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  • Originally posted by Freebird View Post

    No, it wasn't actually, 1st Allied Airborne (Brereton & Browning) put together the Airborne plan.

    Monty's original intent was to have a coup-de-main landing just south of Arnhem, that was dropped.

    Monty didn't tell Browning & the 82nd Airborne to push TWO regiments up on the Grossbeek heights immediately on the first day and not even bother to secure the Waal bridge on which the whole operation depended..

    Monty didn't tell the crashed American officer from the 101st to fly into battle carrying the detailed plan for the whole f**king operation!

    Monty didnt tell 1st Allied Airborne to drop into Nijmegen & Eindhoven (each garrisoned by a single battalion) with 3 full regiments each and then assign only a single British brigade to secure Arnhem on day 1 - facing essentially a full SS motorized division.


    No, Monty wasn't dumb enough to do that s**t.
    Let me fully research that and get back to you
    Trying hard to be the Man, that my Dog believes I am!

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Trung Si View Post

      Let me fully research that and get back to you
      I should probably start a Market Garden thread to let all of the Monty haters rant about it.



      I'll leave you with this. The guy in charge of the whole Allied Airbore Army, Lewis Brereton, was described by Omar Bradley as "marginally competent"

      Would you want to fly on an airplane with a "marginally competent" pilot?

      If your daughter/wife/sister needed a difficult lifesaving operation would you be OK with a surgeon who was "marginally competent"?

      Would you be OK with the architect building a bridge, dam or perhaps your house being "marginally competent"?

      Then why the heck would we want this guy in charge of one of the largest airborne operations of the war?

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Trung Si View Post

        Let me fully research that and get back to you
        That you should. Like most *Army Group Commanders*, Montgomery would not have tried to tell his army, corps and divisionsal commanders deploy and how move their troops. Even more so than Brereton, Browning was the real author of the destruction of the 1st Airborne div at Arnhem.

        In the end, Nijmegen was the key. Like Arnhem, the bridge at Nijmegen should have been taken from both ends the first afternoon. The delays at the border and at Zon would have been overcome due to the vicinity to the main allied start line but Nijmegen was a different sort of objective entirely.
        The Purist

        Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking - John Maynard Keynes.

        Comment


        • Excellent post.
          Originally posted by The Purist View Post

          That you should. Like most *Army Group Commanders*, Montgomery would not have tried to tell his army, corps and divisionsal commanders deploy and how move their troops.
          Correct.
          The overall commander should allocate forces and specify objectives.
          Monty (21st AG) commanded Dempsey & Horrocks.
          They were tasked with relieving the airborne within 48 hours.

          in actuality, XXX Corps arrived at the American 82nd zone 42 hours after the start, with only 6 miles of road left (supposedly) already secured.
          Obviously the failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge or secure the "Island" on day 1 doomed the possibility of securing Arnhem

          Originally posted by The Purist View Post
          Even more so than Brereton, Browning was the real author of the destruction of the 1st Airborne div at Arnhem.
          I would have to partially disagree with this.
          While Browning was in charge of the 1st Airborne Corps and was negligent in not ordering Gavin to secure Nijmegen ASAP, a large portion of the failure to promptly relieve 1st British Airborne (hence it's destruction) is due to the decisions of Brereton early on in the process, which resulted in the failures.

          Specifically, the choices to drop midday, not to have a second drop and not to piggyback gliders (Each transport tug could tow two gliders) and the unfathomable choice to have 3 regiments each from the 82nd & 101 land on day 1, yet attempt to secure Arnhem & Oosterbeck with a single British brigade (!) on the first day, were made by Brereton.

          US-Army-transport-aircraft-World-War-II.jpg

          Originally posted by The Purist View Post

          In the end, Nijmegen was the key. Like Arnhem, the bridge at Nijmegen should have been taken from both ends the first afternoon. The delays at the border and at Zon would have been overcome due to the vicinity to the main allied start line but Nijmegen was a different sort of objective entirely.
          Had the Polish (Or British 4th) dropped south of Arnhem bridge in a "coup-de-main" as suggested by Montys original idea and secured the road section from Arnhem - Nijmegen , the Germans would have been unable to reinforce Nijmegen by heavy weapons & tanks before the British armour arrived, greatly simplifying its eventual capture.

          Comment


          • Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen. Commanded two great U.S. Army infantry divisions, the 1st and 104th.

            "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" Beatrice Evelyn Hall
            Updated for the 21st century... except if you are criticizing islam, that scares the $hii+e out of me!

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Freebird View Post
              Excellent post.

              Correct.
              The overall commander should allocate forces and specify objectives.
              Monty (21st AG) commanded Dempsey & Horrocks.
              They were tasked with relieving the airborne within 48 hours.

              in actuality, XXX Corps arrived at the American 82nd zone 42 hours after the start, with only 6 miles of road left (supposedly) already secured.
              Obviously the failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge or secure the "Island" on day 1 doomed the possibility of securing Arnhem



              I would have to partially disagree with this.
              While Browning was in charge of the 1st Airborne Corps and was negligent in not ordering Gavin to secure Nijmegen ASAP, a large portion of the failure to promptly relieve 1st British Airborne (hence it's destruction) is due to the decisions of Brereton early on in the process, which resulted in the failures.

              Specifically, the choices to drop midday, not to have a second drop and not to piggyback gliders (Each transport tug could tow two gliders) and the unfathomable choice to have 3 regiments each from the 82nd & 101 land on day 1, yet attempt to secure Arnhem & Oosterbeck with a single British brigade (!) on the first day, were made by Brereton.

              US-Army-transport-aircraft-World-War-II.jpg



              Had the Polish (Or British 4th) dropped south of Arnhem bridge in a "coup-de-main" as suggested by Montys original idea and secured the road section from Arnhem - Nijmegen , the Germans would have been unable to reinforce Nijmegen by heavy weapons & tanks before the British armour arrived, greatly simplifying its eventual capture.
              Market Garden is the most interesting failed Allied operation of the war.
              "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" Beatrice Evelyn Hall
              Updated for the 21st century... except if you are criticizing islam, that scares the $hii+e out of me!

              Comment


              • Originally posted by The Purist View Post

                That you should. Like most *Army Group Commanders*, Montgomery would not have tried to tell his army, corps and divisionsal commanders deploy and how move their troops. Even more so than Brereton, Browning was the real author of the destruction of the 1st Airborne div at Arnhem.

                In the end, Nijmegen was the key. Like Arnhem, the bridge at Nijmegen should have been taken from both ends the first afternoon. The delays at the border and at Zon would have been overcome due to the vicinity to the main allied start line but Nijmegen was a different sort of objective entirely.
                Good point.
                Herbert Essling, IIRC, said that Montgomery , if he had abandoned the Arnhem plan and battled to clear approaches to the Antwerp on the Scheldt, would have been castigated for NOT making a plunge across the Rhine and taking the cautious approach. Its dammed if you do, and also- if you don't.

                Montgomery was seen as 'callous' when he announced that the Arnhem operation was '90%' successful.
                There has been speculation that Bernard Montgomery was 'high achieving Asperger's syndrome'-

                Terh operation did succeed in capturing the bridges at Graves and at Mook over the Meuse- and the Nijmegen bridge/. This starved Germany's ability to re-enforce and re- supply von Zangen's doomed fifteenth army.- allied air superiority destroyed most of the ferries over the lower Rhine and Waal. The south of the Netherlands was systematically rolled up from the East and south.
                It was a terrible choice- but a wedge was driven into Models' defenses that made operation Veritable possible.
                The trout who swims against the current gets the most oxygen..

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Freebird View Post
                  Excellent post.

                  Correct.
                  The overall commander should allocate forces and specify objectives.
                  Monty (21st AG) commanded Dempsey & Horrocks.
                  They were tasked with relieving the airborne within 48 hours.

                  in actuality, XXX Corps arrived at the American 82nd zone 42 hours after the start, with only 6 miles of road left (supposedly) already secured.
                  Obviously the failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge or secure the "Island" on day 1 doomed the possibility of securing Arnhem



                  I would have to partially disagree with this.
                  While Browning was in charge of the 1st Airborne Corps and was negligent in not ordering Gavin to secure Nijmegen ASAP, a large portion of the failure to promptly relieve 1st British Airborne (hence it's destruction) is due to the decisions of Brereton early on in the process, which resulted in the failures.

                  Specifically, the choices to drop midday, not to have a second drop and not to piggyback gliders (Each transport tug could tow two gliders) and the unfathomable choice to have 3 regiments each from the 82nd & 101 land on day 1, yet attempt to secure Arnhem & Oosterbeck with a single British brigade (!) on the first day, were made by Brereton.

                  US-Army-transport-aircraft-World-War-II.jpg



                  Had the Polish (Or British 4th) dropped south of Arnhem bridge in a "coup-de-main" as suggested by Montys original idea and secured the road section from Arnhem - Nijmegen , the Germans would have been unable to reinforce Nijmegen by heavy weapons & tanks before the British armour arrived, greatly simplifying its eventual capture.
                  iirc, Walter Model took personal command of Te Forces in the Peel Marshes, and raked together KAMPFGRUPPE ON THE SPOT out of whatever was able to fight, - and repeatedly blocked the sole road north to Arnhem.
                  BTW, the operation that cleared the south of Holland was Operation Pheasant.
                  Von Rundstedt reported to Hitler that the 15th Army must pull back across the line of the Waal river, but Hitler ordered that it must stand fast in the area to the south of the Maas. As the situation of the 15th Army continued to deteriorate, von Rundstedt asked for new orders. Hitler's response merely reiterated his demand, and said that a major reinforcement of the 15th Army had been ordered.[36] More significant, in operational terms, was the order that Generaloberst Kurt Student, commanding the 1st Parachute Army on the 15th Army's left, should take command of all German forces in the north-western part of the Netherlands known as Army Group Student. Student's came formally into existence on 11 November and was later renamed Army Group H with three army groups on the Western Front.[36]
                  The trout who swims against the current gets the most oxygen..

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Freebird View Post
                    Excellent post.
                    Specifically, the choices to drop midday, not to have a second drop and not to piggyback gliders (Each transport tug could tow two gliders) and the unfathomable choice to have 3 regiments each from the 82nd & 101 land on day 1, yet attempt to secure Arnhem & Oosterbeck with a single British brigade (!) on the first day, were made by Brereton.
                    Yes and even if only RAF 46 Group had flown a second sortie the first day, bringing in 4th Parachute Brigade, that would have been enough to tip the balance. One of the weaknesses of the plan was 1st Airlanding Brigade having to spend over 24 hours defending the drop zones for the second lift, rather than pressing onto the objectives whilst resistance was still weak.
                    Theoretically all three brigades could have been on the objective by the end of Day 1.

                    Also a second lift on the first day could have seen the German reaction slowed and even panicked a bit, as 21st Panzer Division abandoned its counter-attack on D-Day as it saw the second lift of 6th Airborne fly over them.

                    Had the Polish (Or British 4th) dropped south of Arnhem bridge in a "coup-de-main" as suggested by Montys original idea and secured the road section from Arnhem - Nijmegen , the Germans would have been unable to reinforce Nijmegen by heavy weapons & tanks before the British armour arrived, greatly simplifying its eventual capture.
                    If the weather had been kind, the Polish Brigade would have been dropped not far south of the Bridge whilst Frost's men still held the northern part.

                    Comment


                    • One of the biggest reasons 1st Airborne at Arnhem failed so badly was that the unit's signals troops, for whatever reason, completely failed in their duties to keep the Eureka transmitters on drop sites running properly. Out of six sites, only one was lost to the Germans in the early days of the operation. Four more failed because the equipment didn't work properly. Whether this was through neglect, inability to keep the equipment running due to parts or technical competence, I don't know. But it was enough to ensure that the 1st wasn't getting supplied like they would have had the sites been up and running properly.
                      The Rebecca / Eureka system was a critical component in making accurate drops for supplies. At Bastogne in the Ardennes the 101st used the same system effectively to allow the USAAF to drop supplies with nearly unerring accuracy meaning they got in excess of 90% of what was delivered.

                      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebecc...sponding_radar



                      This was a critical communications system that completely broke down very early in the operation for the 1st Airborne. Without these running, the planes had to drop as best they could off visual clues which meant that drops were scattered and often landed in the wrong place.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by T. A. Gardner View Post
                        One of the biggest reasons 1st Airborne at Arnhem failed so badly was that the unit's signals troops, for whatever reason, completely failed in their duties to keep the Eureka transmitters on drop sites running properly. Out of six sites, only one was lost to the Germans in the early days of the operation. Four more failed because the equipment didn't work properly. Whether this was through neglect, inability to keep the equipment running due to parts or technical competence, I don't know. But it was enough to ensure that the 1st wasn't getting supplied like they would have had the sites been up and running properly.
                        The Rebecca / Eureka system was a critical component in making accurate drops for supplies. At Bastogne in the Ardennes the 101st used the same system effectively to allow the USAAF to drop supplies with nearly unerring accuracy meaning they got in excess of 90% of what was delivered.

                        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebecc...sponding_radar



                        This was a critical communications system that completely broke down very early in the operation for the 1st Airborne. Without these running, the planes had to drop as best they could off visual clues which meant that drops were scattered and often landed in the wrong place.
                        Excellent post, TAG.
                        I had forgotten about the Eureka failure.
                        H>H> Essling said that intelligence failed completely to spot the resources that Walter Models' fifteenth army, Blaskowitz Student Group,( Kurt Student's parachute regiments. and the SS Panzer divisions were concentrating at Arnhem. The 'Euphoria of Easy Victory'.- infected everyone, IIRC, was Essling's description.

                        To Horrock's and Dempseys credit, they did take advantage of the build up in the Salient which wasn't going to reach Berlin,( or cross the Rhine..)


                        THE aRROW (RED) AT THE UPPER RIGHT HAND CORNER,iirc, SHOULD BE THE AMERICANS MINNESOTA 104TH "TIMBERWOLVES' WHO FOUGHT THROUGH AND BLOCKED THE RAIL BRIDGE OVER HOLLANDS dIEP.
                        this closed the trap on the 15th German army.

                        he American 104th Timberwolves infantry division had travelled from the Hurtgen forest offensive to join 21st Army group and help assist in the operations there. They were positioned on the left flank of the British 49th Infantry Division and the Polish 1st Armoured Division on the right. They joined in offensive operations from October 20.[29]

                        On 30 October, after five days of continuous operations the division had pushed about fifteen miles to within sight of the Mark River and had liberated the town of Zundert after a hard fight. Soon after they had gained control of the Breda-Roosendaal Road, and had overrun the Vaart Canal defenses.[29]Achtmaal, Leur and Etten fell as the division advanced to the Mark River, arriving there by 31 October. A coordinated attack over the Mark River at Standdaarbuiten on 2 November established a bridgehead and the rest of the division crossed the river. For the next two days, the Timberwolves pursued German remnants north to the Maas River. Zevenbergen was captured and the Maas River was reached on 5 November.[29]



                        they are marked as British, but since if you are from Minnesota, you 're 90% Canadian, so I can see how the error happened .
                        Last edited by marktwain; 12 Feb 20, 12:06.
                        The trout who swims against the current gets the most oxygen..

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by marktwain View Post

                          Excellent post, TAG.
                          I had forgotten about the Eureka failure.
                          H>H> Essling said that intelligence failed completely to spot the resources that Walter Models' fifteenth army, Blaskowitz Student Group,( Kurt Student's parachute regiments. and the SS Panzer divisions were concentrating at Arnhem. The 'Euphoria of Easy Victory'.- infected everyone, IIRC, was Essling's description.

                          To Horrock's and Dempseys credit, they did take advantage of the build up in the Salient which wasn't going to reach Berlin,( or cross the Rhine..)


                          THE aRROW (RED) AT THE UPPER RIGHT HAND CORNER,iirc, SHOULD BE THE AMERICANS MINNESOTA 104TH "TIMBERWOLVES' WHO FOUGHT THROUGH AND BLOCKED THE RAIL BRIDGE OVER HOLLANDS dIEP.
                          this closed the trap on the 15th German army.

                          they are marked as British, but since if you are from Minnesota, you 're 90% Canadian, so I can see how the error happened .
                          Looks like the U.S. Army 104th Infantry Division had its roots spread out all over the U.S. West. With units from Idaho, Utah, Montana and Wyoming. By the time it got into combat it would have men from all over the U.S. in its ranks.

                          The 104th is considered to be one of the best U.S. Army "high number divisions" in the war.

                          During the war it was commanded by one of my favorites Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen!
                          "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" Beatrice Evelyn Hall
                          Updated for the 21st century... except if you are criticizing islam, that scares the $hii+e out of me!

                          Comment


                          • I don't know if you can have a best overall general in WW2 as even the very best had weaknesses and strengths. Even when considering one specific element, eg armoured formations, one can consider different generals at different levels, such as:

                            Brigade (eg one battalion each of mot inf and tanks) : Creighton Abrams.
                            Division : Pip Roberts. Rommel was another example, although probably promoted beyond his ability.
                            Army : Herman Hoth. Patton was also excellent when the campaign was fluid.
                            Army Group : Von Manstein or Konstantin Rokossovsky, who I consider the best overall generals of the war.

                            Obviously the list is less than exhaustive, but hopefully reflects that the title 'Best General' is too large a field, and needs to be narrowed to a specific genre.
                            How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
                            Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

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