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  • General Giap's Memoirs

    General Vo Nguyen Giap.


    Giap's memoirs... (Gen. Giap was a very famous and knowledgeable General in
    the North Vietnamese Army.)


    General Giap has published his memoirs and confirmed what most Americans knew. The Vietnam war was not lost in Vietnam -- it was lost at home. The exact same slippery slope, sponsored by the Dems and the US media, is currently well underway. It exposes the enormous power of a biased media (the Dems could never do it alone) to cut out the heart and will of the American public.

    General Giap was a brilliant, highly respected leader of the North Vietnam military. The following quote is from his memoirs currently found in the Vietnam war memorial in Hanoi:

    "What we still don't understand is why you Americans stopped the bombing of Hanoi. You had us on the ropes. If you had pressed us a little harder, just for another day or two, we were ready to surrender! It was the same at the battles of TET. You defeated us! We knew it, and we thought you knew it. But we were elated to notice your media was definitely helping us. They were causing more disruption in America than we could in the battlefields. We
    were ready to surrender. You had won!"

    A truism worthy of note: Do not fear the enemy, for they can take only your life. Fear the media far more, for they will destroy your honour
    I got this from a Yahoo Vet's Group that I belong to. Has anybody here read Giap's Memoirs? Some of the ?quotes? sound like anything but what a Gen would write in his memoirs. This for an example!
    understand is why you Americans
    Why the you and not just the Americans? Sounds like a fraud to me.

    If any one has read the book do you have a title?

    HP
    "Ask not what your country can do for you"

    Left wing, Right Wing same bird that they are killing.

    youíre entitled to your own opinion but not your own facts.

  • #2
    Originally posted by Half Pint View Post
    General Vo Nguyen Giap.

    I got this from a Yahoo Vet's Group that I belong to. Has anybody here read Giap's Memoirs? Some of the ?quotes? sound like anything but what a Gen would write in his memoirs. This for an example! Why the you and not just the Americans? Sounds like a fraud to me.

    Sounds like a some creative writing to me....
    "This life..., you know, "the life." Youíre not gonna get any medals, kid. This is not a hero business; you donít shoot people from a mile a way. You gotta stand right next to them... blow their heads off."

    BoRG

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    • #3
      If I recall correctly the memoir have been translated in english by an american-vietnamese Woman. Maybe, and only maybe this explain the "you". I haven't yer read them, but I suppose the Giap takes the credit on the RC4 battle and don't says much about his removal after the failure of the 72 offensive... I am in the campo of those who think he was a really really overrated commander.
      the real credit goes to the little ARVN soldier. He is just tremendous, just magnificent. He stood in there, took all that fire and gave it back. General James F. Hollingsworth USA.

      Bomben, Bomben, Bomben auf Hamasland!

      Comment


      • #4
        One thing to have in mind when discussing Giap's role in the 2d Indochina War (the American War) is that he had only very limited power by then, and the same could be said about Uncle Ho to a certain extent. It was people like Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh who really ran the whole show.

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        • #5
          Originally posted by Boonierat View Post
          One thing to have in mind when discussing Giap's role in the 2d Indochina War (the American War) is that he had only very limited power by then, and the same could be said about Uncle Ho to a certain extent. It was people like Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh who really ran the whole show.
          Agree with you, but until 72 giap has still the power coming from his military assignment. Easter Offensive was his brainchild (even if actively supported by Le Duan). Yet after 69 witgh the death of Ho Giap military start was on the waning. He was even demoted from 2nd position in the revolutionary council to 5th even beyonf Troung chin is arch-nemesis... I think that he bidded every thing on easter offensive to be powerful again... and Le duan dutifully killed him after the failure, at least accordinf to Bui Tin and in part to Andrade.

          Yet some westerners call him the Napoleon of Asia... (ok he had the same megalomania)... for my part I am satisfied with the Patton of the Parrot Beak general Do Cao Tri
          the real credit goes to the little ARVN soldier. He is just tremendous, just magnificent. He stood in there, took all that fire and gave it back. General James F. Hollingsworth USA.

          Bomben, Bomben, Bomben auf Hamasland!

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Half Pint View Post
            General Vo Nguyen Giap.




            I got this from a Yahoo Vet's Group that I belong to. Has anybody here read Giap's Memoirs? Some of the ?quotes? sound like anything but what a Gen would write in his memoirs. This for an example! Why the you and not just the Americans? Sounds like a fraud to me.

            If any one has read the book do you have a title?

            HP
            See the following:


            "Undoubtedly, the greatest military figure from modern Vietnamese history is Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap commanded Vietnamese forces that defeated the French during the First Indochina War and was the Minister of Defense during the U.S. fight in Vietnam. Giap's book, General Vo Nguyen Giap: The General Headquarters in the Spring of Brilliant Victory (The Gioi Publishers, Hanoi, 2002), has been translated into English and provides a ready source of information on Giap's view of the final phases of that conflict.

            Giap's memoir is a mixture of historical data, personal interpretation, and regrettably, propaganda. The reader must constantly be alert to understand which is being conveyed at any given time. This is not to dismiss the work out of hand because of this deficiency. Quite the contrary. The recounting of historical events from the North Vietnamese viewpoint is insightful.

            The perspectives Giap provides on the workings of North Vietnam's state, party, and military apparatus brings the reader much closer to an understanding of how this arcane and seemingly inept communist system was able to plan, organize, and prosecute a victorious war against the mightiest power on earth. However, the reader must carefully guard against the unchallenged acceptance of any portion of the narrative that intends to diminish the South Vietnamese or the Americans or to advance the political, military, or moral position of the North. Not that any of these positions could not otherwise be carried by sound argument supported by verifiable data. It is just that Giap does not do so and often puts forth erroneous data that is easy to refute.

            Giap's memoirs recount the U.S. Christmas bombing campaign of 1972 that preceded the signing of the Paris Peace Accords ending U.S. involvement in the war in January 1973. He then highlights the agenda and decisions of the 21st Plenum of the North Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee that laid down the outline for the continuance of the war, in spite of the Paris Peace Accords, to ultimate communist victory. The remainder of the book focuses on how the Plenum's decisions evolved in form and detail and how the resulting campaign was executed through the final collapse of the South Vietnamese regime.

            Two chapters, "Fundamental Plan and Opportunity Plan" and "Making Strategic Decisions," are the most insightful. They show Giap as a student of history, acknowledging the influence of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte while quickly adding the importance of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and Cuban President Fidel Castro as well. Here Giap discusses the interrelationship of the party, the army, and the state in developing the strategy for the post U.S. departure offensive that would overwhelm the South.

            Giap also gives some insight, and possibly exaggerated credit, to the relationship between North Vietnamese officials and those of the remnants of the insurgency in the South. He cites lessons learned from one of the few admitted North Vietnamese failures--the 1972 Easter Offensive--and then describes a process of an evolving position of consensus between the three elements of national power as the plan moved from concept to maturity.

            He points out that the offensive was envisaged to last for at least 2 years. The plan called for two stages. The first was to be in three waves launched in 1975. The waves were to sweep across South Vietnam successively moving from the southern to the northern provinces and were designed only to disrupt pacification efforts; impart some level of military and economic damage; open strategic movement corridors; and essentially set conditions for a 1976 general offensive that would begin the liberation of the South.

            The North was surprised by the speed of its opening actions in 1975 and scurried to craft a revised plan while the campaign was already in rapid motion. The quickly devised branches and sequels, combined with the battlefield initiative of North Vietnamese Army commanders, thrust advances quickly across the countryside and soon threatened, then stormed, the defenses of the South Vietnamese capital--Saigon.

            Giap does not try to conceal that the success of the final North Vietnamese advance to victory depended on the U.S. departure in 1975 and on the politically crippled position of President Richard M. Nixon. He also reveals the worry that surrounded the possibility of subsequent American reintervention in response to North Vietnamese offensive moves.

            There are five principal lessons that come out of Giap's memoirs. The first is the importance of understanding an insurgent adversary's history, geography, and culture. The second is to not underestimate any asymmetric enemy. The third is that the use of military force is but one component of a successful campaign strategy. The fourth is the criticality of ideology and the charismatic energy injected into that ideology. And the fifth is that the people and the governing institutions of North Vietnam were prepared to endure longer than were the people and government of the United States.

            The last message comes forth throughout the text. From the outset, as Giap reflects, there was never any thought other than continuing the fight until the United States tired of its involvement in Vietnam. This important lesson--that conflicts couched in the rhetoric of peoples' wars can continue for many years and even decades--is one of the most significant from the Vietnam War and, certainly, an extremely relevant message of this book.

            What Giap does not divulge, however, is the enormous strategic leverage of a controlled and astutely manipulated population. He also does not discuss the large-scale military and economic aid the Soviet Union or China provided to the North, or the eventual extinguishing of military aid from the United States to the South.

            He fails to provide even an innuendo of any dissent or even modestly differing opinion within the North Vietnamese brain trust or at any level in the communist system. Not that any of these would have necessarily changed the course of the war; it simply seems that an examination of the conclusion of the conflict should consider a much broader range of influences than the narrow path Giap trod.

            A few additional criticisms will better prepare any future reader for some of the intellectual challenges this memoir presents. The book contains a good deal of discussion of towns and regions that will be absolutely confusing to those not intimately familiar with Vietnam's geography and political boundaries, and the book contains no maps or organizational charts, which can befuddle a reader trying to understand the personalities and structure of the state, the party, and the military.

            A final caution: be extremely wary of the data Giap offers as fact. Some of his information is indeed correct, such as the fact that a B-52 was shot down on 22 November 1972 and crashed in Thailand. Other information drifts off the mark, however, and some statements approach the absurd. Giap's claim (citing a communique from the Army High Command) that in one 12-day period North Vietnamese forces shot down 33 B-52s, 5 F-111s, and 24 U.S. Navy and 3 reconnaissance aircraft differs significantly from Western sources that hold losses during that same period to be 17 B-52s and a total of 11 other aircraft.

            Giap further contends that eight U.S. warships were set afire at this time. No record of such incidents exists for the period. As a prisoner of war (POW) in Hanoi's prison system, I dispute Giap's contention that American prisoners of war were "al lowed to make wall newspapers, organize singing festivals, welcome Santa Claus at the side of finely decorated Christmas trees, and to pray for peace and repatriation. I can personally report that none of those holiday perks were enjoyed by anyone I know.

            So, this is a book of value, a work that delivers one great general's insight into the workings of a system that was able to defeat the United States of America. And, it presents details of the planning and execution of Hanoi's last and greatest campaign that have hitherto been unknown.

            At the same time, however, the book is filled with pitfalls that must be negotiated by any serious reader. It is a memoir by Vietnam's most renowned modern military leader--a memoir of North Vietnam's final push to overrun South Vietnam. Not at all surprising, it is also a platform from which to chisel a timeless niche for the role of Giap in that great military victory."



            [email protected] http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-132053836.html


            BTW this guy was once my boss...at Fortress Hood (ATB/CATB/21st Cav Bde). Best Colonel i ever worked for. Course i was the best SMG/TAC/LNO Instructor he ever had there. Just ask him.


            Colonel William S. Reeder. Jr. U.S. Army Retired, Ph.D

            Comment


            • #7
              interesting review... yet I have some doubt about the unflicheness of Hanoi leadership... is too easy to say we were determined until the end... and I still think Giap is a loser trying to make himself in a great Napoleon... (uhm maybe the 3rd?).

              BTW I feel my autobiography will be even worse... if I ever will write one...
              the real credit goes to the little ARVN soldier. He is just tremendous, just magnificent. He stood in there, took all that fire and gave it back. General James F. Hollingsworth USA.

              Bomben, Bomben, Bomben auf Hamasland!

              Comment


              • #8
                Is General Giap's Memoir available?
                Those that forget history are condemed to repeat it.
                If you're going to be one you might as well be a BIG RED ONE

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                • #9
                  yup.

                  http://www.google.com/products?hl=en...&um=1&ie=UTF-8



                  http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/List...se-_-980677185

                  personally i'd go library loan on it.......

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    $81.57??? I'll wait till the movie comes out.
                    Those that forget history are condemed to repeat it.
                    If you're going to be one you might as well be a BIG RED ONE

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Paul Mann III View Post
                      Sounds like a some creative writing to me....
                      Nope, read it before in credible journals. Just proof postive that Phebe and her ilk did indeed have negative influences on Americans fighting and dieing in southeast Asia.
                      "If you are right, then you are right even if everyone says you are wrong. If you are wrong then you are wrong even if everyone says you are right." William Penn.

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                      • #12
                        Phebe?
                        the real credit goes to the little ARVN soldier. He is just tremendous, just magnificent. He stood in there, took all that fire and gave it back. General James F. Hollingsworth USA.

                        Bomben, Bomben, Bomben auf Hamasland!

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Arrigo View Post
                          Phebe?
                          Yeah, she's an old peacenik who is ticked off at the troops in Iraq now because they don't represent 'her'. She is irrate that they actually reenlist. Her innumerable postings can be found on the Terrorism & Gulf War forums.
                          "If you are right, then you are right even if everyone says you are wrong. If you are wrong then you are wrong even if everyone says you are right." William Penn.

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