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  • #16
    Originally posted by BF69 View Post
    Cool. Love to hear some details.
    This is starting to become upsetting, I am missing the rules for a game that some collectors would pay hundreds of dollars for.
    No joke, I'm starting to get angry.

    The plan was really all-out. It would have removed everything that did, or could have, responded to the Allied landings in Italy, as well as all the mechanized units in France & the Balkans, plus every Infantry Division that could be pried loose from Scandinavia and elsewhere that was not manning crucial defenses or activly engaged with Partisans at that moment.

    Do or die in '43, for real.
    "Why is the Rum gone?"

    -Captain Jack

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    • #17
      Originally posted by The Purist View Post
      The problem with the 20 infantry and 6 mech divisions is where do they come from? Manstein can come up with all sorts of plans but there are certainly limits to what the Germans could field. He was also disconnected/insulated from the challenges faced by OKW and the infighting between that body and OKH.

      It was a near miracle to gather the forces they did for July 5th. Finding more without creating a totally unacceptable risk to either the west or south fronts.

      A serious reality check would have to be conducted.
      Well reading to the Battle of Kursk, the Germans attacked with only

      XLI Panzer Korps (Harpe), 9th Army, Army Group Centre
      XLVI Panzer Korps (Zorn), 9th Army, Army Group Centre
      XLVII Panzer Korps (Lemelsen), 9th Army, Army Group Centre

      And

      II SS Panzer Korps (Hausser), 4th Panzer Army, Army Group South
      III Panzer Korps (Breith), Kempf Army, Army Group South
      XLVIII Panzer Korps (Knobelsdorff), 4th Panzer Army, Army Group South

      All told the operation had.

      15 x Infantry Divisions
      6 x Panzer Grenadier Divisions
      12 x Panzer Divisions

      What was lacking was that virtually the entire 2nd Army, Army Group Centre took no action in regards of attack Soviet Lines.

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      • #18
        Originally posted by Roddoss72 View Post

        What was lacking was that virtually the entire 2nd Army, Army Group Centre took no action in regards of attack Soviet Lines.
        It was in no kind of combat shape to do so, Ross:

        Commanded by Colonel General Walter Weiss, the 2nd Army, because of its most recent combat experiences, was much weaker than 9th Army. During the fighting in February and March 1943, the Soviets had decisively beaten the 2nd Army, which had almost been encircled. After the mauling it had received, the 2nd Army, which only had 96,000 men, was incapable of playing a major role at Kursk. Consequently, the 2nd Army, with its seven-plus divisions, received the job of providing a thin screen across the face of the bulge. Weiss divided these divisions, along with three anti-tank detachments, into two army corps: the XIII and VII Army Corps. The two corps, which provided a thin connection between Army Group Centre (AGO and Army Group South (ACS), played a purely defensive role in the offensive. Two divisions of XIII Corps, along with one regiment from another division, would hold the northern part of 2nd Army's sector. While the 82nd Division held the left, the six battalions of the 340th Infantry Division were situated in the centre of the corps' area. VII Corps was responsible for the southern part of the 2nd Army's sector. Four of the 2nd Army's infantry divisions contained nine weak battalions each. The 88th Infantry Division was located next to XIII Corps. South of the 88th Infantry Division were, from left to right, the 26th, the 75th and the 68th Infantry Divisions. The seven weak infantry divisions had the responsibility of covering a 170km (105 mile) front that faced two Soviet armies, the 6th and the 38th.


        http://www.germanmilitaryhistory.com...an-kursk-1943/

        Comment


        • #19
          Originally posted by Roddoss72 View Post

          What was lacking was that virtually the entire 2nd Army, Army Group Centre took no action in regards of attack Soviet Lines.
          Interestingly, Manstein suggested an alternative to Citadel, to occur in the 2nd Army sector ... head on to the bulge.

          "Such a daring operational concept aroused Hitler's interest," Benoit LeMay writes in Hitler's Master Strategist "but not Zeitzler's who clearly preferred to stick with his original plan. At any rate, a complete redeployment of units ... would have demanded too much time."

          Remember that for this battle, Hitler did little of the planning, and in fact didn't do much more than choose between the options offered by Guderian, Kluge, Manstein, Zeitzler and Model, who contradicted each other all the time. Zeitzler, as commander of the army, had the biggest say.

          Hitler was unimpressed as the battle went on by the feuding he witnessed. The Soviets launched two long-waited and colossal offensives either side of Citadel, the Anzio landings happened, Model wanted to withdraw in the north, and Manstein wanted to continue in the south.

          LeMay concludes: "It was thus rightly so that the Fuehrer placed the primary blame for the defeat on his generals: "This is the last time I will listen to the council of my general staff," he declared to his confidants after the meeting with Manstein and Kluge he had convened on July 13 to order them to terminate the operation."

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          • #20
            Originally posted by Exorcist View Post
            This is starting to become upsetting, I am missing the rules for a game that some collectors would pay hundreds of dollars for.
            No joke, I'm starting to get angry.
            Damn. Sucks. Good luck finding them.

            The plan was really all-out. It would have removed everything that did, or could have, responded to the Allied landings in Italy, as well as all the mechanized units in France & the Balkans, plus every Infantry Division that could be pried loose from Scandinavia and elsewhere that was not manning crucial defenses or activly engaged with Partisans at that moment.

            Do or die in '43, for real.
            Interesting. Did they have the logistics to field that lot by then?
            Human beings are the only creatures on Earth that claim a god and the only living thing that behaves like it hasn't got one - Hunter S. Thompson

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            • #21
              Originally posted by BF69 View Post
              Interesting. Did they have the logistics to field that lot by then?

              Yes. After two years in that area they had that pretty much taken care of.
              Keep in mind that the Germans could get by with 28 pounds per man per day on the average, more than the Russians but about 1/6th the US requirement.
              "Why is the Rum gone?"

              -Captain Jack

              Comment


              • #22
                Actually, no, they didn't, at least not entirely. While the rail net had been repaired and converted the capacity never reached what was required. The build up for Citadelle was delayed by more than just waiting for the first 200 Pz Vs, the logistics stockpiles had to be built. Once the battle began the Germans in the north did not have much trouble because they were pretty much stopped after just a few miles. However, Manstein's lads to the south burned a hell of a lot gas and amminition as they ground their way through successive lines of Red Army defenses.

                Toward the end of the battle, fuel and ammunition stocks were dwindling faster than they could be replaced and moving them from depot to combat units was become problematic due to the lack of trucks and constant Red Army air attacks and partisan attacks on the rail lines. Throughout the defensive battles of Aug-Sep German reserves were often commited not by what was available but by what could be fueled and how much ammuntion was available (especially for the artillery).

                Add 25+ divisions plus the forces of 9th Army to the south network's requirements and I think the logistics network would (yet again) have failed to deliver.
                The Purist

                Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

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                • #23
                  Originally posted by Exorcist View Post
                  He wanted to take so much from the west that he would have had the equivalent of 4-6 more Mechanized Divisions and 20 more Infantry Divisions, pluss 2 Parachute Divisions prepped for an actual airborne operation.
                  Manstien's Gambit would either have gained a huge win or collapsed the entire Axis war by the end of that year.
                  Delaying Citadel from May to July helped Army Group South, since it was able to expand from 850 AFVs to 1,500, and Guderian's new tanks and Rudel's new Stukas were able to make their debut.

                  But that buildup made German intentions very clear. Moving the Reich's last troops from other theatres into the Kursk area would have excited STAVKA even more.

                  These would be more troops and tanks that would have to flee back to the Dneipr once the Soviet offensives north and south of the bulge broke through. Could Manstein skilfully get all of them out? Maybe, maybe not.

                  The only question is whether you think the reinforced Citadel assault into layered, fixed defences was actually going to succeed.

                  There is no evidence of that from German armoured offensives from late 1942 onward - at El Alamein, Medenine, in Normandy, the Ardennes, Budapest and Lake Balaton.

                  In each case, once the Schwerpunkt, the line of attack, was identified, the Allies inflicted heavy defeats on the Panzers.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Originally posted by clackers View Post
                    It was in no kind of combat shape to do so, Ross:

                    Commanded by Colonel General Walter Weiss, the 2nd Army, because of its most recent combat experiences, was much weaker than 9th Army. During the fighting in February and March 1943, the Soviets had decisively beaten the 2nd Army, which had almost been encircled. After the mauling it had received, the 2nd Army, which only had 96,000 men, was incapable of playing a major role at Kursk. Consequently, the 2nd Army, with its seven-plus divisions, received the job of providing a thin screen across the face of the bulge. Weiss divided these divisions, along with three anti-tank detachments, into two army corps: the XIII and VII Army Corps. The two corps, which provided a thin connection between Army Group Centre (AGO and Army Group South (ACS), played a purely defensive role in the offensive. Two divisions of XIII Corps, along with one regiment from another division, would hold the northern part of 2nd Army's sector. While the 82nd Division held the left, the six battalions of the 340th Infantry Division were situated in the centre of the corps' area. VII Corps was responsible for the southern part of the 2nd Army's sector. Four of the 2nd Army's infantry divisions contained nine weak battalions each. The 88th Infantry Division was located next to XIII Corps. South of the 88th Infantry Division were, from left to right, the 26th, the 75th and the 68th Infantry Divisions. The seven weak infantry divisions had the responsibility of covering a 170km (105 mile) front that faced two Soviet armies, the 6th and the 38th.


                    http://www.germanmilitaryhistory.com...an-kursk-1943/
                    Thanks for the information.

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Originally posted by clackers View Post
                      In each case, once the Schwerpunkt, the line of attack, was identified, the Allies inflicted heavy defeats on the Panzers.
                      There lies the rub. The Germans could stockpile the supplies they needed, but that tended to tip their hand.
                      One reason for the total surprise at the Battle of the Bulge was that they didn't. 3 of the 5 million gallons of fuel allocated for the attack (which would have been enough) was left on the far side of the Rhine. Clever, until you find that the first Allied bombing raids in response to the offensive was to bomb Rhine bridges, thus leaving the gas out of reach.
                      Oops.

                      It gets bad when the guys in charge ain't as clever as they think they are.
                      "Why is the Rum gone?"

                      -Captain Jack

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Exorcist View Post
                        3 of the 5 million gallons of fuel allocated for the attack (which would have been enough) was left on the far side of the Rhine. Clever, until you find that the first Allied bombing raids in response to the offensive was to bomb Rhine bridges, thus leaving the gas out of reach.
                        Hmm, very interesting, Exorcist ... I'll remember that!

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                        • #27
                          A Time for Trumptes; still the best book on that battle... but like most, it is 90% about the first ten days, and leaves the rest mostly uncovered.
                          "Why is the Rum gone?"

                          -Captain Jack

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            OT but,....

                            It's been years since I've read it but it still holds a place of pride on the book shelves is Peter Elstob's "Hitler's Last Offensive". He was a British tanker amongst those who blocked the Meuse crossings and his book is even better than MacDonald's (mainly because it is larger and covers events and a bit more detail).

                            Out of print now but you can get good copies online for very reasonable prices.
                            Last edited by The Purist; 15 Feb 12, 14:26.
                            The Purist

                            Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

                            Comment

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