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  • Originally posted by broderickwells View Post
    You clearly have no clue. WWI skirmish contacts were often full day affairs with no break for tea, dinner, breakfast, coffee & croissant. Attempts at pursuit would be organised. Pillaging would occur when billeting occurred at the end of the day's march.
    You make no sense as you do not contradict what I stated.

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    • Originally posted by pasar View Post
      Whether he was right or wrong does not depend on the OHL agreeing with him or not.
      So those that disagree express a valid opinion.
      You make no sense. OHL were the arbiters of who was right or wrong. If in their minds he had made the wrong decision, he would have received censure of some kind. Those who disagree therefore express an invalid opinion.

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      • Originally posted by pasar View Post
        You make no sense as you do not contradict what I stated.
        Read it again.

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        • Originally posted by pasar View Post
          I will first read at least one more book which I have ordered before saying more on this subject.
          Fair enough:- I'm sure that most of us need to read more.
          "I dogmatise and am contradicted, and in this conflict of opinions and sentiments I find delight".
          Samuel Johnson.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by BELGRAVE View Post
            I know it's very easy to be critical with the benefit of hindsight, but was he correct, do you think ? I understand that, by doing so, he was disregarding the advice of Wetzell, his prime strategic adviser.
            Which specific advice are you referring to? Ludendorff had been disregarding some of Wetzell's advice for a while. Remember, Wetzell advocated a strike around Verdun, rather than against the BEF, and then after OHL decided on attacking the BEF, Wetzell drew up an phased operational concept that, too, was rejected (although Zabecki shows it nonetheless influenced Ludendorffs' actions during the battle). Are you referring to Wetzell's assessment at the end of March (the 27th or 28th) that Michael had run its course and that forces should be shifted north to provide for a strengthened George?
            Last edited by The Ibis; 18 Jan 13, 23:42.

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            • Originally posted by broderickwells View Post
              You make no sense. OHL were the arbiters of who was right or wrong. If in their minds he had made the wrong decision, he would have received censure of some kind. Those who disagree therefore express an invalid opinion.
              The OHL expresses an expert opinion, that is all. Does not mean that anybody that disagrees cannot express an expert opinion too.

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              • Originally posted by The Ibis View Post
                Which specific advice are you referring to? Ludendorff had been disregarding some of Wetzell's advice for a while. Remember, Wetzell advocated a strike around Verdun, rather than against the BEF, and then after OHL decided on attacking the BEF, Wetzell drew up an phased operational concept that, too, was rejected (although Zabecki shows it nonetheless influenced Ludendorffs' actions during the battle). Are you referring to Wetzell's assessment at the end of March (the 27th or 28th) that Michael had run its course and that forces should be shifted north to provide for a strengthened George?
                Specifically, I had in mind the decision by Ludendorff to change the direction of the "Michael" attack : moving to abandon the attempt to roll -up the British forces in a north-westerly direction and ,instead, making the Eighteenth Army (Hutier)- hitherto a flank guard- the point of main effort by ordering a thrust South West in an effort to split the British and French forces.

                This had the net effect of dispersing the advancing German forces rather than concentrating them and also violated the sacred maxim "Select and Maintain the Aim". Wetzell argued against this fundamental change in Schwerpunkt at the time, I believe.
                "I dogmatise and am contradicted, and in this conflict of opinions and sentiments I find delight".
                Samuel Johnson.

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                • Originally posted by ljadw View Post
                  The usual search for scape-goats
                  There were serious flaws with the Schlieffen Plan. Biggest flaw - bringing Great Britain into the conflict and permanently estranging America due to violation of Belgian neutrality (of course this is a longer range view).

                  I publish simulations on WW1 at the division level. The Schlieffen Plan is VERY difficult to pull off. And requires big mistakes on the part of the French.

                  See the wargames here:
                  www.spwgame.com

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                  • Originally posted by spwgame View Post
                    There were serious flaws with the Schlieffen Plan. Biggest flaw - bringing Great Britain into the conflict and permanently estranging America due to violation of Belgian neutrality (of course this is a longer range view).
                    That could never be a flaw of the Schliefen plan as it intended to achieve a quick victory and then whatever GB does becomes pretty irrelevent. .

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                    • Originally posted by pasar View Post
                      That could never be a flaw of the Schliefen plan as it intended to achieve a quick victory and then whatever GB does becomes pretty irrelevent. .
                      Exactly so: this was the prevailing feeling: and a powerful argument refuting the view held in some quarters that Britain was responsible for the outbreak of the conflict. Militarily, she was just not prepared for it.
                      "I dogmatise and am contradicted, and in this conflict of opinions and sentiments I find delight".
                      Samuel Johnson.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by pasar View Post
                        That could never be a flaw of the Schliefen plan as it intended to achieve a quick victory and then whatever GB does becomes pretty irrelevent. .
                        The Schlieffen Plan was a military solution to a diplomatic problem. It also flew in the face of the evidence of the Franco-Prussian war - that France would fold immediately her army was crushed. This didn't happen in 1871. So the underlying military assumption was flawed as well.

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                        • Originally posted by broderickwells View Post
                          The Schlieffen Plan was a military solution to a diplomatic problem. It also flew in the face of the evidence of the Franco-Prussian war - that France would fold immediately her army was crushed. This didn't happen in 1871. So the underlying military assumption was flawed as well.
                          It was the only possible solution for the two front war. If it worked,France would be defeated.

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                          • I was looking at the long term effects of the Plan. Granted it was supposed to work quickly and win the war for Germany. It is just the long term effects of NOT working were never really considered.

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                            • The other solution to the two front war would have been the "Grosse Ost Aufmarche". Which would have been holding the frontier against France while concentrating against Russia. This might have worked, and Great Britain would have been kept out of the war.

                              The German rail people said they could change the schedules to avoid using the Schlieffen plan but were overridden by Moltke.

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                              • Originally posted by spwgame View Post
                                I was looking at the long term effects of the Plan. Granted it was supposed to work quickly and win the war for Germany. It is just the long term effects of NOT working were never really considered.
                                Schlieffen would have favoured making peace in that case.

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