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  • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    It's not a 'what if' to state the Germans would have had 50% more kit if there had been no strategic bombing, only where the extra resources would be spent on.
    This may be true but the Germans, as I already mentioned in an earlier post, could never match the Soviets in manpower. Simply put the Germans were still able to produce adequate numbers of tanks, planes, and other armaments through the end of 1944 they had an inadequate amount of experienced soldiers to use them. The bombings were taking a toll but I'm not sure I agree with you on the 50% drop off until the beginning of 45. Here again, even in 1945, if they maintained an adequate number of material to wage war they did not have the manpower. On 25 September 1944 Hitler called up the Volkssturm to make some reserves possible. The training of the Volssturm in the Wartheland remained provisional because neither the trainers nor those to be trained expected any success from the deployment of these men. The formally well trained soldiers had paid a high price in blood during the wars progress and the divisions had been bled white. The population had been combed out at the end of 1944 and the younger drafts from 1927 and 1928, as well as the remaining men from 1900 and on, were called up.
    As stated earlier, without the West, the Soviets would have run out of men and machines before Germany. This includes tanks, therefore Red Army tactics were wanting. Tanks leading an advance is not a problem if a suitable vehicle is available, and the Soviets never created a better protected tank than the Churchill, even a KV-1C which was compared to the Churchill III by the Soviets.
    Nick why do you think the Soviets would have run out of men and machines before Germany?

    The T34/85 (5 crew members) was a decent upgrade from the early T 34's and the IS 2 was pretty decent and would have been better if it could have had a 5 man crew.



    Last edited by Kurt Knispel; 20 Jun 20, 15:12.
    Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
      especially when you outnumber them in men and machines.
      Soviet superiority in men on the Eastern Front in mid-1943 was not more than 1.5:1 (considering German allies, Luftwaffe, Hiwis etc). That superiority was far from overwhelming and was on the brink of what was needed to maintain global initiative. As far as materiel is concerned, the Red Army had little advantage. It had some large numbers of guns and aircraft on paper, the reality was however, that expenditure of ammunition per gun and the number of sorties flown per airplane was consistently much smaller than German. As a result the RA didn't have any real advantage in the weight of firepower over the German army:
      https://forum.axishistory.com/viewto...?f=79&t=235629
      In air the Soviet Union couldn't have any superiority over Germany for a very simple reason: it had less aviation fuel. Although detraction of Luftwaffe from the Eastern Front really helped, still even in 1943 the LW could wrest superiority in air over critical sectors, although it was to weak to control the entire front.
      Add to that a German superiority in motorization and mobility (they had more both horses and motor vehicles per capita) and a growing gap in signal communications.

      In general, the reason of importance of armor was that it was the only area where Soviet material superiority was real and tangible (with some buts like German qualitative edge). Still, the numbers were not really that large. Only in two points the RA had more than 10 000 operational AFVs on the front. The ratio of armor per foot soldiers was far-far less than what was typical for the Western allies.

      So take the Western Allies without their air superiority, without 3/4 of their ammunition and motor vehicles, without 2/3 of their armor, without 4/5 of their communication equipment and without 2 or 3 years that historically had to train and prepare their green divisions and you get where the Soviet Army was by the start of 1943.

      In general, a reason (one of) of heavy casualties in 1943 was that the Soviet Army tried to execute a global offensive on almost the entire Eastern Front not having sufficient manpower or material superiority.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
        Edited post.
        Using Lanchester's square law as a guide, a linear advantage of 1.71 is actually close to 3:1 on the battlefield. The fact that the Soviets were losing at least 3:1, a 9 fold failure effectively, proves the courage of the average Soviet soldier was coupled with the sheer incompetence of most Soviet commanders in 1943.
        Could not find Lancaster notes. However, Glantz in his conclusion to "When Titans Clashed" generally supports your point in his narrative and has an interesting footnote.

        Generally in the conclusion: "German accounts of overwhelming Soviet forces are really a tribute to the Soviet ability to deceive their opponents and concentrate all available forces on a narrow frontage at an unpredictable point {my point about the orchestration of densities and sectors at the operational level]. As a result, the Red Army was able to decimate the Wehrmacht, establishing the overall numerical superiority that characterized the last two years of the war. Even then, however, Soviet manpower was not inexhaustible, and the Soviet commanders increasingly attempted to avoid expensive frontal attacks whenever possible." Footnote: "Based on interviews conducted by the author with Soviet war veterans in July 1989, it is apparent that Soviet infantry casualties remained high throughout the war, in particular, in first-echelon assault units. For example, when asked what the normal losses were in the first-echelon regiment on the main attack axis during the penetration phase of an operation, a former regimental commander of the 97th Guards Rifle Division stated "pochti polovina" [almost half] of the regiment's strength. He went on to state that such was the case to the very end of the war."

        Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

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        • The difference between the years of the war was the number of casualties suffered by the other side.
          There are no Nazis in Ukraine. Idiots

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          • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post

            This may be true but the Germans, as I already mentioned in an earlier post, could never match the Soviets in manpower. Simply put the Germans were still able to produce adequate numbers of tanks, planes, and other armaments through the end of 1944 they had an inadequate amount of experienced soldiers to use them. The bombings were taking a toll but I'm not sure I agree with you on the 50% drop off until the beginning of 45. Here again, even in 1945, if they maintained an adequate number of material to wage war they did not have the manpower.
            I will say that it was the other way around. They had the men but didn't had the weapons.

            https://books.google.be/books?id=iWU...%20age&f=false

            Germany had millions of potential soldiers but nothing to arm them.
            There are no Nazis in Ukraine. Idiots

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            • Originally posted by Emtos View Post
              The difference between the years of the war was the number of casualties suffered by the other side.
              If "the other side" is Germany I agree.
              Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Artyom_A View Post
                Soviet superiority in men on the Eastern Front in mid-1943 was not more than 1.5:1 (considering German allies, Luftwaffe, Hiwis etc). That superiority was far from overwhelming and was on the brink of what was needed to maintain global initiative.
                What is your source for the 1. 5: 1 ratio mid 1943? Do you know the ratio from January 44 until the wars end?

                I am asking because the Italian 8th Army, the Romanian 3rd and 4th Army's, and Hungarian 2nd Army were decimated during the Soviets offensive November 42 through January 43. And no source on Hiwi numbers could be 100% accurate. And Romania sided with the Soviets in the summer of 44.

                Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Artyom_A View Post
                  Here are, for example, references for the Chapter 8 "Pre-war Soviet tanks"
                  Kavalerchik.pngKavalerchik2.pngKavalerchik3.png

                  In general, the book focuses more on technical characteristics of armored vehiccles and less on combat employment. I can provide a pdf copy to you, if you want.
                  Artyom, thanks for the feedback. I will get the book; the author's technical approach will probably yield a different perspective on the tanks.
                  Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post

                    What is your source for the 1. 5: 1 ratio mid 1943? Do you know the ratio from January 44 until the wars end?

                    I am asking because the Italian 8th Army, the Romanian 3rd and 4th Army's, and Hungarian 2nd Army were decimated during the Soviets offensive November 42 through January 43. And no source on Hiwi numbers could be 100% accurate. And Romania sided with the Soviets in the summer of 44.
                    Glantz, in "When Titans Clashed" gives for July '43 1.71: 1 ( Sov numbers 9 July and Ger numbers 20 Jul). He has a March 1944 correlation of 2.20: 1.

                    His sources:

                    For German--Ziemke, "From Stalingrad to Berlin" and Fremde Heere Ost comparative strength reports for 20.7.43, 1.5.44.

                    Soviet sources:
                    Krivosheev's Losses of the armed forces of the USSR in wars...)
                    Textbook, for internal use only by the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff (Soviet strength data is accurate, but German strength is grossly inflated).
                    TsPA UML (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism and Leninism,which include State Committee Decrees
                    Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                    Comment


                    • Thanks Richard. What I find interesting is that many renowned authors who cover the eastern front (Glantz & Stahel among others) write that the German losses there were very detrimental to them. An example as early as July 1941 Glantz - Barbarossa derailed states that the losses sustained by AGC were unacceptable for them to achieve success.

                      22 June through 15 October the Soviets lost millions in irrecoverable losses while the German number of irrecoverable losses in the same period was 200,000. The authors never put the same emphasis on the staggering amount of Soviet losses. This scenario continues throughout the entire war.

                      This is why my most recent posts emphasize the manpower disadvantage the Germans had by the end of 1943 on all fronts. And when I say this I am referring to sufficiently trained professional soldiers.


                      btw, I have the Krivosheev book as well as "The Price Of Victory" by Lopukhovsky and Kavalerchik.



                      Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post
                        Thanks Richard. What I find interesting is that many renowned authors who cover the eastern front (Glantz & Stahel among others) write that the German losses there were very detrimental to them. An example as early as July 1941 Glantz - Barbarossa derailed states that the losses sustained by AGC were unacceptable for them to achieve success.

                        22 June through 15 October the Soviets lost millions in irrecoverable losses while the German number of irrecoverable losses in the same period was 200,000. The authors never put the same emphasis on the staggering amount of Soviet losses. This scenario continues throughout the entire war.

                        This is why my most recent posts emphasize the manpower disadvantage the Germans had by the end of 1943 on all fronts. And when I say this I am referring to sufficiently trained professional soldiers.


                        btw, I have the Krivosheev book as well as "The Price Of Victory" by Lopukhovsky and Kavalerchik.


                        You're reading the impact of casualties right, the Germans could not stand the trade off, nor match the depth in manpower, even with their Allies. There is a point of view, the Germans lost when they began the invasion--just bit off more than the could chew and cover all their fronts. And, I'm sure the Germans were unwilling to pay the price in blood that the Russians would pay. Glantz, IMHO, captured the essence of the cost in his Barbarossa Derailed--the Russians did not rollover like the French.
                        Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post
                          What is your source for the 1. 5: 1 ratio mid 1943? Do you know the ratio from January 44 until the wars end?
                          Compilation and estimates.
                          Soviet frontline strength as of 1.7.43 (Tolmacheva):
                          Ground forces - 5,769,000
                          Air forces - 358,000
                          Air defense - 267,000
                          Navy - 233,000
                          For a total of 6,663,000 men

                          German ground forces from Baltic to the Black Sea on 1.7.44 - 3,138,000 men (including SS and Luftwaffe ground units):
                          https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/...inspect/zoom/8
                          Plus 20 Geb. Army in Arctic - 176,000

                          Osttruppen with the German Army - about 170,000 in May 43 (estimated by Drobyazko)
                          Hiwis with the German Army and Air Force - about 150,000 on 15 March 43 and 260,000 on 1 December 1943 (Drobyazko). About 200,000 estimated in July 43.

                          Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front - about 450,000 in July 1943:
                          https://forum.axishistory.com/viewto...30065&start=15

                          German Navy on the Eastern Front - about 50,000 (pure guess)

                          Finnish field army, air force and navy on 1.7.43 - about 330,000 (Finnish official history)

                          Romanian Army east of the Bug River (mostly Crimea and Caucasus) - about 100,000 (Axworthy)

                          Foreign formations with the German Army, Romanian Navy etc - generally negligible.

                          Which gives some 4,600,000 men (naturally that's a rough number).

                          There were additional hundreds of thousands men in Wehrmacht Command Ostland and Ukraine, German regular and auxiliary (collaborationist) police, Hungarian and Slovak forces, but they mostly performed occupational duties.

                          Commitment of Soviet reserves and losses suffered by the German army further changed this ratio, so I guess it was maximal circa 1 September 43 which correlates with general German retreat in the central and southern part of the Eastern Front.



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                          • Originally posted by Artyom_A View Post
                            Compilation and estimates.
                            Soviet frontline strength as of 1.7.43 (Tolmacheva):
                            Ground forces - 5,769,000
                            Air forces - 358,000
                            Air defense - 267,000
                            Navy - 233,000
                            For a total of 6,663,000 men

                            German ground forces from Baltic to the Black Sea on 1.7.44 - 3,138,000 men (including SS and Luftwaffe ground units):
                            https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/...inspect/zoom/8
                            Plus 20 Geb. Army in Arctic - 176,000

                            Osttruppen with the German Army - about 170,000 in May 43 (estimated by Drobyazko)
                            Hiwis with the German Army and Air Force - about 150,000 on 15 March 43 and 260,000 on 1 December 1943 (Drobyazko). About 200,000 estimated in July 43.

                            Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front - about 450,000 in July 1943:
                            https://forum.axishistory.com/viewto...30065&start=15

                            German Navy on the Eastern Front - about 50,000 (pure guess)

                            Finnish field army, air force and navy on 1.7.43 - about 330,000 (Finnish official history)

                            Romanian Army east of the Bug River (mostly Crimea and Caucasus) - about 100,000 (Axworthy)

                            Foreign formations with the German Army, Romanian Navy etc - generally negligible.

                            Which gives some 4,600,000 men (naturally that's a rough number).

                            There were additional hundreds of thousands men in Wehrmacht Command Ostland and Ukraine, German regular and auxiliary (collaborationist) police, Hungarian and Slovak forces, but they mostly performed occupational duties.

                            Commitment of Soviet reserves and losses suffered by the German army further changed this ratio, so I guess it was maximal circa 1 September 43 which correlates with general German retreat in the central and southern part of the Eastern Front.


                            Thanks Art
                            Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post

                              This may be true but the Germans, as I already mentioned in an earlier post, could never match the Soviets in manpower. Simply put the Germans were still able to produce adequate numbers of tanks, planes, and other armaments through the end of 1944 they had an inadequate amount of experienced soldiers to use them. The bombings were taking a toll but I'm not sure I agree with you on the 50% drop off until the beginning of 45. Here again, even in 1945, if they maintained an adequate number of material to wage war they did not have the manpower. On 25 September 1944 Hitler called up the Volkssturm to make some reserves possible. The training of the Volssturm in the Wartheland remained provisional because neither the trainers nor those to be trained expected any success from the deployment of these men. The formally well trained soldiers had paid a high price in blood during the wars progress and the divisions had been bled white. The population had been combed out at the end of 1944 and the younger drafts from 1927 and 1928, as well as the remaining men from 1900 and on, were called up.


                              Nick why do you think the Soviets would have run out of men and machines before Germany?

                              The T34/85 (5 crew members) was a decent upgrade from the early T 34's and the IS 2 was pretty decent and would have been better if it could have had a 5 man crew.
                              I'll answer that in reverse order .

                              My post referred to 1943, and the T-34/85 and IS-2 were not available until 1944. The IS-2 did have a 3 man turret, which was important, losing the bow machine gunner.

                              Germany could never match the Soviets manpower, even with their allies, but Zetterling and Frankson point out that Soviet losses were such, that without having to fight elsewhere, the Soviets would have run out of men first. Z&F state 4x losses, but even if they have overestimated Soviet losses by 500000 men, and underestimated Axis losses by the same amount, we still have a ratio of 3:1. Soviet theory appears correct, but something was going wrong in practice.
                              How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
                              Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

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                              • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post

                                Could not find Lancaster notes. However, Glantz in his conclusion to "When Titans Clashed" generally supports your point in his narrative and has an interesting footnote.

                                Generally in the conclusion: "German accounts of overwhelming Soviet forces are really a tribute to the Soviet ability to deceive their opponents and concentrate all available forces on a narrow frontage at an unpredictable point {my point about the orchestration of densities and sectors at the operational level]. As a result, the Red Army was able to decimate the Wehrmacht, establishing the overall numerical superiority that characterized the last two years of the war. Even then, however, Soviet manpower was not inexhaustible, and the Soviet commanders increasingly attempted to avoid expensive frontal attacks whenever possible." Footnote: "Based on interviews conducted by the author with Soviet war veterans in July 1989, it is apparent that Soviet infantry casualties remained high throughout the war, in particular, in first-echelon assault units. For example, when asked what the normal losses were in the first-echelon regiment on the main attack axis during the penetration phase of an operation, a former regimental commander of the 97th Guards Rifle Division stated "pochti polovina" [almost half] of the regiment's strength. He went on to state that such was the case to the very end of the war."
                                It's the Lanchester Square Law, not Lancaster. Essentially, you square the numbers of each side fighting, and assuming each side has the same fighting power, you can work out who would would win, and the size of the victorious army. For example a force of 5 divisions fights 4 equally capable enemy divisions. We square both, take away the smaller total from the larger, and then find the square root. In this case (5x5) - (4x4) = 25 - 16 = 9 => 3 divisions remaining out of 5, with the 4 opposing lost. It's simplistic, but a decent rough guide.

                                That the Soviets were continuingly able to hide their planned offensives from the Heer is a testiment to the ability of their command.
                                https://www.amazon.com/SOVIET-OPERAT.../dp/B0065QX0U0

                                Where the Soviets appear to fail continuously is at divisional (Soviet Corps) level and lower, given the sheer number of Soviet losses in comparison with the Heer up to 1943 at least.
                                How to Talk to a Climate Skeptic: http://grist.org/series/skeptics/
                                Global Warming & Climate Change Myths: https://www.skepticalscience.com/argument.php

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