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  • Originally posted by pasar View Post
    You are misinterpreting. It is about not respecting neutrality when it suits your purposes. In that respect Brittain was no virgin either.
    Once again, you deliberately misinterpret. For Germany in 1914 it was about respecting neutrality that suited their purposes. Witness the case of Switzerland. It was briefly considered as an alternative invasion route but dismissed due to paucity of roads. It was also the base of the ICRC and provided a conduit through which prisoners and other nationals could be repatriated. If Germany had continued with the original Schlieffen plan, there would have been no trade with the Dutch and the British blockade would have been considerably tighter.

    Belgian neutrality would have been respected if a similar situation to 1870 pertained, or if Belgium had a large enough army to cause real concern (which partly applied to the Netherlands).

    Comment


    • Originally posted by broderickwells View Post
      Once again, you deliberately misinterpret. For Germany in 1914 it was about respecting neutrality that suited their purposes. Witness the case of Switzerland. It was briefly considered as an alternative invasion route but dismissed due to paucity of roads. It was also the base of the ICRC and provided a conduit through which prisoners and other nationals could be repatriated. If Germany had continued with the original Schlieffen plan, there would have been no trade with the Dutch and the British blockade would have been considerably tighter.

      Belgian neutrality would have been respected if a similar situation to 1870 pertained, or if Belgium had a large enough army to cause real concern (which partly applied to the Netherlands).
      Speaking of Switzerland, the French remained concerned the Germans would violate its neutrality and launch an attack through that country up til at least the winter of 1917-18. As part of his duties when he was "in the wilderness," Foch was responsible for Le Plan H, which was to be France's response.

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      • For the Moltke Bashers (you know:Moltke spoiled the perfect plan of Schlieffen):

        In 1912,Schlieffen bequeathed to Moltke a second version of his plan ,with the elimination of the march through Holland,thus,it was not Moltke who was eliminating Holland .

        Source :
        The Schlieffen Plan :case study of the relation of military strategy to national security policy.
        Note 55,with references to

        Albertini Volume II P 242

        Ritter:the Sword and the Scepter Volume II P 224

        Comment


        • Originally posted by ljadw View Post
          For the Moltke Bashers (you know:Moltke spoiled the perfect plan of Schlieffen):

          In 1912,Schlieffen bequeathed to Moltke a second version of his plan ,with the elimination of the march through Holland,thus,it was not Moltke who was eliminating Holland .

          Source :
          The Schlieffen Plan :case study of the relation of military strategy to national security policy.
          Note 55,with references to

          Albertini Volume II P 242

          Ritter:the Sword and the Scepter Volume II P 224
          In his "The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth," Ritter also makes the point that Schlieffen himself became very concerned about the plan's prospect's for success:

          It is evident from Schlieffen's papers that by the time he finally framed his Plan he had come to feel very doubtful whether Germany had or could attain the superiority of force needed for a reasonable assurance of success in such an offensive venture. But he seems to have taken the technician's view that his duty was fulfilled if he did the utmost with the means available, and "made the best of a bad job" in compliance with the customs and rules of his profession. He did not consider that he had the higher responsibility of warning the Emperor and the Chancellor that the chances of success were small compared with the risks, and that German policy ought to be adjusted to that grave reality.
          Ritter, of course, is taken heavily to task by Zuber. And round and round it goes.

          Comment


          • One of the best articles about the Schlieffen Plan is :

            Keeping the Right Wing strong :Historians and the Schlieffen Plan

            Very recommendable,it could be used as basis for a discussion .

            Comment


            • Originally posted by pasar View Post
              Nonsense. Brittain and France were not really virgins, you know. Their colonial empires, for example, were not really intended to civilze the natives, but to exploit them.
              So getting upset about poor Belgium has zero credibility.
              Historically, the foreign policy of countries has mostly been determined by naked self interest. War did not disappear after ww1 and ww2.
              Leaving aside the violated virginity of Britain and France (and I would be the last to say than any nation's record is quite above reproach). Please tell me-in practical and not moralistic terms- what the violation of Belgium's neutrality gained for Germany ?
              "I dogmatise and am contradicted, and in this conflict of opinions and sentiments I find delight".
              Samuel Johnson.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by BELGRAVE View Post
                Leaving aside the violated virginity of Britain and France (and I would be the last to say than any nation's record is quite above reproach). Please tell me-in practical and not moralistic terms- what the violation of Belgium's neutrality gained for Germany ?
                It gained the speed which was crucial for Germany. It was the fastest way to Paris. It was Germany's one hope of victory once Russia mobilized.
                "We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo

                Comment


                • Originally posted by The Ibis View Post
                  In his "The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth," Ritter also makes the point that Schlieffen himself became very concerned about the plan's prospect's for success:

                  Ritter, of course, is taken heavily to task by Zuber. And round and round it goes.
                  The very fact of the sheer desperation of the Schlieffen Plan points up the fact that Germany had no motive in 1914 other than self-defense.
                  "We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by peterhof View Post
                    The very fact of the sheer desperation of the Schlieffen Plan points up the fact that Germany had no motive in 1914 other than self-defense.
                    L O Flaming L!!! You're either blinkered or foolish .... or are having a laugh! There's nothing 'desperate' about the Schlieffen 'Plan'
                    Signing out.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by BELGRAVE View Post
                      Leaving aside the violated virginity of Britain and France (and I would be the last to say than any nation's record is quite above reproach). Please tell me-in practical and not moralistic terms- what the violation of Belgium's neutrality gained for Germany ?
                      Marching through Belgium was necessary to execute the wide flanking move against the french army. In a two front war, you cannot sit tight. You need a big victory against one opponent.There was no other way.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by peterhof View Post
                        The very fact of the sheer desperation of the Schlieffen Plan points up the fact that Germany had no motive in 1914 other than self-defense.
                        Desperate it was not . It was the extremely bold move which was made necessary by the two front war.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by peterhof View Post
                          It gained the speed which was crucial for Germany. It was the fastest way to Paris. It was Germany's one hope of victory once Russia mobilized.
                          Exactly.

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                          • What? do we now have TWO threads on the Schlieffen Plan? Having 6 on how the WWI was alll 'England'/Grey/King Edwards fault was more than bad enough, lets try and keep replication to a minimum gents
                            ------
                            'I would rather be exposed to the inconveniencies attending too much liberty than those attending too small a degree of it.' - Thomas Jefferson

                            If you have questions about the forum please check the FAQ/Rules

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                            • You ain't see nothing yet:I hear a lot of noise in the distance:a lot of goose-stepping,and I will expect the opening of 2 new threads:

                              1)The responsability of Edward of the Tower for the failure of the Schlieffen Plan

                              2)The responsability of Edward the Whisperer for the arson of Louvain :after all,if there was no war,Germany would not be obliged to invade,reluctantly,Belgium and to destroy,reluctantly, Louvain .And,as we all know (source: professors Stieve and Barnes) that Britain was responsible for the outbreak of the war......

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Full Monty View Post
                                Once it was decided to go to war, which happened on August 4th, such a point is moot. Unless you're going to claim that Britain would go to war and not mobilise its armed forces?
                                Asquith's cabinet had the key positions in the hands of trusted men, so that whether there was or was not a cabinet crisis did not matter. Churchill war-mobilized the navy, and was fully prepared to resign in any showdown. That's Churchill taking a war measures step, and Churchill does not care what cabinet thought. Asquith mobilized the army, and was equally prepared to end the government, hence was able and willing to dispatch the army to France regardless of a stalemate in Cabinet. If it had reached embarkation time (say August 11th) and no cabinet concensus yet existed, Asquith would have simply penned the order, and the BEF would have gone to France.

                                I presume from your post that you understand why German 1st and 2nd Armies end the cabinet crisis around 25 August, when these crash into the BEF in Northern France.

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