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Was the Barbarossa plan altered from Hitlers original concept?

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  • Was the Barbarossa plan altered from Hitlers original concept?

    In my internet searches, I came across a site with an historian that claims that Franz Halder, in the planning stages for Barbarossa, altered the concept of the entire plan by transferring units slated for Armee Group South, and ordering them to be deployed instead to Armee Group Center.

    Hitler's original planning concept was, apparently, to have the majority of the mobile units deployed with the Southern arm of the invasion, and to have them push deep into the Soviet Union, past Rostov, and into the Don and beyond during the first campaigning season.
    Halder not only altered this plan, but argued forcefully for the objective of MOSCOW, rather than Rostov on Don, as the principle objective of the 1941 thrust.

    It got me thinking how different the campaign would have been had this plan been adopted.

    Was the fall of Moscow any guarantee of a Soviet surrender? Hitler himself is on record as not wanting to emulate Napolean in 1812 and make the same mistakes.

    The Reich had a serious problem with fuel supply in 1941, and a serious food shortage as well..

    No wonder Hitler placed less and less trust in the Generals of the Whermacht. How many other times did this happen on the Eastern front as well? There certainly was a screaming debate over objectives in September of 1941, as the copnference at Orsha demonstrated.

    Would the Whermacht have been able to shut the Soviets down altogether by denying them their oil and grain from the south?

    Or is it just another example of excuses by the Generals, blaming Adolf for their own failings?

    Im confused and would appreciate some clarification from the members of this forum....

    Drusus
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  • #2
    I also remember something called the Marcks plan that postulated no effort in the South at all, and a concentration of objective thrust upon Moscow and Leningrad alone. Was it Hitler or Halder that rejected this plan?

    Again I ask, would the Soviet Union have come to the negotiating table? Stalin locked himself away for 11 days, and it was rumoured that he was close to surrender.

    What say you, my forum friends? Artyom, where are you?
    My Articles, ALMOST LIVE, exclusive to The Armchair!

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    GULAG Glossary....Who Really Killed The Red Baron?....Pearl Harbor At 75
    Lincoln-Douglas Debates

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    • #3
      Originally posted by Drusus Nero View Post
      In my internet searches, I came across a site with an historian that claims that Franz Halder, in the planning stages for Barbarossa, altered the concept of the entire plan by transferring units slated for Armee Group South, and ordering them to be deployed instead to Armee Group Center.

      Hitler's original planning concept was, apparently, to have the majority of the mobile units deployed with the Southern arm of the invasion, and to have them push deep into the Soviet Union, past Rostov, and into the Don and beyond during the first campaigning season.
      Halder not only altered this plan, but argued forcefully for the objective of MOSCOW, rather than Rostov on Don, as the principle objective of the 1941 thrust.

      It got me thinking how different the campaign would have been had this plan been adopted.

      Was the fall of Moscow any guarantee of a Soviet surrender? Hitler himself is on record as not wanting to emulate Napolean in 1812 and make the same mistakes.

      The Reich had a serious problem with fuel supply in 1941, and a serious food shortage as well..

      No wonder Hitler placed less and less trust in the Generals of the Whermacht. How many other times did this happen on the Eastern front as well? There certainly was a screaming debate over objectives in September of 1941, as the copnference at Orsha demonstrated.

      Would the Whermacht have been able to shut the Soviets down altogether by denying them their oil and grain from the south?

      Or is it just another example of excuses by the Generals, blaming Adolf for their own failings?

      Im confused and would appreciate some clarification from the members of this forum....

      Drusus
      Germany needed oil,and part of the plan had to include taking Soviet oil fields. Politically, however, Moscow was the prize of all prizes and capturing it would have been a major coup for Germany and a terrible blow to Soviet morale.

      Coulda, woulda, shoulda - "no plan survives first contact with the enemy."
      Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Who is watching the watchers?

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      • #4
        Plus... past yr 1 of the war Moscow was not going to be taken. If it could have been at all.
        SPORTS FREAK/ PANZERBLITZ COMMANDER/ CC2 COMMANDER

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        • #5
          Originally posted by Drusus Nero View Post
          In my internet searches, I came across a site with an historian that claims that Franz Halder, in the planning stages for Barbarossa, altered the concept of the entire plan by transferring units slated for Armee Group South, and ordering them to be deployed instead to Armee Group Center.

          Hitler's original planning concept was, apparently, to have the majority of the mobile units deployed with the Southern arm of the invasion, and to have them push deep into the Soviet Union, past Rostov, and into the Don and beyond during the first campaigning season.
          Halder not only altered this plan, but argued forcefully for the objective of MOSCOW, rather than Rostov on Don, as the principle objective of the 1941 thrust.

          It got me thinking how different the campaign would have been had this plan been adopted.

          Was the fall of Moscow any guarantee of a Soviet surrender? Hitler himself is on record as not wanting to emulate Napolean in 1812 and make the same mistakes.

          The Reich had a serious problem with fuel supply in 1941, and a serious food shortage as well..

          No wonder Hitler placed less and less trust in the Generals of the Whermacht. How many other times did this happen on the Eastern front as well? There certainly was a screaming debate over objectives in September of 1941, as the copnference at Orsha demonstrated.

          Would the Whermacht have been able to shut the Soviets down altogether by denying them their oil and grain from the south?

          Or is it just another example of excuses by the Generals, blaming Adolf for their own failings?

          Im confused and would appreciate some clarification from the members of this forum....

          Drusus
          Of course, it is another example of excuses by the generals .
          There was NO change of the Barbarossa planning ,
          And about the oil of the Caucasus : it could only be captured in 1941 AFTER the defeat of the Soviets , but it would not cause the defeat of the Soviets.
          And for 1942 (Blau ) there is in Germany and WWII ( I have to look at the concerning tome ) a citation of a warning from the German experts that the capture of the Caucasian oil would hurt the Soviets ,but that there was no proof that it would cause the collapse of the SU .
          The Soviets lost in 1941 the grain of the Ukraine but were not defeated .
          In 1942 they lost almost half of the oil production of Baku ,but were not defeated .
          In 1945, they captured Berlin whith an oil production that was only 60 % of that of 1940 .
          During the war,the Soviets needed less oil than before the war .

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Mountain Man View Post
            . Politically, however, Moscow was the prize of all prizes and capturing it would have been a major coup for Germany and a terrible blow to Soviet morale.
            "[/B]
            Moscow was more than just a political and symbolic prize. It was also a major economic / production center and a major rail and road hub.

            Whether the fall of Moscow would have resulted in the surrender of the USSR will be debated forever.
            "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" Beatrice Evelyn Hall
            Updated for the 21st century... except if you are criticizing islam, that scares the $hii+e out of me!

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            • #7
              Originally posted by 17thfabn View Post

              Moscow was more than just a political and symbolic prize. It was also a major economic / production center and a major rail and road hub.

              Whether the fall of Moscow would have resulted in the surrender of the USSR will be debated forever.
              True. More profitable to ask why no winter provisions of uniforms. Overconfidence kills.
              Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Who is watching the watchers?

              Comment


              • #8
                There was no way that the Germans would make it to Caucasus during Barbarossa. Rostov was as far as they could go (and historically, they were kicked out of there before the main winter offensive), and even then their supply problems became critical. And how is the Kiev pocket formed without any panzer divisions in ACG and ACN?
                Wisdom is personal

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                • #9
                  I've read a number of accounts that claim that both sides ended 1941 with essentially no operational tanks left. The Soviets lost the bulk of their armor during the campaign and the Germans to combat, mechanical breakdown, and the overloading of their recovery system.

                  The point is: even had winter just magically not occurred in 1941, the Germans had basically reached the end of their logistical and operational rope in December 1941. And Rostov-on-Don is basically just half way to the Caucasus oil fields. As such, I don't think reaching the Caucasus in '41 was a realistic plan, even if it had been proposed.

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                  • #10
                    The south was where the SU had concentrated her heaviest forces assuming that was where the German spear point was going to be. Now I’m not sure that it would have made a huge difference to the smash and grab of 41, but, as was pointed out, the great battles of encirclement then become problematic (although not impossible given the chaos of the SU high command in the first couple of months).
                    Anything beyond Rostov was a dream no matter how it’s gamed - logistics, logistics, logistics.
                    The Germans lost the war on June 22. The USSR was too big, and even if the people were beaten senseless by Stalinism, too proud and obstinate, to ever lose. Nothing short of an internal revolution was going to make much of a difference.
                    Matthew 5:9 Blessed are the cheesemakers

                    That's right bitches. I'm blessed!

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                    • #11
                      There was a conflict in objectives between Hitler and his Generals. The Generals believed the objective should be Moscow, the political center as well as center for the railroad and highways in the country. Hitler wanted to eliminate Leningrad because it was the 'cradle of Bolshevism' and seize the Ukraine for its bread basket and minerals. There was no conflict between the leadership until Army Group Center was derailed from its march on Moscow. So, Hitler shifted forces towards Leningrad and turned forces south to take Kiev.
                      Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

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                      • #12
                        Originally posted by R.N. Armstrong View Post
                        There was a conflict in objectives between Hitler and his Generals. The Generals believed the objective should be Moscow, the political center as well as center for the railroad and highways in the country. Hitler wanted to eliminate Leningrad because it was the 'cradle of Bolshevism' and seize the Ukraine for its bread basket and minerals. There was no conflict between the leadership until Army Group Center was derailed from its march on Moscow. So, Hitler shifted forces towards Leningrad and turned forces south to take Kiev.
                        Me Armstrong. Big fan of your works and posts so I ask you - was there ever a chance of the SU falling apart?
                        Matthew 5:9 Blessed are the cheesemakers

                        That's right bitches. I'm blessed!

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Rojik View Post

                          Me Armstrong. Big fan of your works and posts so I ask you - was there ever a chance of the SU falling apart?
                          Thank You. Stalin's purges in the 1930's ensured a tight grip on his government. He had his people, and none of them were invulnerable, in the key places of government. I think the chance of the SU falling apart were very slim. They would have gone collectively down in defeat. Look at the Soviet human sacrifices endured to derail the German invasion--Leningrad held, Moscow held, and Kirponos died at Kiev.
                          Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 20 May 20, 17:28.
                          Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.

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                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Mountain Man View Post

                            True. More profitable to ask why no winter provisions of uniforms. Overconfidence kills.
                            True indeed.A inexplicable lapse in Nazi planning.Win or lose,proper winter clothing would always have been required.
                            "I dogmatise and am contradicted, and in this conflict of opinions and sentiments I find delight".
                            Samuel Johnson.

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                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Mountain Man View Post

                              True. More profitable to ask why no winter provisions of uniforms. Overconfidence kills.
                              Yes, even if the Germans were counting on a short campaign they would still need winter gear for occupation duty.
                              "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" Beatrice Evelyn Hall
                              Updated for the 21st century... except if you are criticizing islam, that scares the $hii+e out of me!

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