Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Red Army Tank Tactics

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post

    It's the Lanchester Square Law, not Lancaster. Essentially, you square the numbers of each side fighting, and assuming each side has the same fighting power, you can work out who would would win, and the size of the victorious army. For example a force of 5 divisions fights 4 equally capable enemy divisions. We square both, take away the smaller total from the larger, and then find the square root. In this case (5x5) - (4x4) = 25 - 16 = 9 => 3 divisions remaining out of 5, with the 4 opposing lost. It's simplistic, but a decent rough guide.

    That the Soviets were continuingly able to hide their planned offensives from the Heer is a testiment to the ability of their command.
    https://www.amazon.com/SOVIET-OPERAT.../dp/B0065QX0U0

    Where the Soviets appear to fail continuously is at divisional (Soviet Corps) level and lower, given the sheer number of Soviet losses in comparison with the Heer up to 1943 at least.
    Thanks for the correction, and you captured what I considered the snag--the assumption of each side has the same fighting power. In ancient warfare when there were a limited number of weapons, one can find a wide variation in the force structure of armies which manifested itself in different fighting power whether it came from infantry swords/spears, cavalry/chariot mobility/ or archers/catapults firepower or shock forces elephants/Greek fire. Assuming each side has the same fighting power is theory at work, when it is not the same on the battlefield.

    I like your reading material. The operational level deception masked the arrangement in the density of forces in main attack sectors. I don't know if it was a failure at the tactical level, but with the densities of overwhelming force in the main sectors (and risks in light densities in other sectors), the Soviet's were willing to accept 50% casualties in the main sectors to make the penetration into the operational depth where the Germans were weak in operational reserves (because they placed their panzer units relatively close to the front for quick counterattacks (tactical efforts). There was Manstien's back-hand strike, a counterstrike (operational level effort), against Popov Group which taught the Soviets to increase protection (in the form of artillery, antitank, and engineer mobile obstacle units) on the flanks of the penetration.

    In briefing staffs and exercise critiques, the conventional analytical wisdom in the U.S. Army in the 1980's on Soviet breakthrough operations that the first echelon would take 25-30% casualties in the first echelon. I reminded the audience that the Red Army accepted 50% or more. I extrapolated out to the staffs, that to stop Soviet force, one had to calculate the kill ratio to see if they could hold. A Soviet tank regiment was roughly 100 tanks, and a US tank battalion had roughly 50. If the U.S tank battalion kill at a ratio of 2:1 then at the 50% loss for the Soviets was in the US Bn a 50% loss. And, this was at a time when Army was coding its readiness with Green, Amber, Red status; Amber represented at a 75% level. You can play with the numbers at different ratios and see what it would take in a kill ratio to hold your defensive sector. But the problem, is the second echelon tank regiment coming through with another 100 tanks. And if you are there with 25 tanks...., maybe your Brigade commander can give you a tank company (roughly 10 tanks), his reserve?
    Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 22 Jun 20, 06:50.
    Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post

      Thanks for the correction, and you captured what I considered the snag--the assumption of each side has the same fighting power. In ancient warfare when there were a limited number of weapons, one can find a wide variation in the force structure of armies which manifested itself in different fighting power whether it came from infantry swords/spears, cavalry/chariot mobility/ or archers/catapults firepower or shock forces elephants/Greek fire. Assuming each side has the same fighting power is theory at work.

      I like you reading material. The operational level deception masked the arrangement in the density of forces in main attack sectors. I don't know if it was a failure at the tactical level, but with the densities of overwhelming force in the main sectors (and risks in light densities in other sectors), the Soviet's were willing to accept 50% casualties in the main sectors to make the penetration into the operational depth where the Germans were weak in operational reserves (because they placed their panzer units relatively close to the front for quick counterattacks (tactical efforts). There was Manstien's back-hand strike, a counterstrike (operational level effort), against Popov Group which taught the Soviets to increase protection (in the form of artillery, antitank, and engineer mobile obstacle units) on the flanks of the penetration.

      In briefing staffs and exercise critiques, the conventional analytical wisdom in the U.S. Army in the 1980's on Soviet breakthrough operations that the first echelon would take 25-30% casualties in the first echelon. I reminded the audience that the Red Army accepted 50% or more. I extrapolated out to the staffs, that to stop Soviet force, one had to calculate the kill ratio to see if they could hold. A Soviet tank regiment was roughly 100 tanks, and a US tank battalion had roughly 50. If the U.S tank battalion kill at a ratio of 2:1 then at the 50% loss for the Soviets was in the US Bn a 50% loss. And, this was at a time when Army was coding its readiness with Green, Amber, Red status; Amber represented at a 75% level. You can play with the numbers at different ratios and see what it would take in a kill ratio to hold your defensive sector. But the problem, is the second echelon tank regiment coming through with another 100 tanks. And if you are there with 25 tanks...., maybe your Brigade commander can give you a tank company (roughly 10 tanks), his reserve?
      I'm glad you like my reading choices as I've just bought this : https://www.amazon.co.uk/Red-Army-Le...2825800&sr=8-3
      How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
      Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post

        I'm glad you like my reading choices as I've just bought this : https://www.amazon.co.uk/Red-Army-Le...2825800&sr=8-3
        Two-thumbs up!
        Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
          I'll answer that in reverse order .

          My post referred to 1943, and the T-34/85 and IS-2 were not available until 1944. The IS-2 did have a 3 man turret, which was important, losing the bow machine gunner.

          Germany could never match the Soviets manpower, even with their allies, but Zetterling and Frankson point out that Soviet losses were such, that without having to fight elsewhere, the Soviets would have run out of men first. Z&F state 4x losses, but even if they have overestimated Soviet losses by 500000 men, and underestimated Axis losses by the same amount, we still have a ratio of 3:1. Soviet theory appears correct, but something was going wrong in practice.
          Without having to fight elsewhere
          Are you referring to Germany fighting in Italy and the western front?

          Are you using "Kursk A Statistical Analysis" by Zetterling and Frankson as your source?
          Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
            Zetterling and Frankson point out that Soviet losses were such, that without having to fight elsewhere, the Soviets would have run out of men first.
            Well, in 1941 Soviet losses (dead and missing) were higher than in 1943, while Axis losses were smaller. Hence, Soviet exhaustion seemed even more inevitable. Instead, we see that by the end of 1943 the victorious Soviet Army was driving the Germans and their allies to the west. A common sense suggests that there is apparently some flaw in this line of reasoning.
            Z&F state 4x losses, but even if they have overestimated Soviet losses by 500000 men, and underestimated Axis losses by the same amount, we still have a ratio of 3:1.
            Z&F have numbers messed up, they ignore discrepancies in various German data sets, they ignore the question of the exact definition of "losses". Even more, medical casualties are mostly irrelevant for the question of expenditure of manpower, since about 70% of wounded and 90% or more of sick returned to duty eventually. If we take purely irrevocable casualties (killed in action, deaths of wounds, non-battle deaths, missing in action) then in 1943 the German Wehrmacht lost nearly 900,000 men on all fronts, while the Soviet army and Navy lost 2,300,000 (Krivosheev). The number of men drafted to service in 1943 was some 3 million in Germany and 5.9 million in the SU. The number of men drafted from the start of 1943 to the end of the war was some 5.4 and 11.1 million respectively. So some 1:2 ratio of manpower reserves. Hence, Soviet collapse actually seemed pretty distant. That agrees with the obvious fact that this collapse never happened either in 1943 or later. Instead, with casualties mounting on all fronts the Germany and her allies started to fall apart.


            Comment


            • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post



              Are you referring to Germany fighting in Italy and the western front?

              Are you using "Kursk A Statistical Analysis" by Zetterling and Frankson as your source?
              I was using Z&F as my original source.

              I'm not referring to the Heer fighting the W Allies in Europe. I'm referring to the amount of effort that Germany had to put into trying to nullify the Strategic Bombing Campaign.
              How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
              Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Artyom_A View Post
                Well, in 1941 Soviet losses (dead and missing) were higher than in 1943, while Axis losses were smaller. Hence, Soviet exhaustion seemed even more inevitable. Instead, we see that by the end of 1943 the victorious Soviet Army was driving the Germans and their allies to the west. A common sense suggests that there is apparently some flaw in this line of reasoning.

                Z&F have numbers messed up, they ignore discrepancies in various German data sets, they ignore the question of the exact definition of "losses". Even more, medical casualties are mostly irrelevant for the question of expenditure of manpower, since about 70% of wounded and 90% or more of sick returned to duty eventually. If we take purely irrevocable casualties (killed in action, deaths of wounds, non-battle deaths, missing in action) then in 1943 the German Wehrmacht lost nearly 900,000 men on all fronts, while the Soviet army and Navy lost 2,300,000 (Krivosheev). The number of men drafted to service in 1943 was some 3 million in Germany and 5.9 million in the SU. The number of men drafted from the start of 1943 to the end of the war was some 5.4 and 11.1 million respectively. So some 1:2 ratio of manpower reserves. Hence, Soviet collapse actually seemed pretty distant. That agrees with the obvious fact that this collapse never happened either in 1943 or later. Instead, with casualties mounting on all fronts the Germany and her allies started to fall apart.
                No one has suggested imminent Soviet collapse, only that the USSR would eventually run out of men before the Nazi's, if it was purely a case of a war on the Eastern Front.

                Using your figures, the Soviets are able to replace manpower on a favourable 2:1 ratio, but losing men on a 3:1 ratio, and not Z&F x4 rate. If no other combatants are involved, the SU loses. Mathematics does not lie.

                How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
                Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post

                  I was using Z&F as my original source.

                  I'm not referring to the Heer fighting the W Allies in Europe. I'm referring to the amount of effort that Germany had to put into trying to nullify the Strategic Bombing Campaign.
                  While the Western Allies strategic bombing was crippling German armament/industrial output and tying up a greater percentage of the Luftwaffe 1943 until wars end the German Heer divisions fighting elsewhere still figures prominently within your "what if it was just the fascists vs the communists" conclusions The following link has the distributions of the German divisions throughout all of WWII.

                  https://www.axishistory.com/axis-nat...n-world-war-ii

                  I picked the column of June 1944 because obviously the Normandy invasion coupled with the Soviets destruction of AGC (OP Bagration). The numbers are 150 divisions on the eastern front and 137 on all other fronts combined. If those divisions were on the eastern front the total there would be 287 instead of 150 to face the Red Army divisions including the 2.3 million Soviet troops involved in OP Bagration.

                  For an offensive of this scope, the Red Army assembled 118 rifle divisions, eight tank and mechanized corps, 13 artillery divisions and six cavalry divisions, a total of approximately 2.3 million frontline and support troops. The attack would be led by the rifle and tank divisions, which collectively fielded 2,715 tanks and 1,355 assault guns. To feed the offensive, the Red Army stockpiled 1.2 million tons of ammunition, rations and supplies behind the front lines.
                  Complete page here:

                  https://www.historynet.com/operation...ve-of-1944.htm


                  Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
                    No one has suggested imminent Soviet collapse, only that the USSR would eventually run out of men before the Nazi's, if it was purely a case of a war on the Eastern Front.
                    Again, "by the end of 1943 the victorious Soviet Army was driving the Germans and their allies to the west". The strength of Soviet armed forces increased by nearly a million men throughout 1943. Everything pointed to imminent breakdown of the Axis block. All that suggests that predictive value of the analysis above is at least dubious.
                    If no other combatants are involved
                    If no other combatants were involved the war on the Eastern Front would never start as it really started and would never developed as it really developed. Which makes such hypothetical scenarios artificial. Historically there were no Soviet depletion until the end of the war. On the contrary, German forces become depleted both on the Eastern Front and in general. So depletion scenario didn't work. As explained above, contrary to Z&F the actual ratio of irrevocable casualties in 1943 was not much different from a ratio of manpower resources which made such scenario improbable. Even more, in 1944 the Soviet casualties strongly decreased while German and Axis strongly increased, hence the Axis collapse.

                    Comment


                    • Glantz in his symposiums offered that a macro trend in the for the Red Army during the war was to develop and produce more weapons to compensate for the loss in manpower.

                      In my research on the rebuilding of the Red Army tank force, one can see the creation from tank brigades with a good teeth to tail ratio, to tank/mech tank corps with a force structure that eliminated a division level of command and staff and division assets with more support personnel, and onto the development of homogeneous tank armies with high mobility.

                      In my current research on the Guards Mortar (Katyusha) Units, the Red Army pulled together from testing/research a relatively inexpensive and easily massed produced weapon system with a lot of destructive power. Ten experimental batteries of 3-7/9 launchers were deployed in July and August which led to battalion-, regiment- and division-size formations. The proliferation of these systems in an initial period of chaos, formation of a new branch of arms with its own supply/rocket distribution, and ramping up system and rocket production is an incredible story. Point of interest, in the first 10 batteries deployed, six were destroyed by October despite Stavka direction in their secrecy and provision by host units to protect them, and not allow the launchers to fall into enemy hands.
                      Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                      Comment


                      • Just looked at the evolution of Red Army Rifle Division in manpower:

                        Apr '41 - 14,483
                        Jul '41 - 10,859
                        Dec '41 - 11,626
                        Mar '42 - 12,795
                        Jul '42 - 10,386
                        Dec '42 - 9,435
                        Jul '43 - 9,380
                        Dec '44 - 11,706
                        Jun '45 - 11,780

                        Another effect in downsizing and streamlining, it would reduce also the span of control for commanders and staff, an indirect improvement in efficiency.
                        Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post
                          Just looked at the evolution of Red Army Rifle Division in manpower:

                          Apr '41 - 14,483
                          Jul '41 - 10,859
                          Dec '41 - 11,626
                          Mar '42 - 12,795
                          Jul '42 - 10,386
                          Dec '42 - 9,435
                          Jul '43 - 9,380
                          Dec '44 - 11,706
                          Jun '45 - 11,780

                          Another effect in downsizing and streamlining, it would reduce also the span of control for commanders and staff, an indirect improvement in efficiency.
                          Do those numbers represent the "bayonets" (combat soldiers) or the rear area support units as well?

                          Would you agree that the Soviet 5th Tank Army with its 2 tank corps which was part of the southwestern fronts shock group in Operation Uranus was the first successful Soviet use of a large tank/mechanized formation?

                          5th Tank Army main attack force:
                          1st Tank Corps
                          26th Tank Corps
                          8th Guards Tank Brigade
                          8th Cavalry Corps
                          8th Guards Motorcycle Regiment
                          16 RVGK artillery and mortar regiments
                          5 rifle divisions - average strength of these 5 divisions 8,800 men (6,500 "bayonets")

                          5th Tank Army had a strength of 80,000 men and 359 tanks

                          Last edited by Kurt Knispel; 23 Jun 20, 11:30.
                          Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Artyom_A View Post
                            Again, "by the end of 1943 the victorious Soviet Army was driving the Germans and their allies to the west". The strength of Soviet armed forces increased by nearly a million men throughout 1943. Everything pointed to imminent breakdown of the Axis block. All that suggests that predictive value of the analysis above is at least dubious.

                            If no other combatants were involved the war on the Eastern Front would never start as it really started and would never developed as it really developed. Which makes such hypothetical scenarios artificial. Historically there were no Soviet depletion until the end of the war. On the contrary, German forces become depleted both on the Eastern Front and in general. So depletion scenario didn't work. As explained above, contrary to Z&F the actual ratio of irrevocable casualties in 1943 was not much different from a ratio of manpower resources which made such scenario improbable. Even more, in 1944 the Soviet casualties strongly decreased while German and Axis strongly increased, hence the Axis collapse.
                            I think we are going to have to agree to disagree. If the Germans were able to use those resources required elsewhere, they could have held on. That is until 1947 or so, when the Nazi economy would have imploded.
                            How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
                            Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post
                              Just looked at the evolution of Red Army Rifle Division in manpower:

                              Apr '41 - 14,483
                              Jul '41 - 10,859
                              Dec '41 - 11,626
                              Mar '42 - 12,795
                              Jul '42 - 10,386
                              Dec '42 - 9,435
                              Jul '43 - 9,380
                              Dec '44 - 11,706
                              Jun '45 - 11,780

                              Another effect in downsizing and streamlining, it would reduce also the span of control for commanders and staff, an indirect improvement in efficiency.
                              Those are the exact same numbers I have. Mine are taken from the Red Army Handbook by Zaloga and Ness.
                              How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
                              Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
                                No one has suggested imminent Soviet collapse, only that the USSR would eventually run out of men before the Nazi's, if it was purely a case of a war on the Eastern Front.

                                Using your figures, the Soviets are able to replace manpower on a favourable 2:1 ratio, but losing men on a 3:1 ratio, and not Z&F x4 rate. If no other combatants are involved, the SU loses. Mathematics does not lie.
                                You ignore the change in casualties ratio. It imporved over years.

                                34552_original.png

                                https://fat-yankey.livejournal.com/33040.html

                                The German losses are given for all fronts, but even without them, we can see the change in ratio.
                                There are no Nazis in Ukraine. Idiots

                                Comment

                                Latest Topics

                                Collapse

                                Working...
                                X