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  • Ewell taking Cemetery and Culp's Hills

    Do you think Ewell could have taken Cemetery and Culp's Hills at on July 1st?

    To aid with the poll and discussion, I'll add the testimony of John B. Gordon, the general officer commanding the Confederate advance that fateful afternoon,

    No battle of our civil War-no battle of any war- more forcibly illustrates the truth that officers at a distance from the field can not, with any wisdom, attempt to control the movements of troops actively engaged. On the first day neither General Early nor General Ewell could possible have been fully cognizant of the situation at the time I was ordered to halt. The whole of that portion of the Union army in my front was in inextricable confusion and in flight. They were necessarily in flight, for my troops were upon the flank and rapidly sweeping down the lines. The firing upon my men had almost ceased. Large bodies of the Union troops were throwing down their arms and surrendering, because in disorganized and confused masses they were wholly powerless either to check the movement or return the fire. As far down the lines as my eye could reach the Union troops were in retreat. Those at a distance were still resisting, but giving ground, and it was only necessary for me to press forward in order to insure the same results which invariably follow such flank movements. In less than half an hour my troops would have swept up and over those hills, the possession of which was of such momentous consequence. It is not surprising, with a full realization of the consequences of a halt, that I should have refused at first to obey the order. Not until the third or fourth order of the most peremptory character reached me did I obey. I think I should have risked the consequences of disobedience even then but for the fact that the order to halt was accompanied with the explanation that General Lee, who was several miles away, did not wish to give battle at Gettysburg. It is stated on the highest authority that General Lee said, sometime before his death, that if Jackson had been there he would have won in this battle a great and possibly decisive victory.
    The Rev. J. William Jones, D.D., writing of this statement of General Lee's, uses these words: "General Lee made that remark to Professor James J. White and myself in his office in Lexington one day when we chanced to go in as he was reading a letter making some inquiries of him about Gettysburg. He said, with an emphasis that I cannot forget, and bringing his hand down on the table with a force that made things rattle: 'If I had had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg, I would have won that fight, and a complete victory there would have given us Washington and Baltimore, if not Philadelphia, and would have established the independence of the Confederacy.'"
    26
    Yes
    38.46%
    10
    No
    61.54%
    16
    Last edited by American87; 28 Jun 16, 03:20.
    "It is a fine fox chase, my boys"

    "It is well that war is so terrible-we would grow too fond of it"

  • #2
    And on the non-biased side we have this:

    http://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen...gettysburg.htm

    Which Jackson shows up? Jackson missing an arm after his wounding? The Jackson who couldn't whip a lone rookie Yankee brigade at Grovetown with his entire Corps? The Jackson who was almost beaten at Cedar Mountain by Banks had A.P. Hill not shown up? Jackson had his strong points, but he also had his weak ones as well. He could perform poorly tactically at times.
    The muffled drums sad roll has beat the soldier's last tatoo. No more on life's parade shall meet that brave and fallen few.

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by hellboy30 View Post
      And on the non-biased side we have this:

      http://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen...gettysburg.htm

      Which Jackson shows up? Jackson missing an arm after his wounding? The Jackson who couldn't whip a lone rookie Yankee brigade at Grovetown with his entire Corps? The Jackson who was almost beaten at Cedar Mountain by Banks had A.P. Hill not shown up? Jackson had his strong points, but he also had his weak ones as well. He could perform poorly tactically at times.
      Douglas Haines comes off as a Lost Cause conspiracist, believing that evidence contrary to his opinion is an attempt to deflect blame from Lee, and he rests the bulk of his argument on Ewell's casualties for the day.

      But,

      1.) Gordon, one of the best generals in the army and who was present at the front, believed his brigade could take the heights by following up their success.

      2.) Early, arguably Ewell's best division commander, also supported the idea to take the hills. At least two members of the corps staff who served under Jackson, Sandie Pendleton and James Power Smith, believed the assault should be made.

      3.) Ewell himself was open to the idea if he could only be supported by the Third Corps.

      4.) Ewell was originally ordered to advance on either Gettysburg or Cashtown, and on reaching the former he complained that Lee's orders were too discretionary for him to know what to do. Early believed that Ewell was at loss as to what opinion to form.

      5.) General Hancock states that an attempt had been made to rally the retreating Union troops on Cemetery Hill, but that it was not very successful.

      It seems to me that had Ewell continued his assault without halting, or if he resumed it after a short halt, he could have taken the heights. Freeman's opinion seems the most natural: Ewell was habituated to Jackson's detailed orders, and he was left confused by the discretion given by Lee. This same hesitation was displayed in the battle of the Wilderness.

      And as to Jackson, it would probably be the version that appeared at Chancelorsville, Fredericksburg, Antietam, Second Manasses, the Valley Campaign, and First Bull Run. And even at Cedar Mountain Jackson was quick to assume the high ground and adjacent territory.
      "It is a fine fox chase, my boys"

      "It is well that war is so terrible-we would grow too fond of it"

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by American87 View Post
        Douglas Haines comes off as a Lost Cause conspiracist, believing that evidence contrary to his opinion is an attempt to deflect blame from Lee, and he rests the bulk of his argument on Ewell's casualties for the day.
        Actually, he comes across as a well informed & researched historian, who shoots holes in the fantasies of Lost Cause advocates. As we have seen with your mistaken beliefs about Lee & Grant in the Wilderness, your bias clearly shows through here. It is clear that you did not read the entire article as you miss many of the key points and arguments.

        Originally posted by American87 View Post
        But,

        1.) Gordon, one of the best generals in the army and who was present at the front, believed his brigade could take the heights by following up their success.
        Sure he does, yet the circumstances clearly say that he could not. There was a fresh Federal brigade on the hill & Hancock was rallying the men, despite what you claim below.

        Originally posted by American87 View Post
        2.) Early, arguably Ewell's best division commander, also supported the idea to take the hills. At least two members of the corps staff who served under Jackson, Sandie Pendleton and James Power Smith, believed the assault should be made.
        WITH support. You leave that part out conveniently enough.

        Originally posted by American87 View Post
        3.) Ewell himself was open to the idea if he could only be supported by the Third Corps.
        Which completely destroys your argument. Either he has enough troops on hand or he does not. Ewell believed that he did not (and he was right)

        Originally posted by American87 View Post
        4.) Ewell was originally ordered to advance on either Gettysburg or Cashtown, and on reaching the former he complained that Lee's orders were too discretionary for him to know what to do. Early believed that Ewell was at loss as to what opinion to form.
        This has nothing to do with the possible assault & is just an attack on Ewell. This is the same Ewell who absolutely devastated the Federals at Winchester a few weeks before.
        http://www.historynet.com/second-bat...es-command.htm

        Originally posted by American87 View Post
        5.) General Hancock states that an attempt had been made to rally the retreating Union troops on Cemetery Hill, but that it was not very successful.
        This is blatantly false.

        Originally posted by American87 View Post
        It seems to me that had Ewell continued his assault without halting, or if he resumed it after a short halt, he could have taken the heights. Freeman's opinion seems the most natural: Ewell was habituated to Jackson's detailed orders, and he was left confused by the discretion given by Lee. This same hesitation was displayed in the battle of the Wilderness.
        Let's actually examine the article I posted & see how wrong you are on several levels here.

        No one disputes this detailed description of the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg. The controversy begins with the Federal retreat. Those who blame Ewell for losing the battle claim that when Lee saw the enemy fleeing the field, he sent Ewell orders to ‘press those people [and] secure possession of the heights.’ They charge that Ewell lacked the courage to carry out Lee’s instructions, thus allowing the Federals to entrench on Cemetery Hill, the ultimate key to their victory. How true are the charges?

        At about 4:30 p.m., as the Union line began to break, Lee and Hill stood atop Seminary Ridge and watched the Federals retreating through Gettysburg and up Cemetery Hill. While they were thrilled by the Rebel success, they were also stunned by the cost of that victory. Hill had thrown seven brigades into the battle and suffered terrible losses. Archer and Davis, who opened the fray, had taken about 1,400 casualties, one-third of their original number. Their troops lay exhausted on Herr Ridge. Brockenbrough and Pettigrew had lost 648 men, 20 percent of the force that had charged the Union troops on McPherson’s Ridge. Their brigades were strewn along the dearly bought ground. Brigadier Generals Abner Perrin, James H. Lane and Alfred Scales, who had pushed the attack against the Federals on Seminary Ridge, had seen more than 1,000 of their men, one-fourth of their commands, fall in the fight. Only Perrin had continued the pursuit of the enemy troops into Gettysburg.

        Lee, who was personally commanding Hill’s troops (he had at first refused to order them into battle, then changed his mind and sent them forward), decided at the time to accept what had been accomplished that afternoon. He did not instruct Ewell to mount a charge against Cemetery Hill. He allowed Perrin to return to Seminary Ridge. Had Lee wanted to deny the enemy the heights, he could have sent Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson’s division — just now arriving and ready to fight — ahead to Cemetery Hill. Instead, Lee told Anderson to prepare to camp for the night.

        When he wrote his report, Hill recalled Lee’s words, ‘Prudence led me to be content with what had been gained [in the fight], and not push forward troops [who were] exhausted and necessarily disordered … to encounter fresh troops from the enemy.’

        Lee’s actions were sensible. He had just fought and won a punishing battle, during which he had committed every man available. Lieutenant General James Longstreet and his I Corps were approaching with reinforcements, but they were not expected to arrive before sunset. If Lee was to continue the fray, he would have to do so with the troops at hand, most of whom had spent all day in battle.

        At the same time, the entire Union Army was known to be rushing toward Gettysburg, and the lead elements had already arrived and offered battle. Were Meade’s other corps about to come into line? Lee did not know, but since more Federal infantry were apt to appear at any moment, he could not gamble on sending weary troops against Cemetery Hill, which was likely to be defended by fresh enemy troops.

        Ewell’s forces were in just as bad shape as Hill’s. Rodes had sent all five of his brigades into the battle, but only two, Doles’ and Ramseur’s, were at the front and in position to continue the fighting. O’Neal had lost almost 25 percent of his force, and most of his survivors (except the few who had joined Ramseur’s charge) remained on Oak Hill. Daniel, too, had taken huge losses; almost 35 percent of his troops had fallen in battle. Iverson had suffered the most. His casualties exceeded 900 men, 60 percent of his brigade, and the remnants lay exhausted atop Oak Hill. And even though both Doles and Ramseur were ready for more action, their numbers, too, were diminished. They had entered into battle with 2,600 effectives; only about 2,000 remained.

        Only one of Early’s four brigades was still positioned for action. Avery’s 2,000 men had advanced to the base of Cemetery Hill, where they were still attracting the enemy’s attention. ‘We were subject to galling fire,’ remembered Lieutenant Warren Jackson. ‘I spent about two hours as miserably as I ever did in my life.’

        Early’s other brigades were unavailable for Ewell to send into action. William Smith’s men were posted east of the village, on the York Pike, guarding the corps’ flank; Gordon’s troops were north of Gettysburg, awaiting a resupply of ammunition; and Hays’ soldiers were in the town, encumbered with 3,000 Union prisoners.

        Ewell had no thought of continuing the battle, but his rationale for holding in place was not based on having fewer than 4,000 men available for action. He was more concerned over having disobeyed his orders. ‘General Lee … instructed me not to bring on a general engagement,’ he replied to the subordinates who urged an assault against Cemetery Hill. ‘I will wait for those orders.’

        While Ewell’s reasons for not challenging the Federals crowded on Cemetery Hill were perhaps wrong, was he right in not mounting an assault against the slope? Experts who have studied Gettysburg say yes. They base their analysis not only on the impotence of the Confederate forces but also on the strength of the Union forces.

        When the Federal lines collapsed north and west of Gettysburg, the Union troops drew back to Cemetery Hill, the designated haven in case of defeat. Colonel Orland Smith’s 2,000-man brigade, supported by a battery of six guns, was atop the knoll, eager to greet any oncoming Rebels. As the fleeing Federals climbed the slopes, their officers guided them into imposing defensive positions. Gamble’s 1,500 troopers were sent south, in front of and along Cemetery Ridge, where they guarded the left flank from Confederate assault. Most of the I Corps fell in atop Cemetery Ridge behind the cavalry; Wadsworth’s division rushed to Culp’s Hill to protect the right flank; and Howard’s corps augmented Smith’s men on Cemetery Hill. A total of about 12,000 Union soldiers were ready to defend the heights.

        Reinforcements were also at hand. Five hundred veterans from the 7th Indiana came forward, and Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps had arrived. The leading columns of the 1st Division, led by Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger, began filing into position behind Cemetery Hill at about 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General John W. Geary’s 2nd Division reached Gettysburg about half an hour later. These 8,000 fresh troops brought the Union strength to about 20,000 soldiers.

        In addition to the reinforcements, the Federals had most of their artillery pieces, which they had salvaged during their retreat. Almost 40 cannons had joined Smith’s six guns, and the entire array was emplaced, unlimbered and ready to fire, atop Cemetery Hill.
        Ewell, of course, saw the enemy digging in on Cemetery Hill. Although he no doubt suspected that the Union soldiers would be impossible to dislodge, he knew that sooner or later he would have to charge the heights. When Early urged an immediate assault, Ewell agreed, but insisted that Lee must approve their attack and Hill had to provide reinforcements. James Power Smith, an aide who had spent the afternoon with Lee and had just now come to Gettysburg (without bringing any orders from Lee to Ewell), was dispatched back to Lee with those two requests.

        Back on Seminary Ridge, when Lee saw that the Federals had aligned their guns shoulder to shoulder across the crest of Cemetery Hill, he also recognized that the Southerners would have to attack the heights — perhaps better now than on the morrow. Lee had already recalled Hill’s men from the field; therefore only Ewell’s troops were available to dispute the enemy’s new front.

        After 5 p.m., just prior to Smith’s arrival with Ewell’s proposal to charge Cemetery Hill and long after the Union retreat had started, Lee sent an aide, Colonel Walter Taylor, to Ewell with instructions to challenge the Federals. ‘The enemy is retreating … in great confusion,’ Lee said in his message. ‘You only need to press those people to gain possession of the heights … .Do this if possible.’

        Lee’s order seemed to assume that it would be relatively easy for Ewell to dislodge the Federals from their post atop Cemetery Hill. After the Civil War, apologists for Lee ignored the fact that the Union position was virtually impregnable, and they used this order as proof that Lee was not responsible for the Southern defeat at Gettysburg. Ewell was to blame because he had failed to pursue the defeated Northern army, allowing them to entrench on the critical high ground.

        When Taylor found Ewell in Gettysburg and presented the message, Ewell made no comment. He may have been dumbfounded by Lee’s apparent assumption that the enemy could be easily pushed off Cemetery Hill; more likely, he knew that the note was meaningless. He could not move until he received Lee’s response to his plea for reinforcements. Years later, Taylor would claim that Ewell’s silence meant that he had agreed to charge Cemetery Hill, another attempt to clear Lee by discrediting Ewell.

        When Smith arrived at army headquarters, he handed Ewell’s request for reinforcements to Lee. ‘Tell General Ewell … I regret that my people are not [able] to support his attack,’ Lee responded, ‘but … I wish him to take Cemetery Hill if practicable.’ He then added an impossible condition — should Ewell advance against the hill, he must ‘avoid a general engagement.’

        Smith returned to Gettysburg, where he found Ewell and gave him Lee’s instructions. Ewell saw at once that his new orders were paradoxical. He could not drive the enemy from the heights without reinforcements. The force at hand, 4,000 men, was no match for the hordes of Federals, backed by cannons, atop Cemetery Hill. To attack would bring disaster to his corps. And even if Ewell mounted the suicidal assault, how could he assure Lee that reopening the battle would not bring on a general engagement? He had no choice. Ewell dropped his plan for a direct charge against Cemetery Hill.

        In the fighting that followed on days two and three at Gettysburg, the Confederates had numerous chances to defeat the enemy, but in each instance, they failed to take advantage of their opportunities. Ewell blundered more than once, and he manfully admitted his errors. He was as much responsible for the South’s losing the battle as any of the other commanders involved.

        But Ewell was not frozen by indecision, unable to find the courage to charge the Union forces on Cemetery Hill on the first day. Lee’s order to ‘press those people … if possible’ was not sent during the Union retreat. He issued the directive after he recalled Perrin’s force from Gettysburg, after the Federals had fled the field and after the enemy troops had consolidated their position atop the heights. Ewell, refused the reinforcements he believed necessary for a successful attack on Cemetery Hill, elected not to charge, a good decision in retrospect, because the Federals were never really vulnerable to being driven off the high ground. Ewell did not lose Gettysburg by himself.
        Several things are very clear. The Confederate generals you quoted had no clue about the strength of the Federal position. Ewell didn't have the artillery to counter the 40 pieces of Federal artillery on there. His 4,000 men certainly weren't going to plow through 20,000 Yankees. The events of the next 2 days showed that the Federals were very able to defend these same positions. Then there is the fact that Lee gave contradictory orders. "Take the hill if practical, but don't bring on a general engagement"? Huh? In other words, if you can take it without a lot of bloodshed, do so.....Ewell correctly made the right call.

        Originally posted by American87 View Post
        And as to Jackson, it would probably be the version that appeared at Chancelorsville, Fredericksburg, Antietam, Second Manasses, the Valley Campaign, and First Bull Run. And even at Cedar Mountain Jackson was quick to assume the high ground and adjacent territory.
        Wow, that is some cognitive dissonance going on there. We've gone through Jackson's tactical faults during the 2nd Manassas Campaign-specifically at Groveton before. He messed up several times in the Valley. There is much debate as to whether Bee was praising Jackson or vilifying him for not coming to his brigade's aid. Jackson's line was the only one penetrated by the Federals at Fredricksburg. Hood certainly wasn't very happy with Jackson's methods at Antietam....“Robert E. Lee: “Great God General Hood, where is your splendid division?” Hood: “They are lying on the field where you sent them.” (From Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 by Joseph L. Harsh. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1999.) Lee, of course, was not responsible for sending them into the Cornfield, Jackson was. And finally, had Jackson been alive, then you have no way of knowing that events would have borne out the way they did. The Butterfly Effect tells us that changing one part of the equation would mean a ripple effect of changes. Perhaps Buford doesn't engage the enemy at Gettysburg knowing that Jackson is still out there? Or maybe the Federal columns march closer together? What if, instead of 2 corps, there are 5 corps of Federals ready to engage on the first day? There are literally 1000 different ways that the situation could change. And again, do we get the Jackson who is wounded or not? That could change his temperament & his method of fighting. That's the problem with "What Ifs", there is no way of knowing.
        The muffled drums sad roll has beat the soldier's last tatoo. No more on life's parade shall meet that brave and fallen few.

        Comment


        • #5
          Would not taking Culp's negate having to take Cemetery immediately?

          SPORTS FREAK/ PANZERBLITZ COMMANDER/ CC2 COMMANDER

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by hellboy30 View Post
            Actually, he comes across as a well informed & researched historian, who shoots holes in the fantasies of Lost Cause advocates. As we have seen with your mistaken beliefs about Lee & Grant in the Wilderness, your bias clearly shows through here. It is clear that you did not read the entire article as you miss many of the key points and arguments.
            No, Haines' purpose is to throw out first hand testimony of anyone who seems to vindicate Lee. As my sources have shown about Grant and Lee in the Wilderness, there is a widespread tendency by 'Lost Cause Conspiracists' to undermine the latter and put all praise on the former.

            Sure he does, yet the circumstances clearly say that he could not. There was a fresh Federal brigade on the hill & Hancock was rallying the men, despite what you claim below.
            Gordon was in the best possible position at this point to decide what to do, and as shown below your support of Haines' Union positions is misguided.

            WITH support. You leave that part out conveniently enough.

            Which completely destroys your argument. Either he has enough troops on hand or he does not. Ewell believed that he did not (and he was right)
            Gordon and the staff officers believed the attack should have been made outright instead of maintaining the halt. Early, interviewed sometime later, believed the attack should be made with support. I mention Ewell's support of the idea because it shows he was tempted by the practicality of the effort.

            This has nothing to do with the possible assault & is just an attack on Ewell. This is the same Ewell who absolutely devastated the Federals at Winchester a few weeks before.
            http://www.historynet.com/second-bat...es-command.htm
            How is this an attack on Ewell? Ewell was confused by Lee's orders and didn't have the spirt to assume the initiative and seize the high ground.


            This is blatantly false.

            Let's actually examine the article I posted & see how wrong you are on several levels here.

            Several things are very clear. The Confederate generals you quoted had no clue about the strength of the Federal position. Ewell didn't have the artillery to counter the 40 pieces of Federal artillery on there. His 4,000 men certainly weren't going to plow through 20,000 Yankees. The events of the next 2 days showed that the Federals were very able to defend these same positions. Then there is the fact that Lee gave contradictory orders. "Take the hill if practical, but don't bring on a general engagement"? Huh? In other words, if you can take it without a lot of bloodshed, do so.....Ewell correctly made the right call.
            From Hancock's report,

            Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh Corps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position. They pushed forward a line of battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery. In forming the lines, I received material assistance from Major-General Howard, Brigadier-Generals Warren and Buford, and officers of General Howard's command.
            As soon as the line of battle mentioned above was shown by the enemy, Wadsworth's division, First Corps, and a battery (thought to be the Fifth Maine) were placed on the eminence just across the turnpike, and commanding completely this approach. This important position was held by the division during the remainder of the operations near Gettysburg. The rest of the First Corps, under Major-General Doubleday, was on the right and left of the Taneytown road, and connected with the left of the Eleventh Corps, which occupied that part of Cemetery Hill immediately to the right and left of the Baltimore turnpike.
            Hancock's report clearly shows he had trouble reforming his line on Cemetery Hill and that he attributes the Confederate halt to his own efforts, not to Ewell's commands. More importantly, the solid defenses weren't put in place until after the Confederate halt. Had Ewell continued his assault without halting, or had he resumed it shortly after the halt, he could have seized the heights without bringing on a general engagement.

            Wow, that is some cognitive dissonance going on there. We've gone through Jackson's tactical faults during the 2nd Manassas Campaign-specifically at Groveton before. He messed up several times in the Valley. There is much debate as to whether Bee was praising Jackson or vilifying him for not coming to his brigade's aid. Jackson's line was the only one penetrated by the Federals at Fredricksburg. Hood certainly wasn't very happy with Jackson's methods at Antietam....“Robert E. Lee: “Great God General Hood, where is your splendid division?” Hood: “They are lying on the field where you sent them.” (From Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 by Joseph L. Harsh. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1999.) Lee, of course, was not responsible for sending them into the Cornfield, Jackson was. And finally, had Jackson been alive, then you have no way of knowing that events would have borne out the way they did. The Butterfly Effect tells us that changing one part of the equation would mean a ripple effect of changes. Perhaps Buford doesn't engage the enemy at Gettysburg knowing that Jackson is still out there? Or maybe the Federal columns march closer together? What if, instead of 2 corps, there are 5 corps of Federals ready to engage on the first day? There are literally 1000 different ways that the situation could change. And again, do we get the Jackson who is wounded or not? That could change his temperament & his method of fighting. That's the problem with "What Ifs", there is no way of knowing.
            I've corrected you and others several times on Jacksons actions, particularly those at Groveton. I am not going to rebuke every point about Jackson here, but suffice to say your opinion is wholly misguided.

            My whole point of including the Jackson paragraph in the first place was to show the contrast between him and Ewell, and highlight the fact that Ewell was led to inaction by his confusion and caution.
            Last edited by American87; 29 Jun 16, 13:40.
            "It is a fine fox chase, my boys"

            "It is well that war is so terrible-we would grow too fond of it"

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by American87 View Post
              No, Haines' purpose is to throw out first hand testimony of anyone who seems to vindicate Lee. As my sources have shown about Grant and Lee in the Wilderness, there is a widespread tendency by 'Lost Cause Conspiracists' to undermine the latter and put all praise on the former.
              A claim which you cannot back up. Your "sources" didn't show squat. We used actual historians & what the Confederates said to disprove your claims there. Enough said.



              Originally posted by American87 View Post
              Gordon was in the best possible position at this point to decide what to do, and as shown below your support of Haines' Union positions is misguided.
              Gordon was an unabashed supporter of the Lost Cause & tempered his remarks accordingly. His views are tainted & must be recognized as such. The fact that you refuse to do so tells me all about you & your own agenda.



              Originally posted by American87 View Post
              Gordon and the staff officers believed the attack should have been made outright instead of maintaining the halt. Early, interviewed sometime later, believed the attack should be made with support. I mention Ewell's support of the idea because it shows he was tempted by the practicality of the effort.
              And yet they made the assumption based off false indicators. Ewell had the contradictory orders. Ewell was in charge. The call was his to make & the men could not have taken it from the Federals who were up there. It would have been a bloody disaster.



              Originally posted by American87 View Post
              How is this an attack on Ewell? Ewell was confused by Lee's orders and didn't have the spirt to assume the initiative and seize the high ground.
              Confused by a contradictory order? Who wouldn't be. Again, please explain to all of us here how he could have been expected to take the hill "if practicable" and "without bringing on a general engagement"? We all await your response.




              Originally posted by American87 View Post
              From Hancock's report,
              Funny how you bold face one part & ignore the rest:
              " but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position. They pushed forward a line of battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery. In forming the lines, I received material assistance from Major-General Howard, Brigadier-Generals Warren and Buford, and officers of General Howard's command."
              Difficult, but NOT impossible as he clearly says that they do establish a defensive line.



              Originally posted by American87 View Post
              Hancock's report clearly shows he had trouble reforming his line on Cemetery Hill and that he attributes the Confederate halt to his own efforts, not to Ewell's commands. More importantly, the solid defenses weren't put in place until after the Confederate halt. Had Ewell continued his assault without halting, or had he resumed it shortly after the halt, he could have seized the heights without bringing on a general engagement.
              You clearly are missing the time frame here. 12th Corps arrived & was filing into place. Explain how 4,000 men were going to take out 20,000?



              Originally posted by American87 View Post
              I've corrected you and others several times on Jacksons actions, particularly those at Groveton. I am not going to rebuke every point about Jackson here, but suffice to say your opinion is wholly misguided.
              Oh boy, you've corrected nothing. You gave a flawed & wrong opinion on it. Thanks for offering it, but as can be seen in your other threads, you clearly do not know enough about the American Civil War.

              Originally posted by American87 View Post
              My whole point of including the Jackson paragraph in the first place was to show the contrast between him and Ewell, and highlight the fact that Ewell was led to inaction by his confusion and caution.
              Yes, we understand the Lost Cause mentality going into it. Your poll is up & will stay up for now. That may change.
              The muffled drums sad roll has beat the soldier's last tatoo. No more on life's parade shall meet that brave and fallen few.

              Comment


              • #8
                This is alot like saying 'if' my dad and your dad fought... mine would win.

                Why you say?... because I say? Can it be proven either way... NO.

                SPORTS FREAK/ PANZERBLITZ COMMANDER/ CC2 COMMANDER

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by hellboy30 View Post
                  A claim which you cannot back up. Your "sources" didn't show squat. We used actual historians & what the Confederates said to disprove your claims there. Enough said.
                  From the beginning of Haines' essay,

                  While this is an interesting story — and one that has been repeated again and again in many books about the Civil War — it is also a lie that libels Ewell. The story was concocted by Lee’s apologists in a postwar attempt to shift the blame for losing the battle from their hero onto Ewell.

                  And he deflects contrary evidence as attempts to "shift blame from Lee". He is a conspiracist.

                  And yes, I used primary sources, especially Grant's official report, to make my point.


                  Gordon was an unabashed supporter of the Lost Cause & tempered his remarks accordingly. His views are tainted & must be recognized as such. The fact that you refuse to do so tells me all about you & your own agenda.
                  Gordon's politics have nothing to do with his war report. The fact that you throw out primary sources because of the author's politics says a lot about your agenda.

                  And yet they made the assumption based off false indicators. Ewell had the contradictory orders. Ewell was in charge. The call was his to make & the men could not have taken it from the Federals who were up there. It would have been a bloody disaster.
                  They made their assumptions based on what they saw with their eyes and field glasses, and on what they heard from reports-just as any general did. And they all reached the same conclusion that most generals reach in the same situation, especially Grant: when the enemy is defeated, follow up the victory.

                  And as shown below, it would not have been difficult for Ewell to take the ground from "the Federals who were up there."




                  Confused by a contradictory order? Who wouldn't be. Again, please explain to all of us here how he could have been expected to take the hill "if practicable" and "without bringing on a general engagement"? We all await your response.
                  By driving the Federals from the heights or capturing them...



                  Funny how you bold face one part & ignore the rest:
                  Difficult, but NOT impossible as he clearly says that they do establish a defensive line.



                  You clearly are missing the time frame here. 12th Corps arrived & was filing into place. Explain how 4,000 men were going to take out 20,000?
                  The XII Corps and Union reinforcements didn't arrive until 4:30. Until that time Hancock was struggling to form his line and Ewell was stuck deciding what to do. Gordon and Early had both suggested an advance before this time, and it wasn't until after 4pm that Ewell agreed to assault with the support of the Third Corps. Ewell lost his chance by indecision.
                  "It is a fine fox chase, my boys"

                  "It is well that war is so terrible-we would grow too fond of it"

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                  • #10
                    Originally posted by dgfred View Post
                    Would not taking Culp's negate having to take Cemetery immediately?

                    Would have had to take Cemetery Hill first, might have had a good chance when the Union troops were in route.
                    My worst jump story:
                    My 13th jump was on the 13th day of the month, aircraft number 013.
                    As recorded on my DA Form 1307 Individual Jump Log.
                    No lie.

                    ~
                    "Everything looks all right. Have a good jump, eh."
                    -2 Commando Jumpmaster

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                    • #11
                      Originally posted by American87 View Post
                      From the beginning of Haines' essay,

                      And he deflects contrary evidence as attempts to "shift blame from Lee". He is a conspiracist.

                      Gordon's politics have nothing to do with his war report. The fact that you throw out primary sources because of the author's politics says a lot about your agenda.
                      Actually, he is a Historian, which you are obviously not. Gordon's politics have NOTHING to do with his war report?

                      Originally posted by hellboy30 View Post
                      Gordon has to be taken with a big grain of salt. From http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/a...rdon-1832-1904
                      After the war's end in 1865 Gordon returned to Atlanta, where he worked assiduously to undermine Reconstruction and became one of the leading proponents of both the New South creed and the cult of the Lost Cause. Generally acknowledged as the head of the Ku Klux Klan in Georgia, he was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1872 and was one of the architects of the Compromise of 1877, which gave Republican Rutherford B. Hayes the presidency in exchange for the removal of Federal troops from the South. Having shed his soldier's uniform for a businessman's suit, Gordon, aided by his ally Henry W. Grady, espoused a vision that called for a new economic future free of the shackles of slavery but that also paid homage to the Confederate past. His unification of these themes, along with his personal magnetism and the backing of Grady's Atlanta Constitution, made him nearly impossible to defeat. He won election as governor of Georgia (1886-90) and again as a U.S. senator (1891-97). Along with former Confederate leaders Alfred H. Colquitt and Joseph E. Brown, Gordon formed the so-called Bourbon Triumvirate, which dominated Georgia politics for nearly a quarter of a century.
                      Looks like you are wrong yet again. Gary Gallagher further backs this up by stating:
                      Among the leading examples of participants whose postwar writings must be used with great care is John B. Gordon. Few witnesses matched Gordon for his egocentrism or his willingness to play loose with the truth, and his recollections leave unwary readers with a distinct impression that the South would have triumphed if only misguided superiors such as Ewell and Early had acted on his advice.

                      It is especially important to employ discrimination in using literature that embraces the myth of the Lost Cause, much of which was used to canonize Lee........readers should be aware that they contain much special pleading, selective recall, and outright falsehood.
                      Originally posted by American87 View Post
                      They made their assumptions based on what they saw with their eyes and field glasses, and on what they heard from reports-just as any general did. And they all reached the same conclusion that most generals reach in the same situation, especially Grant: when the enemy is defeated, follow up the victory.
                      Wrong again. I suggest reading yet another Historian on the matter, who contradicts what you claim:
                      https://books.google.com/books?id=Yg...lagher&f=false
                      Start at the bottom of page 24 and go through page 29. Nolan utterly rips your claims apart.....and does so by quoting Early, who paints a different picture from what you claim. He even quotes Douglas Southall Freeman & shows how even HE admitted that Ewell didn't have the forces available. Robert Rhode's battle report likewise contradicts your claim:
                      To have assaulted that line with his division, which had suffered more than twenty-five hundred casualties, would have been absurd.
                      And oddly enough, John Gordon, in a letter written to his wife 6 days after the battle (and in direct contradiction to his later writings which you quote)said that his brigade:
                      drove [The Federals]before us in perfect confusion, but night came on [and]they fell back to strong positions & fortified themselves.

                      Originally posted by American87 View Post
                      And as shown below, it would not have been difficult for Ewell to take the ground from "the Federals who were up there."
                      You keep dodging the question. How were 4,000 Confederates, without artillery support, going to plow through 40 Federal cannons & 20,000 infantry? Almost 10,000 of which were completely fresh?

                      Originally posted by American87 View Post
                      By driving the Federals from the heights or capturing them...
                      Easier said than done. Not with the troops & artillery available to the Federals.

                      Originally posted by American87 View Post
                      The XII Corps and Union reinforcements didn't arrive until 4:30. Until that time Hancock was struggling to form his line and Ewell was stuck deciding what to do. Gordon and Early had both suggested an advance before this time, and it wasn't until after 4pm that Ewell agreed to assault with the support of the Third Corps. Ewell lost his chance by indecision.
                      Wrong again. The 11th Corps's fresh brigade was there along with almost 1000 other men who had not engaged. The 12th Corps was arriving at that time (4:30pm)-even if they were not in place, they were on hand. Even in the best scenario, they would have taken tremendous casualties taking the hill & would have been thrown right back off by the nearly 10,000 fresh troops of the 12th Corps. Either way, they would not have been able to keep it. Ewell made the right decision.
                      The muffled drums sad roll has beat the soldier's last tatoo. No more on life's parade shall meet that brave and fallen few.

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                      • #12
                        Originally posted by 101combatvet View Post
                        Would have had to take Cemetery Hill first, might have had a good chance when the Union troops were in route.
                        Except for the 40 cannon & nearly 3,000 fresh bodies sitting up there. Not to mention, the rest of the survivors had fought well against the Confederate forces, but had been flanked out of position. Many still had a good deal of fight in them-they were simply disorganized. These same men fought like demons over the next 2 days defending this same line.
                        The muffled drums sad roll has beat the soldier's last tatoo. No more on life's parade shall meet that brave and fallen few.

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                        • #13
                          I thought with a little bit of 'left hook' movement they would be right at Culps.

                          Heyyy... it used to work on Sid Meyer's Gettysburg .
                          SPORTS FREAK/ PANZERBLITZ COMMANDER/ CC2 COMMANDER

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                          • #14
                            Originally posted by dgfred View Post
                            I thought with a little bit of 'left hook' movement they would be right at Culps.

                            Heyyy... it used to work on Sid Meyer's Gettysburg .
                            Yes, but traveling down the Baltimore Pike they would have passed Cemetery Hill, take it or be cut off.
                            My worst jump story:
                            My 13th jump was on the 13th day of the month, aircraft number 013.
                            As recorded on my DA Form 1307 Individual Jump Log.
                            No lie.

                            ~
                            "Everything looks all right. Have a good jump, eh."
                            -2 Commando Jumpmaster

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by hellboy30 View Post
                              Except for the 40 cannon & nearly 3,000 fresh bodies sitting up there. Not to mention, the rest of the survivors had fought well against the Confederate forces, but had been flanked out of position. Many still had a good deal of fight in them-they were simply disorganized. These same men fought like demons over the next 2 days defending this same line.
                              Very disorganized, I would call it shattered in some cases.

                              About 19 artillery pieces were ready initially according to Pfanz.
                              My worst jump story:
                              My 13th jump was on the 13th day of the month, aircraft number 013.
                              As recorded on my DA Form 1307 Individual Jump Log.
                              No lie.

                              ~
                              "Everything looks all right. Have a good jump, eh."
                              -2 Commando Jumpmaster

                              Comment

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