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  • From the Michiganjewishaction council :Liberal American Jewish youth's estrangement from Israel ( March 23 2018 )

    '' As more Jews are adopting '' progressiveness '' as their religion and Judaism as their culture,to be accepted or discarded depending on circumstances,they are losing their anchors .And so are their children .
    Right now the US is a great country for us.As we watch what's happening to European Jews,w'd better understand that this may be not always the case .Israel must always be there for us and us for Israel .''
    other sources :
    Jewish Self-Estrangement is perennial August 7 2018 (David Solway in pjmedia.com )
    The Democrats are a party of Anti-Semitic cowards ( Daniel Greenfield March 2 2017 )
    The Democrats depend on Anti-Semitic votes
    Jewish Press : Jimmy Carter is an Anti-Semitic Schmuck
    Memories from an Anti-Semitic State Department .

    One can easily replace in the article on the Michiganjewishactioncouncil the word Jews by Christians, because the Democratic Party is not only anti Jewish,but also anti white and anti Christian .

    Comment


    • Originally posted by wolfhnd View Post

      Soros is just an easy example of how the left has sold out and no longer represents the interests of the productive class. It's worse than just champagne liberals who sit around drinking mid class wine and complain about the plight of the poor while living off the profits of the evil corporations that are the root of all problems. Soros has never contributed anything to an economy he is the same person who went around collecting Jews for the Nazis but now he goes around collecting the wealth of productive people. You can no more wash away the sins of Soros with his "philanthropy" than you can wash away your sin of passive Marxism/post modernism and the millions of dead at the hands of socialism by supporting BLM.
      Exactly. The middle class suffers under the Democrats, which is why there’s an exodus from the blue states. One reason Virginia voted for Hillary is probably because of all the NY-NJ yankees moving there and bringing their demons with them.
      "It is a fine fox chase, my boys"

      "It is well that war is so terrible-we would grow too fond of it"

      Comment


      • Originally posted by wolfhnd View Post

        he is the same person who went around collecting Jews for the Nazis but now he goes around collecting the wealth of productive people.
        Oh dear. The Soros conspiracy theory is worthy of all the contempt one can muster for the age old, but less in fashion, International Jewish Banker Conspiracy, it's the same thing just under a different guise.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by slick_miester View Post
          But govt backed them. That's what called incentive. If the govt thought that ninja loans were bad, then why did govt offer loan guarantees to outfits that offered ninja loans?


          I missed that!

          You are wrong

          Read the links I post

          https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevede.../#5187c04cf92f

          ..the loans at the heart of the global crisis — were underwritten by unregulated private firms. These were lenders who sold the bulk of their mortgages to Wall Street, not to Fannie or Freddie. Indeed, these firms had no deposits, so they were not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp or the Office of Thrift Supervision.


          Last edited by pamak; 06 Oct 18, 15:37.

          Comment


          • and more data from the heart of the economic crisis which corroborate the sources I posted earlier. NINJA loans were not sold and could not be insured by the feds

            https://www.occ.treas.gov/publicatio...2-2009-pdf.pdf

            Performance of GSE Mortgages

            Mortgages serviced for GSEs—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—have a higher concentration of prime mortgages than those serviced for private investors or held on the servicers’ balance sheets. As a result, these mortgages showed lower delinquencies and foreclosures in process. In the second quarter of 2009, 93.1 percent of these loans were current and performing compared with 88.6 percent for the total servicing portfolio. Seriously delinquent loans increased to 3.0 percent—rising by 19.1 percent from the previous quarter and by 146.4 percent from a year ago. The percentage of these loans in the process of foreclosure increased to 1.7 percent—rising by 24.5 percent from the previous quarter and by 196.2 percent from a year ago. Mortgages serviced for these agencies made up about 64 percent of all mortgages in the portfolio, or approximately 21.5 million loans. Of the GSE mortgages, 66 percent were serviced for Fannie Mae and 34 percent were serviced for Freddie Mac.



            And as for other federal activities linked to other agencies like the FHA, here is more information

            https://www.mcclatchydc.com/latest-n...uency%20survey

            Screen Shot 2018-10-07 at 11.20.26 AM.png

            Notice the much better performance of federally linked loans ( VA and FHA dash lines on the graph) compared to that of the subprime loans

            It is OBVIOUS that the subprime mess is the result of an unregulated and greedy private market!
            Last edited by pamak; 07 Oct 18, 22:40.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by pamak View Post
              Originally posted by slick_miester View Post
              But govt backed them. That's what called incentive. If the govt thought that ninja loans were bad, then why did govt offer loan guarantees to outfits that offered ninja loans?


              I missed that!

              You are wrong

              Read the links I post

              https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevede.../#5187c04cf92f

              ..the loans at the heart of the global crisis — were underwritten by unregulated private firms. These were lenders who sold the bulk of their mortgages to Wall Street, not to Fannie or Freddie. Indeed, these firms had no deposits, so they were not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp or the Office of Thrift Supervision.

              Have you read the Congressional Budget Office's report?

              [quote]By 1997, private-label securities accounted for nearly 25 percent of new MBSs [Mortgage-Backed Securities] issued, and by their peak, in 2005 and 2006, they made up 55 per-cent of new issues (see Figure 1-2)

              https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/fi...niefreddie.pdf

              Figure 1-2 tell an interesting story, however:



              For the year ended 31 Dec 2003 -- the very eve of the bottom falling out -- GSEs (Government-Sponsored Enterprises, for purposes of this discussion Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae) had issued roughly 80% of that year's new MBSs.

              And then the GSEs did something very interesting:

              The GSEs’ susceptibility to losses was increased by their relaxation of credit standards at the height of the housing boom, when they were quickly losing market share to the private-label securities market and were looking for new sources of profit. In particular, the risky private-label sub-
              prime and Alt-A MBSs that they bought for investment purposes—as well as nontraditional loan products that they bought or guaranteed to help meet their affordable-housing goals—were the source of their initial losses (see Figure 1-5). 7 And although those private-label holdings and other risky, nontraditional loans accounted for less than one-third of Fannie Mae’s business, they were the source of more than 70 percent of its recent credit losses. 8 The GSEs eventually also suffered large losses on their MBS guarantees as housing prices fell further and delin-quencies and foreclosures rose for prime borrowers.
              GSEs were buying other "labels'" -- aka private securitizing companies' -- issues in order to maintain their market share. The very act of buying other parties' issues generated, in the CBO's words

              Full privatization of the secondary mortgage market would pose two major risks. First, the government might not credibly be able to distance itself from an implied federal guarantee, particularly given the number of times it has intervened to save creditors of too-big-to-fail institutions during financial crises.
              - emphasis mine

              This is a criticism of Federal interventions since the S&L collapse in the late 1980s-early '90s, and it's a criticism that I've repeated often myself. Economists call it moral hazard.

              In economics, moral hazard occurs when someone increases their exposure to risk when insured, especially when a person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks. A moral hazard may occur where the actions of one party may change to the detriment of another after a financial transaction has taken place.

              A party makes a decision about how much risk to take, while another party bears the costs if things go badly, and the party isolated from risk behaves differently from how it would if it were fully exposed to the risk.

              https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_hazard
              Re exotic CDSs: On that count I agree with you. I was taught long ago to never buy an instrument that I couldn't fully explain to a layman, because such a failure exposes one's lack of true understanding of the instrument in question. Such a mindset certainly lowers V, but it promotes safety and "understandability," (if you'll permit the term) which I view both as desirable goals. Generally speaking, such exotics were fashioned by financial professionals not for sale to the general public, but to other financial professionals. In other words, some fair number of financial pros bought something that they did not understand, and they bought a lot of it. In some cases outright criminality was involved, but far more common was arrogance prompted by greed and spurred by the aforementioned moral hazard. US Treas and the Fed have been bailing out losers since the S&L collapse, so it takes no great imagination to see how some people could be conditioned to believe that they'd always be bailed out no matter how stupid they got.

              But even more fundamental than that, the easiest and most immediate way that the US Treas and the Fed can short-circuit, or at least arrest potential investment bubbles, is to raise interest rates.



              After "emerging markets" and the tech bubbles burst in 1999-2000, the Fed dropped their rate from 5.5% to 1% -- and it hasn't surpassed 5% since. Increased interest rates tend to cool the "casino" investors, because increased interest increases the cost of borrowing. Most securities are bought on "margin:" like homes, one pays a small bit down, sometimes as little as 1%, then borrows the rest to buy the security in question. Generally speaking, the whole of a margin is not repaid until the security in question is sold, then the margin is repaid from the proceeds of the sale and the investor pockets the remainder as his profit. The other time that margins are repaid is when the value of the security declines: since the security is the loan's collateral, when it looses value, the lender issues a "margin call" in order to protect its investment. That's a real sh*t hits the fan moment. Increase interest rates, and not only will margin requirements go up, so too will the overall cost of borrowing, while simultaneously securities' values' growth will slow, or even stagnate. Those unintelligible exotics look far less attractive when borrowing costs go up. I was but one member of a chorus of Cassandra's who repeatedly criticized Alan Greenspan's artificial depression of interest rates, out of fear that cheap and easy credit tended to foster the kind of climate that precipitates investment bubbles, and their subsequent bursts. Even Greenspan himself expressed a fear of bubbles, but in the tradition of Fed chairmen, he was reluctant to say too much in public, out of fear of causing dramatic moves in markets.

              Of course, if interest rates rise, home values tend to stagnate, corporate expansion slows, as does employment growth, for those are all fields which rely on credit. So growth may slow, but at least it won't fall off a cliff, like it did in '08. In short, the Fed -- and the politicians who oversee the Fed's activities -- chose growth over boring old stability. They just never admitted to themselves that growth can not -- of itself -- be held as an economic virtue, because un-monitored and uncontrolled growth can all too easily result in a bubble, and bubbles tend to burst, like a sausage left too long in a microwave oven.

              But don't think for a minute that the political class alone viewed growth as a virtue

              [Irrational exuberance] had become a catchphrase of the [tech] boom to such an extent that, during the economic recession that followed the stock market collapse of 2000, bumper stickers reading "I want to be irrationally exuberant again" were sighted in Silicon Valley and elsewhere.

              https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irrati...popularization


              http://www.thinkableornot.com/if-bum...ickers-say-so/

              If there's one thing people want more than money, it's to be relieved of the burden of having to think about it.

              Interest rates, government bail-outs, off-hand comments by political leaders -- whether direct or indirect, they constitute incentives, incentives real enough to move billions of dollars. They go into the calculations that financial people make when they consider a given investment. A guy like Barney Frank, whose clearly been around the block once or twice, knew better. He knew how markets would react to the kind of -- how did the CBO put it -- "relaxation of credit standards at the height of the housing boom." Political leaders and regulators probably didn't want to encourage a "casino" investment climate, but they knew full-well what kinds of utterances and actions would be perceived as incentives by the unscrupulous and the stupid. Closed-mouthedness has been de rigueur among financial regulators since the 1930s. They knew better. I can only guess that they knew restricted growth wouldn't sell come election time.
              I was married for two ******* years! Hell would be like Club Med! - Sam Kinison

              Comment


              • [QUOTE=slick_miester;n5067637]

                Have you read the Congressional Budget Office's report?

                By 1997, private-label securities accounted for nearly 25 percent of new MBSs [Mortgage-Backed Securities] issued, and by their peak, in 2005 and 2006, they made up 55 per-cent of new issues (see Figure 1-2)

                https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/fi...niefreddie.pdf

                Figure 1-2 tell an interesting story, however:



                For the year ended 31 Dec 2003 -- the very eve of the bottom falling out -- GSEs (Government-Sponsored Enterprises, for purposes of this discussion Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae) had issued roughly 80% of that year's new MBSs.

                And then the GSEs did something very interesting:



                GSEs were buying other "labels'" -- aka private securitizing companies' -- issues in order to maintain their market share. The very act of buying other parties' issues generated, in the CBO's words

                - emphasis mine

                This is a criticism of Federal interventions since the S&L collapse in the late 1980s-early '90s, and it's a criticism that I've repeated often myself. Economists call it moral hazard.



                Re exotic CDSs: On that count I agree with you. I was taught long ago to never buy an instrument that I couldn't fully explain to a layman, because such a failure exposes one's lack of true understanding of the instrument in question. Such a mindset certainly lowers V, but it promotes safety and "understandability," (if you'll permit the term) which I view both as desirable goals. Generally speaking, such exotics were fashioned by financial professionals not for sale to the general public, but to other financial professionals. In other words, some fair number of financial pros bought something that they did not understand, and they bought a lot of it. In some cases outright criminality was involved, but far more common was arrogance prompted by greed and spurred by the aforementioned moral hazard. US Treas and the Fed have been bailing out losers since the S&L collapse, so it takes no great imagination to see how some people could be conditioned to believe that they'd always be bailed out no matter how stupid they got.

                But even more fundamental than that, the easiest and most immediate way that the US Treas and the Fed can short-circuit, or at least arrest potential investment bubbles, is to raise interest rates.



                After "emerging markets" and the tech bubbles burst in 1999-2000, the Fed dropped their rate from 5.5% to 1% -- and it hasn't surpassed 5% since. Increased interest rates tend to cool the "casino" investors, because increased interest increases the cost of borrowing. Most securities are bought on "margin:" like homes, one pays a small bit down, sometimes as little as 1%, then borrows the rest to buy the security in question. Generally speaking, the whole of a margin is not repaid until the security in question is sold, then the margin is repaid from the proceeds of the sale and the investor pockets the remainder as his profit. The other time that margins are repaid is when the value of the security declines: since the security is the loan's collateral, when it looses value, the lender issues a "margin call" in order to protect its investment. That's a real sh*t hits the fan moment. Increase interest rates, and not only will margin requirements go up, so too will the overall cost of borrowing, while simultaneously securities' values' growth will slow, or even stagnate. Those unintelligible exotics look far less attractive when borrowing costs go up. I was but one member of a chorus of Cassandra's who repeatedly criticized Alan Greenspan's artificial depression of interest rates, out of fear that cheap and easy credit tended to foster the kind of climate that precipitates investment bubbles, and their subsequent bursts. Even Greenspan himself expressed a fear of bubbles, but in the tradition of Fed chairmen, he was reluctant to say too much in public, out of fear of causing dramatic moves in markets.

                Of course, if interest rates rise, home values tend to stagnate, corporate expansion slows, as does employment growth, for those are all fields which rely on credit. So growth may slow, but at least it won't fall off a cliff, like it did in '08. In short, the Fed -- and the politicians who oversee the Fed's activities -- chose growth over boring old stability. They just never admitted to themselves that growth can not -- of itself -- be held as an economic virtue, because un-monitored and uncontrolled growth can all too easily result in a bubble, and bubbles tend to burst, like a sausage left too long in a microwave oven.

                But don't think for a minute that the political class alone viewed growth as a virtue





                http://www.thinkableornot.com/if-bum...ickers-say-so/

                If there's one thing people want more than money, it's to be relieved of the burden of having to think about it.

                Interest rates, government bail-outs, off-hand comments by political leaders -- whether direct or indirect, they constitute incentives, incentives real enough to move billions of dollars. They go into the calculations that financial people make when they consider a given investment. A guy like Barney Frank, whose clearly been around the block once or twice, knew better. He knew how markets would react to the kind of -- how did the CBO put it -- "relaxation of credit standards at the height of the housing boom." Political leaders and regulators probably didn't want to encourage a "casino" investment climate, but they knew full-well what kinds of utterances and actions would be perceived as incentives by the unscrupulous and the stupid. Closed-mouthedness has been de rigueur among financial regulators since the 1930s. They knew better. I can only guess that they knew restricted growth wouldn't sell come election time.
                I did not see anything in your post to refute what is said. And yes, before my last post, I actually read the report that you posted

                I saw nowhere that NINJA loans (No Income-No Job-No Assets) which were a primary reason for the subprime fiasco that were offered or guaranteed by the feds. Recall again the claim that you try to challenge...

                the loans at the heart of the global crisis — were underwritten by unregulated private firms. These were lenders who sold the bulk of their mortgages to Wall Street, not to Fannie or Freddie. Indeed, these firms had no deposits, so they were not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp or the Office of Thrift Supervision.

                Now compare the above claim to the report that you posted. The report states on

                Page 8

                Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have experienced sizable credit losses, delinquency rates on their portfolio holdings and guaranteed MBSs have been lower than industry averages. For example, at the end of the second quarter of 2010, 4.6 percent of the mortgages held or guaranteed by the GSEs were seriously delinquent (at least 90 days past due or in foreclosure), compared with 9.1 percent for the overall mortgage market.9


                Observers have attributed the GSEs’ relatively low delinquency rates to the fact that their lending standards (even when relaxed) were comparatively stringent, which meant that many less creditworthy borrowers could only obtain mortgages financed through the private-label market.

                Now do you have anything specific to refute the above observation (in red) from YOUR source which perfectly corroborates the claim of the article that you initially tried to challenge?


                In another post, I can expand more on issues I have with the CBO report.

                The "moral hazard" thing which was mentioned (typical conservative argument mostly employed against government interventions. See also Greenspan making the same argument in the video I posted) apparently was not verified by the reality in which private companies made riskier loans than the feds and the Wall Street got bail outs because companies were "too big to fail" while their CEOs were getting golden parachutes. The reality shows that the size of modern corporations, the structure of CEO compensation, and the new financial instruments which securitize (and dispose through sales) the risk that private companies assumed created a moral hazard in the private markets to a much greater degree than the level that existed in the fed loan agencies.

                But I prefer to keep my post shorter and to the point since long posts lose focus!
                Last edited by pamak; 08 Oct 18, 18:59.

                Comment

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