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  • The Exorcist
    replied
    Originally posted by craven View Post
    Yep for the IJA the real enemy was always Russia

    For the IJN it was the US .
    ...and they were even equipped to fight such disparate enemies

    And from a mish-mash like that you get a really fouled up war.



    Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian View Post
    Where are you getting 45,000 Soviets and 75,000 Japanese?...
    I'd like to know that too, so I can mock the source that claims more IJN casualties than were present that the battle!

    Leave a comment:


  • craven
    replied
    Originally posted by Mostlyharmless View Post
    Surely some elements of the Imperial Army after 1931 correctly identified Chiang and his government as mortal enemies of Japan. The endless push forward by those leaders, such as Doihara, was not to gain territory but was aimed at preventing Chiang from building a state that could challenge Japan. Eventually, after being kidnapped, Chiang decided that he could use a war to build a state rather than building up his power and removing rivals before challenging Japan as he had initially planned.

    Having said that I should admit that I have not read Drea (or at least only read his account of Nomonhan), don't remember much about China in Kaigun and note that Barnhart mostly follows another strand of the IJA around Ishiwara (I don't know what Nagata believed) who believed that Manchuria could be developed without a war with China.
    Basically 38 according to barnhart the less radical part of the army and most of the govt wanted to conduct infrastructure spending. At this point Japan had everything it needed in Manchuria and korea.

    instead they decided to go after chiang again and increasing there defense spending significantly . Long term operation cost were killing them.

    Not that Korea would of been fully developed byt if you get to spend 10 to 14 percent of you govt spending on something like that you will make progress. btw percentage is off the top of my head since Barnhart and drea is packed away.

    Leave a comment:


  • Mostlyharmless
    replied
    Originally posted by craven View Post
    ...snip...
    Remember the only reason Japan was at war in china is because elements in the Army kept wanting to grab more land while the more reasonable types wanted to digest what they had. ie more infrastructure and industry development.
    Surely some elements of the Imperial Army after 1931 correctly identified Chiang and his government as mortal enemies of Japan. The endless push forward by those leaders, such as Doihara, was not to gain territory but was aimed at preventing Chiang from building a state that could challenge Japan. Eventually, after being kidnapped, Chiang decided that he could use a war to build a state rather than building up his power and removing rivals before challenging Japan as he had initially planned.

    Having said that I should admit that I have not read Drea (or at least only read his account of Nomonhan), don't remember much about China in Kaigun and note that Barnhart mostly follows another strand of the IJA around Ishiwara (I don't know what Nagata believed) who believed that Manchuria could be developed without a war with China.

    Leave a comment:


  • craven
    replied
    Originally posted by ljadw View Post
    This is very superficial .
    It actually not. read the following and get back to me

    unless you do some deep reading on Japan you really can not understand how they ended up in WW2

    I have yet to read about any other country that so so so dysfunctional when it comes to national policies

    http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/080...?ie=UTF8&psc=1

    http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/070...?ie=UTF8&psc=1

    http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/087...?ie=UTF8&psc=1
    Last edited by craven; 22 May 15, 08:13.

    Leave a comment:


  • ljadw
    replied
    Originally posted by craven View Post

    Remember the only reason Japan was at war in china is because elements in the Army kept wanting to grab more land while the more reasonable types wanted to digest what they had. ie more infrastructure and industry development.

    This is very superficial .

    Leave a comment:


  • BobTheBarbarian
    replied
    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    Obviously I have edited your post.

    Given that c45k Soviets attacked c75K Japanese, I find these numbers completely unlikely.

    If an attack wins, the defenders nearly always lose more men. It is extremely rare when it does not.

    You may be right, but you need to post better links to prove your POV.
    Where are you getting 45,000 Soviets and 75,000 Japanese? Page 24 of my first link lists 65,000 Soviet/Mongolians vs 28,000 Japanese/Manchukuoans. The Soviet order of battle for Khalkhin Gol at the time of the August offensive included 5 divisions with numerous regiments and brigades.

    (Pages 10 and 11)
    http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaw...lkhin_cut1.pdf

    By contrast, the Japanese fielded the equivalent of one mechanized infantry division and several auxiliary units.

    The second link, to amvas' site, lists relative Soviet and Japanese personnel losses at the bottom of the page. (The above includes the losses of the USSR and Mongolia, but not Japan.)

    Leave a comment:


  • Nick the Noodle
    replied
    Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian View Post
    And it was a remarkable victory, albeit a predictable one given the sizes of the forces involved and the restrictions placed upon the Japanese force for fear of starting a broader conflict. Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to detract from the achievement, but it was far from a one-sided fight as is the common perception.



    It also summarizes Soviet losses in all categories other than aircraft. For that, I relied on Kondratiev.



    Not Khalkhin Gol per se, rather its role (or lack of) in Japan's decision to "go south." The SSI examines the primary reasons for that decision, the fighting with the USSR not being one of them. The link was intended to support the refutation of the claim that Khalkhin Gol played a major part in the Japanese decision to attack the West.



    By "decisive," do you mean "quick"?

    The battle lasted from May to September (air combat), with the final Soviet ground offensive that encircled and destroyed a large portion of the IJA 23rd Division taking 11 days (August 20-August 31). It wasn't exactly a steamrolling, given the small scale of the battle and the tenacity of the resistance. In fact, pg. 71 of Otto Chaney's biography of Zhukov describes an incident in which one of his divisions had two commanders successively relieved for unsatisfactory progress.

    Soviet casualties, in terms of both men and material, were higher than those of their enemy. The Soviet claims of 45,000-60,000+ Japanese casualties are an impossibility, as fewer than 30,000 Axis (Japan and Manchukuo) personnel actually participated in the fighting. According to Japanese records, the 23rd Division suffered roughly 70% casualties.

    If one compares the Kwantung Army medical records with the declassified Soviet data, the casualty ratio appears as:

    USSR: 25,655
    Japan: 17,719
    Ratio: 1.45 : 1 in favor of Japan.

    Adding in the casualties of Mongolia and Manchukuo gives a figure of:

    Allies: 26,211-26,550 (Mongolian losses were between 556 and 895)
    Axis: 20,614 (2,895 from Manchukuo)
    Ratio: 1.27-1.29 : 1 in favor of the Axis.

    I have no direct source for this other than Wikipedia, but it is said that GRU Col. Vasili Novobranets wrote that Zhukov had revised the original battle report to hide his massive losses, and that the outcome was decided not by tactics but by sheer weight of numbers. The source material for this statement is cited as "Я предупреждал о войне Сталина" ("I warned about Stalin's war"), a book I don't have.
    Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian View Post
    If one compares the Kwantung Army medical records with the declassified Soviet data, the casualty ratio appears as:

    USSR: 25,655
    Japan: 17,719
    Ratio: 1.45 : 1 in favor of Japan.
    Obviously I have edited your post.

    Given that c45k Soviets attacked c75K Japanese, I find these numbers completely unlikely.

    If an attack wins, the defenders nearly always lose more men. It is extremely rare when it does not.

    You may be right, but you need to post better links to prove your POV.

    Leave a comment:


  • BobTheBarbarian
    replied
    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    Your first link...
    And it was a remarkable victory, albeit a predictable one given the sizes of the forces involved and the restrictions placed upon the Japanese force for fear of starting a broader conflict. Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to detract from the achievement, but it was far from a one-sided fight as is the common perception.

    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    Your second link states that the Soviets took high tank losses. This, the Soviets agreed with and before 1989 and all that entails: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaw...gol/losses.htm
    It also summarizes Soviet losses in all categories other than aircraft. For that, I relied on Kondratiev.

    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    I'm not too sure your third link is relevant to the battle in question?
    http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...mary.cfm?q=905
    Not Khalkhin Gol per se, rather its role (or lack of) in Japan's decision to "go south." The SSI examines the primary reasons for that decision, the fighting with the USSR not being one of them. The link was intended to support the refutation of the claim that Khalkhin Gol played a major part in the Japanese decision to attack the West.

    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    The Soviets decisively beat the Japanese at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, inflicting far more human casualties, although losing more kit. Seems a surprising Western way of war for a Soviet general ?
    By "decisive," do you mean "quick"?

    The battle lasted from May to September (air combat), with the final Soviet ground offensive that encircled and destroyed a large portion of the IJA 23rd Division taking 11 days (August 20-August 31). It wasn't exactly a steamrolling, given the small scale of the battle and the tenacity of the resistance. In fact, pg. 71 of Otto Chaney's biography of Zhukov describes an incident in which one of his divisions had two commanders successively relieved for unsatisfactory progress.

    Soviet casualties, in terms of both men and material, were higher than those of their enemy. The Soviet claims of 45,000-60,000+ Japanese casualties are an impossibility, as fewer than 30,000 Axis (Japan and Manchukuo) personnel actually participated in the fighting. According to Japanese records, the 23rd Division suffered roughly 70% casualties.

    If one compares the Kwantung Army medical records with the declassified Soviet data, the casualty ratio appears as:

    USSR: 25,655
    Japan: 17,719
    Ratio: 1.45 : 1 in favor of Japan.

    Adding in the casualties of Mongolia and Manchukuo gives a figure of:

    Allies: 26,211-26,550 (Mongolian losses were between 556 and 895)
    Axis: 20,614 (2,895 from Manchukuo)
    Ratio: 1.27-1.29 : 1 in favor of the Axis.

    I have no direct source for this other than Wikipedia, but it is said that GRU Col. Vasili Novobranets wrote that Zhukov had revised the original battle report to hide his massive losses, and that the outcome was decided not by tactics but by sheer weight of numbers. The source material for this statement is cited as "Я предупреждал о войне Сталина" ("I warned about Stalin's war"), a book I don't have.

    Leave a comment:


  • Nick the Noodle
    replied
    Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian View Post
    Christopher Bellamy and Joseph Lahnstein's case study of Khalkhin Gol (pg. 24) has a figure of 65,000 Soviet-Mongolian forces (57,000 were Russian according to amvas's RKKA site), against 28,000 Japanese-Manchukuoan soldiers (IJA forces consisted of mostly the 23rd Division and a few auxiliaries, with several thousand Manchukuoans).

    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a517710.pdf

    Amvas' site: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaw...gol/losses.htm

    On the subject of the Soviet forces and their losses, M Kolomiets, the Russian historian cited on the webpage, puts Soviet losses as 9,703 dead and 15,952 wounded. Mongolian losses are listed at 556, but I have also seen the figure of 895. For Japanese forces and their losses, the Kwantung Army medical records that Kolomiets references put IJA losses 8,632 dead and 9,087 wounded. A source posted by Emtos awhile back (link is dead) lists total Manchukuoan casualties at 2,895. The total ratio for manpower casualties was thus 26,211-26,550 Allied against 20,614 Axis, including 25,655 Soviet and 17,719 Japanese. These figures suggest an Allied casualty total nearly 30% higher than that of their foe.

    The material disparity is even greater. According to Kolomiets, Soviet forces lost 397 AFVs, including 253 tanks. The Red Army also lost 692 other motor vehicles, including 496 trucks. Total ground vehicle losses thus add up to a total of 1,089. The Russians also lost some 94 mortars, artillery pieces, and anti-tank guns. Vyacheslav Kondratiev, in addressing the air campaign, puts Soviet losses as 208 combat (including write-offs due to damage), 42 non-combat (operational), and 426 aircraft damaged (686 total). He puts Japanese losses as 88 shot down and 74 combat write-offs, as well as 220 damaged (382 total). The research of Yotaro Oda, as well as V. Dyatlov's "Soviet Artillery in the conflict at Khalkhin gol" states that Japanese material losses amounted to 59 AFVs (including 30 tanks), 327 artillery, AT guns, and mortars. Other Japanese vehicle losses (trucks, etc.) are unknown but presumably high.

    Earlier Soviet propaganda, combined with a general lack of available information on the subject, created the false perception that the battle was a one-sided walkover. It also overplayed the battle's role in Japan's decision to go south, which was in reality minimal to nonexistent.

    Japan's motive for attacking Pearl Harbor and seizing the so-called "Southern Resource Area" was chiefly economical. The United States embargoes of vital raw materials following the Japanese invasion of French Indochina in 1940 effectively crippled Japan's capacity to wage protracted warfare. The Japanese were then forced to either concede to American demands (unacceptable) or invade Southeast Asia and start a war with the US, but get the raw materials they needed and preserve their honor. If the US embargoes had not taken place, IGHQ likely would have ordered preparations for war with the USSR shortly after the German invasion. Many senior Japanese figures, including Tojo, Yamashita, Yamamoto, Matsuoka, and even the Emperor himself favored a war against the USSR over the USA, on account of the fact that the former was both a weaker opponent, and a nearer one.

    Here is a like to the US Army Strategic Studies Institute's assessment of the situation: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...mary.cfm?q=905

    Khalkhin Gol receives a passing mention only as a warning that was ignored. Even in 1941, with war with the US looming, they still contemplated invading the USSR. The fact of the matter was that the Japanese fanatics were completely unafraid of the Soviet Union, and never gave up their plans for offensive warfare against them until the events in the Pacific permanently turned their gaze elsewhere.

    Hope this helps!
    Your first link states:
    Although Soviet casualties were high, the Soviets' meticulous operational planning, elaborate deception measures, purposeful integration of combined arms, aggressive maneuver, and use of the air component to achieve local air superiority and seal off the battlefield-plus the remarkably imaginative and diligent solution to their acute logistics problem-all contributed to a remarkable victory. And we should mention too the Soviet chief of signals, whom Zhukov praised for always providing adequate communications and thus troop control."
    Your second link states that the Soviets took high tank losses. This, the Soviets agreed with and before 1989 and all that entails: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaw...gol/losses.htm

    I'm not too sure your third link is relevant to the battle in question?
    http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...mary.cfm?q=905

    The Soviets decisively beat the Japanese at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, inflicting far more human casualties, although losing more kit. Seems a surprising Western way of war for a Soviet general ?

    Leave a comment:


  • craven
    replied
    Yep for the IJA the real enemy was always Russia

    For the IJN it was the US

    If not for the oil embargo Japan probally keeps itself busy in China for the next four years. Well besides grabbing French Indo-China.

    Remember the only reason Japan was at war in china is because elements in the Army kept wanting to grab more land while the more reasonable types wanted to digest what they had. ie more infrastructure and industry development.

    Leave a comment:


  • BobTheBarbarian
    replied
    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    Do you have a source for that ?

    While the Soviets certainly had more tanks and aircraft, they had only about 80% of the Japanese manpower. Japanese casualties were also much higher, over 50% of their force (c45k) compared to less than half that of the Soviets (c17k).

    If you have a truer account of Khalkhin Gol I would love to hear it .
    Christopher Bellamy and Joseph Lahnstein's case study of Khalkhin Gol (pg. 24) has a figure of 65,000 Soviet-Mongolian forces (57,000 were Russian according to amvas's RKKA site), against 28,000 Japanese-Manchukuoan soldiers (IJA forces consisted of mostly the 23rd Division and a few auxiliaries, with several thousand Manchukuoans).

    http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a517710.pdf

    Amvas' site: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaw...gol/losses.htm

    On the subject of the Soviet forces and their losses, M Kolomiets, the Russian historian cited on the webpage, puts Soviet losses as 9,703 dead and 15,952 wounded. Mongolian losses are listed at 556, but I have also seen the figure of 895. For Japanese forces and their losses, the Kwantung Army medical records that Kolomiets references put IJA losses 8,632 dead and 9,087 wounded. A source posted by Emtos awhile back (link is dead) lists total Manchukuoan casualties at 2,895. The total ratio for manpower casualties was thus 26,211-26,550 Allied against 20,614 Axis, including 25,655 Soviet and 17,719 Japanese. These figures suggest an Allied casualty total nearly 30% higher than that of their foe.

    The material disparity is even greater. According to Kolomiets, Soviet forces lost 397 AFVs, including 253 tanks. The Red Army also lost 692 other motor vehicles, including 496 trucks. Total ground vehicle losses thus add up to a total of 1,089. The Russians also lost some 94 mortars, artillery pieces, and anti-tank guns. Vyacheslav Kondratiev, in addressing the air campaign, puts Soviet losses as 208 combat (including write-offs due to damage), 42 non-combat (operational), and 426 aircraft damaged (686 total). He puts Japanese losses as 88 shot down and 74 combat write-offs, as well as 220 damaged (382 total). The research of Yotaro Oda, as well as V. Dyatlov's "Soviet Artillery in the conflict at Khalkhin gol" states that Japanese material losses amounted to 59 AFVs (including 30 tanks), 327 artillery, AT guns, and mortars. Other Japanese vehicle losses (trucks, etc.) are unknown but presumably high.

    Earlier Soviet propaganda, combined with a general lack of available information on the subject, created the false perception that the battle was a one-sided walkover. It also overplayed the battle's role in Japan's decision to go south, which was in reality minimal to nonexistent.

    Japan's motive for attacking Pearl Harbor and seizing the so-called "Southern Resource Area" was chiefly economical. The United States embargoes of vital raw materials following the Japanese invasion of French Indochina in 1940 effectively crippled Japan's capacity to wage protracted warfare. The Japanese were then forced to either concede to American demands (unacceptable) or invade Southeast Asia and start a war with the US, but get the raw materials they needed and preserve their honor. If the US embargoes had not taken place, IGHQ likely would have ordered preparations for war with the USSR shortly after the German invasion. Many senior Japanese figures, including Tojo, Yamashita, Yamamoto, Matsuoka, and even the Emperor himself favored a war against the USSR over the USA, on account of the fact that the former was both a weaker opponent, and a nearer one.

    Here is a like to the US Army Strategic Studies Institute's assessment of the situation: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...mary.cfm?q=905

    Khalkhin Gol receives a passing mention only as a warning that was ignored. Even in 1941, with war with the US looming, they still contemplated invading the USSR. The fact of the matter was that the Japanese fanatics were completely unafraid of the Soviet Union, and never gave up their plans for offensive warfare against them until the events in the Pacific permanently turned their gaze elsewhere.

    Hope this helps!
    Last edited by BobTheBarbarian; 19 May 15, 14:32.

    Leave a comment:


  • Nick the Noodle
    replied
    Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian View Post
    Hi Nick,

    Unfortunately the notions that the Japanese were one-sidedly beaten at Khakhin Gol, and that this defeat caused them to look south, are largely myths.

    During the aforementioned battle Soviet losses were significantly higher than those of the outnumbered Japanese, massively so in equipment. Although both sides drew lessons from the fight, it had little bearing on Japan's overall war plans against the USSR. The decisive reason for Japan's advance southward was in fact the series of American embargoes placed on them in the aftermath of the 1940 invasion of French Indochina. Without this, they would have continued to prosecute the war against China, and even invaded the Soviet Union, with the continued backing of American material aid.
    Do you have a source for that ?

    While the Soviets certainly had more tanks and aircraft, they had only about 80% of the Japanese manpower. Japanese casualties were also much higher, over 50% of their force (c45k) compared to less than half that of the Soviets (c17k).

    If you have a truer account of Khalkhin Gol I would love to hear it .

    Leave a comment:


  • BobTheBarbarian
    replied
    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post

    Japan had just recently had their Butts handed to them on a silver plate, courtesy of Zhukov in 39. They are not going to attack a nation with a larger army, better kit, and the will to win. That rules out A, C, F and H.

    Japans military needs economic assets beyond China. That rules out D & E.
    Hi Nick,

    Unfortunately the notions that the Japanese were one-sidedly beaten at Khakhin Gol, and that this defeat caused them to look south, are largely myths.

    During the aforementioned battle Soviet losses were significantly higher than those of the outnumbered Japanese, massively so in equipment. Although both sides drew lessons from the fight, it had little bearing on Japan's overall war plans against the USSR. The decisive reason for Japan's advance southward was in fact the series of American embargoes placed on them in the aftermath of the 1940 invasion of French Indochina. Without this, they would have continued to prosecute the war against China, and even invaded the Soviet Union, with the continued backing of American material aid.

    Leave a comment:


  • The Exorcist
    replied
    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    Hi Dashy
    ...
    Ignoring the morality implication of supporting the Nazi's, its always economically best to support a small nation with a vast trading network, than a land locked power simply trying to create an economic block to rival your own.
    Perhaps, but not unthinkable.
    In fact, plans were made along some very different lines. we call it bizarre now, but back then it was called War Plan Red.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red

    Leave a comment:


  • Nick the Noodle
    replied
    Originally posted by Dashy View Post
    The problem with most discussions in Alt history are the lak of context. Usually these discussions are set off with a simple "what if" question and everyone else is expected to bring knowledge to the conversation with no context.

    This thread will sort that problem by having an OP with multiple scenarios, setting clear contexts. If anything is unclear about the scenario, please ask and I'll sort it out.

    Scenario A.


    Scenario B.



    Scenario C.


    Scenario D.


    Scenario E.


    Scenario F.


    Scenario G.


    Scenario H.


    I think I've covered the main ones, refer to each scenario individually and explain why the Allies win/lose.
    Hi Dashy

    Japan had just recently had their Butts handed to them on a silver plate, courtesy of Zhukov in 39. They are not going to attack a nation with a larger army, better kit, and the will to win. That rules out A, C, F and H.

    Japans military needs economic assets beyond China. That rules out D & E.

    That leaves B, US supports Britain, or G, US supports Germany.

    Ignoring the morality implication of supporting the Nazi's, its always economically best to support a small nation with a vast trading network, than a land locked power simply trying to create an economic block to rival your own.

    Leave a comment:

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