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Shattered Jade: Japanese Götterdämmerung, 1945-1947

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  • #61
    Originally posted by copenhagen View Post
    I believe one idea was for Operation Downfall and Olympic was to hit the landing areas with atomic weapons then send the Marines in. They knew little about fallout then. There'd be a lot very sick and dying Marines thereafter...
    You are right. For the first landing, Operation Olympic in Kyushu, Marshall's dislike of atomic weapons used in strategic bombing led to the also-horrifying plan to drop 6 on the first Japanese line of defense then another 3 on the counterattacking reserves. At the time, the US thought any negative effects from radiation would dissipate after about 48 hours.

    Originally posted by T.A. Gardner
    Actually, as testing in the 50's demonstrated, the effects of a bomb 48 hours before, 2 hours before, would be minimal or non-existent on US troops in terms of the battle space and time...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Plumbbob

    30 minutes after one of these tests the US Army marched a 1000 man battalion in nothing but normal uniforms across ground zero. It would make zero difference in terms of the battle.
    This is not to say it would have had horrid consequences for the soldiers and their families down the road. Imagine the baby boomers being remembered as the generation that was horribly disfigured due to radiation effects and cancer... it would have a permanent effect on American history.
    Last edited by BobTheBarbarian; 07 Oct 20, 19:32.
    Divine Mercy Sunday: 4/21/2020 (https://www.thedivinemercy.org/message) The Miracle of Lanciano: Jesus' Real Presence (https://web.archive.org/web/20060831...fcontents.html)

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    • #62
      Also, a slight alteration to the composition of the Japanese 12th Area Army defending the Tokyo Area. Due to inconsistencies between the maps in Giangreco's book and the Order of Battle provided by the Japanese after the war in marktwain's link, "The Reports of General MacArthur," the 12th Area Army was slightly stronger than I posted earlier.

      Order of Battle for 12th Area Army is as follows:

      Kashima Sea Area

      Fifty-first Army-Lt. Gen. Kengo Noda
      44th Division
      151st Division
      221st Division
      115th Independent Mixed Brigade
      116th Independent Mixed Brigade
      7th Tank Brigade

      Kujukuri Beach Area

      Fifty-second Army-Lt. Gen. Tokumatsu Shigeta
      3d Imperial Guards Division
      147th Division
      152d Division
      234th Division
      3d Tank Brigade

      Sagami Bay Area

      Fifty-third Army-Lt. Gen. Yaezo Akashiba
      84th Division
      140th Division
      316th Division
      117th Independent Mixed Brigade
      2d Tank Brigade

      Central Kanto (Central Mobile Reserve)

      Thirty-sixth Army-Lt. Gen. Toshimichi Uemura
      81st Division
      93d Division
      201st Division
      202d Division
      209th Division
      214th Division
      1st Armored Division
      4th Armored Division

      Southern Chiba Prefecture

      Tokyo Bay Group-Lt. Gen. Shihei Oba
      354th Division
      96th Independent Mixed Brigade

      Miura Peninsula

      Yokosuka Naval Station Force-Vice Adm. Michitaro Totsuka
      Yokosuka Combined Special Landing Force
      11th to 26th Naval Landing Parties
      114th Independent Mixed Brigade
      Special-Attack forces

      Tokyo

      Tokyo Defense Army-Lt. Gen. Jo Iimura
      1st Garrison Brigade
      2d Garrison Brigade
      3d Garrison Brigade

      Izu Islands

      O-shima
      321st Division
      Nii-Jima
      66th Independent Mixed Brigade
      Hachijo-Jima
      67th Independent Mixed Brigade
      According to this, the 12th Area Army consisted of 20 divisions and 13 brigades, plus the Yokosuka SNLF. Combined with the reinforcements of up to 8 divisions, the 12th Area Army would have 28 divisions and 13 brigades with which to fight 40+ Allied divisions and other smaller units attacking Tokyo.

      --Edit--

      Originally posted by marktwain
      From the standpoint of decisive battle planning, the most dangerous basic material shortage was that of oil.18 By the end of June, the quarterly gross national production and import of crude and refined petroleum had fallen to 24% of the wartime peak established in the period July-September 1943, and the inventory of 4,751,000 barrels was only about 8% of what had been on hand at the beginning of the war.19 Of this, only about 606,000 barrels were aviation gasoline, of which 333,900 barrels were earmarked for decisive battle operations.

      Despite a reduction in operations to within 80% of expectations, including rigid curtailment of training flights and elimination of all operational flights except those connected with the continued prosecution of Ten-Go,20 consumption still ran about 188,600 barrels in June against a production of about 98,000 barrels.21 Although aviation gasoline was to be supplemented by alcohol and other substitute fuels, the projected margin between requirements and

      [617]


      inventories was so exceedingly narrow that, particularly if the enemy continued to bomb refineries and tank farms, it was doubtful whether the decisive air battle could be fought later than the end of 1945.
      This is why the Japanese were so loathe to commit aerial assets to defend their cities against US bombing raids: they wanted to hoard the aviation fuel for the final defense of the Homeland, leading some US analysts to the false conclusion that the Japanese Air Forces had been finished.
      Last edited by BobTheBarbarian; 31 Jan 15, 11:05.
      Divine Mercy Sunday: 4/21/2020 (https://www.thedivinemercy.org/message) The Miracle of Lanciano: Jesus' Real Presence (https://web.archive.org/web/20060831...fcontents.html)

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      • #63
        Order of Battle for Japanese 16th Area Army on Kyushu, 1945. From "The Reports of General MacArthur:"

        The deployment of major units of Sixteenth Area Army was as follows: (Plate No. 159)

        Miyazaki-Ariake Bay Area

        Fifty-seventh Army-Lt. Gen. Kanji Nishihara
        Coastal Forces:
        Miyazaki Coast-154th and 156th Divisions
        Ariake Bay-86th Division
        Osumi Peninsula-98th Ind. Mixed Brigade
        Mobile Reserve:
        Kirishima Mt. (Stagingarea)-25th Division, 5th Tank Brigade, one regt., 6th Tank Brigade
        Northern Miyazaki Plain-212th Division
        Tanegashima Detachment
        Tanegashima-109th Independent Mixed Brigade

        Satsuma Peninsula

        Fortieth Army-Lt. Gen. Mitsuo Nakazawa
        Coastal Forces:
        Makurazaki Coast-146th Division
        Kaimon Mt. District-125th Independent
        Mixed Brigade
        Fukiage Coast-206th Division
        Kushikino Dist.-303d Division
        Mobile Reserve:
        Kagoshima area-6th Tank Brigade (less one refit.)
        Kirishima Mt. area-77th Division

        Northern Kyushu

        Fifty-sixth Army-Lt. Gen. Ichiro Shichida
        Coastal Forces:
        Shimonoseki-Moji Area-Shimonoseki Fortress Unit
        Fukuma Area-145th and 351st Divisions
        Karatsu Area 312th Division
        Iki Island-Iki Fortress Unit
        Mobile Reserve:
        Hakata Plain-57th Division and 4th Tank Brigade

        Central Kyushu

        Chikugo Group-Lt. Gen. Waichiro Sonoda
        Coastal Forces:
        Nagasaki Area-122d Ind. Mixed Brigade
        Oita Area-118th IndependentMixedBrigade
        Mobile Reserve-None:
        Higo Group-Lt. Gen. Ichiji Tsuchihashi
        Coastal Forces:
        Amakusa-126th Independent Mixed Brigade
        Mobile Reserve:
        Kumamoto Dist.-216th Division

        Sasebo

        Sasebo Naval Station-10 battalions

        Tsushima

        Tsushima Fortress Unit

        Goto Islands

        107th Independent Mixed Brigade
        Total: 14 divisions, 9 brigades, 3 fortress units, and 10 naval battalions, plus reinforcements of up to 4 additional divisions from Honshu.
        Last edited by BobTheBarbarian; 31 Jan 15, 15:35.
        Divine Mercy Sunday: 4/21/2020 (https://www.thedivinemercy.org/message) The Miracle of Lanciano: Jesus' Real Presence (https://web.archive.org/web/20060831...fcontents.html)

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        • #64
          Just like the Japanese were not up to much against the Russians in 1939

          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fuUR95-o_fw

          so too in 1945

          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIiHJHzqWbg

          and even less against the Americans in 1946.

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          • #65
            Originally posted by copenhagen View Post
            I believe one idea was for Operation Downfall and Olympic was to hit the landing areas with atomic weapons then send the Marines in. They knew little about fallout then. There'd be a lot very sick and dying Marines thereafter...
            Eventually, the Allied intelligence would have discovered that Japan had at most three months worth of fuel - and the landings would have been 'waited out' - with the possible exception of Kyushu, which would probably have been defoliated and burnt over first.

            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties

            Japanese losses were actually 'relatively low' at 2.8 to 4% of the total population. Compared to 57 % of Europe's Jews. The Losses would have been approx. 15 to 20% if the invasion had occurred.

            Japan got off relatively lucky.
            The trout who swims against the current gets the most oxygen..

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            • #66
              Just a question--what was the supply situation for the Japanese mainland armies? They wouldn't be getting anymore from the homeland in this scenario.

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              • #67
                According to this link from AMVAS' site, http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaw...gol/losses.htm, the Soviet-Mongolian losses as reported by M. Kolomiets in Frontovaya Illyustratsia amounted to 9,868 killed and 16,343 wounded (26,211 total casualties), compared with Japanese losses of 8,632 killed and 9,087 wounded (17,719 total casualties). The Soviet vehicle losses, according to the same source, totaled 397 tanks and AFVs, 692 other motor vehicles, 94 mortars, artillery pieces, and AT guns, compared to Japanese losses of 30 tanks, 327 mortars and artillery pieces, 29 other AFVs, and an unknown number of other vehicles. (These figures are obtained through the research of Yotaro Oda, plus V. Dyatlov in "Soviet Artillery in the conflict at Khalkhin gol.")
                Japanese casualties according to Western and Soviet sources are far greater than presented by the Japanese especially concidering that the 23rd Japanese division was all but destroyed. Plus Manchukuo losses aren't counted in.
                There are no Nazis in Ukraine. © Idiots

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                • #68
                  Originally posted by TacCovert4 View Post
                  Another interesting thought which I'll expound on later is that the Soviet Union could find itself in a very poor position early in the cold war if the Japanese manage to hold out for another year. The falling out with the west is inevitable. But if the west still has reason to maintain a war footing. ...then stalin could find himself stretched thin trying to control Europe and fight in Asia while also maintaining his nation's ascendancy.

                  A continuous war with Japan would keep the west on a war footing and mean that there would be a likely more aggressive response to Soviet action in Europe. I would not be surprised to see the US arming german pows and sending them back to Germany as a west german army in 1946. The west has this option in 46. The soviets do not yet have control of the eastern European countries to a reliable degree. ....and therefore they must deploy their reliable army in Europe as well as send it to the east. Plus maintain it and the country entirely on their own resources.

                  Maintaining a Soviet China is also problematic in 46 as there is no red navy to speak of and the land routes between the two are crap. Otoh the sea routes to China are big and easily secured by the huge western fleets.
                  Good point. By October 1945 JCS 1067 had already modified the worst provisions of the Morgenthau Plan. A prolonged war with Japan would have seen the need to replicate and repair allied equipment , wholesale scrap and recycling, etc. Germany would have needed better conditions, and the Warsaw pact area could have demanded more independence.
                  The trout who swims against the current gets the most oxygen..

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                  • #69
                    Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian
                    M. Kolomiets is a Russian historian. The Japanese casualties are his estimates. At Khalkhin gol the Japanese committed the 23rd division, and a regiment of the 7th division (plus unknown Manchukuoan forces) to face Shtern and Zhukov. According to the Japanese, the 23rd division suffered 70 percent casualties, plus the losses of the 26 infantry regiment of the 7th Division. 18,000 casualties is a numerical value that would correspond well for this figure. (The actual Jap. military record is different: it lists 8,440 killed and 8,766 wounded.)

                    As for the Manchukuoans, I don't know how many of them participated in the battle, but I would assume their numbers (and casualties) were relatively small. I would estimate their total losses to be no higher than 1,000. (The Mongolian forces that fought on the side of the Red Army lost 556 men, of whom 165 were killed.)

                    If you can find actual records for Manchukuoan casualties, please feel free to post them! It would be extremely beneficial to this discussion.
                    According to this site they lost 2895 men. The numbers for Japanese also change following sources.

                    http://www.mongolnow.com/Peresmotr_stat.html
                    There are no Nazis in Ukraine. © Idiots

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                    • #70
                      Originally posted by Emtos View Post
                      According to this site they lost 2895 men. The numbers for Japanese also change following sources.

                      http://www.mongolnow.com/Peresmotr_stat.html
                      Thank you for this information. The information about Mongolian casualties is also different, giving a figure of 895 compared to Kolomiets' 556.

                      The ratio of Allied to Axis losses can now be broken down as:
                      Allies:
                      USSR: 25,655
                      Mongolia: 556-895
                      Total: 26,211-26,550

                      Axis
                      Japan: 17,719
                      Manchukuo: 2,895
                      Total: 20,614

                      Ratio: 1.27-1.29:1 in favor of the Axis

                      This is more even, especially considering the Axis' defensive advantage over the Allies: Allied manpower losses were only a little over a quarter higher than the enemy, but were still significantly higher in equipment.

                      In addition, this article puts Japanese-Manchurian numerical strength at between 55,000 and 75,000. Japanese sources suggest the numbers actually engaged in the battle were only about ~28,000. Perhaps the inconsistency lies in the number of personnel in the Japanese forces in the area, and those who were directly participating in combat?
                      Last edited by BobTheBarbarian; 01 Feb 15, 11:30.
                      Divine Mercy Sunday: 4/21/2020 (https://www.thedivinemercy.org/message) The Miracle of Lanciano: Jesus' Real Presence (https://web.archive.org/web/20060831...fcontents.html)

                      Comment


                      • #71
                        Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian View Post
                        Thank you for this information. The information about Mongolian casualties is also different, giving a figure of 895 compared to Kolomiets' 556.

                        The ratio of Allied to Axis losses can now be broken down as:
                        Allies:
                        USSR: 25,655
                        Mongolia: 556-895
                        Total: 26,211-26,550

                        Axis
                        Japan: 17,719
                        Manchukuo: 2,895
                        Total: 20,614

                        Ratio: 1.27-1.29:1 in favor of the Axis

                        This is more even, especially considering the Axis' defensive advantage over the Allies: Allied manpower losses were only a little over a quarter higher than the enemy, but were still significantly higher in equipment.

                        In addition, this article puts Japanese-Manchurian numerical strength at between 55,000 and 75,000. Japanese sources suggest the numbers actually engaged in the battle were only about ~28,000. Perhaps the inconsistency lies in the number of personnel in the Japanese forces in the area, and those who were directly participating in combat?
                        Soviets had greater number of tanks lost but it's due to the number involved and their use in the battle. Japanese had far fewer tanks and almost all of them were lost in the battle. Soviets also captured a huge number of trophies unlike the Japanese.
                        There are no Nazis in Ukraine. © Idiots

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                        • #72
                          It might be worthwhile to remember that America is still issuing Purple Hearts that were originally ordered and stockpiled in anticipation of the huge number of casualties anticipated in the invasion of the Japanese home islands.

                          Politically speaking, an invasion of the home islands could not be sold to Americans, any more than the proposal to commence war against the Soviet Union made by both Patton and MacArthur.

                          Many comments here abut using large scale defoliants, but no references to what defoliants or what stocks were actually available.

                          Re: moving ground troops into an area immediately post-nuclear attack: this can be done very briefly but the troops cannot reamin to occupy the area, a fact that was not known or appreciated even years later when military personnel immediately boarded Bikini Atoll test vessels to check results and hosed them down with radioactive sea water, wearing only tropical issue uniforms, T-shorts and dungarees.

                          The effects on the invading troops would have been catastrophic within a relatively short period of time, and over the longer term politically devastating to the American government.

                          Just mentioned this as food for thought.
                          Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Who is watching the watchers?

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                          • #73
                            Hye MM:
                            Starting on Post #30 I listed the chemicals available in 1945-46 and gave the Links

                            I do agree that the invasion would have been rather brutal, but the use of defoliants and incendiaries would have probably forced a Japanese surrender before it was fully committed.

                            http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.230...=3737720&uid=4

                            Japanese support by 1950 for the emperor had reached a 'low point." A starvation winter would have produced mass dissent, as happened in 1918-1919.
                            The trout who swims against the current gets the most oxygen..

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                            • #74
                              Originally posted by johns624 View Post
                              Just a question--what was the supply situation for the Japanese mainland armies? They wouldn't be getting anymore from the homeland in this scenario.
                              After the July bombing of the Kure Naval yards sunk the remaining fleet, they were essentially cut off.

                              Japan in mid 1945 had only 785,000 tons of merchant shipping, most of which http://military.wikia.com/wiki/Bombi...ure_(July_1945)

                              was small vessels under 200 tons each.
                              The trout who swims against the current gets the most oxygen..

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                              • #75
                                According to the sources above, the Japanese lost 30 tanks and 29 other Armored Fighting Vehicles during the battle (59 total) out of 182 tanks and an unknown, presumably similar number of other AFVs committed to the fight. The Soviets, on the other hand, committed 498 tanks and 385 armored vehicles, and lost 397.
                                I'm not sure that Japanese had so much tanks since they had just two regiments of tanks.
                                There are no Nazis in Ukraine. © Idiots

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