it was trying to hold its DZ's, attacking toward Arnhem and holding the ground between the two. If this wasnt a clue to the coming disaster i dont know what is.

                      Time...

                      As Monty's exercise notes point out its time thats key to airborne operations success or failure. Specifically how long the ground forces will take to relieve the airborne.

                      Nijmegen

                      In the context of this thread in think its at Nijmegen the planning has to be changed. If you look at what the 82nd had as its objectives, then it seems clear it was too small for its given role. Possibly we might discuss this part more deeply so...

                      Can anyone give us a brief description of the 82nd's objectives and the forces allocated to them for the first 24 hours after the landings?

                      ... after which possible changes might be suggested.

                      thanks

                      Gary

                      Comment


                      • #86
                        Originally posted by Carl Schwamberg View Post
                        I saw something like this in a NATO Ex. back in the 1980s. The air mobile element was to be a series of heliocopter squadrons inserting infantry companys, the ground attack force a brigade rather than corps, and the enemy Warsaw Pact forces, whom it was assumed would be slow to react. The execution repeatedly fell apart mostly due to the complexity of timing the various groups. Despite handicaps the opforce was able to mass resrves in the threatened sector. And, most important destroy the two key bridges. In one case a change in plan for the route and time of a airmobile element resulted in the loss of 20% of the helos to Blue force anti air fires. The KISS principle was clearly illustrated.
                        Carl et al...

                        By sequential i meant that the basic plans would have remained the same, but the airborne drops staggered by 2 or so days. This would allow each division to be inserted as a complete entity within one single day. The the 101st would go in on day one, the 82nd on day three and the 1st on day five. By doing this you retain the ability to cancel or pospone a drop if the ground forces run into serious delays.

                        I agree it does give more time to the German defences, but this could be matched by the benefits of full divisional drops integrated with the ground force attacks. For example by day three 30 corps would have reached the 101st, consolidated their positions and 'repaired' any bridges or crossings. Then on (possibly) day four 30 corps begins a set piece attack towards Nijmegen as the 82nd make their landing as a complete division. Once the 82nd's objectives had been consolidated and Nijmegen and its crossings taken, then the following day the 1st AB makes its landing as a whole division as 30 corps begins its attack towards Arnhem..

                        Gary

                        Comment


                        • #87
                          ASG, much of what you post is clear with hindsight but certainly could not have been clear at the time. If the forces dropped were insufficient to carry out their roles that's a judgement based on what forces we now know the Germans had in available to them at the time. To the planners, to Montgomery, to Eisenhower, Brooke, Marshall, Churchill et al the Germans were a beaten and demoralised army who just needed to be kept moving.

                          As for 'Grip', the clear responsibility was with Dempsey to whom the airborne forces were seconded once on the ground. Part of the problem I suspect was that Horrocks was clearly unwell and lacked his normal 'fire' allowing the likes of Browning to browbeat him and exert their own authority over tactical matters. Dempsey should have been there BUT one would suspect that he had confidence in Horrocks (and why not based on previous experience?). Montgomery certainly should not have got involved since, as Army Group commander his responsibility did not extend to tactical matters
                          Signing out.

                          Comment


                          • #88
                            Originally posted by allsirgarnet View Post

                            Nijmegen

                            In the context of this thread in think its at Nijmegen the planning has to be changed. If you look at what the 82nd had as its objectives, then it seems clear it was too small for its given role. Possibly we might discuss this part more deeply so...

                            Can anyone give us a brief description of the 82nd's objectives and the forces allocated to them for the first 24 hours after the landings?
                            Gavin's Force for Market Garden, Day One, in Flight Order

                            505th Parachute Infantry Regiment {North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Naples, Volturno River, Anzio, Normandy}

                            307th Airborne Engineer Battalion {North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Naples, Volturno River, Anzio, Normandy}

                            504th Parachute Infantry Regiment {North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Naples, Volturno River, Anzio, Normandy - volunteer pathfinders}

                            508th Parachute Infantry Regiment {Normandy}

                            376th Parachute Field Artilley Battalion (75mm Pack) {Sicily, Salerno, Naples, Anzio}

                            Total 7,250 Parachutists


                            Elements 80th Anti-Aircraft Battalion (only 8 of 57mm ATGs on Day One) {North Africa, Salerno, Naples, Anzio, Normandy}

                            50th & 52nd Wings provided 480 aircraft and 50 Waco Gliders




                            Day Two, by Glider

                            50th and 52nd Wings provided 454 Waco Gliders


                            456th Parachute Feild Artillery Battalion (75mm pack) {North Africa, Sicily, Naples, Anzio, Normandy}

                            319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75mm pack) {North Arfica, Salerno-with Darbys rangers, Naples, Anzio, Normandy}

                            320th GLider Field Artilley Battalion (snub-nose 105mm) {Salerno, Naples, Normandy}

                            Balance of 80th Anti-Aircraft Battalion (.50 caliber air-cooled macs/57mm ATGs)

                            Total 1,899 Gliderists


                            The 325th Glider Infantry Regiment and 81st Anit-Aircraft Battalion did not arrive until D+6

                            Total 3,385 Gliderists
                            Last edited by Paul Mann III; 30 Dec 07, 12:34.
                            "This life..., you know, "the life." Youíre not gonna get any medals, kid. This is not a hero business; you donít shoot people from a mile a way. You gotta stand right next to them... blow their heads off."

                            BoRG

                            Comment


                            • #89
                              Originally posted by Paul Mann III View Post
                              Gavin's Force for Market Garden, Day One, in Flight Order

                              505th Parachute Infantry Regiment {North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Naples, Volturno River, Anzio, Normandy}


                              307th Airborne Engineer Battalion {North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Naples, Volturno River, Anzio, Normandy}

                              504th Parachute Infantry Regiment {North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Naples, Volturno River, Anzio, Normandy - volunteer pathfinders}

                              508th Parachute Infantry Regiment {Normandy}

                              376th Parachute Field Artilley Battalion (75mm Pack) {Sicily, Salerno, Naples, Anzio}

                              Total 7,250 Parachutists


                              50th & 52nd Wings provided 480 aircraft and 50 Waco Gliders

                              part of the 80th Anti-Aircraft Battalion (only 8 of 57mm ATGs on Day One) {North Africa, Salerno, Naples, Anzio, Normandy}



                              Day Two, by Glider

                              50th and 52nd Wings provided 454 Waco Gliders


                              456th Parachute Feild Artillery Battalion (75mm pack) {North Africa, Sicily, Naples, Anzio, Normandy}

                              319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75mm pack) {North Arfica, Salerno-with Darbys rangers, Naples, Anzio, Normandy}

                              320th GLider Field Artilley Battalion (snub-nose 105mm) {Salerno, Naples, Normandy}

                              Balance of 80th Anti-Aircraft Battalion (.50 caliber air-cooled macs/57mm ATGs)

                              Total 1,899 Gliderists

                              The 325th Glider Infantry Regiment and 81st Anit-Aircraft Battalion did not arrive until D+6

                              Total 3,385 Gliderists
                              Paul...

                              Thanks for the info.

                              Can you or anyone list their actual objectives (as planned) for the first 24 hours and then after please?

                              Gary

                              Comment


                              • #90
                                Originally posted by allsirgarnet View Post
                                Can you or anyone list their actual objectives (as planned) for the first 24 hours and then after please?
                                504th PIR - Bridges at Maas River, Bridge at Grave, secondary canal bridges, Vehgel Highway South

                                505th PIR - Groesbeek, & surrounding heights, Mook-325th LZ's, Reichswald border

                                508th PIR - Groesbeek, Wyler, Beek, Nijmagen Bridge

                                Gavin was instructed by Browning that securing the Nijmagen Bridge would be considered "secondary," to be handled after clearing his other objectives. All of the 82nd Airborne Division objectives for Day One where acheived, and then the 1/508th PIR bogged down en route to the Bridge. Gavin lamented in later interviews, feeling he'd botched up the plan by sending the 508th to handle what "should have been obvious, that the 504th was much better prepared and in better position" than the 508th. The plan, however, stated that the Bridge would be taken "at best opportunity," (maybe not on day one) and Gavin felt the 508th PIR had a fortunate chance at the bridge, but was wrong....
                                Last edited by Paul Mann III; 30 Dec 07, 12:52.
                                "This life..., you know, "the life." Youíre not gonna get any medals, kid. This is not a hero business; you donít shoot people from a mile a way. You gotta stand right next to them... blow their heads off."

                                BoRG

                                Comment

                                Latest Topics

                                Collapse

                                Working...
                                X