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  • #91
    Originally posted by Axis of Evil View Post
    1. The early political stages and arming the Wehrmacht were conducting reasonably well. Austria and Czechoslovakia were taken without a fight. Poland fought back hard but with no success and the USSR took over Eastern Poland. However the Third Reich failed to began full war production and total mobilization after both France and Britian declared war on them.

    2. Ending the war in France in 6 weeks was stunning victory made possible by Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein and the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, however it is not without its flaws. Rundstedt and Hitler ignored Guderian when he wanted a trust to destroy the BEF at Dunkirk. The 300,000 man strong BEF was sitting there running back to the UK in pure panic and this juicy golden target was let go. If they had captured the BEF it would have been a massive blow to the British war effort 300,000 captured would have depleted British manpower reserves and moral. The UK would probably have sued for peace if the BEF had been lost. Thus resulting in a total victory for Germany in the West.

    3. During the Battle of Britian Hitler ordered The Luftwaffe to stop targeting RAF airfields and industrial plants to attacking British cities. This only strengthened the British resolve to fight and win. The British Empire was the largest oversea empire ever created. However it was dying and not that strong. If Germany had just kept pounding Britian with air raid after air raid the RAF would slowly but surely give way and Operation Sealion could begin, I think the British ground forces could have put a huge dint in the invasion force but I don't think they could have defeated the Wehrmacht.

    4. Trusting Italy to secure Africa and the Balkans was a mistake as well. The Italians had launched a invasion of Southern France during the 6 week battle there and did very poorly. This was a campaign that the German High Command and most people today seem to pay no attention to. The resources wasted (Afrika Korps, Balkans campaign) to undo Italian failures were great in number. The campaign in Africa could have been avoided completely and the Balkan campiagn could have been over much sooner. Germany would have been better off not allying itself with Mussolini's Italy and going it alone or sending in German advisors to build the Italian military.

    5. Operation Barbarossa was launched before Britian was taken care of thus beginning a two front war. The Wehrmacht won victory after victory on the stepp destroying whole Soviet Fronts with minimal losses Kiev alone yielded well over 600,000 Soviets killed or captured. However Barbarossa displayed Blitzkriegs main and pretty much only flaw. IF IT FAILS THERE IS ALMOST NEVER A PLAN B. And thus Germany found itself in a long war that it was not prepared for. Hitler also sent troops away from Heeresgruppe Mitte To Ukraine and Leningrad (Leningrad could have been in German hands but Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht NOT to enter the city). The Germans had not been issued winter clothing before the infamous general winter came into play. Germany as was stated earlier was not ready for a long war.

    6. Germany then declared war on the United States. This was a massive mistake on Hitler's part. Germany was not required under the Tripartite Pact to do this and tossed its free ride to avoiding war with US down the trash. Germany could have gotten Japan to attack the Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia thus forcing Stalin and RKKA to leave Moscow pretty much defenseless. Germany and Japan pretty much did their own thing through out much of the war they pretty much weren't allies at all.

    7. A year later with the offensive on Stalingrad in full swing Hitler sent the Wehrmacht after two objectives the industrial powerhouse of Stalingrad and the oil fields of Caucasus. The whole offensive lost its power when it went after the two targets when it only had enough power to achieve a single objective. When Georgi Zhukov Operation Uranus Hitler foolishly ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad the 6th Army had a chance to escape but Hitler turned it down and 300,000 troops of the 6th Army were lost as a result. Those 300,000 men could have come in handy in the operations on the Eastern Front yet to come... the 6th Army at Kursk can you say “German victory” and can you say a “Cannae like battle involving 500,000 Soviet soldiers killed or taken prisoner>”

    8. Kursk was anoher blunder on Germany's part. victory after Stalingrad was not possible but if the Wehrmacht had went on the defensive and stayed there Germany might have achieved a stand still. refusing Manstein's plan to pimp slap the Red Army after the victory at Kharkov he went onto attack Kursk. He might have been able to win at least a small tactical victory at Kursk if he had kept up the the fire around Prokhorovka. Hitler allowed the Afrika Korps and Italian forces to be destroyed in North Africa, they could have come in handy in defending Sicily and Italy from the invasions that were about too take place. As Rommel later said failing to stop the Western Allies at the beach really screwed things for them up... badly....

    9. The Normandy Invasion could have been fought off if Hitler had not been asleep and Rommel visiting his wife. This left the mighty Panzer Divisions halted as the allied infantry stormed the beach. As the US, British and other allies dashed across France the Soviets launched Operation Bagration which took out Army Group Center and led to a advance all the way to outskirts of Warsaw. This was due to Army Group Center being deployed way too far forward and failing to place a commander with some talent (they later did after the damage had been done).

    10. Lack of a strategic bomber was a huge handicap. The Luftwaffe was the best tactical air force of WWII. But it did not have the strategic bombers or escort fighters with the range needed to hit key industrial targets in the UK or USSR let alone the US. Germany produced many great fighters and fighter-bombers along with countless aces for both. However it none of that could get at the industrial points that were cranking out replacement tanks, artillery, aircraft and weapons like clock work.

    11. after the industrial revolution the most important aspect of long term industrial warfare became industrial capableness. Wars like this are not won on the battlefield but in the factory. Germany did not have the industry needed to produce enough equipment to fight the world's biggest colonial empire (the UK) the world's largest army (USSR) and the greatest industrial power (the USA) at one time. Germany had 14.4 of the industrial capabilities in WWII compared to:

    UK 10.3
    USSR: 14:0
    USA: 41:4

    which is roughly a six to one ratio.

    12. Intelligence – The famed German enigma had been cracked by the Poles before the war started. The Germans had a lot of trouble gathering intel on the Allies. However many spy rings existed in occupied territories that provided a great deal of critical war winning information to both the Soviets and western allies. The German intelligence and especially counter-intelligence should have gotten more attention than it did. There is a reason why Sun Tzu said “know your enemy and in 100 battles you will never be in peril” and then devoted a whole chapter in his book to how to use spies.


    13. Lease Lend – FDR took full advantage of the industrial capabilities of the USA to send huge amounts of supplies to the UK and USSR. This allowed both to replace their losses and keep their troops supplied all this stuff took a huge strain off allied agricultural and industrial production and further pressed German efforts to keep up with the allies (which was already hard enough!)

    14. Failure to fully mobilize soon enough – this should have been done the day after Operation Barbarossa but it wasn’t done until after Stalingrad. It would have made the Wehrmacht a lot stronger than it was historically. But Blitzkrieg had produced quick victories time and time again. I know that it is easy to scream “20/20 hindsight” but total war is needed when you open up a second front in a two front war. Its not nice to subject the population to things like rationing, universal conscription or putting women into the factory but fighting a war is something you gotta go all the way with.

    15. By the end of the war Germany was fighting a four front war:

    1. Eastern Front
    2. Western Front
    3. Italian Front
    4. Genocide against various peoples

    the forth was counter productive in every shape and form. It destroyed many potential allies such as the Ukrainians, Belorussians, baltic peoples and jewish geniuses it wasted a massive amount of resources and manpower into this pointless and self defeating task. The path to victory lay not in a single massive war but in a number of wars one by one paving the way to victory. Hitler also appointed more people who were intuned with his ideas (ie 'yes' men) such as Himmler, Goring and others to field commands. especially towards the end. He put the ME 262 project coulda had it out in 1942 but Hitler didn't like it... This is due to a massive amount of oversight by Hitler. He should have put some time into building a strategic bomber force so he could reach industry which was outta the reach of his short range tactical dive bombers. His ego simply got to big for Germany's good he believed he was unstoppable (who can really blame him? The Wehrmacht was doing the impossible time and time again!) and the result led to disaster.

    I believe Germany lost any chance to win the war outright after the failed attempt to take Moscow and was doomed after the Normandy landings and Operation Bagration.
    1°Point 1 is wrong : Germany did NOT fail to start full mobiliation : see Tooze

    2.Point 2 is wrong : there were NO 300000 British soldiers at Dunkirk and you should NOT believe what Guderian was saying after the war


    3.Point 3 is wrong : Hitler did not order the LW to stop the attacks against the airfields and to attack the cities

    4.Point 4 is wrong : Germany was NOT allying with Italy,Italy was allying with Germany

    Point 5 is wrong : the German losses were NOT minimal but cery high,and ,the winter had NO influence on the outcome of Barbarossa

    Point 6 ....:WRONG : The DOW on the US was no big mistake, the Germans could NOT order Japan to attack the SU and such an attack would have no infuence on the battle of Moscow


    Point 7 : WRONG

    Point 8 :wrong

    Point 9 : wrong

    Point 10 :irrelevant

    Point 11 : irrelevant

    Point 12 : wrong

    Points 13,14,15 : wrong

    Comment


    • #92
      The determinist view of history is a very strong and persuasive one when looking at the Second World War. The Axis Powers (the main nations of Germany, Italy and Japan) both individually and collectively were geographically, demographically, and most importantly resourcefully and economically weaker than the Allied Powers (those mainly being Britain and her Empire, the USSR and the USA). This is fact and was known by many before and during the conflict, and the economic gap has been enlarged since. In weighing up what both sides had and what they could in time get suggests that the Axis should have been halted immediately.

      The Nazis and Japanese militarists had almost limitless aims, a lack of cohesion in both economic and military branches, were years behind the Allies in creating a Nuclear weapon and had policies that would alienate and cause likely inevitable wars of resistance against their rule wherever they occupied. This placed the Axis in a position of huge difficulty in achieving their main aims - the destruction of China and the USSR as existing states, the forced acceptance of this via armistice or peace conference by Britain and the US, and finally the creation in the occupied areas of 'racially acceptable' populations and hierarchy through the deliberate extermination of tens of millions. What the Axis managed to do during their brief period of existence was huge, systematic and grotesque enough to force any people to prefer death in resisting them (I.E the Jews, Chinese and Slavs) or suffering high costs in the aim of not co-existence with them (I.E the British and Americans), and many rightly could not see an Axis victory being any less sadistic and cruel.

      The biggest problem the Axis had, and this Hitler was aware of making many references to it throughout his time as Fuhrer, was time. To defeat Britain and thus prevent the US from directly intervening against Germany (and Italy's) expansion Hitler had to divert resources to his navy and air force, but this could not be done until the army had been massively reduced in size. To do this his land enemy (after the surprising and fast defeat of France in 1940), the USSR, had to be defeated by his army. As history shows this failed, and with it any chance of victory.

      Whether the USSR could not be defeated in one campaign (I.E 1941) or in a long war of attrition (through into 1942 and possibly 1943) is still questionable. In 1941 Hitler tried to force a political victory - destruction of the Stalinist state - via the military means of the Wehrmacht by destroying the Red Army west of the rivers Dnieper and Dvina. The year before this had worked against France - a military strong but politically weak leadership succumbed to a not totally superior military force. In 1942 Hitler tried to force a political solution - again destroying Communism in Russia - via economical means by occupying and destroying what was at that point the most economically important area of the USSR, the Caucasus region. History again shows the outcome to be utter German failure and a defeat made then and there inevitable. Before this time (with Japan being included in the post-December 1941 victory, of sorts) defeat, I believe, was not yet a foregone conclusion.
      Last edited by WarMachine; 03 Feb 15, 16:02.

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      • #93
        I argue that the US's development of nuclear weapons, which began as a response to German aggression, by itself assured Axis defeat in WWII. In my opinion, if the Axis countries (Germany and Japan) had gotten their act together and coordinated strategy (pre-occupation of Indochina) they MIGHT have been able to defeat the Soviet Union, but would never have achieved anything resembling a 'victory' in the long run. Even if they tried their absolute hardest to keep the US out of the war, American participation was, for all intents and purposes, inevitable, especially with FDR in the White House.

        To me, the odds of the Axis achieving anything near a draw, or even a Versailles-esque negotiated settlement, are essentially zero.
        Divine Mercy Sunday: 4/21/2020 (https://www.thedivinemercy.org/message) The Miracle of Lanciano: Jesus' Real Presence (https://web.archive.org/web/20060831...fcontents.html)

        Comment


        • #94
          Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian View Post
          I argue that the US's development of nuclear weapons, which began as a response to German aggression, by itself assured Axis defeat in WWII. In my opinion, if the Axis countries (Germany and Japan) had gotten their act together and coordinated strategy (pre-occupation of Indochina) they MIGHT have been able to defeat the Soviet Union, but would never have achieved anything resembling a 'victory' in the long run. Even if they tried their absolute hardest to keep the US out of the war, American participation was, for all intents and purposes, inevitable, especially with FDR in the White House.

          To me, the odds of the Axis achieving anything near a draw, or even a Versailles-esque negotiated settlement, are essentially zero.
          I concur with most of what you have said here. No empire is destined to last forever, not even Britain's last for a thousand years. The better you treat the conquered the longer your empire shall last - Britain, for the most part, only reacted violently (unjustified though it was) against its subjects when they rioted etc. However, Germany and Japan planned to murder millions as they did historically regardless of how they were greeted as they conquered people's land. Thus, any empire that they did achieve would not have lasted long and would have eventually self-destructed.

          If Britain stays in the war - as the unsinkable aircraft carrier - then whether the Soviets are defeated or not is mostly irrelevant as Germany will still be in the war and there by be liable for atomic bombing. This is where the problem arises for me. For Axis defeat to be unavoidable from the beginning (via atomic bombing) Britain has to then stay in the war. While in 1940 Britain was safe, it was the years of 1941 and 1942 where the existence of Stalin's state hung in the balance that would ultimately decide whether Britain would or could win with the US against Germany. Without the supplies being sent to the army the German navy had to make do with what resources and industrial space it could get, which was not particularly much, but even then she exacted a big (though not decisive) toll on British merchant shipping, which would keep her in the war and allow her to be the sword to stab Germany from the West.

          Why was it not decisive? Because not enough U-Boats were at sea at any one time to intercept and destroy convoys in enough numbers to strangle Britain (regardless of how well her Empire is doing in North Africa/ East Asia). Germany had to defeat the USSR to defeat Britain, and prevent eventual, as you say, nuclear bombing, and with that eventual defeat. In 1941 and '42 Germany conclusively failed to defeat Stalin and her defeat, one way or another, was made certain.
          Last edited by WarMachine; 03 Feb 15, 17:43.

          Comment


          • #95
            Originally posted by WarMachine View Post
            If Britain stays in the war - as the unsinkable aircraft carrier - then whether the Soviets are defeated or not is mostly irrelevant as Germany will still be in the war and there by be liable for atomic bombing. This is where the problem arises for me. For Axis defeat to be unavoidable from the beginning (via atomic bombing) Britain has to then stay in the war.
            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_YB-35
            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convair_B-36_Peacemaker

            These are two nuclear-capable transatlantic bombers the United States worked on during and after WWII. Had Britain been defeated (itself an extremely unlikely outcome, remember the 1974 Operation Sealion wargame at Sandhurst? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operati...Lion_(wargame)), projects such as these would have undoubtedly been brought to the top of the priority list for US military aviation. With American ingenuity and industrial muscle, such aircraft likely would have come online in force by the time they acquired atomic weapons. From there, it would only be a matter of time before the inevitable occurred, and there would be nothing the Axis could do about it. Despite German advancements in jets and rocketry, and Japanese pursuits of plague bombs and death-rays, the most they would succeed in is killing millions of people before being blasted into oblivion.
            Last edited by BobTheBarbarian; 03 Feb 15, 21:40.
            Divine Mercy Sunday: 4/21/2020 (https://www.thedivinemercy.org/message) The Miracle of Lanciano: Jesus' Real Presence (https://web.archive.org/web/20060831...fcontents.html)

            Comment


            • #96
              Originally posted by ljadw View Post
              1°Point 1 is wrong : Germany did NOT fail to start full mobiliation : see Tooze

              It took them until 1943 after Stalingrad.

              2.Point 2 is wrong : there were NO 300000 British soldiers at Dunkirk and you should NOT believe what Guderian was saying after the war.

              Yes, there were. Well to be fair I was wrong there was about 338,226. See the link below.

              http://www.historyofwar.org/articles..._dynamo.html#5


              3.Point 3 is wrong : Hitler did not order the LW to stop the attacks against the airfields and to attack the cities

              I am pretty sure he did.

              4.Point 4 is wrong : Germany was NOT allying with Italy,Italy was allying with Germany

              Italy screwed up a lot. Germany needed better friends.

              Point 5 is wrong : the German losses were NOT minimal but cery high,and ,the winter had NO influence on the outcome of Barbarossa

              Did I say they were low? 900,000 isn't a small number. And the winter played a big role regardless of if or if not the Russians like it.

              Point 6 ....:WRONG : The DOW on the US was no big mistake, the Germans could NOT order Japan to attack the SU and such an attack would have no infuence on the battle of Moscow

              Declaring war on a country that has 40% the world's industrial output and twice your population is always really dumb especially when your already fighting two superpowers on two fronts.

              Point 7 : WRONG

              Point 8 :wrong

              Point 9 : wrong

              Point 10 :irrelevant

              Point 11 : irrelevant

              Point 12 : wrong

              Points 13,14,15 : wrong
              You just the rest of my points were wrong or irrelevant without explaining why....

              Comment


              • #97
                1
                Originally posted by BobTheBarbarian View Post
                http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_YB-35
                http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convair_B-36_Peacemaker

                These are two nuclear-capable transatlantic bombers the United States worked on during and after WWII. Had Britain been defeated (itself an extremely unlikely outcome, remember the 1974 Operation Sealion wargame at Sandhurst?
                http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operati...Lion_(wargame)), projects such as these would have undoubtedly been brought to the top of the priority list for US military aviation. With American ingenuity and industrial muscle, such aircraft likely would have come online in force by the time they acquired atomic weapons. From there, it would only be a matter of time before the inevitable occurred, and there would be nothing the Axis could do about it. Despite German advancements in jets and rocketry, and Japanese pursuits of plague bombs and death-rays, the most they would succeed in is killing millions of people before being blasted into oblivion.
                I am aware of that wargame, but I do not consider that Germany could at any time defeat Britain through invasion and occupation. Germany's U-Boat arm was effective even in its historical record, which was when it never recieved the majority of resources or industrical space needed to create the numbers of U-Boats necessary to independently defeat Britain. When this had been given top priority after a defeat of the USSR in '41 and/or '42 then Britain would have had to face a very much larger U-Boat enemy in '42 or '43 than she did historically.

                Concerning the US ability to nuke Germany (and an occupied Europe) it has to be remembered that historically the US was never placed in a position where that action could have been considered. We can be sure that the Axis would increase production of chemical weapons (biologial and bacterial devices) and eventually be in a position to make a nuclear strike upon them a very costly decision by the US leadership.

                The very likely outcome that you have suggested I agree had the highest probability of occuring over the alternative - it not happening and the US finding a compromise with the new German, Italian and Japanese Empires resulting in a eventual disintergration from the inside out of these new world powers. The chance was extremely small, though I don't believe either that it was non-existent.

                Comment


                • #98
                  WW2 could have been very different if different political choices had been made. Given the political choices there were few or no decisive battles or turning points. The political choices, including those well described in Ian Kershaw's “Fateful Choices”, made the military outcomes certain or very probable.

                  The most obvious of the fateful choices was made by Britain in 1940 and Churchill's role was very important although others, including Chamberlain, also wanted to fight on. We can easily imagine ways of removing Churchill between September 1939 and May 1940, most famously when torpedoes hit Nelson but did not explode http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Zahn but clearly a crash on flying to or from France is equally plausible. A less violent possibility would be if Churchill had been blamed for errors leading to the failure in Norway in 1940.

                  We don't know whether Britain would have fought on without Churchill's influence in Summer 1940. What does seem clear is that, even if no peace were accepted, no other British leader would have trusted the United States to come to Britain's aid (Churchill's mother was American). Thus I suspect that Britain would have minimized its purchases from America to avoid running out of Dollars and stood on the defensive. Britain might well have kept its radar research and Tube Alloys work secret, which might have had significant consequences.

                  We can even characterise the failure of Germany and Italy to combine their efforts in the Mediterranean in Summer 1940 as political. Mussolini did not want Germany in their Mare Nostrum and was even crazy enough to respond to not being involved in discussions of Hungary and Romania by attacking Greece.

                  Then there are the less frequently discussed things that didn't happen especially those involving Japan. For example, if we made Japan's relations with the USSR better in 1939, might the Tientsin Incident http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tientsin_incident have led to war? If Britain had been fighting Germany, Italy and Japan in Summer 1940 with America neutral, I suspect that even Churchill might have failed to persuade anyone to fight on.

                  More randomly, if Japan had occupied all of Indochina in 1940 when it took the North, perhaps the Pacific War might have been avoided although that would probably not have helped Hitler or even in the long run Japan.

                  Of course, we should acknowledge heroic attempts by alternate historians to win military victories for the Axis http://counter-factual.net/upload/showthread.php?t=9046 or http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtop...cc26fc3987837b and http://warships1discussionboards.yuk...g-costs?page=1, whilst noting that those outcomes are improbable.

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                  • #99
                    Originally posted by Axis of Evil View Post
                    You just the rest of my points were wrong or irrelevant without explaining why....


                    7 : 6thArmy had no chance to escape and there were NO 300000 Germans encircled at Stalingrad ,but some 170000

                    8 :Kursk was not a blunder

                    9:That Hitler was sleeping during the night was irrelevant and the PzD wre not almighty

                    10:lack of a strategic bomber was not a huge handicap,one can argue that for Germany to have a strategic bomber in 1940 would heve been a big mistake

                    12:the German intelligence was as good as that of the others

                    13: the importance of LL has been enormously exggerated

                    14 /Germany was fully mobilizing from the beginning: see "The Wages of Destruction"

                    15: The resources used for the Holocaust were meaningless compared to the total .

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Axis of Evil View Post
                      You just the rest of my points were wrong or irrelevant without explaining why....
                      Sigh :

                      1: you are wrong : see the source I have given


                      2: You are wrong : 338000 was the total of the Allies : the British number was 190000,almost as many British soldiers were evacuated from the French atlantic harbours (operation Ariel)

                      3 : I am pretty sure that you are wrong : British cities were bombed already before september 1940

                      4 :there were no better friends

                      5: you said "with minimal losses" : the German losses were not minimal and,Barbarossa had failed BEFORE the start of the winter

                      6 :the DOW on the US was no blunder,because,war with the US was a certainty,and ,de facto,US and Germany were already at war

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by WarMachine View Post
                        1

                        . When this had been given top priority after a defeat of the USSR in '41 and/or '42 then Britain would have had to face a very much larger U-Boat enemy in '42 or '43 than she did historically.

                        .
                        More U Boats does not mean more sinkings of merchant ships,one can argue the opposite : more U Boats result in the loss of more U Boats .

                        Aircraft and destroyers would have more chance to find,attack and sink U Boats if there were 200 operational U Boats instead of 100 operational U Boats.Besides;more U Boats does not automatically result in more operational U Boats .

                        Exemple : on 1 january 1942,there were 249 U Boats,of which 158 were training and 91 front)line boats,of these 55 were for the Atlantic ,of which only 22 were patrolling .

                        :march 1943 : 400 U Boats of which 178 training,and 222 front-line,182 for the Atlantic of whom 70 were patrolling .

                        An increase of 151 U Boats resulted in an increase of 48 patrolling U Boats

                        To be able to starve Britain,Germany would need 200/300 patrolling U Boats ,which would mean a total of some 1000 UBoats,which was out of the question ..

                        Comment


                        • An Interesting Story

                          "Triumph of the Dictators," a 1 and 1/2 page scenario written by professor David Fromkin in "What If?: Eminent Historians Imagine What Might have Been," is an entertaining short narrative of an alternate WWII history, one which leaves out the United States and envisions an Axis linkup in the Middle East (the old 70 degrees East demarcation line). While I personally don't agree with Fromkin's conclusion, it is still a diverting read:

                          TRIUMPH OF THE DICTATORS
                          Originally posted by David Fromkin
                          In the spring of 1941, Nazi Germany was poised to dominate the earth. France, the Low Countries, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and much of Poland had been overrun by the Germans. All of Europe, save neutral Sweden and Switzerland, was in the hands of Hitler's friends and allies: dictators or monarchs who ruled Fascist Italy, Vichy France, Franco's Spain, Portugal, the Balkan Countries, Finland, and above all the Soviet Union.

                          A single German division under General Erwin Rommel, sent to rescue beleaguered Italians in Libya, drove Britain's Middle Eastern armies flying and threatened the Suez lifeline; while in Iraq a coup d'etat by the pro-German Rashid Ali cut the land road to India. In Asia, Germany's ally, Japan, was coiled to strike, ready to take Southeast Asia and invade India. No need to involve the United States; by seizing the Indies, Japan could break the American embargo and obtain all the oil needed for the Axis Powers to pursue their war aims.

                          Hitler should have sent the bulk of his armies to serve under Rommel, who would have done what Alexander did and Bonaparte failed to do: He would have taken the Middle East and led his armies to India. There he would have linked up with the Japanese. Europe, Asia, and Africa would have belonged to the coalition of dictators and militarists.

                          The Nazi-Soviet-Japanese alliance commanded armed forces and resources that utterly dwarfed the military resources that the holdouts, Britain (with its empire) and the United States, could field. The English-speaking countries would have been isolated in a hostile world and would have had no realistic option but to make peace with their enemy, retaining some autonomy for a time, perhaps, but doomed ultimately to succumb. Nazi Germany, as unofficial leader of the coalition, would have ruled the world.

                          Only Hitler's astonishing blunder in betraying and invading his Soviet ally kept it from happening.

                          Original Axis plan for partition of Eurasia (70 degrees East):

                          Divine Mercy Sunday: 4/21/2020 (https://www.thedivinemercy.org/message) The Miracle of Lanciano: Jesus' Real Presence (https://web.archive.org/web/20060831...fcontents.html)

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by ljadw View Post
                            More U Boats does not mean more sinkings of merchant ships,one can argue the opposite : more U Boats result in the loss of more U Boats .

                            Aircraft and destroyers would have more chance to find,attack and sink U Boats if there were 200 operational U Boats instead of 100 operational U Boats.Besides;more U Boats does not automatically result in more operational U Boats .

                            Exemple : on 1 january 1942,there were 249 U Boats,of which 158 were training and 91 front)line boats,of these 55 were for the Atlantic ,of which only 22 were patrolling .

                            :march 1943 : 400 U Boats of which 178 training,and 222 front-line,182 for the Atlantic of whom 70 were patrolling .

                            An increase of 151 U Boats resulted in an increase of 48 patrolling U Boats

                            To be able to starve Britain,Germany would need 200/300 patrolling U Boats ,which would mean a total of some 1000 UBoats,which was out of the question ..
                            But in March 1943 Germany was putting almost all her war effort against the USSR with tanks and other AFVs having top priority. By that point the U-Boats were hoped to have that desperately needed cutting edge, but with it still not receiving the necessary resources and industry (due to the war in the East) this was a futile hope.

                            While it is true that if more U-Boats were built the Western Allies would place more effort in anti-U-Boat technology a Germany with all effort behind the U-Boat arm would not struggle (with a land war no longer needing to be fought - the USSR being defeated in either '41 or '42) to produce the numbers needed (that could not be built historically) and with that the necessary numbers of patrol U-Boats to increase allied merchant shipping sinking.

                            The 'happy times' were usually when high priority was given to the U-Boats (during a lull on the Eastern Front or when the belief that the current numbers of U-Boats could, if supplied enough, decide the outcome in the North Atlantic) where an injection of resources was given to the U-Boats. This injection gave them in the short-term an ability to sink allied merchant shipping that was for the Allies at an unsustainable rate. With no mammoth quantities of resources being diverted to the East this sustainable loss rate could be made long-term, and it is this what was needed to defeat Britain.

                            The simple maths of destroying more ships than what could be built or sent over in time, or sent through the main U-Boat hunting areas, while sustaining a stable number of patrol U-Boats continually with organised rotation could defeat Britain. But only with no war in the East and so a war won in the East in either 1941 or 1942.
                            Last edited by WarMachine; 04 Feb 15, 17:18.

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                            • 1)No war with the SU does not mean that more U Boats would be available ,because, Porsche who was making tanks,could not make U Boats: only a few firms had the knowledge to build U Boats. To build more U Boats would need more time (years),independent of there was a war with the SU (it took a year to have an operational U Boat).

                              2)The sinking of more ships than were built does not mean that Britain would be starved,because,what important was,was not how much was lost,but how much arrived AND,how much was needed .

                              3)Most merchant ships were lost accidentally,by chance : only 10 % of the big trans-atlantic convoys were attacked (most never were discovered),and of those who were attacked,the losses were only 10 %,which means that the losses of the big convoys were only 1 %.Most U Boats never sank a merchant ship .


                              4)It was the same on the other side : most U Boats were lost by chance,most were not discovered .

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                              • I am also not convinced by "the happy times" POV,which,IMHO,is a much to narrow POV:the mission of the U Boats was not to sink as much as possible merchant ships : it was to hurt Britain.

                                What would hurt Britain more ?

                                To sink 1 tanker of 8000 GRT,or to sink 2 ships each of 5000 GRT carrying grain ?

                                To sink 2 tankers each of 10000 GRT carrying oil from Aruba to New Orleans (operation Drumbeat) or to sink 2 ships of each 6000 GRT,belonging to a HX convoy ?

                                It is also not so that more U Boats = more sinkings

                                ex:

                                february 1940 : 34 U Boats were sinking 170000 GRT (= on an average 5000 GRT for each)

                                october 1940: 25 U Boats sank 352000 GRT (= on an average 14000 GRT for each)

                                And this is without counting the average number of days at sea per month:

                                for october 1940,it was 15,which means that the average tonnage sunk per boat per day was 938,for february it was 400

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