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  • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post

    Since you have his book, look at his bibliography and note how many are Russian titled, Russian published. Second if he has Russian books, then check his passages where he notes the Russian study of American Civil War cavalry and do those passages have a footnote citing specific Russian book(s)/sources.

    I would be interested in what you find.
    I counted 22 Russian books out of the total of 121 in his bibliography section. Almost all of Glantz' books are used as well.

    Maybe you could drop Colonel Glantz an email about this. I would like to know what he thinks as he is the preeminent Soviet WWII scholar in America.
    Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

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    • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post

      I counted 22 Russian books out of the total of 121 in his bibliography section. Almost all of Glantz' books are used as well.

      Maybe you could drop Colonel Glantz an email about this. I would like to know what he thinks as he is the preeminent Soviet WWII scholar in America.
      You did not do step two. The first part is easy part straight count. You have to discern if the bibliography has been padded. He did admit that he had to get other people to translate--22 books is a lot of favors. The quick way is to find his points on the American Civil War and 1) see if he footnoted the source, 2) if he has a footnote, look at the source, especially Russian. I have several Russian books on Soviet Cavalry and the memoirs of Pliev who commanded cav-mech groups through the war including Manchurian campaign.

      His reference to Ukrainians while on exercise could be anything from uninformed opinions to attempts to build a rapport, before becoming a viable source for historical methodology.

      My experience with Red Army General staff studies is they focused on the wars that used the combustible engine--leading to motor transports, tanks, airplanes for airborne troops.
      Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post
        Artyom, appreciate your time and the response. I was impressed that your find of the 11th Tank Brigades war diary on line (posted earlier on this thread) and thought it might be possible the Guards Mortar Regiments and Divisions may also have surfaced. I find the higher level unit records will show the order of battle and allocation of GM units to support other units, but little on their specific actions in success or no results.
        There are, for example, daily reports on operations which recorded specific action, expenditure of ammunition, targets etc. Example:
        https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133338344
        In general the search by abbreviation "ГМЧ" gives some 45 000 various documents of various levels. I'me sure there are even more document on this subject on after-action reports, experience reports, fire plans etc. Which, naturally, require a lot of times and efforts to study and analyze. It should also be remembered that neither documents in the section of the Red Army Main Artillery Directorate or the section of the command of rocket troops were digitized and uploaded and they only exist in a paper form in the archive.

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        • Let's continue with some documents of interest. From a report entitled "Battle experience of employment of T-34 and T-60 tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion" (21 Tank Brigade, 4.2.42)
          Teamwork.
          Cooperation between different arms is still poorly organized especially with infantry regiments. Tasks are assigned so hastily that no time is left to make reconnaissance and organize cooperation with infantry and artillery. Frequently it is not possible to to take tank commanders and drivers to the attack site and give them tasks on the spot. Hence crews have a poor understanding of their tasks and the area of actions.

          Employment of single tanks
          in our experience didn't prove its worth. Some combined-arms commanders assign excessive tasks to single tanks without giving them support with AT guns. Such a single tanks is instantly swallowed by hostile anti-tank defenses.
          In such cases a tank should be employed as mobile artillery bringing it closer to infantry or to infantry lines for fire from a covered position against weapons emplacements that hinder advance of infantry.

          Attacks in settlements and strongpoints
          Tanks attacking settlements and strongpoints from the front always suffer heavy losses. Single tanks which penetrate a village without infantry are frequently destroyed. Our experience revealed that in attack on a strongpoint, especially when few forces are available, one should employ surprise envelopment from flank and rear with infantry riding tanks. When approaching a village one or two tanks stop and deliver fire from a halt using terrain cover on discovered hostile anti-tank guns until the others enter the village.
          All buildings (especially houses, barns etc on the edge of a village) should be destroyed by gunfire and impact, since they usually harbor AT guns, heavy machine guns and anti-tank rifles.
          In such a type of combat the commander should have a reserve (two or three tanks) to develop success of the first echelon and to support infantry whose advance was stopped. When there is no reserve, tanks should return back to help to resume the advance of infantry which provides the enemy time to open strong fire.

          Fire from tanks
          In attack tanks as a rule should deliver hurricane fire on area and flanking tanks should secure flanks with fire. This fire neutralizes the enemy and forces him to take cover and saves our tanks from hostile aimed fire.
          1. Attacking tanks which don't deliver fire on areas and suspected sites but try to find targets loose a lot of time and as a rule suffer heavy losses.
          2. Almost all knocked-out tanks had a large number of ammunition left which means that their fire was not intensive, but tanks which spent a lot of ammunition remain intact.

          T-60 tanks
          At the present moment T-60 tanks are not suitable for independent actions. They should be positioned behind T-34 tanks or attached to infantry since they stuck in snow and stay exposed as a target.

          Supply
          To supply tanks with fuel and ammunition we need animal-drawn transport of tracked vehicles.
          https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=451230908

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Artyom_A View Post
            There are, for example, daily reports on operations which recorded specific action, expenditure of ammunition, targets etc. Example:
            https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133338344
            In general the search by abbreviation "ГМЧ" gives some 45 000 various documents of various levels. I'me sure there are even more document on this subject on after-action reports, experience reports, fire plans etc. Which, naturally, require a lot of times and efforts to study and analyze. It should also be remembered that neither documents in the section of the Red Army Main Artillery Directorate or the section of the command of rocket troops were digitized and uploaded and they only exist in a paper form in the archive.
            Thanks for the assessment on the available material. It would take a good part of a lifetime to wade through that quantity of material and then synthesize it into a readable book with analysis.
            Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Artyom_A View Post
              Let's continue with some documents of interest. From a report entitled "Battle experience of employment of T-34 and T-60 tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion" (21 Tank Brigade, 4.2.42)

              https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=451230908
              This is a great post. The report shows many elementary aspects of armored warfare that were not being practice in early 1942. And by May 1942, the Red Army was fielding the larger tactical force, the tank corps which had their problems at Kharkov, and there was a learning curve for the commanders of the tank corps through 1942. The report also shows the fundamental aspects of capturing, analyzing and then disseminating the war experiences (aka lessons learned) which was established by the Red Army General Staff in November 1941. This process was how the Red Army turned around its fighting force in the face of catastrophic defeat.
              Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post

                You did not do step two. The first part is easy part straight count. You have to discern if the bibliography has been padded. He did admit that he had to get other people to translate--22 books is a lot of favors. The quick way is to find his points on the American Civil War and 1) see if he footnoted the source, 2) if he has a footnote, look at the source, especially Russian. I have several Russian books on Soviet Cavalry and the memoirs of Pliev who commanded cav-mech groups through the war including Manchurian campaign.

                His reference to Ukrainians while on exercise could be anything from uninformed opinions to attempts to build a rapport, before becoming a viable source for historical methodology.

                My experience with Red Army General staff studies is they focused on the wars that used the combustible engine--leading to motor transports, tanks, airplanes for airborne troops.
                I agree with everything you wrote and I have started reading Harrel's book. Maybe there are answers in the text which has numbered sources on every page listed in the chapters at the back of the book. The following article also mentions the ACW as well as operations by the KMG's (cavalry mechanized groups).
                Originally published in the September 2007 issue of
                World War II Magazine. https://www.historynet.com/red-saber...valry-guru.htm
                Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

                Comment


                • The following pamphlet written by L.T.C. James G Snodgrass for the School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas is one of the first sources used by Harrel in his book. I read the entire pamphlet which sheds some light on Harrel's ACW connection with Soviet OMG.
                  Operational Maneuver: From the American Civil War to the OMG: What are its Origins and Will it Work Today? - War College Series

                  https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a196036.pdf
                  Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post
                    The following pamphlet written by L.T.C. James G Snodgrass for the School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas is one of the first sources used by Harrel in his book. I read the entire pamphlet which sheds some light on Harrel's ACW connection with Soviet OMG.
                    Operational Maneuver: From the American Civil War to the OMG: What are its Origins and Will it Work Today? - War College Series


                    https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a196036.pdf
                    Your author on page 22 makes an incredible general leap unsupported by his previous development of the subject and caps it with closing paragraph sentence: "The horse cavalry experience and lesson learned from the American Civil War, I submit [my Bold], have had an enormous impact on the formulation of subsequent maneuver doctrine, including deep operations and eventually the OMG concept."

                    I noted the author cited my article in Parameters on the OMG, but he did not grasp the greater point of the article. The OMG mission versus forward detachments which were tactical, is the OMG had two major missions in penetrating the operational-strategic depth of a defense: one, when the OMG is into the operational depth it could spread its force to take out nuclear delivery weapons, concentration of conventional artillery/missiles, communications centers--which all these targets were a lower scale or nonexistent n the Civil War.

                    As an intel officer, I would watch for the commitment of the OMG and if it spread, I knew it was going for stripping out the infrastructure. If it stayed in a tight formation, then I knew it was coming for us as the operational level counterstrike force and the forerunners of the strategic reinforcement. You see there was nothing theoretical about my study on the OMG it was operational level warfare contingency planning.
                    Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 23 Feb 20, 12:01.
                    Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post

                      Your author on page 22 makes an incredible general leap unsupported by his previous development of the subject and caps it with closing paragraph sentence: "The horse cavalry experience and lesson learned from the American Civil War, I submit [my Bold], have had an enormous impact on the formulation of subsequent maneuver doctrine, including deep operations and eventually the OMG concept."

                      I noted the author cited my article in Parameters on the OMG, but he did not grasp the greater point of the article. The OMG mission versus forward detachments which were tactical, is the OMG had two major missions in penetrating the operational-strategic depth of a defense: one, when the OMG is into the operational depth it could spread its force to take out nuclear delivery weapons, concentration of conventional artillery/missiles, communications centers--which all these targets were a lower scale or nonexistent n the Civil War.

                      As an intel officer, I would watch for the commitment of the OMG and if it spread, I knew it was going for stripping out the infrastructure. If it stayed in a tight formation, then I knew it was coming for us as the operational level counterstrike force and the forerunners of the strategic reinforcement. You see there was nothing theoretical about my study on the OMG it was operational level warfare contingency planning.
                      During the American Civil War both the CSA and Union forces had very large cavalry groups. I believe the industrial age changed the way wars were fought and cavalry was used. Obviously, after the ACW, mechanization, for the most part, would replace the cavalry in deep operations. That being said the targets were still the same. Destroying infrastructure and manufacturing/industrial facilities greatly affected your enemies ability to wage war in 1861 - 65 as well as 1941 - 45.

                      There are countless well documented ACW operational maneuver groups or raiding groups by the south and the north which greatly affected the outcome and course of a larger military operation which affected strategic goals. The "gallant" sabre drawn cavalry charges were for the most part abandoned and cavalry was "dismounted infantry" That the ACW was the first large scale war at the dawn of the industrial age it was also the first war where tactics and strategy was not decided with a decisive clash of 2 armies on a small frontal battlefield of 1 - 2 square miles. There were larger moving fronts and forces with many battles involving flanking maneuvers that were spread out over tens of miles in what would eventually be known as operations.

                      Is it your professional opinion that neither Isserson, Svechin, Triandafillov, Tukhachevsky or any other Russian military mind, whether they admit it or not, studied in any way the ACW?



                      Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

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                      • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post
                        Is it your professional opinion that neither Isserson, Svechin, Triandafillov, Tukhachevsky or any other Russian military mind, whether they admit it or not, studied in any way the ACW?
                        My "professional opinion" is that the Soviet military mind was a Marxist mind--Marxist are historians who took over Russia. They did study military history and they may have looked at ACW, but I have never read that they took lessons for their own doctrine. And, I believe that you have not read any of the four, especially the first three who were Russian-Soviet military theorists.

                        Probably the more interesting question to ask, instead of chasing such an illusive historical connectivity spanning centuries, would be why did the Red Army maintain such a strong cavalry presence on the battlefield when generally Western armies the cavalry officers for the most part made a transition to tank/mechanized forces relieving themselves of a fighting force which had a great burden in sustaining support. Even the German army which had thousands of horses for transport and a limited cavalry force, proved a great burden to sustain and held back infantry support from panzer forces during Barbarossa.

                        Still waiting for you to find specific citations making these historical connections in your book. Don't make the same inferential analytical leap that the LTC made in a rather amateurish paper.
                        Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 24 Feb 20, 04:03.
                        Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post

                          My "professional opinion" is that the Soviet military mind was a Marxist mind--Marxist are historians who took over Russia. They did study military history and they may have looked at ACW, but I have never read that they took lessons for their own doctrine. And, I believe that you have not read any of the four, especially the first three who were Russian-Soviet military theorists.

                          Probably the more interesting question to ask, instead of chasing such an illusive historical connectivity spanning centuries, would be why did the Red Army maintain such a strong cavalry presence on the battlefield when generally Western armies the cavalry officers for the most part made a transition to tank/mechanized forces relieving themselves of a fighting force which had a great burden in sustaining support. Even the German army which had thousands of horses for transport and a limited cavalry force, proved a great burden to sustain and held back infantry support from panzer forces during Barbarossa.

                          Still waiting for you to find specific citations making these historical connections in your book. Don't make the same inferential analytical leap that the LTC made in a rather amateurish paper.
                          I have read Isseron. Svechin and ,Triandafillov have also been translated to English. As I said in an earlier post I did not get the Harell book because of the supposed ACW connection but rather for what you have just stated which is true. The Soviets were the one nation still using very large cavalry groups and cavalry mechanized groups for offensive operations in WWII. Harell has 1 chapter on ACW and the rest of the book is about Soviet military operations.

                          I was just curious as to why Harell, and the LTC, made the connection to the ACW in such a way as to mislead a reader. Especially a reader who may not be well versed in WWII history. It is my belief that the ACW was looked at but in a cursory manor and could not have been the sole influence on Soviet cavalry doctrine.

                          I also believe that the Soviets wrongly take sole credit for deep operations. That they were planning it during the industrial age between the world wars which brought forth many sudden large scale and ongoing changes in the way wars are fought is true. However in light of Stalin's purges the theories were first put in practice during WWII by the Germans. And before the Germans there was Nathan Bedford Forrest and many other ACW cavalry commanders who had already been using deep operations although on a smaller scale. Even the Native Americans here were smart enough to cut off supply lines and harass the wagon trains supplying the American frontier armies during the Indian wars.

                          Btw I read your chapter on Katukov and enjoyed it. I have just finished reading Zhukov's Greatest Defeat and Katukov commanded the newly formed 3rd Mechanized Corps during Operation Mars.


                          Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

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                          • I was thinking about one of your statements in your last post.

                            relieving themselves of a fighting force which had a great burden in sustaining support.



                            I believe there were many instances on the eastern front where cavalry traversed difficult terrain and deep snow/mud better and faster then the armored fighting vehicles and supporting troop transport vehicles. The horses could also benefit by foraging for food and water in the wilderness in some cases (they had a natural supplemental supply besides supporting logistics) and did not need to rely soley on support logistics of fuel and mechanical parts.

                            The Soviet 20th Army failed in their Operation Mars mission and Kriukov's KMG suffered greatly. It was this chapter in Zhukov's Greatest Defeat that piqued my curiosity about the Soviet use of large KMG's.

                            Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

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                            • Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post
                              I was thinking about one of your statements in your last post.




                              I believe there were many instances on the eastern front where cavalry traversed difficult terrain and deep snow/mud better and faster then the armored fighting vehicles and supporting troop transport vehicles. The horses could also benefit by foraging for food and water in the wilderness in some cases (they had a natural supplemental supply besides supporting logistics) and did not need to rely soley on support logistics of fuel and mechanical parts.

                              The Soviet 20th Army failed in their Operation Mars mission and Kriukov's KMG suffered greatly. It was this chapter in Zhukov's Greatest Defeat that piqued my curiosity about the Soviet use of large KMG's.[/FONT][/COLOR][/LEFT]
                              I had considered doing a book on the Cav-Mech Group and started collecting books and other material. I followed Pliev's operations during the war. I recall reading in one of the German memoirs, that when Pliev's group showed up in their sector, they (the Germans) were in for "a wild and woolly time".

                              Agree, the cav-mech gave a versatility for mobility in mixed terrain. I never got into how these units were supplied, their duration of operations, nor how they sustained themselves in the deep offensive advances from Belorussia on to Berlin.
                              Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post

                                I had considered doing a book on the Cav-Mech Group and started collecting books and other material. I followed Pliev's operations during the war. I recall reading in one of the German memoirs, that when Pliev's group showed up in their sector, they (the Germans) were in for "a wild and woolly time".

                                Agree, the cav-mech gave a versatility for mobility in mixed terrain. I never got into how these units were supplied, their duration of operations, nor how they sustained themselves in the deep offensive advances from Belorussia on to Berlin.
                                I think a book on KMG's would be great. I know, however, you are still writing the Katyusha book. Both of those subjects have not received the coverage they deserve. I did run across this book on Amazon and was wondering if you have a copy and if so what is your opinion on it. I also added the links for the English translated Svechin and Triandafillov books. I am interested in reading them as they have much more content then Isserson's book. Svechin's book is 374 pages and Triandafillov's is 240 compared to Isseson's 136.

                                https://www.amazon.com/dp/0080312004...v_ov_lig_dp_it

                                https://www.amazon.com/dp/1879944332...FF7AFXNS&psc=1

                                https://www.amazon.com/dp/0714641189...v_ov_lig_dp_it

                                Theo mir ist die munition ausgegangen ich werde diesen ramman auf wiedersehen uns in walhalla

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