Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

The Germans discover Patton's army is a ruse

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • #61
    Originally posted by philiplaos View Post
    That's the kind of input I was hoping for.

    If the Germans could hold back the Allies from breaking out for a whole two months with roughly equal losses using the forces they had while still massively defending Calais, what would have been the effect of facing the Allied invasion with the re-deployment of German units as a result of the discovery of Operation Fortitude South?

    Surely, the advantage would have then been with the Germans, and the repulsion of the invasion a very real possibility.

    And then, what would have happened?

    Please remember, the thread topic is a 'What if........?'. Not a 'What did........?'


    Philip

    IIRC I think Rommel wanted the Pz Lehr deployed around St Lo and, .........if given control of 12th SS also........

    That might have allowed for the Pz Lehr to intervene at Omaha late on D-day, with 12th SS coming into the line the next morning.

    And IF all the senior commanders were present, maybe the delays imposed on the 21st Pz D. on D-day would have been avoided.
    Scientists have announced they've discovered a cure for apathy. However no one has shown the slightest bit of interest !!

    Comment


    • #62
      My two cents.

      Phillip...IF the Germans knew that Patton and FUSAG were a hoax, and (stretching far beyond your initial POD) IF they knew that the landings were happening in early June in the area encompassing the mouth of the Seine/Normandy, and IF they suddenly realized a number of infantry divisions released from the Pas de Calais?

      Dig them in on the shoreline/bluffs, shoulder to shoulder, with emplaced MG42's, a half dozen barrels and 50,000 rounds per each. Yes...bombardment will cut holes in the line but still?

      Nobody will get off any beach alive...period.

      Not as sexy as all those Panzer Divisions that everyone salivates over, this I will admit.

      Even if the organic artillery and other elements couldn't make the show, a presence such as this would do the job.

      Think Dieppe (and the fate of the RCR), but on a horrific, sickening scale...

      That's the only way to do it...

      Make the carnage so vast, so manifest, that after feeding sucessive "waves" of infantry into the meatgrinder, the WAllies will go "Oops, this ain't working"...mop the paratroops up later.

      The only kink in such a plan would be dealing with the armor that made ground in the initial assault, before they could roll up such a defensive gunline. A line of remotely fired charges (controlled from a central CP), spaced at intervals along the suitable landing beaches, would likely suffice in this regard.

      Armored "counterattacks" won't do it. You need to have overwhelming firepower and hit them while they're still struggling through the surf....with 60 lbs of gear on their backs. And make sure that every one that does get out of the water has at least one 7.92mm reminder of why this was a bad idea.

      This IS what happened to the RCR at Dieppe...

      95% combat ineffective, before making the sand. And that was only a half dozen MG's doing the bulk of the damage.
      48 trips 'round the sun on this sh*tball we call home...and still learning...
      __________________________________________________ __________________

      Comment


      • #63
        Originally posted by dutched View Post
        I like this sneaky, but at what stage should the ruse have become apparent to the Germans? The allies in their preparation still isolated the Normandy landing area. If they do not get to move on within the first 12 hours, it would be likely still be too late.

        Ed.
        The converse of this is the point where the Allies become aware their deception effort is failing. The deception staff had acess to the whole of the Allied intelligence collection effort and closely monitored the German activity. They were in fact adjusting the deception events according to German actions.

        This feedback loop extended to 21st Army Group and SHAEF as well. Planning for Op. Neptune and Overlord, & Dragoon for that matter, was constantly refined as new information became available. Significant changes like the addition of the Utah Beach landing or changing H Hour to low tide vs the usual choice of high tide were made long after the original Neptune plan was presented in January.

        Bottom line here is a significant redeployment of defenders to the Calvados coast will not face the same preperation, assualt, or follow up as in OTL.

        Comment


        • #64
          Originally posted by Carl Schwamberg View Post
          The converse of this is the point where the Allies become aware their deception effort is failing. The deception staff had acess to the whole of the Allied intelligence collection effort and closely monitored the German activity. They were in fact adjusting the deception events according to German actions.

          This feedback loop extended to 21st Army Group and SHAEF as well. Planning for Op. Neptune and Overlord, & Dragoon for that matter, was constantly refined as new information became available. Significant changes like the addition of the Utah Beach landing or changing H Hour to low tide vs the usual choice of high tide were made long after the original Neptune plan was presented in January.

          Bottom line here is a significant redeployment of defenders to the Calvados coast will not face the same preperation, assualt, or follow up as in OTL.
          Indeed.

          The fact that the Allies were able to read the Germans' mail would be to me the crucial factor in ensuring the success of the invasion and breakout in the face of the German forces being re-configured as a result of them discovering the ruse of Patton's fake army.

          This, together with the effectiveness and importance of the vast array of deception measures employed under the umbrella of Operation Bodyguard, is what I would hope could be established.

          That is: that the deceptions, subterfuges, interceptions, use of double agents, false messaging, etc. were at least as important as physical military strength and actual battlefield tactics.

          Perhaps more so.

          In other words - we succeeded by being really, really sneaky!

          I like that.


          Philip
          "The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts." Bertrand Russell

          Comment


          • #65
            Originally posted by iron View Post
            Phillip...IF the Germans knew that Patton and FUSAG were a hoax, and (stretching far beyond your initial POD) IF they knew that the landings were happening in early June in the area encompassing the mouth of the Seine/Normandy, and IF they suddenly realized a number of infantry divisions released from the Pas de Calais?

            Dig them in on the shoreline/bluffs, shoulder to shoulder, with emplaced MG42's, a half dozen barrels and 50,000 rounds per each. Yes...bombardment will cut holes in the line but still?

            Nobody will get off any beach alive...period.

            Not as sexy as all those Panzer Divisions that everyone salivates over, this I will admit.

            Even if the organic artillery and other elements couldn't make the show, a presence such as this would do the job.

            Think Dieppe (and the fate of the RCR), but on a horrific, sickening scale...

            That's the only way to do it...

            Make the carnage so vast, so manifest, that after feeding sucessive "waves" of infantry into the meatgrinder, the WAllies will go "Oops, this ain't working"...mop the paratroops up later.

            The only kink in such a plan would be dealing with the armor that made ground in the initial assault, before they could roll up such a defensive gunline. A line of remotely fired charges (controlled from a central CP), spaced at intervals along the suitable landing beaches, would likely suffice in this regard.

            Armored "counterattacks" won't do it. You need to have overwhelming firepower and hit them while they're still struggling through the surf....with 60 lbs of gear on their backs. And make sure that every one that does get out of the water has at least one 7.92mm reminder of why this was a bad idea.

            This IS what happened to the RCR at Dieppe...

            95% combat ineffective, before making the sand. And that was only a half dozen MG's doing the bulk of the damage.
            I will add to this impressive scenario, by filling in at 500 metre intervals 75mm and 88mm PaK guns this would take care of incoming barges and those carrying tanks. Plus laying down up to 500 metres off shore a belt of mines that can be detonated by remotely fired charges (controlled from various CP), this incluudes your beach laid mines.

            I support your bloodbath stance, within five hours Operation Overlord is turning out as a massacre, none of the invading troops that survive the off shore mines and the onshore mines can travers the beach expanses without being torn apart from automatic gunfire and the landing tanks are eliminated by PaK fire, General Dwight D Eisenhower makes the decision to call and end to the Operation and begin recalling as many troops as possible back to the fleet.

            The casualty list is a damning endictment to the failure, approximately 200,000 troops are killed including over 125,000 American, where as the Germans lose no more than 5,000 troops, General Dwight D Eisenhower is forced into a humiliating public address on US radio that leads to his forced resignation. Other knock on effects include British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill's continious failure at large operations such as Galipoli, Dieppe and others ends with him losing a vote of no confidence and is forced to resign and that Clemment Atlee becomes Prime Minister. One outcome to also follw is that Operation Dragoon is cancelled outright.

            Comment


            • #66
              In terms of naval gunfire from the sea, the big show at Normandy never even slightly resembled what could have been had all brought forth for Normandy been so engaged.

              And, again, everybody ignores just how much firepower existed off shore that was barely ever really brought into full play en-masse & in full bore bombardment mode to a depth of up to 20 miles inland. Had all available & off shore in depth been brought to the fore in full offensive mode, they could have decimated the beach fortifications with selective fire from the big guys when needed. It would have changed the initial run ups if initial success to gain foot hold had not occurred, thus forcing a withdrawal of amphib elements for such time as to plaster everything until they could return - hours, not days - but the landings would have certainly continued. And if all that redirected German armour & assorted mechanized elements had been push forward, then the BBs & CAs would have engaged to a very high degree. The fact that they didn't was not because they couldn't bombard effectively inland, it was because ground forces were sufficient to deal with what they actually did deal with WITHOUT the BBs & CAs destroying & compounding damage to basic infrastructures & roads that our forces could use much more effectively in any advances inland that would come eventually. Unleashing the heavies offshore was also not desired - unless absolutely needed - because the land they would be pulverizing was that of France & we did not have to unleash such destruction upon those we were liberating such that they turned against even our own efforts because of such 'punishment'. We needed them to desire our efforts in their liberation & what help that engendered, not with hold it or obstruct us from their own senses of devastation wrought by the result.

              Naval Rifles off shore which could easily concentrate bombardment from 5 to 20 miles inland if brought fully to bear with air observed & corrected fall of shot:

              Battleships

              Seven battleships
              • USS Arkansas 12 - 12" / 16 - 5"
              • USS Nevada 10 - 14" / 16 - 5"
              • HMS Nelson 9 - 16" / 12 - 6" / 6 - 4.7"
              • HMS Ramillies 8 - 15" / 14 - 6" / 2 - 3"
              • HMS Rodney 9 - 16" / 12 - 6" / 6 - 4.7"
              • USS Texas, 10 - 14" / 6 - 5" / 10 - 3"
              • HMS Warspite 6 - 15" (1 turret inoperable) / 16 - 6" / 2 - 3"

              Heavy Cruisers

              Five heavy cruisers
              • USS Augusta 9 - 8" / 8 - 5"
              • USS Quincy 9 - 8"/ 8 - 5"
              • USS Tuscaloosa 9 - 8"/ 8 - 5"
              • HMS Frobisher 4 - 7.5" / 12 - 3"
              • HMS Hawkins 7 - 6" / 8 - 3"

              Light Cruisers

              20 Light Cruisers
              • HMS Argonaut 8 - 5.25"
              • HMS Ajax 8 - 6" / 4 - 4"
              • HMS Arethusa 6 - 6" / 4 - 4"
              • HMS Belfast 12 - 6" / 12 - 4"
              • HMS Bellona 8 - 5.25"
              • HMS Black Prince 8 - 5.25"
              • HMS Capetown 5 - 6" / 2 - 3"
              • HMS Ceres 5 - 6" / 2 - 3"
              • HMS Danae 5 - 6" / 1 - 3"
              • HMS Diadem 8 - 5.25
              • ORP Dragon 5 - 6"
              • HMS Emerald 5 - 6"
              • HMS Enterprise 7 - 6"
              • Georges Leygues 9 - 6" / 8 - 3.5"
              • HMS Glasgow 12 - 6" / 8 - 3"
              • HMS Mauritius 12 - 6" / 8 - 4"
              • Montcalm (Free French) 9 - 6" / 8 - 3.5"
              • HMS Orion 8 - 6" / 8 - 4"
              • HMS Scylla 8 - 5.25 / 1 - 4"
              • HMS Sirius 10 - 5.25"

              Destroyers and escorts

              63 Destroyers, Destroyer Escorts & Corvettes
              • HMCS Algonquin 4 - 4.7"
              • USS Amesbury 3 - 3"
              • USS Baldwin 4 - 5"
              • USS Barton 6 - 5"
              • HMS Bleasdale 6 - 4"
              • HMS Boadicea 4 - 4.7"
              • HMCS Cape Breton 2 - 4.7"
              • USS Carmick 5 - 5"
              • HMS Cattistock 6 - 4"
              • HMCS Chaudiere 4 - 4.7"
              • USS Corry 4 - 5"
              • HMS Cottesmore 6 - 4"
              • USS Doyle 5 -5"
              • HMS Eglinton 6 - 4"
              • HMS Faulknor 5 - 4.7"
              • USS Frankford 5 -5"
              • HMS Fury 4 - 4.7"
              • USS Glennon 5 -5"
              • HNoMS Glaisdale 6 - 4"
              • HMS Grenville 4 - 4.7"
              • USS Harding 4 - 5"
              • USS Hobson 5 - 5"
              • HMS Jervis 8 - 4.7"
              • HMS Kelvin 6 - 4.7"
              • HMS Kempenfelt 4 - 4.7"
              • HMCS Kitchener 1 - 4"
              • ORP Krakowiak 6 - 4"
              • La Combattante 4 - 4"
              • USS Laffey 6 - 5"
              • USS McCook 5 - 5"
              • HMS Melbreak 6 - 4"
              • HMS Middleton 6 - 4"
              • USS Murphy 4 - 5"
              • USS O'Brien 6 - 5"
              • HMS Pytchley 6 - 4"
              • USS Rich 3 - 3"
              • USS Satterlee 4 - 5"
              • HMS Saumarez 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Scorpion 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Scourge 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Serapis 4 - 4.7"
              • HMCS Sioux 4 - 4.7"
              • ORP Slazak 6 - 4"
              • HMS Stevenstone 4 - 4.7"
              • HNoMS Stord 4 - 4.5"
              • HMS Swift 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Talybont 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Tanatside 4 - 4"
              • USS Thompson 4 - 5"
              • HMS Ulster 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Ulysses 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Undaunted 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Undine 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Urania 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Urchin 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Ursa 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Venus 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Verulam 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Vigilant 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Virago 4 - 4.7"
              • HMS Whimbrel 6 - 4"
              • RHN Kriezis 4 - 4"
              • RHN Tobazis 4 - 4"

              Other warships

              2 Monitors
              • HMS Erebus 2 - 15 inch guns
              • HMS Roberts 2 - 15 inch guns


              Total Naval Rifles Off Normandy

              12" - 12


              14" - 20


              15" - 18


              16" - 18


              Total > 68 heavy naval rifles with an effective range of 22 - 26 miles @ 2 rounds per minute (at least)



              8" - 27


              7.5" - 4



              6" - 138



              5" - 101



              4.7" - 121



              4" - 114



              3.5" - 16



              3" - 27


              Total > 548 light to medium naval rifles with effective ranges from 6.6 - 17 miles @ rough avg of 6 - 15 rounds per minute.


              IOW, it would NEVER have been anything even slightly aproaching a cake walk for armour, mechanized & Infantry formations out in the open trying to advance upon a coast line such as to throw amphibious landing forces off. And the big boys could have seriously plastered or largely disbursed some large formations IF they had ever been called in & unleashed. That they never were to any serious degree is more a case of NOT destroying what one seeks to liberate for an ally. But it very much could have been done if things became so critical as to guarantee that the allies did come ashore & stay there. In that the allies essentially had large run of the skies, aerial spotting for fall of naval shot would have been relatively easy & German surface forces were not so large & able as to interdict to much degree as to be decisive in shutting such naval gunfire down if it had been called upon.


              Just sayin & just me opinion.



              Last edited by Admiral; 27 Jun 12, 02:00.
              On the Plains of Hesitation lie the blackened bones of countless millions who, at the dawn of victory, sat down to rest-and resting... died. Adlai E. Stevenson

              ACG History Today

              BoRG

              Comment


              • #67
                All of that is very impressive, Admiral.
                What happens if on June 7 the weather turns bad, the visibility is 500 meters, and the enemy's tactics consists of simply achieving defense from bombardment by getting so close so quickly onto the landed troops, that any bombardment will be friendly fire too?

                I don't think the Germans would win, mind you. But I don't see the shore bombardment as a routine peacetime shooting drill easily carried out in a brightly lit, uncluttered indoor training gallery, either.
                Michele

                Comment


                • #68
                  Nothing is easy, lass. But, again, all that has been discussed is pure speculation. Armour, mechaniozed & infantry forces don't just rush in from so far away in hours. As well, we know what the weather did do & that would not be a reasonable 'what if' to suggest it would occur any differently than it did - this alternative scenario is not incumbent or suggesting different weather than did occur. That would be another ATL scenario altogether.

                  Further - if it were - weather was certainly a factor before any of the fleet or flotillas ever set sail. Before they did, it was relatively known that no significant movements had been made & that Calais was still central to Hitlers perceptions & suspicions.

                  Again, so many speculate about variations on what did happen w/o accepting that many things are not subject to such change under the OPs scenario.


                  On the Plains of Hesitation lie the blackened bones of countless millions who, at the dawn of victory, sat down to rest-and resting... died. Adlai E. Stevenson

                  ACG History Today

                  BoRG

                  Comment


                  • #69
                    Originally posted by philiplaos View Post
                    Indeed.

                    The fact that the Allies were able to read the Germans' mail would be to me the crucial factor in ensuring the success of the invasion and breakout in the face of the German forces being re-configured as a result of them discovering the ruse of Patton's fake army.
                    It is even bigger than that. Because we could read their mail, and give them false mail of ours to read, we had all the options as to where to land and they were always going last. It was a one on one game of Blind Man's Buff. The Allies were always going to land where the Germans were weakest because we knew where they were weakest.

                    This, together with the effectiveness and importance of the vast array of deception measures employed under the umbrella of Operation Bodyguard, is what I would hope could be established.

                    That is: that the deceptions, subterfuges, interceptions, use of double agents, false messaging, etc. were at least as important as physical military strength and actual battlefield tactics.

                    Perhaps more so.

                    In other words - we succeeded by being really, really sneaky!

                    I like that.


                    Philip
                    We succeeded because German military intelligence and counterintelligence was totally shyte. In part this was symptomatic of having the Nazis in power, they were a team few wanted to play for, as well as part of the Heer's culture, wars were won by force not stealth and subterfuge. To continue with the mail analogy from above, we wrote almost all of their mail for them and they had no idea we were doing it.

                    Comment


                    • #70
                      Originally posted by Admiral View Post
                      Nothing is easy, lass.

                      (...)
                      Lass? I suppose you were misled by my name. It's a male name over here, and I'm a man.

                      I see your points, but
                      a) there might be different opinions as to what makes a reasonable what if scenario, or an unreasonable one, and
                      b) I was not so much discussing the overall scenario, but rather the idea that no matter what, regardless of any unpredictable event, naval bombardment will always save the day. Granted you didn't put that down in so many words, but it seemed the gist of your post. If I misunderstood, my apologies.
                      I agree it will have very good chances to flatten any counteroffensive, as it did before elsewhere. It's just that I don't see it as such a 100% sure thing.
                      Michele

                      Comment


                      • #71
                        All things considered with the throw weight of the naval artillery, its limited to the coastal area and only in weather that allows accurate fire. For example, the storm that pounded the fleet for 3 days and destroyed the Omaha Mulberry wasn't exactly good weather.
                        Even if the Naval artillery is incredibly effective, what does that accomplish? A Verdun like moonscape that Allied Soldiers eventually have to cross? Also, its not like the Germans will put their substantial artillery assets within range of the ships. If the Germans react more quickly and with more troops they will contain the beach heads more quickly and in smaller areas than the historical timeline. This creates a smaller area for them to defend, higher troop density along the perimeter and a smaller area to concentrate their own artillery. If the Germans figured out the invasion target was Normandy even 90 days before the landing they could have contained it for months longer than they did historically.
                        "Amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics"
                        -Omar Bradley
                        "Not everyone who studies logistics is a professional logistician, and there is no way to understand when you don't know what you don't know."
                        -Anonymous US Army logistician

                        Comment


                        • #72
                          My apologies, Michele.

                          And I make absolutely no claim or supposition that the navy "saves the day". That is why I posted numbers of naval rifles off shore & also why bombardment wasn't called upon such as was possible - the allies did make it ashore & stayed there without it. It should be noted how well just a few Destroyers did when they were needed as the slightest of indications of what could have been done on massive scale from the shoreline to well inland had the call & desperate need arisen. It didn't arise, though. The bunkers & pill boxes of Normandy were not the caves of Suribachi & would easily have been vulnerable to BB fire if amphib forces were withdrawn to take them out or found to initially have been greater than they were.

                          My bigger point was all to many seem to completely ignore all other assets off shore to concentrate almost exclusively on what was most actually brought to bear.

                          Last edited by Admiral; 27 Jun 12, 08:42.
                          On the Plains of Hesitation lie the blackened bones of countless millions who, at the dawn of victory, sat down to rest-and resting... died. Adlai E. Stevenson

                          ACG History Today

                          BoRG

                          Comment


                          • #73
                            My bigger point was all to many seem to completely ignore all other assets off shore to concentrate almost exclusively on what was most actually brought to bear.
                            I'm not ignoring it at all, just keeping in in proper historical and technical perspective. Allied naval artillery can destroy German units it can hit and thus protect Allied troops, it cannot protect Allied troops from German artillery nor can it protect Allied troops that have to advance beyond its protection. 20 miles and only in good weather is a severe limitation. I'm not suggesting that the Germans had anything close to the capability of crushing the beach heads, but the definately could make the Normandy campaign a much slower and much more difficult campaign for the Allies. I think they could have achieved a 4-5 month stalemate followed by a more orderly withdrawl in this "what if".
                            "Amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics"
                            -Omar Bradley
                            "Not everyone who studies logistics is a professional logistician, and there is no way to understand when you don't know what you don't know."
                            -Anonymous US Army logistician

                            Comment


                            • #74
                              Or by moving within range in much higher concentration the Germans might be pounded & degraded much sooner than they actually were, as well.


                              On the Plains of Hesitation lie the blackened bones of countless millions who, at the dawn of victory, sat down to rest-and resting... died. Adlai E. Stevenson

                              ACG History Today

                              BoRG

                              Comment


                              • #75
                                Hitler would have just said he knew it was a ruse and not done a damn thing.he was so far mentally gone at that point he was too bull headed to have changed anything no matter who tried to talk to him.hell, his aides did not wake him up until noon on dday,and when they did he said something like"i'm glad! now i have them where i want them!".that sounds like the ravings of somebody in serious need of long needles and heavy sedation.
                                I am a soldier, I fight where I am told, and I win where I fight.
                                General George Patton Jr

                                Comment

                                Latest Topics

                                Collapse

                                Working...
                                X