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How not to hunt Zeppelins part 1

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  • How not to hunt Zeppelins part 1

    At the start of the First World War one great terror was the threat of the German rigid airships (usually referred to as Zeppelins although other manufacturers also built airships of their own design). These were credited with a military potency that was way beyond their actual abilities for mayhem. Predictions were made of death and destruction raining on cities on a scale that did not materialise until the Second World War when the London Blitz and the RAF raids on German cities like Hamburg and Dresden showed the full extent of air power as a means of mass destruction. Fictional works such as ‘The War in the Air’ by H.G.Wells, in which a German airship fleet attacks and destroys New York, doubtless strengthened this fear. The Zeppelin was indeed regarded as a weapon of mass destruction. In 1914 and 1915 there was great concern in London and Paris over the looming threat of large scale air raids. This set many military priorities so that the very first long range bombing raids carried out by British aircraft in 1914 were on Zeppelin bases and the airships in their sheds. These were initially successful, as much through the element of surprise as anything else, and a number of airships were set on fire. Foiling airships already airborne was a different matter. The heavier than aircraft of the day usually had an operational ceiling well below that of the airship and the latter could climb much faster (by dropping ballast). Moreover early experience suggested that it was extremely difficult to shoot down a Zeppelin with small calibre weapons.

    Rigid Airships are not just huge bags of gas; the hydrogen (or today helium) that provides their lifting power is contained in internal cells within the rigid outer skin. These cells are under little or no pressure. A bullet just passing through the outer skin will cause no leakage of gas. A single bullet hole in a gas cell will cause negligible leakage given the vast volume of gas held. Gas would have to leak out for years before affecting the airships buoyancy, much more gas would be lost through natural osmosis through the material from which the cells were made. Many, many holes would be needed to have a noticeable impact. Zeppelins had been downed by loss of gas through small calibre fire but only in France when a German army airship had come within range of troops on the ground and had been riddled with machine gun and rifle fire. An aircraft of the time simply did not carry enough ammunition to have such an impact. Surprisingly enough incendiary bullets also appeared at first to be ineffective. Although hydrogen is highly inflammable and even explosive it is only so when mixed with an appropriate quantity of air; a naked flame immersed in pure hydrogen will simply go out. Similarly a single incendiary bullet in the middle of a gas cell will be equally ineffective. It is worth considering the fact that outside the casualties of warfare the only airship for which fire was the primary cause of destruction was the Hindenberg. Recent research reveals that even here the disaster was not precipitated by the Hydrogen catching light but by static electricity igniting the outer skin of the zeppelin (it had recently been doped using material containing the same propellant as used in the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile).

    Even getting close enough to attack an airship was difficult, by dropping bombs and or ballast an airship could climb far faster than the aircraft that existed in early years of the First World War. Defending fighters were usually attacking from below a target that was rapidly rising away from them. The first successful attack on an airborne airship was made on one descending as it was returning to its base so that the aircraft happened to already be above its target. It was rare that an anti Zeppelin fighter would be so lucky.

    Eventually it was discovered that a mixture of incendiary, explosive and solid rounds were needed, the later to cause leakage of gas into the air and the former to ignite it. This mix fired from a Lewis light machine gun mounted at a forty five degree upward angle (to allow the aircraft to attack from below the airship) could bring down an airship in flames. At the same time more powerful fighters flying and climbing faster were able to engage the airships at their operational altitude. This combination effectively broke the back of the German airship offensive against Britain. Before this situation was reached a number of ingenious and often ingenuous, approaches had been developed in an attempt to bring down these giants of the clouds.

    An early approach was to drop contact fused explosive and incendiary devices onto airships. A special form of incendiary dart was developed known as the Rankine Dart. These could be dropped in numbers from containers carried under aircraft. One variant had flaps in its tail that opened on impact with the skin of the airship to prevent the dart from passing right through. However unless a gas cell was ruptured this was likely to be highly ineffective. This approach of course also ignored the problem that it was extremely difficult for the aircraft of the day to get above a Zeppelin in order to drop its darts. . It further failed to take into consideration that attacking raiding airships over cities could mean that any darts and bombs dropped that missed the airship could cause further damage to the areas already being bombed by the raiders. There is no record of any German airship suffering significant damage from a Rankine dart.

    Sub Lieutenant Warneford of the Royal Naval Air Service was flying a Morane Sauliner parasol monoplane armed with a small conventional bomb load of six 20 lb bombs when he encountered a German airship, Zeppelin L.Z.37, over Ghent one day in 1915. The airship was descending on its return to its base and therefore not at its normal cruising height and Warneford was able to get his tiny aircraft over the top and drop a stick of small bombs onto it. The first bombs appeared to have no effect but they must have ruptured gas cells and allowed the hydrogen to mingle with the air for the last bomb caused the airship to explode. This revealed the other major drawback to using bombs to attack airships – a hydrogen explosion will go upwards towards the attacking plane. The force of the explosion flipped Warneford’s plane upside down, broke a fuel line and stopped its engine. He was able to regain control, glide to a landing behind enemy lines, fix the engine and return to his airfield. Warneford was awarded the Victoria Cross for his exploit. It was very clear that bombing airships in flight was both a dangerous procedure and depended on the enemy dirigible not being at its normal cruising altitude. This was not an approach that would solve the problem posed by Zeppelin attacks on London and Paris!

    Attempts had been made started to fit large calibre weapons to aircraft even before the First World War had. A Short S81 Seaplane was fitted with a one and a half pounder semi automatic cannon for trials in 1913. When the gun was fired in flight the recoil effect was so fierce that the aircraft was stopped dead and fell several hundred feet before regaining flying speed – not a desirable feature for a combat, or indeed any, aircraft. It was obvious that some sort of recoilless weapon was required if large calibre weapons were to be practical in the aircraft of the day. An American naval officer one Commander Davis had been experimenting with recoilless weapons specifically for deployment in aircraft. His first attempt was a single shot weapon where the shell emerged frontward and the breachof the gun was fired backwards to cancel the recoil. This was not very practical but by the outbreak of the First World War he had refined the weapon into a gun with two barrels, one facing forward and one rearward with a common breach in the middle. When fired the shell was shot towards the target whilst a counter weight of tallow and lead balls were blasted backwards. The gun was manufactured in Connecticut and came in a number of sizes the smallest being a 1 1/2 pounder with a calibre of about 35mm, this was regarded as a suitable anti Zeppelin weapon whilst the larger guns were regarded as having a potential to be used for ground attack or anti shipping (particularly against U boats).

    Ingenious as it was the Davis gun posed a number of problems the major of which was the need to ensure clear space behind it so that the counter weight did not damage the aircraft – it would discourage pilots if firing the weapon blew off their own aircraft’s tail. Coupled with this was the design of the breach that required manual loading and reloading so that the gun could not be mounted over wing and away from the reach of the pilot or a gunner. Another issue was the fact that the breach was not always completely gas tight so that flames and smoke often spurted from it on firing. The British Admiralty (The Royal Navy was initially responsible for defending the UK against airships) decided that specialised aircraft would be needed to carry the Davis gun into action.

    The first two designs were the ADC Scout of 1915 and the Blackburn Triplane of 1916 respectively. Both were designed by the same person and very similar in concept being single seaters with pusher engines and propellers mounted behind the pilot. The tail assemblies were mounted on a spindly looking framework attached to the upper and bottom wings. The nacelle for the pilot and engine was, unlike most pusher aircraft, mounted high up on the top wing, presumably to maximise the chances of the pilot being killed if the aircraft should nose over on landing! This was encouraged in the ADC design by a tall main undercarriage with the wheels extremely close together. Maintaining the engine on both aircraft would have been awkward for the ground staff and the airman who swung the propeller to start the engine must have had an interesting time as he would have needed to do this from a stepladder (and probably been blown off it by the prop wash). Both nacelles had long deep noses to house the Davis gun, these must have greatly impeded the pilot’s forward view. It seems probable that both aircraft were designed without their designer being aware of the full characteristics of the Davis gun. If fitted in the Sparrow the breach would have been between the pilot’s legs, giving full scope for the effects of the escape of fire and smoke, whilst in both aircraft the only direction in which the counterweight could be fired would be through the propeller with a high probability that this would be smashed. In fact neither aircraft was fitted with its intended armament and both never proceeded past the prototype stage.

    The Robey Peters Gun Carrier completed in spring 1917 adopted a different approach. This was a large ponderous single engined tractor biplane with two gunners nacelles fitted to the top wing, one port and one starboard. Both gunners would have a clear field of fire and there was no part of the aircraft that would be hit by the counterweight. It would still have been an interesting experience sharing the gunners elevated cockpit with a flame spitting breach of a Davis gun. The pilot however sat so far back in the main fuselage behind the wings that his cockpit was almost in the tail. His view in any useful direction would have been negligible and he had no means of communicating with the gunners. This would have made locating and intercepting any airship problematic let alone taking off and landing on airstrips at night. As it was the prototype Robey Peters Gun Carrier damaged its undercarriage on the first take off attempt and did not become airborne. After repairs were made a second flight attempt was successful in that the aircraft took off and flew round the airfield – before crashing – appropriately enough on the local lunatic asylum. No more Robey Peters Gun Carriers were built.

    The last, and most outré, attempt to produce a Davis gun armed anti airship fighter was made by the newly formed Supermarine company (formerly Pemberton Billings and Co). This was the Supermarine P.B.31.E Nighthawk, a very large twin engined quadruplane. The fuselage, which was mounted between the middle wings, was surmounted by a enclosed cockpit, somewhat reminiscent of a small conservatory, on top of which was built a gunner’s position for the Davis gun and a rearward firing Lewis gun position with a Scarff gun ring. This was level with the top wing. The Davis gun would have a clear field of fire all around the horizon (but the counterweight would decapitate the rear gunner if he was in his cockpit when the main weapon was fired forwards). A second Lewis gun position was stationed in the nose of the main fuselage together with a small searchlight and a 5hp petrol engine to drive a generator for the light and provide heating for the main cockpit that contained sleeping facilities for spare crew members. The pilot was positioned at the rear of the enclosed cockpit doubtless to reduce the possibility that he might actually be able to see an enemy airship whilst at the same time adding extra interest to the process of taking off and landing on ill lit night time air strips.

    The whole contraption was powered by two 100hp rotary engines. It is worth noting that the total power available to the Nighthawk was less than that used by the majority of light two seater aircraft today and with this it was expected to haul a crew of between three and five, two machine guns and a Davis gun (all with ammunition) and up to 18 hours worth of fuel around the night sky. In fact the Nighthawk could take off and climb very very slowly to its cruising altitude, it could then amble slowly (almost gliding) on its patrol. Its top speed of 60 mph was not that much greater than that of the later Zeppelins and its best chance of intercepting one of these was by collision if one accidentally flew into its path. By the time the Nighthawk was undergoing flight trials in mid 1917 conventional aircraft were shooting down Zeppelins using ordinary machine guns loaded with an ordinary round/explosive round/incendary round combination of ammunition and there was no need for other approaches. The Nighthawk did make one useful contribution to British defence – one of the junior members of the design team was a Reginald J Mitchell and this was his first experience of aircraft design. He later went on to design the Supermarine Spitfire.

    No more anti Zeppelin aircraft were specifically designed for the Davis Gun although a considerable amount of Allied effort and resource was wasted on trying to devise suitable mountings for existing aircraft to use the weapon for ground and anti shipping use. Only one Davis gun is known to have been used in combat – the crew of an RFC RE8 serving in the Middle East extemporised a simple mounting on the side of their aircraft for a Davis gun at a fixed angle of 45 degrees downward (so that the counterweight exited upwards and rearwards). With this they carried out successful ground attack missions against the Turkish army. It is interesting to consider that a similar (but reversed) mounting on the side of any of the conventional aircraft available for the defence of the UK, allowing the Davis gun to fire forward and upwards at 45 degrees, could have provide a most effective anti Zeppelin weapon.
    Attached Files
    Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe (H G Wells)
    Mit der Dummheit kaempfen Goetter selbst vergebens (Friedrich von Schiller)

  • #2
    How not to hunt Zeppelins part 2

    It may seem surprising, given that today’s military aircraft rely extensively (and possibly even excessively) on the rocket propelled missile, to find that not much thought was given to using rockets as a means of attacking airships. However the rockets available to aircraft of the time (the French Le Prieur) were little more than large versions of the firework rockets used for Guy Fawkes or 4th of July celebrations complete with cardboard tube and wooden stick. These were fired from tubes for the sticks mounted on the interwing struts but with a cardboard casing were very vulnerable to damp conditions (and condensation is often to be found in night flying). As a result they could fail to fire (or worse still could hang fire until after landing thus adding some interest and excitement to the lives of ground crews and armourers). The French had some limited success using them in daylight against tethered observation balloons (and on one occasion even against other aircraft) but although some British home defence BE2s were fitted with Le Prieur rockets there is no record of them being actually used by any British aircraft against airships.

    There was one attempt to develop a rocket-based weapon for specific use against airships. The Vickers Crawford rocket gun looked like a conventional breach loading gun, albeit with a very large recoil spring under the barrel, but it was in fact a rocket launcher.as the shell used a slow burning rocket propellant. A rocket firing gun with a closed breach gives no advantage in terms of reduced recoil unless the rocket motor continues to fire after it has left the barrel (in which case the exhaust incinerates the gunner) but it can have a significant impact on the weight of the mechanism. The breach and barrel do not experience the same pressure as on a conventional gun and can be made much lighter (it was for this reason that the Germans developed a similarly based anti tank weapon towards the end of the Second World War). Unfortunately it shared a fault with the much later M81 tank gun as the solid rocket fuel used in the Vickers Crawford fragmented easily and often left pieces of smouldering fuel in the breach after firing, this would re-ignite when the breach was opened to load another round. This sprayed hot gas and burning fragments into the cockpit and created the danger that rounds waiting to be fired could be ignited prematurely. Crews involved in the development trials of this weapon could be easily distinguished by pained expressions and a complete lack of facial hair. The weapon was not generally adopted.

    As aircraft developed and became more robust thoughts returned to fitting a big gun (as with the original Short 81 Sea Plane). The Coventry Ordinance Works developed a gun specifically for this purpose. It was a 30 mm cannon capable of firing five round clips of shells. With a singular lack of imagination its designers named it “The Coventry Ordinance Works Gun”. It quickly became known as the COW gun, an appellation that was to haunt it. The initial idea was to mount the COW gun in the rear of a light bomber, firing forwards and upwards at an angle of 45 degrees. From the outset problems were experienced with firing such a powerful weapon from the aircraft of the day, on one occasion the round fired upwards at 45 degrees whilst the entire gun installation exited downwards out of the bottom of the aircraft at a similar angle. Eventually three Dh 4 bombers were converted to carry the weapon but too late to see action.

    Attempts were still being made in the early 1930s to adopt the COW gun as a fighter weapon, all without success – the gun was simply too big and powerful for the aircraft of its day. The concept was regarded by many as old fashioned and completely out moded. In 1944 the Germans fitted an almost identical installation into the rear fuselage of a number of JU88 night fighters. Known as Shragge Musik (Jazz music) it had significant success against Allied night bombers.
    Attached Files
    Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe (H G Wells)
    Mit der Dummheit kaempfen Goetter selbst vergebens (Friedrich von Schiller)

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    • #3
      Wow....

      I always thought that the Zeppelins were a waste of time and effort for Germany, considering the actual results.
      Now I have to ask, weren't the Allied counter-measures even more wasteful, self-defeating and just plain ridiculous?

      That part about the 45-degree guns was very interesting. It wasn't just the Germans that used that idea, the Japanese also used it to attack B-29 bombers in 1945.
      Effectively.

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      • #4
        Originally posted by The Exorcist View Post
        Wow....

        I always thought that the Zeppelins were a waste of time and effort for Germany, considering the actual results.
        Now I have to ask, weren't the Allied counter-measures even more wasteful, self-defeating and just plain ridiculous?

        .
        Not compared to the cost of a day's fighting in France or the impact of blockade on Germany, I would guess.
        History is not tragedy; to understand historical reality, it is sometimes better to not know the end of the story.

        Pierre Vidal-Naquet

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by The Exorcist View Post
          Wow....

          I always thought that the Zeppelins were a waste of time and effort for Germany, considering the actual results.
          ly.
          On the basis of the actual damage done - yes but in terms of the disruption to production, general public panic and diversion of resources no.
          Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe (H G Wells)
          Mit der Dummheit kaempfen Goetter selbst vergebens (Friedrich von Schiller)

          Comment


          • #6
            The Zeppelins were quite effective in shaking morale and diverting resources away from the Western Front, resources which were disproportionate to the commitment of forces the Zeppelins represented.
            Divine Mercy Sunday: 4/21/2020 (https://www.thedivinemercy.org/message) The Miracle of Lanciano: Jesus' Real Presence (https://web.archive.org/web/20060831...fcontents.html)

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            • #7
              In some respects the Zeppelin raids were a form of terrorism. For example schoolchildren were killed (probably collaterally). In cold logic this did not impact on Britain's war capacity, in reality it caused the diversion of fighter squadrons and AA guns from the Western Front
              Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe (H G Wells)
              Mit der Dummheit kaempfen Goetter selbst vergebens (Friedrich von Schiller)

              Comment


              • #8
                In some respects the Zeppelin raids were a form of terrorism. For example schoolchildren were killed (probably collaterally). In cold logic this did not impact on Britain's war capacity, in reality it caused the diversion of fighter squadrons and AA guns from the Western Front
                Though that is true, they made no difference to the course of the war.

                But bless 'em, they did expend their own resources trying.
                History is not tragedy; to understand historical reality, it is sometimes better to not know the end of the story.

                Pierre Vidal-Naquet

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Bluenose View Post
                  Though that is true, they made no difference to the course of the war.
                  The fact is we don't know. For example some very recent analysis of the battle of Amiens have suggested that insufficient air support may have contributed tg British relative failure. Would those squadrons and pilots pulled back for home defence have made a difference? We'll almost certainly never know.
                  Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe (H G Wells)
                  Mit der Dummheit kaempfen Goetter selbst vergebens (Friedrich von Schiller)

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    The fact is we don't know. For example some very recent analysis of the battle of Amiens have suggested that insufficient air support may have contributed tg British relative failure. Would those squadrons and pilots pulled back for home defence have made a difference? We'll almost certainly never know.
                    I take your point that homeland defence denuded the battlefront, but since air support did not win the war, there is a limit to the effect of the raids beyond distracting equipment and supplies from the front.

                    The course of Amiens - or any other major battle - was not going to change significantly with a couple of extra scout squadrons.
                    History is not tragedy; to understand historical reality, it is sometimes better to not know the end of the story.

                    Pierre Vidal-Naquet

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Bluenose View Post
                      I take your point that homeland defence denuded the battlefront, but since air support did not win the war, there is a limit to the effect of the raids beyond distracting equipment and supplies from the front.

                      The course of Amiens - or any other major battle - was not going to change significantly with a couple of extra scout squadrons.
                      My mistake I should have typed Arras not Amiens and the lack of effective contact patrols and effective corps reconnaissance to keep Corps Command up to date with where the troops where and where artillery support was needed may have helped loose the battle. The lack of this was at least in part because there were not enough fighters to protect the army's eyes from enemy fighters. If Arras had been won the war would probably have been a lot shorter. As I said we'll never know if the squadrons pulled back for home defence would have been enough but I wouldn't be as dismissive as you. As chance would have it I'm back at the War Studies faculty tomorrow. If the guy who did the research is attending the same lectures I'll ask him.
                      Last edited by MarkV; 04 Dec 15, 11:28.
                      Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe (H G Wells)
                      Mit der Dummheit kaempfen Goetter selbst vergebens (Friedrich von Schiller)

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by MarkV View Post
                        My mistake I should have typed Arras not Amiens and the lack of effective contact patrols and effective corps reconnaissance to keep Corps Command up to date with where the troops where and where artillery support was needed may have helped loose the battle. The lack of this was at least in part because there were not enough fighters to protect the army's eyes from enemy fighters. If Arras had been won the war would probably have been a lot shorter. As I said we'll never know if the squadrons pulled back for home defence would have been enough but I wouldn't be as dismissive as you. As chance would have it I'm back at the War Studies faculty tomorrow. If the guy who did the research is attending the same lectures I'll ask him.
                        I agree that the RFC support was crucial and the scout squadrons played their part, but the presence of 56 and 60 (off the top of my head - do not recall the exact units) was not going to change the essential parameters of what caused Bloody April, nor was what occurred at Arras in Spring 1917 going to have a major impact on the duration of the war, though a better result might have aided the wider Allied position in 1917. More scouts did not cause Messines or Vimy, nor could they have altered essential conditions at Chemin des Dames nor the weather for 3rd Ypres, 2 operational factors in the evolution of fighting for the year.

                        By the same token, unleashing the ADGB Tempests and Spitfires for Normandy would have made marginal difference to the ground battle or keeping JG3 with AGC after Kursk would have made limited difference to German defensive efforts in the Autumn; distraction of fighter forces back to home defence is a net loss for the relevant sides, but does not alter the factors that decide the land battle
                        History is not tragedy; to understand historical reality, it is sometimes better to not know the end of the story.

                        Pierre Vidal-Naquet

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by MarkV View Post
                          My mistake I should have typed Arras not Amiens and the lack of effective contact patrols and effective corps reconnaissance to keep Corps Command up to date with where the troops where and where artillery support was needed may have helped loose the battle. The lack of this was at least in part because there were not enough fighters to protect the army's eyes from enemy fighters. If Arras had been won the war would probably have been a lot shorter. As I said we'll never know if the squadrons pulled back for home defence would have been enough but I wouldn't be as dismissive as you. As chance would have it I'm back at the War Studies faculty tomorrow. If the guy who did the research is attending the same lectures I'll ask him.
                          Hi

                          I know this is getting away a bit from Zeppelins but during Arras on the whole the Corps squadrons did carry out their tasks in supporting the troops on the ground despite their losses (although reported to be better towards the end of April than the beginning of the battle), indeed the weather (as always) could be a bigger problem than the enemy at times when trying to fulfil a mission. One major problem to the successful completion of a Contact Patrol mission was the failure of ground troops to show their location by lighting flares or show their other devices. There were various reasons for this; they could be rather busy fighting, they might have used up their flares and their other devices (during 1917 this includes metal discs kept inside the jacket and Watson Fans) may not have been visible, enemy aircraft could have been overhead and the troops reluctant to show their location. This last reason was sympathised with by the RFC as they were used to spotting the German infantry showing their location to German Contact machines and had called in artillery fire. Indeed all the combatants had experienced problems with infantry not showing their location when called for (their are copies in archives of German leaflets dropped to their infantry to urge them to show their location during 1918 for instance).

                          However, during 1917 as a whole GHQ regarded the Contact Patrol system not to have been as successful as it should have been and at the end of the year they conducted a survey of the ground troops and RFC to find what had worked and what hadn't and for ideas on equipment and procedures. This resulted in a lot of different opinions that led to more experiments and trials and new documents and some equipment being issued. But good training was probably the best method of improving the situation, with a reminder to troops that by not showing their location it meant that good artillery support could not be supplied (ie. you might get 'friendly' artillery hitting you).

                          Also during 1917 experiments during battle led to, what was later called, the Counter Attack Patrol task being separated from the Contact Patrol task so having separate aeroplanes to do these tasks. The Counter Attack Aeroplane would spend its time looking out for a build up of German forces prior to a counter attack (this could be further over enemy lines than a Contact aeroplane would normally fly), the machine would then call in artillery fire by wireless and/or use its own weapons (MGs and Cooper bombs) on the enemy troops. They could also warn troops on the ground with a parachute flare (or other means).

                          Mike

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                          • #14
                            If the guy who did the research is attending the same lectures I'll ask him.
                            Did he have an answer?
                            History is not tragedy; to understand historical reality, it is sometimes better to not know the end of the story.

                            Pierre Vidal-Naquet

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Bluenose View Post
                              Did he have an answer?
                              He wasn't there. I understand that he has a seriously ill close relative so I haven't bothered him - I'll send an e mail in the New Year and ask.
                              Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe (H G Wells)
                              Mit der Dummheit kaempfen Goetter selbst vergebens (Friedrich von Schiller)

                              Comment

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