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  • #46
    Originally posted by Bwaha View Post
    So the allies get to post at. and artillery on the ground...

    How does the axis kick them out?
    Through superiority in manpower, resources and firepower. Plus the conventional wisdom that an attacking force needs superiority in all three to ensure success. With a substantial re-deployment to Normandy by the Germans, the Allies would have lacked those.

    IIRC, the Axis forces had twice as many divisions which could have been deployed to Normandy as the Allies had to mount the invasion and breakout. That is, if the Germans had concluded that Pas du Calais would not be the main thrust of the invasion and re-deployed accordingly.

    From a success/failure viewpoint, it doesn't matter whether the Allies are stopped from gaining footholds on the beaches or if the breakout from the beaches is stopped. Either would have been a failure of the invasion.

    BTW, my hoped for objective with this thread is to establish that Operation Bodyguard (with all its myriad sub-deceptions) was critical to the invasion of France to the extent that its uncovering would have led to the failure of the invasion.

    I'd like to see brilliance and creativity, such as exemplified in the deception planning and implementation of Operation Bodyguard, as highly regarded as sheer military might and tactics on the battlefield.

    I'm sneaky that way.


    Philip
    "The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts." Bertrand Russell

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    • #47
      Nah, Can't kick us off the coast...

      Try playing wif. The axis is doomed...
      Credo quia absurdum.


      Quantum mechanics describes nature as absurd from the point of view of common sense. And yet it fully agrees with experiment. So I hope you can accept nature as She is - absurd! - Richard Feynman

      Comment


      • #48
        Originally posted by philiplaos View Post
        Through superiority in manpower, resources and firepower. Plus the conventional wisdom that an attacking force needs superiority in all three to ensure success. With a substantial re-deployment to Normandy by the Germans, the Allies would have lacked those.

        IIRC, the Axis forces had twice as many divisions which could have been deployed to Normandy as the Allies had to mount the invasion and breakout. That is, if the Germans had concluded that Pas du Calais would not be the main thrust of the invasion and re-deployed accordingly.

        From a success/failure viewpoint, it doesn't matter whether the Allies are stopped from gaining footholds on the beaches or if the breakout from the beaches is stopped. Either would have been a failure of the invasion.

        BTW, my hoped for objective with this thread is to establish that Operation Bodyguard (with all its myriad sub-deceptions) was critical to the invasion of France to the extent that its uncovering would have led to the failure of the invasion.

        I'd like to see brilliance and creativity, such as exemplified in the deception planning and implementation of Operation Bodyguard, as highly regarded as sheer military might and tactics on the battlefield.

        I'm sneaky that way.


        Philip
        Yet, the Germans lacked both air and offshore naval bombardment supremacy. They both proved to be the crucial turning factors in those first vital 24 hours.
        "Profanity is but a linguistic crutch for illiterate motherbleepers"

        Comment


        • #49
          Originally posted by Carl Schwamberg View Post
          The Brits did make a few concessions to the US pressure for a NW Europe invasion. COSSAC was established as a combined US/British staff for studying requirements and preparing further contingency plans for Sledgehammer Operations. Operation Roundup was the principle of these & it covered several 'emergency' plans should the German situation in France weaken. Those included a single army landing in Normandy, smaller landings near Calais, and paratroop drops within France should the Germans weaken sufficently. The basic assumption behind the Roundup group of plans was some sort of disaster in the east would cause German ground forces in the west to be drawn down.
          However after Sledgehammer (invasion in 1942) was rebuffed, the British assumed that Bolero (US build-up in Britain) would continue, leading to Round-up (invasion in 1943). IIRC in about September 1942 the British were surprised to find that Bolero had been slowed without telling them, and US forces comitted to the Pacific.

          It can be argued that it was this, together with US foot dragging on Torch which meant that Tunis was not captured in 1942, that ruled out Round-up rather than outright British opposition.

          Comment


          • #50
            Originally posted by philiplaos View Post
            BTW, my hoped for objective with this thread is to establish that Operation Bodyguard (with all its myriad sub-deceptions) was critical to the invasion of France to the extent that its uncovering would have led to the failure of the invasion.
            The success of the operation was less to do with rubber tanks, fake signal units or even double-agents but more to do with weaknesses in the German army:
            - believing that a short sea-crossing to Pas de Calais was the obvious invasion route - easier logistics, shorter route to Germany etc
            - over-estimating the Allied order of battle so that they still believed that after Overlord that so few units had been committed that it was a deception

            Even allowing for all that, the Allied plan were based on worst case expectations eg the Germans would be alerted the night before to likely sea-landings in Normandy, German armmoured reserves would be ordered to teh area promptly.

            If the Germans had perfect intelligence and transferred more mobile units to the West, then all the Allies had to do was delay for a month and wait for the Russian summer offensive to draw them away again.

            Comment


            • #51
              If so, how would they have reconfigured their defenses, and would they have been able to mount a successful defense under that scenario?
              I'd say that despite the disparity in many categories that the German defense in June-August of 1944 could be considered to some degree very successful. Before the Falaise pocket battle the casualties for both side were relatively equal in personnel, with the Allies losing 4000 tanks and over 4000 aircraft. The Germans managed to hold the Allies in Normandy for two months while being handicapped by Hitler's decision to hold troops in/around Calais.

              Now if you want to consider that the Germans know that the Allies are going to land in Normandy I think that the Wehrmacht can definately make it a much more difficult battle for the Allies. Shifting the defensive emphasis from Calais to Normandy would free up two Infantry Corps from the 15th Army, a Flak Corps and relocate reserve panzer divisions to the Normandy area (at the least). The addition of these forces alone would make any airborne landing highly risky and the attrition rate would be very unattractive. There is also the issue of increased fortification depending on how early the Germans figure out that Normandy is the likely target. What I see as key here is the relationship between any additional hold up on the beaches and the intervention of the reserve panzer divisions that will not be held back as they were historically. We are only talking hours and minutes with this, so any time lost on the beach to additional fortification allows the Germans to get their tanks in closer (remember 21st Panzer made it to the coast on D-Day).
              The bottom line is likely that the Germans have more troops early and are able to handle the airborne part of the invasion, retake bridges, counter-attack the beaches early and generally make the Allies fight tooth and nail for any gains. This will allow the Germans to fortify the defenses holding against the Allied beach heads to the point where the Normandy campaign may take months longer that in the OTL.
              Allied airpower and naval artillery are certainly formidable, but as I mentioned above German Flak assets (assuming additional are added) are nothing to be discounted either. As far as Naval gunfire is concerned, the Germans managed to fight under heavy artillery in the past quite successfully and I don't see why excellent defensive country like the bocage would be any different. A smaller beach head also allows for German guns to concentrate on a smaller area as well.
              "Amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics"
              -Omar Bradley
              "Not everyone who studies logistics is a professional logistician, and there is no way to understand when you don't know what you don't know."
              -Anonymous US Army logistician

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              • #52
                Biggest mistake hitler ever made was not trusting any of his generals to do anything without asking his permission.If he would have let Rommell be leader of the german military forces,there is every chance that the nazis could have overthrown europe all the way to england and ireland.they would have eventually made their own nukes and would have fired them at the usa from england.
                I am a soldier, I fight where I am told, and I win where I fight.
                General George Patton Jr

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                • #53
                  Originally posted by bigjake1963 View Post
                  Biggest mistake hitler ever made was not trusting any of his generals to do anything without asking his permission.If he would have let Rommell be leader of the german military forces,there is every chance that the nazis could have overthrown europe all the way to england and ireland.they would have eventually made their own nukes and would have fired them at the usa from england.
                  While a damn good officer, Rommel had his limitations. It's definitely questionable whether or not he could have led the entire German military to dominate all of Europe and to quash the Americans. He had a tendency to overstretch his supply lines, and though Rommel's rapid tactics led to some brilliant maneuvers and spectacular victories, he wasn't able to capitalize on them. Plus, he didn't have the respect of other elitists field marshals in the command heirarchy. Eventually, they would have convinced Hitler to oust him as the ranking leader.
                  "The time for war has not yet come, but it will come, and that soon; and when it does come, my advice is to draw the sword and throw away the scabbard."

                  -Thomas Jonathan Jackson-

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    Originally posted by bigjake1963 View Post
                    Biggest mistake hitler ever made was not trusting any of his generals to do anything without asking his permission.If he would have let Rommell be leader of the german military forces,there is every chance that the nazis could have overthrown europe all the way to england and ireland.they would have eventually made their own nukes and would have fired them at the usa from england.
                    If Hitler let Rommel be in charge, then he'd be facing an uprising from all the disgruntled senior officers who got passed over. Furthermore, the German Army would be leaderless most of the time as its commander ran round on the frontline and lost sight of the big picture.
                    Diadochi Rising Wargame:
                    King Pairisades I of the Bosporan Kingdom

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                    • #55
                      This is one take on it. As usual the more we dig into it the more complicated it gets

                      Originally posted by Aber View Post
                      However after Sledgehammer (invasion in 1942) was rebuffed,
                      'Indefinitly postphoned might be a better term. Sledgehammer was a collection of British plans, so to nitpick - Brooke & Churchill could not rebuff the US leaders for ideas from their own side of the pond. tho in reality Brooke did rebuff Marshalls proposals those ideas actually be executed

                      Originally posted by Aber View Post
                      the British assumed that Bolero (US build-up in Britain) would continue, leading to Round-up (invasion in 1943). IIRC in about September 1942 the British were surprised to find that Bolero had been slowed without telling them, and US forces comitted to the Pacific.
                      The Brits should not have been suprised, they were warned the allocation plans were not set in stone and would be refined as circumstances changed. Its also a bit curious they would be suprised by ground and airforces being sent to the Pacific since the emergency there was not clearly resolved through 1942. -and what they might have expected the US to do when Australia was told Britain could do nothing more for Australias defense after the Netherlands East Indies defeat. What I frequently find when digging into the details is a failure of communicate properly. This seems to be particulary bad with Churchill who so often heard what he wanted rather than what the other party was trying to say, and who made 'large' assumptions about what the other party wanted to hear. Brooke, Dill Marshall, & the rest were not as bad a Churchill, still it took a lot of memos and ftf meetings to get past preconceptions and jump started conclusions.

                      Originally posted by Aber View Post
                      It can be argued that it was this, together with US foot dragging on Torch which meant that Tunis was not captured in 1942, that ruled out Round-up rather than outright British opposition.
                      The details supporting either of those would be usefull as counter point to the several other PoV on how and why Gymnast - Gymnast II - Torch had so many delays & postphonments, or the decisions of the Quadrant & Symbol confrences.

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Originally posted by Javaman View Post
                        I'd say that despite the disparity in many categories that the German defense in June-August of 1944 could be considered to some degree very successful. Before the Falaise pocket battle the casualties for both side were relatively equal in personnel, with the Allies losing 4000 tanks and over 4000 aircraft. The Germans managed to hold the Allies in Normandy for two months while being handicapped by Hitler's decision to hold troops in/around Calais.

                        Now if you want to consider that the Germans know that the Allies are going to land in Normandy I think that the Wehrmacht can definately make it a much more difficult battle for the Allies. Shifting the defensive emphasis from Calais to Normandy would free up two Infantry Corps from the 15th Army, a Flak Corps and relocate reserve panzer divisions to the Normandy area (at the least).
                        That's the kind of input I was hoping for.

                        If the Germans could hold back the Allies from breaking out for a whole two months with roughly equal losses using the forces they had while still massively defending Calais, what would have been the effect of facing the Allied invasion with the re-deployment of German units as a result of the discovery of Operation Fortitude South?

                        Surely, the advantage would have then been with the Germans, and the repulsion of the invasion a very real possibility.

                        And then, what would have happened?

                        Please remember, the thread topic is a 'What if........?'. Not a 'What did........?'


                        Philip
                        "The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of doubts." Bertrand Russell

                        Comment


                        • #57
                          I think you are maybe forgetting that anything within 20+ miles of the coast would be within range of near 1 ton High Explosive or even Armour Piercing shells fired from up to 5 miles off the Normandy shoreline... If you cannot eliminate the battleships, few as you might think they were, - and as anything got closer to the coast, the lesser warships increasing the fire from afloat - you are in for some huge trouble if you intend to drive headlong into it.

                          It's not about German stupidity or allied prowess - or the opposite in both cases - it's a certainty to be devastating & would not have kept the BC&A forces from coming ashore. And feeding greater forces into any attempt to dislodge at the shore would have certainly led to even greater loss. Yes, the allied loses would have likely be a good piece greater, but it would never have become any sort of rout.

                          Just me tinkin, nothin more. I, for one, never thought the Germans to be stupid or incapable. Simply fighting against far superior odds that they could not overcome entirely at Normandy - regardless of if they might have had foreknowledge. If they had foreknowledge & the slaughter ensued - on both sides - because they reinforced towards Normandy, I think the result might actually have shortened the war a small bit. Aside from increased loses earlier, a great many mechanized German elements would have begun their eventual mechanical degradation sooner than otherwise did occur. And, no, I am not ignoring that it would also have taken it's toll on the allies, but they were already inclined to the offensive in logistical terms, not predisposed to the defensive.


                          Last edited by Admiral; 26 Jun 12, 00:54.
                          On the Plains of Hesitation lie the blackened bones of countless millions who, at the dawn of victory, sat down to rest-and resting... died. Adlai E. Stevenson

                          ACG History Today

                          BoRG

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                          • #58
                            For general information Japans Ambasador Oshimas report on his late May 1944 conversation with Hitler can be found here:

                            http://www.scribd.com/paspartoo/d/97...ection=3535291

                            The bulk of it concerns Hitlers thoughts on the current military situation facing Germany & Axis partners and his intent. One point that caught eye was Hitler expressed the intent to withdraw the bulk of his armored formations from the west if the Allies did not invade France soon. He wanted to resume the attack in the east and attempt again to set back the Red Army.

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                            • #59
                              Had the Germans strongly believed that the Allied invasion would fall where it did, one option might have been to mine the Bay of the Seine with pressure mines at the end of May 1944. I have no idea how many pressure mines were available but torpedoes are much more complicated than mines and Germany produced 70,000 torpedoes during WW2. It is possible that I overestimate the effectiveness of unsweepable mines (I have posted a successful Sealion thread based on magnetic mines elsewhere http://alternatehistory.com/discussi...d.php?t=167056 or http://counter-factual.net/upload/showthread.php?t=9046) but a large number of pressure mines in the right (wrong) place would have been very inconvenient.
                              Last edited by Mostlyharmless; 26 Jun 12, 10:17.

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                              • #60
                                Originally posted by philiplaos View Post
                                Through superiority in manpower, resources and firepower. Plus the conventional wisdom that an attacking force needs superiority in all three to ensure success. With a substantial re-deployment to Normandy by the Germans, the Allies would have lacked those.

                                IIRC, the Axis forces had twice as many divisions which could have been deployed to Normandy as the Allies had to mount the invasion and breakout. That is, if the Germans had concluded that Pas du Calais would not be the main thrust of the invasion and re-deployed accordingly.

                                From a success/failure viewpoint, it doesn't matter whether the Allies are stopped from gaining footholds on the beaches or if the breakout from the beaches is stopped. Either would have been a failure of the invasion.

                                BTW, my hoped for objective with this thread is to establish that Operation Bodyguard (with all its myriad sub-deceptions) was critical to the invasion of France to the extent that its uncovering would have led to the failure of the invasion.

                                I'd like to see brilliance and creativity, such as exemplified in the deception planning and implementation of Operation Bodyguard, as highly regarded as sheer military might and tactics on the battlefield.

                                I'm sneaky that way.


                                Philip
                                I like this sneaky, but at what stage should the ruse have become apparent to the Germans? The allies in their preparation still isolated the Normandy landing area. If they do not get to move on within the first 12 hours, it would be likely still be too late.

                                Ed.
                                The repetition of affirmations leads to belief. Once that belief becomes a deep conviction, you better wake up and look at the facts.

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