War Plan Red

[Stryker 19K30]

Thanks for providing this. It looks interesting and I will read it when I get the opportunity. The author's reference to Henry Gole's book seems a little confused. The full title of Gole's book is The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940. It is not about the same time period that this thesis covers and is not really relevant to it. Also, he states that: "Gole counts RED as unrealistic because he considers Britain a most 'unlikely foe' during the Inter-War period." What Gole actually said was: "Red (England) was an unlikely foe in the 1930s...." The important difference is that by the 1930s the world was a different place compared to the 1920s. Gole was clearly correct in his judgement.

But he's talking about the origins of the plan. I don't see how the reference is confused. I think the effect (the planning) is quite relevant to his thesis on the cause (the origins). How could the effect not be relevant to the cause?

[Roadkiller]

What if War Plan Red was activated and the United States launched an attack on Canada? Who do you think would come out on top?

Well, in accordance with Canada's Defence Scheme One, as soon as evidence of an attack was discovered, Canada would have conducted a pre-emptive invasion of the norther USA (!).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_Scheme_No._1

[OpanaPointer]

"In other news Canada launched a nuclear attack against Albany today. In retaliation the US nuked Detroit."

[johnbryan]

Well, in accordance with Canada's Defence Scheme One, as soon as evidence of an attack was discovered, Canada would have conducted a pre-emptive invasion of the norther USA (!).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_Scheme_No._1

If so, then the New York City Police Department would have placed the invaders under arrest.

[broderickwells]

If so, then the New York City Police Department would have placed the invaders under arrest.

Not if they stopped in Bean Town.

[Tuor]

And 90% of your population lives within six feet of the border with the US. (The other 10% are in Arizona right now.)

You're forgetting about the 10% at the Jersey shore in the summer (do you really want to invade Canada in the winter, eh?). And of corse there are the Canadian fifth columnists in NHL cities (the Flyers alumni are especially prolific in South Jersey).

[taco]

But he's talking about the origins of the plan. I don't see how the reference is confused. I think the effect (the planning) is quite relevant to his thesis on the cause (the origins). How could the effect not be relevant to the cause?

It's not about cause and effect. Gole's book, as the title states, is about what was happening in planning in the US army from 1934 to 1940. Gleason is about 1914 - 1919 and is about the origins of Plan Red. Those are vastly more different subjects than you realize. The 1930s were very different from even the 1920s. Gleason realized that when he stated in his conclusion on page 161: "Not until the next decade [1930s], when the two great powers settled all their naval differences at the London Conference of 1930, and common threats from Asia emerged after 1931, and Europe after 1935, did Americans and Britons finally produce overriding mutual interests."

Henry Gole uses information found by historian Louis Morton in 1957. That information was found in 25 "footlockers" containing the "Course Material" used at the Army War College from 1934 to 1940. He covers more than just that course material but that is a dominate part of the book. The part of the course material that is most interesting is the "Participating with Allies" that began in 1934 at the AWC. That first year of planning the proposed alliances were only focused in the Pacific and had the US, Britain, China, and Russia against Japan. In 1935 the focus was on Europe and with the alliance of the US, Britain, France, and Italy against Germany. There is much more in the book but what should be obvious is that it is vastly different from what Gleason wrote in his masters thesis.

As I said before Gleason seems confused in even using Gole's book. On page two of the thesis Gleason states: "In full agreement, an Army War College production, Henry Gole’s Road to Rainbow, implies that these plans[Plan Red] 'bore little relation to contemporary developments in international affairs'.” The words that Gleason puts in quotation marks are not from Gole. They are the words of Maurice Matloff a US army historian writing in 1953 who did not know about the "Participating with Allies" planning that had been performed at the AWC. Gole only quoted Matloff to show what he called "the essence of the mainstream interpretation of prewar planning" at the time. Gleason could not even accurately state what Gole said. Also, Henry Gole's book is his own and is not an "Army War College production."

I suggest you get a copy of the book and make your own judgement.

[Carl Schwamberg]

taco... thanks for that information & interpretation. US miltiary planning of that era is a understudied subject. While reading a dozen+ bios of the principle US Army leaders of WWII it struck me how important that era was on the decisions they made during the 1940s. Sifting through the professional papers in the journals or the artillery, infantry, & cavalry associations reinforces how the foundations of the 'modern' army of 1943-44 were laid in the 1920s.