Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Best General of WWII?

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Capt AFB
    replied
    Originally posted by DingBat View Post

    It's happening because "something, something.... Montgomery".

    I'd welcome a discussion about Slim.
    I think the exchange about Market Garden is quite interesting and I am learning a thing or two.

    And therefore I suggest it should have its own thread.

    Meanwhile the Best General in WW2? thread has been sidetracked, which I think is another interesting exchange in this forum.

    I will take some blame for the sidetracking with some of my posts, but MG took a life of its own.

    Leave a comment:


  • DingBat
    replied
    Originally posted by Capt AFB View Post
    So how all this Market Garden stuff fits in with the thread that deals with the Best General in WW2? Perhaps ask the Admin to take all these MG posts and start a new thread about it?

    As for my opinion, the best WW2 general was Slim, hands down. When I find some time and this thread gets back on track I will explain why.
    It's happening because "something, something.... Montgomery".

    I'd welcome a discussion about Slim.

    Leave a comment:


  • Capt AFB
    replied
    So how all this Market Garden stuff fits in with the thread that deals with the Best General in WW2? Perhaps ask the Admin to take all these MG posts and start a new thread about it?

    As for my opinion, the best WW2 general was Slim, hands down. When I find some time and this thread gets back on track I will explain why.

    Leave a comment:


  • R.N. Armstrong
    replied
    Originally posted by Gooner View Post

    Well the mission of the report was just to produce a factual account. Guess its up to historians to approach it with a more critical bias.
    Of course, historians should use critical judgment to determine if there is bias in an official report.

    For decades, a historian on the eastern front had to read between the lines on official reports and accounts. Someone has already suggested Brereton cleaned up official files....

    [/QUOTE]

    Leave a comment:


  • Gooner
    replied
    Originally posted by Aber View Post
    It's telling that Buckingham attributes the failure of the 101st to capture the Son bridge intact to "bad luck".
    Also "Similarly, paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division in Nijmegen were narrowly beaten to the road bridge across the River Waal by elements of the 9th SS Panzer Division." is down to bad luck rather than the six hours wait before 82nd even attempted to capture the bridge.

    Dunno if I'll buy the new edition now

    Leave a comment:


  • Gooner
    replied
    Originally posted by Aber View Post
    A couple of observations:
    The overall feel is justification of all critical decisions with some subtle distortions.
    Well the mission of the report was just to produce a factual account. Guess its up to historians to approach it with a more critical bias.

    Which, funnily enough, they have failed to do

    None of the histories, that I can recall, have ever placed the 'broad front' versus 'narrow thrust' controversy as one of Eisenhower changing the plan (and his mind). Most preferring the lazy canard that it was Monty's ego and desire for glory that was at the heart of the dispute, when it is more likely the other way around ...

    Leave a comment:


  • Aber
    replied
    A couple of observations:

    Originally posted by Gooner View Post
    94. Earlier estimates of developments beyond the Lodgement Area had visualized a pause by the Allied forces on the line of the Seine for a period of some three months as a likely neccessity. Such a halt was visualized in order that the forces might be reorganized and reinforced, and their logistical situation strengthened befere initiating the next phase of the campaign
    I've never seen a suggestion of a 3 month pause; the longest I've seen suggested is 1 month for the US forces, while British forces crossed the Lower Seine to isolate and capture Le Havre (IIRC generally known as Operation Axehead). Para 13 times this delay to AFTER the capture of Paris and the Seine ports.

    21 Army Group and that portion of 12th Army Group which was to advance north of the Ardennes were to breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.
    The dividing line between 12th and 21st Army Groups was drawn at the northern edge of the Ruhr, with various SHAEF directives encouraging 21st Army Group to take Rotterdam etc.

    The overall feel is justification of all critical decisions with some subtle distortions.
    Last edited by Aber; 19 Aug 20, 10:25.

    Leave a comment:


  • Gooner
    replied
    Excellent find

    "DECISION AS TO MAIN EFFORT

    78. Concurrently with the completion of preparations for the invasion of France and the securing of the Lodgement Area, plans were being prepared for the Allied advance to Germany. It was decided that the Ruhr, the nearest of the industrial areas vital to German economy, would be the primary objective in Germany. The line Amiens -Maubeuge Liege -the Ruhr was chosen as the main axis of advance, with a subsidiary axis on the line Verdun -Metz -Saarbrucken. These axes were selected to obtain flexibility of maneuver and after consideratior. of factors such as logistics, suitability of terrain for armor and for airfield construction, and the degree of tactical air operations possible from bases in the United Kingdom.

    92. Course of Action Adopted.

    ~ After reviewing all factors, the Supreme Commandcr in May 1944 approved the course of action which would use both the route north of the Ardennes and the Metz gap. It was decided, therefore, to make the main effort with the bulk of the forces along the axis Amiens - Mauberge -Liege -the Ruhr, and a secondary effort wIith a small force along the axis Verdun ~ Metz.

    THE MODIFIED PLAN

    94. Earlier estimates of developments beyond the Lodgement Area had visualized a pause by the Allied forces on the line of the Seine for a period of some three months as a likely neccessity. Such a halt was visualized in order that the forces might be reorganized and reinforced, and their logistical situation strengthened befere initiating the next phase of the campaign
    The decisive victory in the Falaise -Argentan pocket and the disintegration of German resistance in front of the Allies revised this concept. The situation in northern. France, coupled with the success of the Seventh U.S. Amy drive in Southern France now afforded an opportunity to seize the Saar industrial area as well as the Ruhr. It was decided to continue the attack without. delay, regardless of the logistical difficulties that might. be incurred by so doing.
    Moreover the original plan had proposed that the secondary effort along the Rheims -Verdun -Metz axis would be made by a small force with the mission of diverting enerrw resistance from the main thrust and preventing the escape of enemy troops from Southwestern France by linking up with the Allied forces moving up from the Mediterranean. At the end. of August the plan was modified to provide for an attack in force along the Reims -Verdun - Metz axis by the Third U.S. Army (less the VIII Corps, which was operating in Brittany) and one corps of the First U.S. Army. Further developments in the situation led to the additional decision on 4 September that these forces would continue east to occupy the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Saar and then seize Frankfurt. 21 Army Group and that portion of 12th Army Group which was to advance north of the Ardennes were to breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.

    Leave a comment:


  • Gooner
    replied
    Originally posted by Nick the Noodle View Post
    The reality remains that armour was being forced down corridors to bash through local defenses, much like a battering ram, before any other objectives can be achieved. Shermans are the wrong tank for such a tactic, which proves my point.
    Eh? 30 Corps had more or less got through the minefields and reached their objectives. 10 Corps was tasked to move through them to fight or shield them from enemy armour whilst 30 Corps continued their 'crumbling' attacks.
    And Montgomery didn't give orders to 'tanks' he gave them to armoured formations comprised all arms; tanks, infantry, artillery, sappers and anti-tank guns.

    Leave a comment:


  • Aber
    replied
    Originally posted by Kurt Knispel View Post
    Has anyone read William F. Buckingham's Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944?
    His speciality is British airborne forces, and he does seem to be biased against the ground forces eg

    It did not move until 14:35 and halted at dusk after covering just seven miles.
    The ground attack did not start until after the airborne attack to avoid alerting German defences. Also they needed RAF support against any German roadblocks as they moved beyond artillery range from the startline, but the airborne planners grounded the tactical airforces while troop planes were in the area. Armoured forces do not fight well in the dark until they have broken through.

    It took another full day to cover the remaining distance against minimal German resistance.
    Eindhoven was an objective for the 101st - you don't use an armoured division to take a large town, especially when the commanders intent is for the ground forces to move "on a carpet of airborne troops" and expect to fight at the far end of the corridor. It's unclear when 101st advanced into Eindhoven (they were on the wrong side of the blown bridge at Son) and they did not seem to be able to make radio contact with the ground forces.

    IIRC the recce units of Guards Armoured spent the morning looking at alternate routes before they made contact with the 101st, and then learned about the blown bridge. Bridging the canal with a Bailey bridge would have taken c10 hours, so even if Guards Armoured had reached Son earlier in the day, the advance would still have stalled until the morning of the 19th. It's telling that Buckingham attributes the failure of the 101st to capture the Son bridge intact to "bad luck".

    Leave a comment:


  • Kurt Knispel
    replied
    Has anyone read William F. Buckingham's Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944?

    The book was published in March of 2019 and, unlike Antony Beevor's new book on the subject, which countless reviewers have stated adds little new material to Hasting's A Bridge to Far, Buckingham's book, based on a small number of reviews, could be the new definitive book on the subject.

    Here is an article written by Buckingham titled Debacle at Arnhem – Five Reasons for the Failure of Operation Market Garden

    https://militaryhistorynow.com/2019/...market-garden/

    I have not read his book but plan on buying a copy. I have read Kershaw's It Never Snows In September and McManus's September Hope - The American Side of A Bridge To Far. I do recall that there was a "lack of urgency" displayed by Harrock's 30 corps in their drive north for the link up with the airborne units and Buckingham reflects on this in the article.

    Lack of drive by the Garden force


    Although often overlooked, the most salient reason for the breakdown of Market Garden was the failure of 30 Corps’ two formations, the Guards Armoured Division and the 43rd Division, to reach the Lower Rhine at Arnhem. This is routinely ascribed to unexpectedly heavy German resistance, but it was not the case. The only opposition encountered in the ground advance up the airborne corridor was at Nijmegen, where the 82nd Airborne Division did the bulk of the fighting.

    The real problem was an overall lack of urgency from the outset. Major-Generals Allan Adair’s Guards Armoured Division was scheduled to link up with the U.S. 101st Airborne at Eindhoven, approximately 16 miles from the start line, by 19:30h on Sept. 17. It did not move until 14:35 and halted at dusk after covering just seven miles. It took another full day to cover the remaining distance against minimal German resistance. The Guards started late and stopped early throughout Garden and followed the standard British dictum that tanks fought by day and halted by night, while 30 Corps also forbade vehicular movement after dark.

    All this failed to address the urgency of the situation despite this being explicitly and repeatedly stressed and acknowledged in a variety of orders. Similarly, Major-General Ivor Thomas’ 43rd Division took 30 hours to travel 60 miles unmolested up the airborne corridor to Nijmegen and then effectively wasted three days after crossing the River Waal on Sept. 22. Neither formation acted with the application required, and gave the distinct impression that the plight of the 1st Airborne Division was not really their concern.

    The root of the problem was that the two division commanders simply ignored direct orders and Corps commander Horrocks tolerated their behaviour, in part apparently due to illness; Horrocks had been allowed to return to duty before fully recovering from serious wounds received in 1943. He was ordered to take sick leave in December 1944. By that time the damage to Market Garden was done.

    It can therefore be seen that despite the evidence being hidden in plain sight for 75 years, the real reasons for the failure of Operation Market Garden are still not fully appreciated or understood.


    Leave a comment:


  • m kenny
    replied
    https://usacac.army.mil/sites/defaul...to/eto-001.pdf

    Leave a comment:


  • Nick the Noodle
    replied
    Originally posted by Gooner View Post

    Rather clueless.
    Pish.

    Originally posted by Gooner View Post
    "'Lightfoot: Memorandum No 2 by Army Commander', 6 October 1942

    11 (d) The main task of 10 Corps will be to destroy the enemy's armour.
    If this should not be possible initially, the Corps will be manoeuvred so as to keep enemy armour from interfering with the 'crumbling' operations being carried out by 30 Corps.
    Opportunity may occur for 10 Corps to assist in these 'crumbling' operations, both in the Northern sector in front of 9 Aust Div, and to the South oft he MITEIRIYA ridge on the West flank of the N.Z. Div.
    The reality remains that armour was being forced down corridors to bash through local defenses, much like a battering ram, before any other objectives can be achieved. Shermans are the wrong tank for such a tactic, which proves my point.
    Originally posted by Gooner View Post
    How would it not? A single army attack with the airborne corps.
    Care to expand .

    Leave a comment:


  • R.N. Armstrong
    replied
    Of course, the situation map is only as good as the information posted--kinda like the wisdom of the computer world--garbage in, garbage out.

    Leave a comment:


  • Aber
    replied
    Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post

    One cannot fight a battle or campaign without a map. Thanks Gooner.
    I like this one; I think the logistics guys are trolling Bradley.

    Ruppenthal map.JPG

    Leave a comment:

Latest Topics

Collapse

Working...
X