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China & North Korea Vs. South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Philippines 2014

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  • Frtigern
    replied
    Originally posted by Draco View Post
    As long as Vitenam is not attacked and maybe its claims are satisfied to dissuade it from fighting, Russia has a lot more to gain by trading with China and letting China expand east and south, than taking a belligerant position that severs relations with China.
    China is simply too powerful an economy to oppose. It has single handedly regulated the price of grain, metals, leather, cotton, lumber, etc, by purchasing enormous quantities at a low price and with good terms,which then causes scarcity and prices to go up for its competitors. It has single handedly bankrupted most of the clothing, shoe, etc, industries in the rest of the world and reduced the price of these items.
    If Russia continues providing oil, gas, etc, to China during the war (as Stalin did with Hitler), it has a lot more to gain that if it opposed China. The same goes for the US.
    Americans were were not willing to fight weak China in 1951 (as Mac Arthur suggested), they are less belligerant now and China much stronger. In the depression, would they really start WW II over distant countries?
    Russia has a lot to lose by siding with China too. By doing nothing to pressure China to stop, the world is going to isolate itself from Russia, just as its doing now. You still erroneously believe, without providing how, China will defeat an East Asian alliance and annex some of the most powerful countries in Asia, with much different ways of life and forms of government. Just the thought of China being in control and forced to accept its draconian laws in their countries will drive the general population into a suicidal panic. Korea, Japan, and Taiwan would rather fight to the death than bow to China. Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam, if they were invaded, would resist the Chinese fiercely as well.

    China is prepared to conduct war one front at a time and would probably be capable of taking Taiwan with heavy losses and a long insurgency, but they are in no way prepared to fight a multi-front war with all other East Asian countries and the US from Hokkaido to Eastern Malaysia. You might even get Australia involved, as the stability the region is also in its best interests and being that China would be the aggressors, guess who they would side with...

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  • broderickwells
    replied
    Popcorn! Hot buttered popcorn! We got beer too!

    Leave a comment:


  • Doveton Sturdee
    replied
    Originally posted by Draco View Post
    I wouldn't bother argueing with a schizo if I were you.
    As you are evidently unable to provide a reasoned answer to a reasonable question, I assume that you accept the obvious flaws in your suggestion.

    To have two capital ships with inadequate AA armament exposed to potential air attack in the manner you propose is foolish enough, but to have them too far apart to be mutually supportive should Japanese heavy ships appear really goes so far beyond the realities of naval warfare in 1942 as to border upon the lunatic.

    Leave a comment:


  • Draco
    replied
    Originally posted by Doveton Sturdee View Post
    I have been reading your posts on this and other threads with increasing incredulity, and would be delighted beyond measure if you would kindly explain something which is mystifying me, and, no doubt, numerous others.

    On the Yamamoto or Nimitz Plan Midway Properly you make the following statements:-

    Post 5

    Mitchell was forced to leave after proving that twin engine biplanes with 2,000 lb bombs could sink a battleship in minutes in 1921.

    Post 14

    The USN did their best to prevent the sinking of the battleship, repeatedly changing the conditions and delayig the attacks on several ships over several days. They stupidly limited the attack on a cruiser to 600 lb bombs and planes sank it, to the navy´s surprise and chagrin. The actual attack on the Ostfriesland lasted minutes and Mitchell had to ignore the last minute conditions and dropped all the bombs. 1 bomber out of 8 had to return without attacking, the ship sank after 6 bombs and the last one was dropped as a salute where the ship had sunk.

    Even after the sinking, the navy stupidly refused to accept the fact and concluded that battleships were the most important weapon.

    Post 29

    (much easier to sink than the battleship that Mitchell sank with 6 bombs, which had survived 14 heavy shells in the battle of Jutland and a mine as it returned to harbour and after 2 months of repairs was ready to fight again). Mitchell did with 8 cheap bombers what British battleships could not do.

    On that thread you clearly argued that battleships were desperately vulnerable to air attack, and, at least in your view, had been since 1921. The mighty Ostfriesland, according to your (incorrect) claim in post 29, survived 14 heavy hits from the RN at Jutland, but succumbed in a few minutes to a few bombs. - Incidentally, I did ask you to let me have details of the sources which stated that Ostfriesland had received these hits, but other than a wildly incorrect article in an aircraft magazine, nothing has so far been forthcoming.

    Given your claims as stated above, how can you now possibly propose that Nimitz should have taken the action I have highlighted above? Do you not grasp that there is something of a contradiction here? If, as you apparently believe, the battleship had been vulnerable for 20 years, are you really arguing that a small force including one (oldish) battleship should have been sent to Midway, and a similar force sent to operate WNW of Midway, in order to 'attract' air attack?

    Perhaps you would have had the crews paint bullseyes on the fo'c's'les and quarterdecks (fantails) to further attract attention from Japanese aviators?!!

    You do at least state above that:

    1) BBs (even the slow American ones) were far from being useless at the time of Midway and were used dismally by both sides.

    but I fail to grasp how sending two battleships into positions where they could attract air attack is a less dismal use of them.


    My knowledge of Midway is rather less extensive than that of the various contributors who have refuted your arguments here, but I am sure that they would also be interested to receive an explanation of the apparently schizophrenic nature of your statements.

    I wouldn't bother argueing with a schizo if I were you.

    Leave a comment:


  • Draco
    replied
    Given the present situation in the Ukraine, now is the ideal time for China to strike.

    Leave a comment:


  • Doveton Sturdee
    replied
    Originally posted by Draco View Post
    I pointed out Yamamoto´s mistakes already. The fact is that Yamamoto had everything to capture Port Moreby and New Caledonia in February, avoiding the losses in the Coral Sea and to win the battle of Midway and blew it by dividing repeatedly his forces and sending the most vulnerable and valuable ships in the vanguard and not using his extremely expensive BBs to shell Midway, instead of bombing it and to force US planes to attack the BBs, protecting the carriers.

    On the other hand, Nimitz lost Lexington because he sent his 2 best carriers in the Doolittle raid (divided his forces unnecessarily, just to satisfy the president's whim) and did not manage to send Saratoga to the battle. He also had the worst planes and guns in Midway, untrained pilots and sent them without escort. He did not use his BBs to protect Midway, attract some planes and sink ships damaged by the planes. He lost Yorktown and missed a great opportunity to sink Zuiho and BBs, CA, etc,

    My conclusions:
    1) BBs (even the slow American ones) were far from being useless at the time of Midway and were used dismally by both sides.
    2) CAs, CLs and DDs were also used dismally by both sides, leaving almost everything to the Island and carriers. Yamamoto sent only 2 CAs with DDs to shell Midway at night and only after he had lost the battle, when shelling Midway served no purpose at all and forcing them to sail in the Morning within range of US planes and without air cover (sacrificing them).
    2) P-38s, P-26s, TBFs, P-25s (with 3,300 lb=1,500 kg HE bombs) should have debuted in Midway with great success. Obsolete SB2Us, Buffaloes and 7" guns should not have been there.
    3) B-17s should either have been used with 6,000 lb HE bombs or not been there at all.
    4) there should have been at least 100 .50 cal MGs and no 30 cal MGs.
    5) Yamamoto should have forgotten about Aaska and kept Zuikaku, Junyo, Ryujo and Zuiho together with the other 4 CVs and kept them all 250 km behind the BBs and CAs. He should have used all the scout planes of the latter to find the US fleet.
    6) The whole fleet in Alaska should have been near the carriers and BBs that participate in the battle of Midway. All the P-38s, B-26s and P-25s in Alaska should have been in Midway. Nimitz should have let Japan invade so far as it wanted in Alaska. Those troops would be isolated after destroying the Jap carriers.
    7) Nimitz should have left one BB in Midway and one BB 300 km WNW of Midway, each with 1 CA, 1CL and 6 DDs. In order to attract plane attacks and oppose enemy BB and CA attacks.

    Both admirals were quite incompetent. Nimitz was luckier and would receive much more materiel, pilots, etc, in the following 26 months than Yamamoto and his successors, that's why Nimitz won.

    Does anybody know how many mortars were there in Midway? I understand they were the most effective weapons in Normandy. A cheap, small and effective antipersonnel and antivehicle weapon (like the .50 MG)
    I have been reading your posts on this and other threads with increasing incredulity, and would be delighted beyond measure if you would kindly explain something which is mystifying me, and, no doubt, numerous others.

    On the Yamamoto or Nimitz Plan Midway Properly you make the following statements:-

    Post 5

    Mitchell was forced to leave after proving that twin engine biplanes with 2,000 lb bombs could sink a battleship in minutes in 1921.

    Post 14

    The USN did their best to prevent the sinking of the battleship, repeatedly changing the conditions and delayig the attacks on several ships over several days. They stupidly limited the attack on a cruiser to 600 lb bombs and planes sank it, to the navy´s surprise and chagrin. The actual attack on the Ostfriesland lasted minutes and Mitchell had to ignore the last minute conditions and dropped all the bombs. 1 bomber out of 8 had to return without attacking, the ship sank after 6 bombs and the last one was dropped as a salute where the ship had sunk.

    Even after the sinking, the navy stupidly refused to accept the fact and concluded that battleships were the most important weapon.

    Post 29

    (much easier to sink than the battleship that Mitchell sank with 6 bombs, which had survived 14 heavy shells in the battle of Jutland and a mine as it returned to harbour and after 2 months of repairs was ready to fight again). Mitchell did with 8 cheap bombers what British battleships could not do.

    On that thread you clearly argued that battleships were desperately vulnerable to air attack, and, at least in your view, had been since 1921. The mighty Ostfriesland, according to your (incorrect) claim in post 29, survived 14 heavy hits from the RN at Jutland, but succumbed in a few minutes to a few bombs. - Incidentally, I did ask you to let me have details of the sources which stated that Ostfriesland had received these hits, but other than a wildly incorrect article in an aircraft magazine, nothing has so far been forthcoming.

    Given your claims as stated above, how can you now possibly propose that Nimitz should have taken the action I have highlighted above? Do you not grasp that there is something of a contradiction here? If, as you apparently believe, the battleship had been vulnerable for 20 years, are you really arguing that a small force including one (oldish) battleship should have been sent to Midway, and a similar force sent to operate WNW of Midway, in order to 'attract' air attack?

    Perhaps you would have had the crews paint bullseyes on the fo'c's'les and quarterdecks (fantails) to further attract attention from Japanese aviators?!!

    You do at least state above that:

    1) BBs (even the slow American ones) were far from being useless at the time of Midway and were used dismally by both sides.

    but I fail to grasp how sending two battleships into positions where they could attract air attack is a less dismal use of them.


    My knowledge of Midway is rather less extensive than that of the various contributors who have refuted your arguments here, but I am sure that they would also be interested to receive an explanation of the apparently schizophrenic nature of your statements.

    Leave a comment:


  • Draco
    replied
    sorry, I dont disembark, I debark. I don't disasociate, I disociate, I don't disorientate, I disorient, I don't take preventative measures, but preventive measures, regardless of bing. something about a razor.

    That's how productive nitpicking can be. Distracting from the crux of the matter.

    Leave a comment:


  • T. A. Gardner
    replied
    Originally posted by Draco View Post
    My turn to be annoyingly nitpicky, you debark, not disembark.
    Bing dictionary:

    disˇemˇbark
    [ dėssəm báark ]


    1. get off passenger vehicle: to get off a passenger vehicle, especially a ship, aircraft, or train
    2. put passengers or cargo off vehicle: to let passengers off a ship, bus, train, or aircraft, or unload cargo

    Leave a comment:


  • Draco
    replied
    Originally posted by StormyB4 View Post
    Yorktown and Enterprise were laid down three months apart. They were commissioned in 37/38. Yorktown was old? Hornet had literally just entered service and it should have been used instead of Lexington because it was newer? That's absurd.

    I agree the Doolittle raid was a waste and the presence of Enterprise at Coral Sea would have probably resulted in a decisive US victory. But considering Hornet's dismal performance at Midway, it needed more operational training before being committed to combat.
    Lexington and Yorktown pilots were quite lucky that their first encounter with carriers was Shoho, with more A5Ms than A6Ms and limited AAA. An excellent training platform.

    Lexington was the worst and leaving it alone with Yorktown was absurd.
    Operating in a fleet with 3 other CVs to attack a CVL and 2 CVs is the best and safest way to gain experience, while helping considerably, attracting planes away from the other carriers and putting even a few planes in the air.
    Safer than operating for the first time against 4 carriers in Midway.
    Last edited by Draco; 02 Mar 14, 17:35.

    Leave a comment:


  • StormyB4
    replied
    Originally posted by Draco View Post
    Because they were the most recent and maneuverable. Lexington was heavier and had weak fuel piping that leaked after a few explosions, that's why it was lost.

    The ironic thing is that Lexington had a longer deck and would have made TO easier for Doolitle.

    Could be that Yorktown had the most fighting experience at the time? precisely because Hornet and Enterprise had wasted valuable time in the stupid raid?

    Yorktown and Lexington did not coordinate their CAP too well in the Coral Sea.

    Sending old Lexington and Yorktown to battle, while 2 newer carriers do public relations is absurd.
    Yorktown and Enterprise were laid down three months apart. They were commissioned in 37/38. Yorktown was old? Hornet had literally just entered service and it should have been used instead of Lexington because it was newer? That's absurd.

    I agree the Doolittle raid was a waste and the presence of Enterprise at Coral Sea would have probably resulted in a decisive US victory. But considering Hornet's dismal performance at Midway, it needed more operational training before being committed to combat.

    Leave a comment:


  • Draco
    replied
    at least 100 .50 cal MGs includes the 150 or 200 you mention. depending on availability, ammo and personnel.

    Even at PH, the Japs lost planes attacking docked and unprepared BBs. Attacking a fully prepared, moving BB sorrounded by CA, CL, DDs and within sight of island fighters and AAA they would have lost a lot of planes (many more than the Japs lost sinking PoW and Repulse). It makes a lot more sense to direct any plane away and maybe shoot it down from invaluable carriers and into what everybody seems to consider useless, slow BBs (instead of keeping them cruising in the middle of nowhere at the most critical time in US history).

    No carrier had a full air wing. Ryujo and Junyo were far from full complement.
    I already stated that even wth the few planes from Shokaku and Zuikaku, the carrier would have been invaluable prodiced torpedoes, bombs, fuel, mechanics and a deck for faster operations and for the planes from damaged carriers.

    The Japanese could not invade Alaska, Yamamoto knew that it was a diversionary operation. Yamamoto made a big blunder creating the operation and Nimitz defending against it.
    Neither Midway nor Alaska were really important, only the carrriers were, without carriers neither was tenable.



    My turn to be annoyingly nitpicky, you debark, not disembark.

    Leave a comment:


  • T. A. Gardner
    replied
    Originally posted by Draco View Post
    I pointed out Yamamoto´s mistakes already. The fact is that Yamamoto had everything to capture Port Moreby and New Caledonia in February, avoiding the losses in the Coral Sea and to win the battle of Midway and blew it by dividing repeatedly his forces and sending the most vulnerable and valuable ships in the vanguard and not using his extremely expensive BBs to shell Midway, instead of bombing it and to force US planes to attack the BBs, protecting the carriers.
    As usual, your lack of knowledge is just astounding. You do know that New Caledonia in January 1942 had a US infantry division on it, the Americal Division.
    Since the IJA at that point was already overstretched in terms of resources what are you going to invade the island with? An SNLF? One or two thousand Japanese troops versus 10,000 + US ones? That doesn't include that the USAAF already had planes on the island either.

    His having the battleships dragging down the carriers to 20 to 25 knots at most, possibly less, does nothing but hurt them. It is the lack of proper antiaircraft formations and a means of controlling their CAP that is the Japanese carrier weakness along with their having an inferior doctrine for deck operations.
    I'm sure you know nothing about Japanese naval doctrine in 1942.

    Same goes with the invasion of Port Moresby. The miniscule size of the landing forces would have seen them destroyed.

    On the other hand, Nimitz lost Lexington because he sent his 2 best carriers in the Doolittle raid (divided his forces unnecessarily, just to satisfy the president's whim) and did not manage to send Saratoga to the battle.
    Saratoga had been torpedoed and was being repaired at the time. Lexington was lost due to a design flaw in her piping. She had survived the battle and was withdrawing along with Yorktown. Both were headed back to Pearl Harbor. That problem delayed Saratoga's repairs as Bremerton added on work to remove and replace the piping so the problem wouldn't reoccur.
    Coral Sea was essentially a draw. The US also learned that their CAP doctrine needed some fine adjustments. The CAP size went up, placement relative to the carrier, and more controllers and radio channels were added. It worked better at Midway and by Santa Cruz was devastating. Japanese strikes got slaughtered.

    He also had the worst planes and guns in Midway, untrained pilots and sent them without escort. He did not use his BBs to protect Midway, attract some planes and sink ships damaged by the planes. He lost Yorktown and missed a great opportunity to sink Zuiho and BBs, CA, etc,
    Pye's slow battleships were nearly useless for defending Midway. Had the Japanese actually won the carrier actions (most likely at the cost of most of their aircraft in any case) then Pye's battleships could have engaged the Japanese in a Jutland style action off Midway if the Japanese did invade.
    Putting them there earlier just makes them targets.

    With the losses suffered by the carrier air wings the US was smart to withdraw their two intact carriers and refit at Pearl Harbor. The point of the operation was to prevent an invasion of Midway and the US succeeded.

    My conclusions:
    1) BBs (even the slow American ones) were far from being useless at the time of Midway and were used dismally by both sides.
    As AA platforms they add little to the defense of the carriers being too slow to keep up (see Santa Cruz where the USS South Dakota was engaged) and they would just slow the formation down.

    2) CAs, CLs and DDs were also used dismally by both sides, leaving almost everything to the Island and carriers. Yamamoto sent only 2 CAs with DDs to shell Midway at night and only after he had lost the battle, when shelling Midway served no purpose at all and forcing them to sail in the Morning within range of US planes and without air cover (sacrificing them).
    The US used those present to screen the carriers. Using the ring formation the cruisers and destroyers added substantially to the defense of the carrier group.
    The Japanese still steamed in traditional formations for surface ships and surface actions. Their air defense tactics involved individual ships maneuvering and firing. There was no real coordination in their antiair operations.
    Worse, their CAP and flight deck doctrines were terrible. That caused the near loss of two of their fleet carriers at Coral Sea and the loss of four carriers at Midway.


    2) P-38s, P-26s, TBFs, P-25s (with 3,300 lb=1,500 kg HE bombs) should have debuted in Midway with great success. Obsolete SB2Us, Buffaloes and 7" guns should not have been there.
    The USAAF, and USN / USMC are two different air services. The Marines were equipped with what they had (a mix of Buffalo and Wildcats, along with the Vindicator dive bomber). The USAAF aircraft proved marginal and ineffective in combat at Midway. Their crews lacked training to attack ships and their aircraft were not particularly well designed for that task. Later in the war with a change in tactics, better training, and new weapons those aircraft were effective ship killers.
    The presence or absence of the P-38 is largely irrelevant. As it was Japanese strikes took unsustainable casualties. Even the Buffaloes of VMF 221 managed to get some kills among the strike aircraft.
    The 7" guns were every bit as useful as the 5" that were present. Their age has nothing to do with that. The 5"/51 present were not dual purpose either. Both would have been very effective against a landing force.


    3) B-17s should either have been used with 6,000 lb HE bombs or not been there at all.
    The US didn't have 6,000 lb. bombs in 1942, if ever...
    As it was they did prove valuable as scouts. However, it is doubtful that a B-17 using whatever size bomb could be effective against ships unless the crew was willing to get low to attack one. That would have been a really dumb use of a B-17.

    4) there should have been at least 100 .50 cal MGs and no 30 cal MGs.
    Why? Why not 150, or 200? Your claim offers no evidence as to why that should be the case.


    5) Yamamoto should have forgotten about Aaska and kept Zuikaku, Junyo, Ryujo and Zuiho together with the other 4 CVs and kept them all 250 km behind the BBs and CAs. He should have used all the scout planes of the latter to find the US fleet.
    Zuikaku lacked a full air wing. Like Shokaku, hers was decimated at Coral Sea and there were no immediate replacements available. Junyo and Hiyo were not used with the fleet as they were much slower than the other carriers. The small carriers like Ryujo and Zuiho carried very limited numbers of aircraft and were better suited to being air cover for the following fleet units of the amphibious invasion rather than used with the Kido Butai.
    Sending in the BB and CA first would have given the US target practice. Without air cover, those ships would have gotten pummeled.


    6) The whole fleet in Alaska should have been near the carriers and BBs that participate in the battle of Midway. All the P-38s, B-26s and P-25s in Alaska should have been in Midway. Nimitz should have let Japan invade so far as it wanted in Alaska. Those troops would be isolated after destroying the Jap carriers.
    Wait, I thought you said the whole Alaska operation was a mistake...? It wasn't? Alaska and Midway are over 1000 miles apart.... You can't be doing one and doing the other at the same time...
    The US wasn't about to let the Japanese invade Alaska. That was a far more important place to the US than Midway was.

    7) Nimitz should have left one BB in Midway and one BB 300 km WNW of Midway, each with 1 CA, 1CL and 6 DDs. In order to attract plane attacks and oppose enemy BB and CA attacks.
    Oh, there's brilliance for you! Here, we'll set out some ships for the enemy to sink or cripple. That will do wonders for morale... After all, the Japanese didn't sink them at Pearl Harbor so it's only fair we give them a second chance to do it...

    Both admirals were quite incompetent. Nimitz was luckier and would receive much more materiel, pilots, etc, in the following 26 months than Yamamoto and his successors, that's why Nimitz won.
    Yea, there is incompetence here but it isn't Nimitz or Yamamoto...

    Does anybody know how many mortars were there in Midway? I understand they were the most effective weapons in Normandy. A cheap, small and effective antipersonnel and antivehicle weapon (like the .50 MG)
    You understood wrong. There probably were none although the two Marine Raider companies might have had some 60mm ones.
    Just a note: You stop an amphibious invasion at the water's edge. The equipment on Midway combined with the obstacles and wire would have done that. The Japanese landing troops would have had to try to cross a fairly wide coral reef to get to the beach doing so in little rubber boats after off loading from their landing craft well in range of .30 machineguns let alone the other weapons the Marines had.
    Then those same troops would find that they had to disembark at the beach obstacles and wire the Marines had strung, try to cut their way through that then move to the beach itself.
    Given the Japanese didn't even know what the defenses of Midway were or the obstacles to landing, they were doomed from the start had they gotten that far.

    Leave a comment:


  • Draco
    replied
    Because they were the most recent and maneuverable. Lexington was heavier and had weak fuel piping that leaked after a few explosions, that's why it was lost.

    The ironic thing is that Lexington had a longer deck and would have made TO easier for Doolitle.

    Could be that Yorktown had the most fighting experience at the time? precisely because Hornet and Enterprise had wasted valuable time in the stupid raid?

    Yorktown and Lexington did not coordinate their CAP too well in the Coral Sea.

    Sending old Lexington and Yorktown to battle, while 2 newer carriers do public relations is absurd.

    Leave a comment:


  • StormyB4
    replied
    Originally posted by Draco View Post
    I pointed out Yamamoto´s mistakes already. The fact is that Yamamoto had everything to capture Port Moreby and New Caledonia in February, avoiding the losses in the Coral Sea and to win the battle of Midway and blew it by dividing repeatedly his forces and sending the most vulnerable and valuable ships in the vanguard and not using his extremely expensive BBs to shell Midway, instead of bombing it and to force US planes to attack the BBs, protecting the carriers.

    On the other hand, Nimitz lost Lexington because he sent his 2 best carriers in the Doolittle raid (divided his forces unnecessarily, just to satisfy the president's whim) and did not manage to send Saratoga to the battle. He also had the worst planes and guns in Midway, untrained pilots and sent them without escort. He did not use his BBs to protect Midway, attract some planes and sink ships damaged by the planes. He lost Yorktown and missed a great opportunity to sink Zuiho and BBs, CA, etc,

    My conclusions:
    1) BBs (even the slow American ones) were far from being useless at the time of Midway and were used dismally by both sides.
    2) CAs, CLs and DDs were also used dismally by both sides, leaving almost everything to the Island and carriers. Yamamoto sent only 2 CAs with DDs to shell Midway at night and only after he had lost the battle, when shelling Midway served no purpose at all and forcing them to sail in the Morning within range of US planes and without air cover (sacrificing them).
    2) P-38s, P-26s, TBFs, P-25s (with 3,300 lb=1,500 kg HE bombs) should have debuted in Midway with great success. Obsolete SB2Us, Buffaloes and 7" guns should not have been there.
    3) B-17s should either have been used with 6,000 lb HE bombs or not been there at all.
    4) there should have been at least 100 .50 cal MGs and no 30 cal MGs.
    5) Yamamoto should have forgotten about Aaska and kept Zuikaku, Junyo, Ryujo and Zuiho together with the other 4 CVs and kept them all 250 km behind the BBs and CAs. He should have used all the scout planes of the latter to find the US fleet.
    6) The whole fleet in Alaska should have been near the carriers and BBs that participate in the battle of Midway. All the P-38s, B-26s and P-25s in Alaska should have bee
    n in Midway. Nimitz should have let Japan invade so far as it wanted in Alaska. Those troops would be isolated after destroying the Jap carriers.
    7) Nimitz should have left one BB in Midway and one BB 300 km WNW of Midway, each with 1 CA, 1CL and 6 DDs. In order to attract plane attacks and oppose enemy BB and CA attacks.

    Both admirals were quite incompetent. Nimitz was luckier and would receive much more materiel, pilots, etc, in the following 26 months than Yamamoto and his successors, that's why Nimitz won.

    Does anybody know how many mortars were there in Midway? I understand they were the most effective weapons in Normandy. A cheap, small and effective antipersonnel and antivehicle weapon (like the .50 MG)
    How do figure Enterprise and Hornet were the best carriers. That's silly! Yorktown was the best US carrier. It was the only carrier that managed to launch coordinated strikes at both Coral Sea and Midway. To say Enterprise and Hornet's flight deck operations at Midway were seriously lacking is being kind. All 3 were Yorktown class..

    Leave a comment:


  • Draco
    replied
    Originally posted by johns624 View Post
    If the Japanese were so awesome, why did they lose the war?
    I can almost understand Nazi fanbois, at least up to age 14. The Germans had some great equipment. Once you reach adolescence though, and learn about their atrocities and such, then it's gone.
    What I don't understand are Japanese fanbois. They didn't win a battle after the first six months, most of their equipment was junk and it was ugly, to boot.
    I pointed out Yamamoto´s mistakes already. The fact is that Yamamoto had everything to capture Port Moreby and New Caledonia in February, avoiding the losses in the Coral Sea and to win the battle of Midway and blew it by dividing repeatedly his forces and sending the most vulnerable and valuable ships in the vanguard and not using his extremely expensive BBs to shell Midway, instead of bombing it and to force US planes to attack the BBs, protecting the carriers.

    On the other hand, Nimitz lost Lexington because he sent his 2 best carriers in the Doolittle raid (divided his forces unnecessarily, just to satisfy the president's whim) and did not manage to send Saratoga to the battle. He also had the worst planes and guns in Midway, untrained pilots and sent them without escort. He did not use his BBs to protect Midway, attract some planes and sink ships damaged by the planes. He lost Yorktown and missed a great opportunity to sink Zuiho and BBs, CA, etc,

    My conclusions:
    1) BBs (even the slow American ones) were far from being useless at the time of Midway and were used dismally by both sides.
    2) CAs, CLs and DDs were also used dismally by both sides, leaving almost everything to the Island and carriers. Yamamoto sent only 2 CAs with DDs to shell Midway at night and only after he had lost the battle, when shelling Midway served no purpose at all and forcing them to sail in the Morning within range of US planes and without air cover (sacrificing them).
    2) P-38s, P-26s, TBFs, P-25s (with 3,300 lb=1,500 kg HE bombs) should have debuted in Midway with great success. Obsolete SB2Us, Buffaloes and 7" guns should not have been there.
    3) B-17s should either have been used with 6,000 lb HE bombs or not been there at all.
    4) there should have been at least 100 .50 cal MGs and no 30 cal MGs.
    5) Yamamoto should have forgotten about Aaska and kept Zuikaku, Junyo, Ryujo and Zuiho together with the other 4 CVs and kept them all 250 km behind the BBs and CAs. He should have used all the scout planes of the latter to find the US fleet.
    6) The whole fleet in Alaska should have been near the carriers and BBs that participate in the battle of Midway. All the P-38s, B-26s and P-25s in Alaska should have been in Midway. Nimitz should have let Japan invade so far as it wanted in Alaska. Those troops would be isolated after destroying the Jap carriers.
    7) Nimitz should have left one BB in Midway and one BB 300 km WNW of Midway, each with 1 CA, 1CL and 6 DDs. In order to attract plane attacks and oppose enemy BB and CA attacks.

    Both admirals were quite incompetent. Nimitz was luckier and would receive much more materiel, pilots, etc, in the following 26 months than Yamamoto and his successors, that's why Nimitz won.

    Does anybody know how many mortars were there in Midway? I understand they were the most effective weapons in Normandy. A cheap, small and effective antipersonnel and antivehicle weapon (like the .50 MG)
    Last edited by Draco; 02 Mar 14, 15:30.

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