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Intensified Search for Bin Laden

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  • Intensified Search for Bin Laden

    Media reports for the last month attributed military and intel sources describing prep for offensive ops in the Afghan-Pakistani border area versus AQ, once better weather arrives. At the time I thought tipping one's hand was dumb, but the AQ fell for it and were baited into communicating and moving. The imagery and communications surveillance tracked them as they repositioned.

    It is disturbing and frustrating that Fox News Channel or MSNBC reported this weekend that Bin Laden and his chief subordinate had been sighted separately by Predators, yet the UAV's didn't engage with their Hellfire missiles. Is this an anomaly?

    I recommend Robin Moore's recent book, "Hunting Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger in Afghanistan". Moore, revered by the SF community since making it through the Airborne and SF "Q" course as a civilian in the 1960's, had access to participants of the earlier 2001-2002 Afghan ops versus AQ. It is an excellent read on employment of the ODA's and what went right and what went wrong.

    Read p. 304 to learn of chances to take out Bin Laden by a joint SAS-Delta op to flush BL out of a village into an ambush (refused by the chain) and p. 306 to learn of an SF sniper who was refused permission to engage by his team leader and the chain, out of fear that it was a trap and the team lacked strength to take on the target area. Page 376 shows a similar location of Mullah Omar went for naught due to slow reaction by the chain.

    It is sadly ironic, as Moore asserts on p. 304 that these decisive action-oriented units who serve and live by their mottos, "Strength and Honor" (task force), Who Dares Wins" (SAS) and "Speed, Surprise and Violence of Action" (SFOD-Delta)were so ill-served by the chain which hesitated, double-clutching when handed significant opportunities. I sincerely hope that in the upcoming ops, the chain properly understands the capabilities of these units and unleashes them, exploiting them to maximum effectiveness.

    Remember Col. Arthur D. "Bull" Simons' (the leader of the Son Tay raid in November 1970) words: "History teaches us that when we become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

  • #2
    Re: Intensified Search for Bin Laden

    Originally posted by Combat Engineer
    Media reports for the last month attributed military and intel sources describing prep for offensive ops in the Afghan-Pakistani border area versus AQ, once better weather arrives. At the time I thought tipping one's hand was dumb, but the AQ fell for it and were baited into communicating and moving. The imagery and communications surveillance tracked them as they repositioned.

    It is disturbing and frustrating that Fox News Channel or MSNBC reported this weekend that Bin Laden and his chief subordinate had been sighted separately by Predators, yet the UAV's didn't engage with their Hellfire missiles. Is this an anomaly?

    I recommend Robin Moore's recent book, "Hunting Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger in Afghanistan". Moore, revered by the SF community since making it through the Airborne and SF "Q" course as a civilian in the 1960's, had access to participants of the earlier 2001-2002 Afghan ops versus AQ. It is an excellent read on employment of the ODA's and what went right and what went wrong.

    Read p. 304 to learn of chances to take out Bin Laden by a joint SAS-Delta op to flush BL out of a village into an ambush (refused by the chain) and p. 306 to learn of an SF sniper who was refused permission to engage by his team leader and the chain, out of fear that it was a trap and the team lacked strength to take on the target area. Page 376 shows a similar location of Mullah Omar went for naught due to slow reaction by the chain.

    It is sadly ironic, as Moore asserts on p. 304 that these decisive action-oriented units who serve and live by their mottos, "Strength and Honor" (task force), Who Dares Wins" (SAS) and "Speed, Surprise and Violence of Action" (SFOD-Delta)were so ill-served by the chain which hesitated, double-clutching when handed significant opportunities. I sincerely hope that in the upcoming ops, the chain properly understands the capabilities of these units and unleashes them, exploiting them to maximum effectiveness.

    Remember Col. Arthur D. "Bull" Simons' (the leader of the Son Tay raid in November 1970) words: "History teaches us that when we become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."
    The item with the Predators had to have been some glitch with its targeting computer. The other explanation may be that weapons were under remote control, and the operator dropped the ball. Accounts of the "renewed offensive" quite possibly were for public consumption. In addition, the reluctance of in- and out-of theater commanders to confirm that the offensive was in fact targetting bin Laden and al-Zawahiri was likely to spare them embarassment should the operation fail to kill or capture them.

    Using SF is certainly an option, but poerhaps not the best option in this instance. In a clan-dominated society such as Afghanistan, and outsiders will instantly be notices, to the end that local extremists will know of their presence almost immediately.

    Afghanistan has been the death-ground of Western adventurism for about 200 years. The US (and other Coalition members)are learning learning the lessons that many before them learned, and they are faring little better.
    Mens Est Clavis Victoriae
    (The Mind Is The Key To Victory)

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    • #3
      When the better weather arrives, Bin Laden is no longer there.:thumb:
      I hate it when I see one of those road signs that says "Draw Bridge Ahead" and I don't have a pencil.
      -Lou Chiafullo

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