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Perfect Divisional TO&E Eastern Front?

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  • BTW I wonder if anybody have seen any stats on Wehrmacht's procurement of military radios and other communication equipment. Seems to be a part of economical/military history few sources pay attention to.
    Last edited by Artyom_A; 08 Dec 19, 13:14.

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    • In general, Guderian being a signals officer for a cavalry corps in WWI, certainly kept in mind a robust communications linkage down to individual tanks as he forged the panzer force.
      Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

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      • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post
        In general, Guderian being a signals officer for a cavalry corps in WWI, certainly kept in mind a robust communications linkage down to individual tanks as he forged the panzer force.
        One element of the (in)famous White report on German vs US kit concerns radios. USA FM radios were considered superior to German AM radios.

        How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
        Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

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        • True, FM has less static which improves transmissions such as coordinates for arty fire, locations....

          By robustness, I was thinking about the availability of radios in the panzer formations.
          Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

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          • Soviet manual noted regarding German radios that "high mechanical robustness of single details and modules guarantees stable operation and keeping constant parameters of equipment. It also considerably increases weight and dimensions"


            It is obvious that German Feldfu radios were much heavier than e.g. SCR-536 in the same tactical slot. The same manual also praised modular construction, use of standard elements and wide wavelength range covered by different types of radios.

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            • Lenin said, quantity has a quality of its own.
              Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

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              • Originally posted by Artyom_A View Post
                Soviet manual noted regarding German radios that "high mechanical robustness of single details and modules guarantees stable operation and keeping constant parameters of equipment. It also considerably increases weight and dimensions"


                It is obvious that German Feldfu radios were much heavier than e.g. SCR-536 in the same tactical slot. The same manual also praised modular construction, use of standard elements and wide wavelength range covered by different types of radios.
                From Whites report:

                Ralph G Loges , Tech 5 (the only radio expert listed):

                German radios and signal equipment is of about the same quality as ours............(however, t)he German field phone is more waterproof and more compact.
                Bold is mine, and weight is not stated. Brackets enclose my addition.

                Edit: A quick scan on the web appears to reveal US and German radios are about the same weight, British units being lighter. British units used superior FM, as with the USA, rather than inferior AM, as with the Germans.
                https://www.researchgate.net/publica...ions_equipment
                Last edited by Nick the Noodle; 14 Dec 19, 05:00.
                How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
                Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

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                • An opinion from end-users which mostly mirrored a common experience
                  Notes from experience and organization of communications in the 482 Rifle Regiment/131 Rifle Division

                  Radio communications
                  In offensive radio network consisted of five radio stations: one in each of rifle battalions, one with the regiment’s command post and one with the regiment’s commander. Communications with neighbors and attached units via a radio receiver. This organization provided a control in battle save for the following shortcomings:
                  a) Main radio at the staff of the regiment was overloaded since one radio transmitter wasn’t sufficient for the regiment’s network and communications with neighbors and cooperating units. Also the work of two radio operators at the main radio was too tiresome.
                  b) Provision of radio communication to the regiment’s observation point is complicated due to an absence of authorized resources, yet it is badly needed.
                  c) Battle experience demonstrated a need in radio communications with regimental artillery, in particular with 120-mm mortars, which was absent in the tables of organization
                  d) A variety of types of available radios
                  Although authorized radios for the OP and 120-mm mortars were not allotted by TO&Es, radio communications with them was always secured owing to training of telephonists in the period of lull.

                  Wire communications
                  At jump-off positions for an attack wire communications were organized using surrogate and makeshift wire. That saved cable for further stages of attack and also saved time and personnel needed for disassemble signal lines during a shift from jump-off positions.
                  During attack signal lines needed to be reinforced with personnel using reserve and at the expense of communications with neighbors and staff platoon [of the signal company]. TO&E allotment of 5 men per one direction of wire communication is not sufficient. Signal line was laid along the axis of advance of one of the rifle battalions with branches developed at points planned in advance.
                  Shortcomings of wire communications:
                  a) Spontaneous shifts of command points of the regiment and battalions without prior planning.
                  b) Lack of personnel: a loss of only two men makes normal operations impossible

                  Mobile means of communications
                  Mobile means of communication at regimental and battalion level fully proved their worth, but were hampered by small authorized allotment. Their operations was organized by having two messengers from each unit at the command post of the regiment and also at the regimental commander’s observation point

                  Communications at the battalion and company level
                  Wire communication between the battalion CP and companies were only adequate before the start of offensive. In the course of battle 7 men were not sufficient to service four directions (three rifle companies and battalion observation point). Lines to the rifle company were constantly subject to hostile fire which complicated the work of wiremen.
                  Command and control on the level of battalion and company can only be fully satisfactory with provision of radios.
                  Battle experience have demonstrated that such means of signaling as whistles, horns, flags didn’t prove their worth, especially in wooded areas. Rockets proved to be the best means of signaling.
                  https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134490633
                  One of the things briefly mentioned is a typical Red Army's plague: a division of staffs between two echelons (command pots and observation post) even in the small units like regiment and battalion. Which only exacerbated already strained situation with communications.

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